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Reading Art Otherwise 
Abstract 
This thesis considers certain critical moments in the writing about art in 
modemity. I firstly identify key exemplars as responses to a "crisis of 
representation" within a broadly conceived discipline of art history in Britain. 
These mark significant turns in the discipline, one towards a newly invigorated 
Marxist social history of art in the 1980's and one towards an increasingly 
philosophical mode of investigating aesthetic works. Whilst the latter can be said 
to have most impact after the 1980's, key aspects of the actual object of study 
pre-date this. 
The exemplars in the first two parts of the thesis are the writing of the British art 
historian T. J. Clark, principally in respect of his critical work, writing on 
Manet's painting of Olympia in the article first published in the British journal 
Screen in 1980 and the writings on the film Hiroshima Mon Amour, a film which 
dates from 1959 and not only documented by its script writer, Marguerite Duras 
at the time, but subject to critical readings within film theory and testimony 
studies in the 1990s, drawing upon particularly modem French philosophical 
thought. 
I examine how these exemplars present the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics but also the extent to which the paradigms by which they think that 
relation can be shown to come up against their own limits. I consider the 
challenges these exemplars presented to other modes of disciplinary thinking; 
Clark's Marxist criticism was part of a major politicisation of the discipline of 
art history and the film Hiroshima Mon Amour in itself and supported by Duras's 
script presented a major challenge to documentary and "memorial" cinema. But I 
argue that they return us to thinking the political or the historical in foundational 
or other essentialist ways under which the aesthetic is subsumed. 
It is by way of the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy and 
critical thinkers influenced by them that I have problematised these exemplars. 
Derrida and Nancy have provided an approach which whilst respecting the 
criticality of the tradition, shows where that criticality meets its limits and 
forecloses on its questioning and openness to the potential 'other' in the aesthetic 
and the political, out of which there emerges a responsibility to continue to think 
the relation between aesthetics and politics. 
In addition, to deepen the context through which I invoke Derrida and Nancy and 
to offer historical insights to inform current critical concerns within the 
disciplines of art history, the thesis examines the philosophical writings of 
Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin in relation to art and politics and 
technology written in the 1930s. Heidegger's influence especially is fundamental 
to Derrida's and Nancy's thought but it is from the contrasting outcomes of 
Heidegger's and Benjamin's thoughts on art and technology that lessons may be 
drawn in respect of critical issues for contemporary politics and culture. The 
final chapter refers to some of these critical issues as part of a re-iteration of the 
contemporary importance of reading art 'otherwise' in the wake of a perceived 
waning of relevance of 'critical theory'. 
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Introduction 
This thesis deals with the history and what I refer to as the memory of art history 
and the limits of certain of its political interventions over the past thirty years. I 
am interested in folding in a re-thinking of history and memory and what I 
articulate as the politics of memory into the way in which art history has 
problematised itself on the basis of certain "political" paradigms. I draw upon 
primarily two key exemplars of responses to "a crisis of representation7 within 
the discipline, which at the same time indicate a certain intellectual history and 
the epistemological changes at work throughout a broadly conceived art history. 
These changes can be characterised by a turn to the sociological and from there 
to the philosophical, but the turn is not presented as straightforwardly 
chronological in respect of the texts I identify. 
The exemplars are the writing by the art historian T. J. Clark in respect of Manet's 
painting Olympia, a preliminary version of which was first published in the 
British journal Screen in 1980 and writings on the film Hiroshima Mon Amour, a 
film which dates from 1959, but subject to subsequent writings along with that of 
its script-writer, Marguerite Duras and critical positions within film theory and 
"testimony" studies. 
In addition I turn to the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger and Walter 
Benjamin in relation to art and politics, written in the 1930s. These stand as 
exemplary of a former "crisis of representation" and as contrasting models for 
dealing with the then contemporary political world, as thought through the 
relationship between art and technology. They are influences, although 
differentially acknowledged, within the intellectual history that I address. The 
work of these thinkers especially with regard to art and technology is highly 
significant both for its continuing relevance concerning the now contemporary 
issues emerging around art and technology and for its intricate impact upon the 
thought of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy whose ideas form the basis for 
the critical intervention I undertake throughout the thesis. 
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I am concerned with the how far the critical disciplinary moments in the writing 
about art that I identify have offered a different view of the relationship between 
the aesthetic, the political and the historical, or whether despite the challenge 
presented to other modes of thinking and discourses on that relation, they return 
us to mode of thinking the political and the historical in foundational and 
essentialist ways, under which the aesthetic is subsumed. 
It is to contemporary philosophy and the work of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Nancy in particular that I have turned, in order to present the possibility for 
reading art otherwise; that is to say, otherwise than the modes of reading offered 
by my objects of study, in order to bring these readings to an encounter with 
their own limits. 
"Otherwise" is a play upon meaning, invoking otherwise as different or 
alternative and "otherwise" as embracing, letting in, being open to the "other 
than" of "identity formations" or subject positions which start. to characterise 
disciplines and their provenance. 'Reading Art Otherwise' also invokes the 
important sense of responsibility and justice for the past and the future to come, 
which is involved in a rethinking of the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics and the possibility of keeping the question of that relation open for the 
sake of this responsibility. This is a theme that runs through the thesis. 
It is Derrida and Nancy who for me demonstrate an approach to taking on the 
tradition which still respects that tradition's own possibility for questioning 
whilst identifying where that questioning meets its limits; that is to say, precisely 
where it forecloses upon its objects of study and becomes a method towards the 
unveiling of the truth of an "essence" of the political, the historical or the 
aesthetic. 
My methodology is that of textual analysis which combines exegesis, 
commentary and critical intervention. Whilst the thesis maps something of a 
history of intellectual fields and epistemological shifts that have influenced the 
disciplines of art history, art criticism and aesthetics, and I have been drawn to 
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texts that are somehow emblematic of that problematising element over a period 
of time, as suggested above, this is not a chronological mapping. 
The thesis produces a critical reading of the Marxist art historian TJ Clark's 
writings on modem art and modernity and a special focus is placed upon the 
historical moment of his article on Manet's Olympia in the British journal 
Screen. Clark's work and this journal are part of an intellectual history which is 
also my own and the position of Clark's Marxist, Situationist inflected, social 
history of art in the 'radical' film journal typifies a certain moment when art 
history sought to rethink itself and shake off its traditional roots and traits on the 
basis of its politicisation post 1968. Entering Screen is a mark of its embrace of 
the intellectual ferment drawn from "Western Marxism" (e. g. Adomo, Benjamin, 
Althusser, and Gramsci) and increasingly more "structuralist" and 
"poststructuralist" thinkers who formed the basis for a series of epistemological 
changes across the "cultural" disciplines and represented the possibility for an art 
history of "the Left". At the same time, Clark's work became crucial in Britain 
for reflecting upon and reformulating the debate about modernity and its cultural 
phenomena. 
My argument and analysis is that Clark's problematic, the "social history of art 
re-visited", left the discipline with a certain metaphysical "closure", which art 
history has subsequently "struggled" with and has turned towards contemporary 
continental philosophy to deal with. It is in this sense that Derrida and Nancy 
provide me with the means by which to take a critical purchase on Clark's 
position and to take a further, different approach to the model of history, the 
political and the aesthetic that Clark's position subtends. 
The readings of the film Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959 Alain Resnais and 
Marguerite Duras) are given critical scrutiny for related but different reasons. 
This film is a powerful articulation, woven into its very style and content, of the 
crisis of representation and its limits following World War 2. Its very fabric 
traces the ambiguities between representation and memory, how do we 
remember yet move on, mouming and melancholia. In tracing this, the film itself 
performs an "epistemological break", I suggest, as reliance upon the grand 
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narratives of history, museology and documentary representation is fractured. 
My interest, again, is in how readings of the film, including Duras's own through 
her synopsis and annotated screenplay, deal with this and represent certain 
intellectual positions within film criticism. The task here is to critically engage 
with paradigms that of themselves attempt to embrace or articulate this 
"fracture", recognising the integrity of these readings; here I touch upon new 
notions of "film-writing" inspired by the film, its impact on testimony studies 
and its relation to the philosophy of film of Gilles Deleuze as interpreted by 
Gregg Lambert, a reader of Deleuze. The film has been an exemplary case for 
demonstrating Gilles Deleuze's concept of the "time-image" as distinct from the 
"movement-image". Where the"movement 
-image" is characterised by the 
unfolding of narrative articulated via characters and action within the cinematic 
space, such as to correspond to the space and order of perception and subjectivity 
of ordinary experience, the "time-image" defines a cinematic 'abstraction, no 
longer dependent upon such correspondence and its consequential bearing of 
meaning and conventions of narrative flow. I consider this critical position, but 
as significantly I examine Marguerite Duras's own powerful reading via her 
script and commentary. This latter is inflected, as I see it by the literary criticism 
of and intellectual affiliations with Maurice Blanchot. Affiliation with Blanchot 
is important in relation to Blanchot's eschewing of any kind of "overcoming" or 
redemptive criticism or aesthetics of redemption, in the face of the vexed 
question of the subject, writing, testimony, finitude and death. 
I critically problematise the ultimate ethico-political stance of these readings. My 
point is to use the texts and critiques of texts by Derrida and Nancy both to 
uncover the metaphysical presumptions and desires to return to the 'work of 
mourning' or the narrative of the subject for example, which remain within these 
epistemological positions, and in order to provide an opening for an "otherwise" 
reading of the film and its fracture of history, memory and politics, traced 
through the particularities of its aesthetic. 
Then I turn to the philosophical work of Heidegger and Benjamin and their 
differing positions concerning art and technology. There is a set of 
interconnecting reasons for this critical engagement with these two thinkers on 
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this subject. Heidegger's influence is fundamental to Derrida and Nancy's 
thought. But in addition, I suggest, Derrida and Nancy work on and in the 
contrast between the two models of how we deal with the contemporary world 
that Benjamin and Heidegger offer us through their work on art and technology 
then, the "frameworks" of which Derrida and Nancy will take to their limits and 
"extend" rather than break with, for the "now" time of our historical exigencies 
and technologies. The inclusion of their concerns with regard to art and 
technology, which I present in dialogue with critical commentators and the work 
of Derrida and Nancy, point to the continuing relevance of these concerns to 
debates about contemporary art and politics. 
The chapter entitled 'Life after Theory' suggests that Derrida and Nancy's 
thought has been key to thinking through and illuminating the vicissitudes of art 
history as a discipline that perhaps needs to recast its political and ethical 
moment in a history of the present that can break through or surpass its 
"melancholic" stance and its shape through the prism of modernism. The chapter 
particularly sets out the relationship between Nancy and Derrida's thought and 
'the political' in order to state their contemporary importance for the disciplines 
of art history and criticism. Art History's response to and interaction with the 
increasing pervasiveness of the technological in the cultural sphere is the 
impetus for the chapter, which at the same time sets out the significance I 
attribute to the thought of Derrida and Nancy for a 'life after theory'. There is 
still a need to rethink art history. 
Underlying the thesis is a critical approach to the premises upon which the 
readings I investigate conceive of history and what I am terming the "politics of 
memory" and how this relates to the aesthetic. Each of the theoretical positions I 
investigate reflect certain models of history and how that relates to the political. 
By way of introduction I offer the following explanation. 
If history is thought in terms of a temporal linear chronology of past present, 
present now and future present, it marks the time of an event of history with the 
sense of full presence of the present, an originary present as its axis. The 
premises of thinking history as a continuum is a full presence at origin and in 
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that sense a metaphysical logic which arguably goes back to Plato. Such a 
thinking of history is also the structure of genesis and teleology, which 
reconstructs the past and anticipates the future "end" of a fully present subject of 
history. 
Even if a dynamic or dialectic is introduced to complicate this structure this may 
remain under a metaphysical logic, which seeks to reduce time to the subject(s) 
of history. Even if there is recognition of a dynamic between past-as inheritance 
and an anticipatory future- the now of the present is always divided. If a fully 
present subject is still understood as the axis of this dynamic then a metaphysical 
logic still prevails. A dialectical thinking of history depends upon a division 
between the subject and object of history, the interaction of which drives the 
unfolding of history towards its telos or "end". Whether this is thought in 
material, as per a Marxist position or ideal, as per broadly Hegelian, terms the 
productive subject of history and an anticipated goal is presupposed. It is this 
model that I suggest ultimately characterises TJ Clark's position. 
In terms of the understanding of memory under a metaphysical logic, -a memory 
of the past can be understood as that which re-presents that which has been 
present as an originary presence. Memory is in this sense given, as part of the 
logic of originary presence. In straightforward terms memory is the means by 
which the past is recollected or recalled by the subject of memory, the 
remembering subject. A hermeneutics of memory would seek to think how the 
past is not just recalled, but interpreted from the horizon of the present on the 
model of an inter-subjective understanding. A more radical hermeneutics, 
available in Heidegger's thought, would understand remembering the past as a 
response to an inheritance which gives the present and the future its possibilities. 
The task of memory would be the means by which such possibilities, which are 
not able to be simply assumed from the representation of the past, are uncovered 
from the sedimentation of a re-presented past. Whilst this thinking of memory 
displaces the subject in favour of the other of a memory, which cannot be 
presupposed by the subject, memory's task would be the gathering of its 
uncovered possibilities into the horizon of the subject's future. 
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A dialectical model of memory would remember the otherness of the past in a 
dialectical interaction, unfolding or struggle between self (subject) and other 
(object of history) out of which the future for the subject can be thought. A more 
radical thinking of this dialectic would recognise that which had been lost to 
history in this dialectic and remember in terms of that other which, from the 
point of being lost, interrupts the dialectic and disrupts the continuity of past and 
present (even as it is thought in dialectical terms) in favour a dynamic between 
this interruptive other and a future to come. I suggest that this underlies the 
position of Benjamin. However this dynamic may still be predicated upon a 
subject of history and a telos and "end" which may be thought in advance even 
as hope. 
Other ways of thinking history and memory have introduced a thinking of the 
subject of history as dependent upon the "other" of history. Such thought, 
especially as I suggest below, can be intimated in the work of Blanchot and is 
further developed by Derrida. There is no subject without the other and this other 
is not something than can be assimilated to the subject. The more 'radical' ways 
have also recognised that which is lost to memory and thus ally memory to 
mourning. More 'radical' still is to bring these two thoughts together. There is no 
subject without the other and the subject is only insofar as it is in mourning. 
It is mouming that disturbs the thinking of time. It is in mouming inasmuch as 
the other is ungraspable and inassimilable to the self/subject, but also in 
mouming for the future, as in any self/other relation, as we might think it, as one 
subject to another, one will always die before the other. The relation of self 
(subject) to the other is always asymmetrical and contains within it a memory 
and a mouming to come. It is a temporal relation that is "out-of-joint". It is this 
position advanced via the thinking of Derrida that opens up the possibility of re- 
treating the political and aesthetic relation. 
The basis upon which this re-thinking of the political and the aesthetic unfolds is 
thus: The other, referred to above, is the singular other, a singular event/subject 
the otherness of which cannot be assimilated or made coincidental with the 
identity of "self', but upon which the "self' depends and therefore to which the 
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subjectP'I" must respond. The subjectP'l" must respond to that which, as singular 
can never be fully known, or interiorised as a memory for the subject or 
exteriorised "in memoriam". This is because the other is always infinitely 
singularly other, even as "it" is necessarily finitely inscribed or present to the 
self/subject. As the self/subject's temporal relation to the other is always out-of- 
joint, the other (or the other of the other) has no fully punctual point of historical 
reference but always remains and reminds and returns in ways which are 
infinitely incalculable and unpredictable, but to which the "I" has an infinite 
responsibility. No law of history or theory of memory or mourning or particular 
substitution for the other or even messianic faith in a future end can predict this. 
The politics of history and memory thus has to be thought as an in-finite promise 
to the other which in-finitely interrupts and prevents the closure of the 'future to 
come of memory', in respect of the irreducible otherness and out-of-joint ness of 
the time of the other which makes the task (as opposed to prediction, 
prejudgement, calculation or subjective possession) of historical thought, 
mourning and memory possible. 
It might be argued that a politics of memory thought as an in-finite promise to 
the other to prevent the closure of the future to come of memory, cannot be a 
politics at all, if politics is understood as thought translated into practical action 
on the basis of calculation and decision for the future. This latter would be an 
organized, particular politics based upon a particular space and time and rule of 
operation, which the former incessantly resists. And yet, this understanding of 
memory as in-finite promise based upon an out-of-joint temporality or aporia of 
time can also be thought as the condition of possibility of the latter, in that sense 
"outside" the political but at the same time that which makes the political, 
political as opposed to mere determinism. 
This dilemma between politics and an im-possible politics is especially pertinent 
to the thought of art, in tenns of history and memory and how this relates to the 
social and the political and the question of whether and how art can be thought 
of or read politically. 
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A metaphysical logic of originary presence would think art as a vehicle for 
history and memory according to the terms of an adequation to the truth, drawing 
upon the Platonic model. Re-presentation by the spatio-temporal differentiation 
of the artwork would stand or fall by this judgement of adequacy and thus would 
be subordinate to its "law". 
In an attempt to break with this metaphysical logic, art may be thought as 
"originating". It is through the spatio-temporality of art that the historical 
memory linked to future possibilities, which is covered up by the logic of 
representational thinking can be unveiled, in accordance with Heidegger's notion 
of the "unveiling of truth". Here the spatio-temporality of art is understood to do 
its own work of temporalising and spacing, going against a representational logic 
of the present, which consigns art to the temporality of current tele-technologies 
of communication and symbolisation. If on the one hand this opens up the 
possibility of a politics of invention, it closes this down into a particular politics 
and the metaphysical logic this subtends by assuming the "We" for whom such 
art can be originating. 
In addition this latter may be understood as a reactive stance if it fails to fully 
confront the material conditions of production and reproduction, which 
constitute the cultural force of the time, other than by setting up an opposition 
between art and technology, as Heidegger appears to do. The political effort 
must be to think inside the cultural force of technology and prize apart the 
difference between a mobilisation of technology for the sake of undifferentiating 
and a potential mobilisation of technologies for the sake of the spatio-temporal 
differentiation inscribed within them, through which the force of mourning and 
memory for the future might be grasped. This is Benjamin's position. However 
this politics may still be thought through an ultimately metaphysical conception 
of history, if the social world and subject and the future horizon upon which the 
political depends is already presumed. 
There is a need for vigilance to avoid collapsing the difference between 
technology and consciousness and the self/other relation. This leads to the crux of 
the issue concerning tele-technologies, their effects upon the self/other relation 
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and history and memory for the future and the necessity for thinking this in terms 
of Derrida's differance. Any art work or tele-technology is a singular spatio- 
temporal inscription which inscribes an absent other, even as it must be 
repeatable and in principle infinitely so (always to come in the future) in order to 
be read or "countersigned" by an addressee, whose potential death or absence is 
also implied and infinitely so, as above. So no writing or reading or memory can 
ever be complete and is always to come and writing and reading are always in an 
asymmetrical time-out-of-joint relation, as the present/absence can never 
coincide. 
Thus the spacing of time understood as differance is irreducible to any 
technology and to think in such a way as to reduce the spacing of time, which is 
the time of the opening of the future for the other to come, to technology is 
already a denial of and does violence to the future one might want to protect. 
An alternative politics of the image or memory in terms of the political will of 
presumed subjects or reading on behalf of apresumed subject of oppression 
(which might include thought in terms of a particular time or place, such as 
avant-gardism or local versus global political intervention) will yet close down 
that affirmation of and opening to the future to come. 
To return to the content of the thesis, the question of the image, history and 
memory is broached in connection with readings of artworks each of which in its 
particular way raises the question of art, history and memory and the politics of 
this relation. Clark considers the question of art, history, memory and modernity 
and what might constitute political intervention. Here primarily in relation to his 
reading of Manet's Olympia. In the context of what Clark understands in Marxist 
tenns as the cultural force of the image under capitalism, Clark has been 
concerned with the attempts of modem art to prize something away from this 
force, which might speak with a different voice and in that sense offer a different 
memory. He has been concerned with the stakes and challenges facing modem 
art in doing this and Manet was his prime example in this writing in the 1980's. 
The timing is significant, coming as it did, amidst an urgent and earnest 
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politicisation of art history and film criticism, in Britain, exemplified by Screen 
that was increasingly influenced by theoretical perspectives from France. 
The question here is the premise upon which Clark produces a reading of 
Manet's Olympia as "failing to mean" for its critics in 1865. Clark's position, as 
I read it, takes its distance from the increasing emphasis upon textualism in 
Screen and its valorisation of self-reflexive, and so termed "dis-identificatory 
practices" as if a self-critique of art was, in itself a sufficient response to the 
demands upon art to address the meanings within the social. Clark's reading 
holds that the art work has meaning as part of a social totality, structured through 
class division and in that sense artworks address or necessarily respond to 
classed-based meanings, outside the work in the "real". The intelligibility of the 
art work is understood in accordance with its link with the social totality. Art is 
thought in terms of the concepts of class, ideology and "real conditions of 
existence". The figure of "Olympia" in Manet's painting is read as "woman" in 
the context ofthe ideological and "spectacular" play of the tradition of the nude 
and prostitution in Paris in the 19'h century. The art historian's critical task is to 
negotiate across the intelligible "truth" of "woman"; her "real conditions of 
existence" and the 'play' of representation at work in the work. Such reading 
eschews "textual" reading, inasmuch as textualism. can be thought as 
symptomatic of an aestheticisation, which cannot get out of the aesthetic into the 
broader horizons of the socio-political conditions. Manet's play upon his own art 
historical inheritance has a part in this. Clark's political reading will measure the 
"truth" of "Olympia" in the image of her nakedness, vis-a-vis social class and the 
imaginary play of spectacular modernity. 
Such a reading is problematised in this thesis in two ways. One is to critically 
examine what it means to think the social as a social totality structured by 
competing class interests, with all that entails in terms of positions, boundaries, 
identities, communities of interests and subjects whose meanings give a context 
to a response from art. This is done by way of a radical deployment of notions of 
hegemony and antagonism, to suggest articulations of social interests other than 
through presumed, substantive positions. The other, intertwined with this is to 
read Manet's work as indeed bringing on the ghosts of past art on the borders of 
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tradition and spectacle in an event of painting which cannot be halted in a 
hegemonic articulation, except insofar as such an articulation presents a further 
framing of the object for the subject. 
The next reading, that of the film Hiroshima Mon Amour is read as an object of 
critical discourse, including that of Duras's reading of the film she scripted. My 
reading considers the film's and Duras's rejecting of an aesthetic of 
representation and the conventional forms of documentary. Resnais and Duras 
consider such forms to be inadequate to provide knowledge of an historical 
event, the enormity of which defies any re-presentational means. Refusing any 
complicity between seeing and knowing and the conventional understanding that 
seeing will accede to knowledge of the event, Duras's film puts a personal love 
story in place of "Hiroshima" and re-works the cinematic conventions of 
personal memory in the context of a critical reflection upon documentary and 
"memorial" cinema. This broaches the complexity of cinematic "truth" and 
fiction, foregrounding cinema as a fictional construct, whether in documentary or 
narrative mode. In the course of its critical stance against documentary 
representation, Hiroshima Mon Amour re-marked its own memory as cinema, 
cinema's own memory machine, including its stock-in-trade of personalised 
"flashback" in order to produce a "false" documentary, which would have 
political effects. This could be characterised and was, as a self-reflexive 
"modernist" piece of filmmaking. 
The interweaving of the time of the memory of Hiroshima with that of the 
French town of Nevers produces a "false documentary" to put into question the 
accepted truth of the cinematic documents of the bombing. This challenges the 
ethics and politics of the documentary showing of horror with horror, which 
merely repeats, ad infinitum, the horrific images to the point of banality. The 
thesis argues that a certain reading of the film produces its own ethical and 
political dilemma in subsisting an ultimate "subject" of memory, as a living 
connection to history and memory, even as that subject and the inter-subjective 
relation between "she" and "he" in the film gives way to the future of Hiroshima 
and Nevers, East and West at the end. Indeed such a memory for the future of 
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East and West itself may be deemed to repeat assumptions of nation and 
community. 
An alternative reading recognises that any cinematic representation is 
anachronistic and out-of-time with the singular event it purports to represent and 
as such can be read as open to the inassimilable, unknowable absent other-to- 
come. The film itself re-marks this anachronism. I suggest this is not in the 
survival of the French woman, living-on after the death of her lover in Nevers 
, 
acceding to the impossibility of talking about Hiroshima and 'giving' her 
survival to the Japanese man 
, 
which arguably Duras's reading and other critical 
readings ultimately suggest. Rather it is precisely in the sharing of exposure to 
the impossibility of dying with the other, i. e. singularity, which marks the point 
that the subject is and will be, only in so far as it is already in mourning for the 
other, in any relation, whether it be an event of history, an experience of love or 
a work of re-presentation of these. The politics of the memory of Hiroshima is 
thus not a question of substituting one time of memory for another, but of 
understanding the time of memory in relation to the singular event of history, as 
such as an anachronism. 
The third chapter broaches the difference between Heidegger's reading of art and 
technology and that of Benjamin. In Heidegger's Origin ofthe Work ofArt essay 
and in particular in the use he makes of Van Gogh's painting The Shoes 
Heidegger seeks to undermine the representational thinking, which he maintains 
derives from Plato and Aristotle. This determines the thinking of art, along with 
the thinking of things, in terms of an oppositional logic which produces a set of 
distinctions between essence and appearance, intelligible and sensible, form and 
matter for instance as part of an ultimately "instrumental" aesthetics, 
symptomatic of, for Heidegger, the "forgetting of being". Heidegger wants to 
break this logic and demonstrate the significance of art for the understanding of 
being and the history of being. Art is related to the truth of being as truth's 
disclosing in the work as the site of the rift between the world of meaning 
horizons and the concealment of the earth. Art is an origin in bringing into effect 
this strife and the happening of the earth's self-disclosure with and against the 
world's meaning horizons. The "shoe picture" is read as reconnecting the 
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"equipmentality" of equipment, as belonging to the "world" and the aletheia of 
physis, as the "e-vent" of history; the dynamic between that which has been 
handed down and being's future possibilities as against the indifference of 
chronological time. Whilst this reflects upon history and memory and art as 
opening a connection between past and future in an originary way, such that the 
past is "before us", the fact that Heidegger wants to think this connection in 
terms of being and what's more the being of a future to come of a destined 
people, forecloses upon that very opening. 
Derrida, in his essay, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]" a play 
upon words within his book entitled The Truth in Painting demonstrates how 
Heidegger's thought is already compromised by his reading of the shoes in the 
painting of shoes, as a pair, hence producing a representational thesis himself. 
Derrida further reveals, in Heidegger's own fashion, by way of a play upon the 
multiple meaning horizons of the word "correspondence", the absent 
correspondence which has been there all along, between Heidegger and the art 
historian Meyer Schapiro. Both seek to return the shoes to the/in memory of a 
"rightful owner", the philosopher on behalf of an original thinking of being 
which has been forgotten in the sedimentation of historical thought and the art 
historian as a debt owed to the past, which must be repaid. But ultimately both 
correspond in reducing the inscription, which is painting, to an economy of 
exchange, precisely by ignoring it as inscription. Heidegger reads it in terms of 
an inheritance which is gathered up again into the earthly being of a peasant 
woman and a certain singular world. Schapiro reads it as a sign of ownership in 
the past, a pair of shoes, whether for a destined "truth" of being in ultimately a 
substantive nationalism or a subject of the past. 
The issues raised here are part of a wider debate about art and politics and the 
extent to which and how art may be a vehicle through which to bear witness to 
an inheritance and the (im) possibility of ever fully appropriating or re- 
appropriating this inheritance which is at the same time to come. The pertinence 
of this is further explored as Heidegger's critique of representation and his 
pitting of art's originating and disclosing power against the enframing of 
technology is subject to Derrida and Nancy's demonstration that Heidegger's 
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very figuring of the sending and art's disclosure are dependent upon 
representation and an originary gathering all along. 
This leads to another consideration of these issues from the different perspective 
of the reading of art, technology, history and politics in Benjamin. Benjamin 
attempts to forge a concept of history and memory against the catastrophe of the 
historical thought which thinks a continuous history of progress, which denies 
the force of the inheritance of that which is lost to history. The technology of 
modernity becomes the key to this, as technological reproducibility completely 
alters and in an accelerated way, both the spacing of time and subjective 
experience. This enables Benjamin to rethink the historical moment, 
'photographically' in terms of a constellation of past and present, which seizes 
on the past at the moment of its disappearance, producing an after-life like an 
'after-effect'. In Benjamin's terms this opens up the possibility of a hope for the 
future, drawing upon the past, whereby the "now" is present otherwise, in 
relation to and in synchronisation with the "historic index [of images] of the past, 
entering into legibility at a specific time. "' 
Benjamin's 1935 essay A Small History ofPhotography both exemplifies the 
historian's task of seizing on the moment legibility of photography and the 
opposition Benjamin sets up between the contingent, fragmented and relational 
phenomenality of photographic time and the spatio-temporality of the aura 
associated with art and auratic/aestheticised photography. Later in the 1936 
essay The Work ofArt in the Age ofMechanical Reproduction Benjamin reads 
this situation more explicitly politically, in terms of either the adaptability of 
technology to the techniques compatible with fascism whereby the masses are 
presented with an image of themselves as an auratic spectacle or technological 
reproducibility destroys the means of hieractic presentation by its interruptive 
effects and the absence/prescnce intrinsic to its structure. Benjamin's belief that 
the power of photographic technology's interruptive effects is open to political 
articulation with a potentially revolutionary subject of history depends upon his 
1 See Benjamin, Walter., [N3,1 ] of "N [ Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress] " in 
Smith, G., ed. Benjamin: Philosophy, History, Aesthetics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
1989)50 
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particular understanding of the destruction of tradition and experience in the era 
of modernity. His is an understanding that is modulated through his Messianism, 
such that it is the very inauthentic nature of historical experience that provides 
hope for historical change; a change for which the new technologies with their 
ability to reciprocate whilst convolute the spatio-temporal dynamics of modem 
experience provides a potential impetus. Importantly for Benjamin these 
technologies are understood in their historical as well as contemporary dynamic, 
as opening the possibilities for an entire re-casting of experiences lost to the 
'second-nature' of bourgeois modemity. 
Heidegger and Benjamin's thoughts on art and technology have informed the 
contemporary engagements with these issues emerging in the writings of Derrida 
and Nancy. One significant influence is that of what I may still venture to call, 
immanent critique, insofar as, for both Derrida and Nancy, but in differing ways, 
it is from within technology that we can find the resources for its own critique, 
providing we read the 'spectre' of a messianic crossing and interrupting of the 
speed of the 'linear' time of the technological, offered within the 'spectral form' 
of technology (Derrida) or the potential for spacing, circulating and 
communicating without "pre-given" ends in the structuring/destructuring of 
technological networks (Nancy). In this sense but also in others, as I suggest in 
the fourth chapter of the thesis, the critical work of theory within the discipline 
of art history is not over and done. 
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Chapter One: A Marxist Reading of Art: T. J. Clark and Manet's Olympia 
This thesis explores a politics of memory in relation to art. Here, such a politics 
of memory comes up against a memory of politics, which refers to a moment in 
British art history between 1975 and 1985, when the discipline was radically 
politicised in Marxist terms. It refers to the work T. J. Clark, whose brand of art 
history was central to this radical moment. Clark's writing is imbued with a 
memory of a certain politics, a Marxist politics centred in class struggle as the 
motor of history and the thinking of aesthetics in relation to this. How this is 
thought is central to this critical debate. It is central to what, for me, was a 
radical moment of publication and part of a distinctive historical conjuncture 
within the British 'academy', with an article by Clark appearing in the British 
film journal Screen in 1980. 
'Preliminaries to a possible treatment of Olympia in 1865 %2 
, 
as its title suggests, 
was a prelude to a chapter in Clark's book on Manet, The Painting ofModern 
3 Life, Paris in the Art ofManet and hisfollowers, published in 1985 
. 
This title, 
nods to and plays upon the work of Manet's friend Charles Baudelaire. 
Baudelaire wrote an essay in homage to, in his terms, the 'consummate describer 
of modem cxpe. rience', Constantin Guys, entitled 'The Painter of Modem Life', 
and had his Salon criticism collectively published as Art in Paris. It suggests that 
Clark's work is no orthodox or ordinary 'text' or 'context' invoking social 
history. The play in Clark's title signals at the very least, looking at the work(s) 
for their imbrications of modem life in the very text (ure) of the painting and not 
some parallel study of art on the one hand and life on the other. Whilst the 
'Preliminaries... ' article is a touchstone for me in terms of its relationship to the 
general political moment of Screen, it is not possible to give due weight and 
analysis to the article in the terms I want to here, without a further consideration 
of the Manet book and other texts by Clark. 
2 Clark, T. J., "Preliminaries to a possible treatment of Olympia in 1865. ' Screen Vol. 2 1., No. 1, 
Spring (1980) 1841 
3 Clark, T. J. The Painting ofModern Life, Paris in the Art ofManet and hisfollowers (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1985) 
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That this conjuncture is a memory goes back, in part to the political 
circumstances of 1968, as both past and in some sense 'living on' in the 
seventies and eighties' historical conjuncture. This moment presaged new 
theorisations of culture especially in the wake of the retraction of the political 
possibilities 1968 had promised. These theorisations drew characteristically on 
the debates concerning aesthetics and politics in the twenties and thirties and the 
critiques of 'classic' Marxism, which came to be described as Western Marxism. 
This term described discrete theories and thinkers sharing a common demand in 
the wake of the failure of proletarian revolution to be effective on an 
international scale, the rise of fascism and the demise of communism into 
Stalinism. It theorised the role of superstructures in securing the persistence of 
capitalism in the West and re-invigorated a Marxist philosophy and theory upon 
which to base an effective anti-capitalist practice. I elaborate upon this later, in 
particular the influence of the Western Marxism of the French philosopher Louis 
Althusser on Screen theory. 
Debates about Marxism returned in the nineties, this time 'in memory of' the 
collapse of communism as symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.4 
These returning debates indicate that 'we' have not 'done with' Marxism, and I 
necessarily write this chapter in the wake of further re-inscriptions. This chapter 
spans these other times and references, driven primarily by that impetus in the 
seventies and eighties when the possibility of an interventionist politics of the 
aesthetic within the academy seemed alive or living on. 
The chapter situates Clark's readings in relation to the field and force of 
theoretical positions and debates of the seventies and eighties and the pertinence 
of 'Preliminaries... ' It seeks to confront the limits of this moment, exemplified 
4 This was the spur amongst other things for the conference, entitled "Whither Marxism? Global 
Crises in International Perspective" held in the United States in 1993, out of which emerged 
Jacques Derrida's book Specters ofMarx; its companion volume collecting the conference 
papers, Whither Marxism?; the later responses to Derrida's text collected in Ghostly 
Demarcations. WI-fflst not connected, Clark's book, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes in the History 
ofModernism was published in 1999. Derrida, Jacques, Specters ofMarx trans. Kamuf P., 
London: Routledge, 1994); Derrida, Jacques, Whither Marxism?, eds. Magnus, B. and 
Cullenberg, S. (London: Routledge, 1995); Sprinkler, M., ed. Ghostly Demarcations (London: Verso, 1999); Clark, T. J. Farewell to an Idea: Episodes in the history ofModernism (New Ilaven: Yale University Press, 1999) 
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by Clark's writing for Screen and how it relates to or echoes in his later readings 
of modernism. The chapter aims to attend to the re-treating of the political and 
its history and memory and the aesthetic otherwise. It crosses a certain memory 
ofpolitics (in a double sense, as memory of a particular historical conjuncture in 
British art history and Clark's art-historical readings, which are imbued with a 
sense of mourning and regret for a lost moment or opportunity for the aesthetic 
to join forces with the political), with a different politics ofmemory. 
My argument is that, in so far as Clark's reading is a Marxist one, in which a 
political, philosophical, sociological tradition gives an understanding of not only 
the conceptual constituents but also its critical, transforming, and thereby 
political stance, and, even though Clark will want to complicate any easily 
received notions of art and society, text and context prevalent in more vulgar 
5 forms of Marxist analysis 
, 
as I go on to discuss, it is driven by a telos of 
intelligibility, in accordance with the metaphysical distinction between 
intelligible and sensible and its concomitant binary, truth/appearance, in its 
idealist sense and this prevails even as this truth is the material conditions of 
life. 
From a Marxist perspective, the work of art is a social production, the meaning 
of which has to be read in accordance with its historical circumstances and the 
ideologies, which affect and position the work, on the basis of the class 
stratification and conflict within the social totality. The concept of social totality 
is central to Marxism, inasmuch as forms of culture are inextricably related to 
the social relations that arise from the organisation of economic production. 
Debating an art work's political effectiveness will require both rendering 
intelligible the relationship between the image, history and class and the 
dominant ideologies at that time (in the case of Manet's Olympia, 1865) 
concerning modes of representation of the nude, the institutions of art such as the 
Salon and its critics and how both relate to the public articulation of subject- 
matter (here, undeniably prostitution) and the socio-economic forces and power 
5 Arguably T. J. Clark's affiliation to Situationism is important here. Insofar as Situationism. 
identified capitalism's infiltration into the very interstices of the practices of everyday life as 
manifest in the 'society of spectacle', the position of art was either striving to critically reflect 
upon this situation or was almost inevitably drawn into being part of it. 
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relations bearing upon all of these. A Marxist account institutes a theorisation, 
which, I argue, whatever its variants, ultimately deploys a subject/object dualism 
within the conception of the social as a social totality. It requires a model or 
system and 'meaning' of history, articulated through historical materialism, in 
order to be able to systematically relate the conditions for and the meanings of 
cart' to a broader set of 'objective' conditions for the 'subject' on the basis of 
socio-economic determinations. The political effectiveness of the image depends 
on how far its mode of representation critically intervenes in that relationship on 
the basis of 'the real conditions of existence' and both embodies and reveals 
these as objects for consciousness. 
This consideration of memory ineluctably situates the social and political as 
referents for the artwork as a 'prior' and, in that sense, a 'past presence' at 
origin. We remain caught in a metaphysical trap, ultimately that of Plato's 
mimesis. Another manner of addressing memory will suggest that artworks are 
not 'returnable' to a prior origin in the 'social' and, even as one wants to 
understand them politically, are not conditional upon the socio-political for their 
reading, but mayprovoke a 'politics of reading' and a 'politics of memory'. This 
provocation is based on what I argue is the aporetic (de) structure of art works 
and the aporetic (de) structure of the political and social relations in all their 
'infinite finitude'; that is to say, without an appeal to an ultimate transcendental 
signified or teleology. The 'aporetic' is one of the terms for articulating a re- 
thinking of the political and the aesthetic as precisely exceeding the conceptual 
framework of metaphysics and troubling rather than confirming its logic. 
This alternative thought opens up the possibility for considering the aesthetic, the 
political and historical as 'event', in that they cannot be predicated upon a 
'model' of origin or teleology that inevitably calculates their effect. This is 
addressed in a strong sense by Derrida as the 'proper' thinking ofjustice and a 
politics based upon it, which is the sense in which Walter Benjamin aspired to 
give justice to the dead as well as the living, because of its full resistance to 
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exclusionary logic. 6 Similarly, Jean-Luc Nancy 'retreats' the aesthetic and the 
political in the context of a necessary re-thinking of the basis of 'community' as 
'with-out' work or model, as the mutual exposure of singular/pluralities, resistant 
to any thought of determined or determinate groups or indeed inter-subjective 
relation (as if we already knew who these 'subjects' were), which might grip a 
fundamentalist politics as well as most other politics of community. In thinking 
the inter-relation between art and politics, otherwise, I take up arguments 
primarily found in the work of Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy. These thoughts 
matter to me, not just because of a personal history of formative years within the 
milieu of Marxist art history, but for their value in structuring a thinking of the 
political and the aesthetic beyond Marx, necessarily, a post-Marx stance, 
precisely because 'we have not done with' Marxism and find the necessity to 're- 
inscribe'. 
Derrida has shown that the 'political' has to be thought about through the 
disjointedness of time, the 'out of time' of any social relation. To understand his 
notion of differance in a social and political sense has never been a merely 
linguistic concern. It is to understand how differance has sought to recognise the 
absolute otherness in any differential relation, which crosses the logic or logos of 
time as past, present and future, and destabilises the 'ontology' of, for example, 
'real conditions of existence' insofar as they are thought under such an aegis of 
linear and teleological temporality. 7 If as Derrida has argued what is at origin is 
For this reading of Benj amin's idea of history see particularly Newman, Michael., 'Suffering 
from Reminiscences. ' in Postmodernism and the Re-reading ofModernity. edited by Barker, F., 
Hulme, P., & Iversen, M., (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1992. ): 84-114 "The 
notion of progress is not rejected: rather, progress without solidarity, the tradition of the victors 
and their cultural spoils, is empty; solidarity with the generations of the enslaved dead involves 
both rupture and establishment of continuity. Authority is to be granted to critical-historical 
interpretation not by (the) tradition (of the victors) but by the claim which comes from the 
enslaved dead, beyond the presentist orientation of historicism and the future directed gaze of 
progressive liberalism. Praxis as "redemption" follows from not the interruption of history from a 
transcendent exteriority, but the immanent interruption of one moment and its phantasmic 
retrospective and projective continuity by memory comingfrom another, previous repressed 
moment, including its potential for happiness which has been cut short. " Newman, Michael., 
'Suffering From Reminiscences", op. cit: 95 
7 This is shown perhaps most explicitly in Specters ofMarx, 1994, but was there all along as in 
Derrida, Jacques, Positions, originally published in France, 'Les Editions de Minuit', 1972, 
English edition trans. Bass, A. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981 and London 
Continuum Books, revised edition, 2000). In the chapter 'Positions: interviews with Jean-Louis 
Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta', Derrida remarks, "I have attempted to distinguish differance 
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differance or the trace, as re-trait, the mark/identity as the effect of the crossing 
of space and time, which divides the presence of any identity from itself by a 
spatio-temporal deferral and delay, such partitioning of any presence or doubling 
at origin disallows the possibility of full presence, or past present or future 
present, or lack as full absence, because the act of spacing by which a present is 
'traced' is that which takes away such tracing and demarcating of identity. The 
trace is a state of 'being', which is at the same time a 'loss' of being, neither full 
presence nor full absence and subject to an iterability with incalculable effects of 
dissemination. 'Truth', whether that of the political or the aesthetic, can only be 
established by an effect, which does violence to differance by seeking to 
foreclose upon its dissociating and disseminating effects. 
Ethically and politically, differance is the thinking of the other, which allows the 
other 'to-come', entirely unexpectedly without the reduction of the other to the 
self-same by predicting, expecting or programming the arrival of the other and, 
at the same time, without positing the other as ultimately beyond 'being' in a 
Levinasian sense. If, following Derrida, there can never be any pure difference or 
(whose a marks, among other things, its productive and conflictual characteristics) from 
Hegelian difference, and have done so precisely at the point at which Hegel, in the greater Logic 
determines difference as contradiction only in order to resolve it, to interiorize it, to lift it 
up 
... 
into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis. Differance 
.. 
must 
sign the point at which one breaks with the system of the A ujhebung and with speculative 
dialectics. Since this conflictuality of differance 
.. 
can never be totally resolved, it marks its 
effects in what I call the text in general, in a text which is not reduced to a book or a library, and 
which can never be governed by a referent in the classical sense, that is, by a thing or by a 
transcendental signified that would regulate its movement. " Derrida, Jacques, 'Position' in 
Positions, 44. And later: "The metaphysical character of the concept of history is not only linked 
to linearity, but to an entire system of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating and 
interiorizing accumulation of meaning, a certain type of traditionality, a certain concept of 
meaning and truth etc. But I have never believed that there were metaphysical concepts in and of 
themselves. No concept is by itself and consequently in and of itself metaphysical, outside of all 
the textual work in which it is inscribed 
... 
I very often use the word 'history' in order to re- 
inscribe its force and in order to produce another concept and conceptual chain of 'history'... a 
history that also implies a new logic of repetition and trace, for it is difficult to see how there 
could be history without it. " Derrida, Positions, 57. And finally, in relation to dialectical 
materialism, "If I have not very often used the word 'matter' it is not 
... 
because of some idealist or 
spiritualist kind of reservation. It is that in the logic of the phase of overturning this concept has 
too often been reinvested with 'logocentric' values, values associated with those of thing, reality, 
presence in general, sensible presence, for example, substantial plenitude, content, referent etc. 
Realism or sensualism-empiricism- are modifications of logocentrisrrL.. In short, the signifier 
'matter' appears to me problematical only at the moment when its re-inscription cannot avoid 
making of it a new fundamental principle which, by means of a theoretical regression, would be 
reconstituted into a 'transcendental signified'... It then becomes an ultimate referent, according to 
the classical logic implied by the value of referent, or it becomes an 'objective reality' absolutely 
'anterior' to any work of the mark, the semantic content of a form of presence which guarantees 
the movement of the text in general from the outside. " Derrida, Positions, 65 
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system of oppositions, pure self/other-than-self; if in any repetition of a trace 
necessary to the marking of an identity the mark is subject to a re-mark, which 
exposes it to its 'other-than-self' and to the necessary chance of contamination or 
haunting by 'the otherness of its other', its errancy and dissociation, then it 
problematises the question of the linkage between art and the political. If that 
linkage has relied upon a given truth for art or the political, as I contend is the 
case here for a Marxist reading, such that the one would confirm the sense and 
meaning of the other and in the case of Manet's Olympia, draw the identity of 
woman into these confin-nations, it is this very giveness which must be un-done 
and re-thought. 
This (de) structure of artworks accords with an 'aporetic' thinking around the 
political which is not to say that artworks are reducible to the political in another 
guise, which would re-instate another reductive logic. It is a case of reading 
artworks and the political as singular events, as opposed to particular events, 
inasmuch as they are're-marked' as they both exceed the logic and conceptual 
organisation that would institute and interpret them and re-mark this excess or 
exposure to the otherness that conceptual organisation disavows. 8 
" This singularity is articulated in various ways in Derrida's writings about art and literature and 
always in the context; right on the context, in the midst of the work that generates the context as 
a response which cannot be generalised. However in a 'general' way, Derrida has commented 
about art, "Several things drew me towards the question of imagination, in various forms and 
languages 
... 
first of all, there is something about it that has made it a threat to truth, intellect, 
reality 
- 
yet a resource as well. It could easily be shown 
... 
in Plato as in others that imagination 
has an ambiguous nature: on the one hand, it is that which threatens truth and the idea 
- 
the 
image is inferior to the idea, and on the other, it has a positive function 
- 
it is philosophically 
and pedagogically necessary. It is the locus of fiction, but also of a certain synthesis, a place of 
mediation-especially in Kant where imagination is precisely the third terrn, the 'third'. And in the 
end everything we have said about the system comes down to the third. This third term can be 
taken as the mediator that permits synthesis, reconciliation, and participation; in which case 
neither that which is neither this nor that permits the synthesis of this or that. But this fiinction is 
not limited to the form it has taken in Hegelian dialectic, and the this of neither-this-nor-that can 
indeed also be interpreted as that whose heterogeneity resists all integration, participation and 
systern, thus designating the place where the system does not close. It is, at the same time, the 
place where the system constitutes itself, and where this constitution is threatened by the 
heterogeneous, and by a fiction no longer in the service of truth. What particularly interests me 
here is that which participates in participation and non-participation. And the regular return to 
this theme 
- 
which is also the theme of art, of rnimesis 
- 
betrays a double postulation in my 
work, and a raising of the stakes 
- 
since we find at the heart of the third as participation that 
which in no case allows itself to be re-appropriated by participation, and thus by a philosophical 
systern. " See Derrida, Jacques, and Ferraris, Maurizio, A Tastefor the Secret trans. Donis, G. (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), 5. Singularity is a complex term which involves recognising a work 
as both singular (unique) and necessarily repeatable, iterable and thus operating in a 'general 
economy' but it is the insistent 'gap' between the singular and the general, each time 'anew' that 
the singular event of the work at the same time 're-marks' and demands or calls for the response 
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In a related sense, Jean-Luc Nancy has, across a number of his works, re-thought 
the aesthetic and the political under the aegis of the 'absence of sense', which is 
the characteristic of contemporary modernity or, put more forcefully, the 
exigency of 'our' time and 'world'. This involves a re-treating of that 
Nietzschean sense of the transvaluation of all values, especially as Nancy traces 
the 'absencing of sense' along the border of that philosophically troubling 
division between intelligible and sensible sense. Insofar as there is a loss of any 
transcendent meaning, or teleology or 'absolute' value, which would provide an 
which is also a responsibility of reading. This is what I am trying to capture by the term 'aporetic 
(de) structure', which necessarily crosses time thought as the present or the presence of the work 
or text, inasmuch as it re-marks an un-thematisable and un-phenomenologisable 'other' that is 
anterior to its 'institution' as a work (and thus it could be said that a work is always already 'in 
mourning' for this absent 'other') and by the logic of iterability, is still to come in an incalculable 
way. Derek Attridge comments, "Against [this] transcendentalising and universalising tendency, 
Derrida tries to do justice to the [literary] text as radically situated 
- 
written and read and re-read 
at particular times and places and possessing a singularity (each time) which can never be 
reduced by criticism or theoretical contemplation 
... 
However, Derrida places his emphasis on 
... 
the 
puzzling yet productive relation between singularity and generality, a relation which for him is 
... 
a 
structural interdependence. For if the literary text were absolutely singular 
... 
it would have no 
access, to the human world at all; its readability, its possession of 'meaning'... implies a repetition, 
a law, an ideality of some type. Thus to be interpretable any literary text must belong to a genre 
or a number of genres, a set of generalised conventions 
... 
but the relation of belonging in this 
instance is not one that can be easily handled by philosophical thought-Whenever the text 
signals its own status as writing, as literature, as a member of a specific genre, it does so by 
means of a mark which is necessarily marked in advance as a mark 
- 
by what Derrida calls the 
're-mark'. This is not a self-reflection nor a classical mise-en-abyme 
... 
but a moment at which the 
categories of form and content, inside and outside, break down; an intimation of an anterior 
movement 
- 
the trace, differance, supplementarity 
- 
which both produces and restricts the 
categories of philosophy 
... 
a text in which the re-mark and the relation between singularity and 
generality are staged with haunting power is, to that extent 'literary'... Iiterature [is] a term like 
writing or law, capable of destabilising the discourses and institutions within which it has its 
being 
.... 
This question of the singular and the universal raises a number of issues 
... 
one of these is 
the issue of translation and translatability 
... 
for instance, 'A text lives only if it lives on, and lives 
on only if it is at once translatable and untranslatable 
... 
Totally translatable, it disappears as a text, 
as writing, as a body of language. Totally untranslatable, even within what is believed to be one 
language, it dies immediately' (Derrida, Jacques, 'Living On/Borderlines'... this is not just a 
feature peculiar to literature; it is equally constitutive of the operation of justice, which relies 
upon a union of a singular occurrence and a general law". Attridge, Derek, 'Introduction', in, 4cts 
ofLiterature (London: Routledge, 1992), 15-18. It is in these senses that art and literature are 
analogous to the historical and political in Derrida's terms. A response to literature is akin to a 
responsibility towards justice for the 'other' before the 'law' in the important double sense of 
'before' and at the same time the literary event can articulate the anachronism and 'out of jointness' of time constitutive of history and the 'politics' of justice. It is no accident or diversion 
therefore to include 'the time is out of joint' and the ghost of Harnlet's father in an encounter 
with Marxism and history, where the history of both 'texts' is both 'anterior' and 'still to come'. 
But in case these literary references appear to the reader as too convenient in terms of their 
content, Derrida's meditation upon the act of drawing and the self-portrait in ruins attests to this 
same undecideability and instability between the 'law' of the subject and the inscription of the 
radically temporalised 'other' as the non-phenomenalisable trace which both constitutes and 
'ruins'any substantiated and ontological subject and to which there is responsibility to bear 
witness in the 'name' ofjustice. See Derrida, Jacques., Memoirs of the Blind: the Setf-Portrait 
and Other Ruins trans. Brault, P., and Naas, M. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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essential summation and meaning to existence, so there is a loss of meaning to 
the 'world' of sensuous ense. 9 This is the premise for Nancy's 're-treating' of 
the political and the aesthetic, 'along the lines' of the divisions between 
absolutism and relativism, essence and appearance, the transcendental and 
empirical, theoretical 'truth' and historical 'truth', in order to displace these 
divisions precisely to the border at which they meet and are exposed to each 
other. This requires an opening onto the thought of this border as the locale or 
space for a re-thinking of sense that avoids the oscillation or dialectic between 
either pole, which each in their own way present as a certain given truth of 
sense. 10 
9 Nancy articulates this variously, "There is something like a general loss of sense. Sense, that's 
the word that matters to me today; a general flight of sense, whether it occurs in a political or 
aesthetic or religious or whatever other forms. Think a moment about the sense of words like 
triation', 'people', 'sovereignty', 'right. 'beauty', 'community', 'humanity', 'life', 'death', and so 
many others. It is not just a matter of the traditional complexity and difficulty of notions such as 
these; rather it is a question of an exhaustion, a zero degree-in the 'best' of cases, of an operation 
of complete re-appropriation which we will have to undertake on the 'meanings' that are ebbing 
away there, that are leaking as of so many cracked vessels 
... 
far from considering this general 
flight of sense as a catastrophe and a loss, I want to think of it as the event of sense in our time, 
for our time. It is a question of thinking sense in the absencing of sense 
... 
philosophy as 'giver of 
sense' is in flight. Philosophy, that's the cracked vessel. As 'conception of the world; (by 
History, the Subject, the City, Spirit or whatever you like), philosophy is at the end of its time 
- 
and this extremity of time is ours, the time in which we must philosophize. At an end as well 
- 
and wom. out 
- 
is the philosophy that does not want to give sense but to analyze the conditions 
for delivering a coherent sense. Clearly, it is a question of something else. It is a question of 
thinking what 'sense' can be when one has come to the end of sense understood in that 
fashion 
... 
Indeed this is probably nothing new. It is our way of playing out again something that 
already belongs, as well to our whole tradition. In this sense, it is not 'revolutionary' and it is not 
one more 'philosophy' or 'ideology'. But in another way it is revolution itself, the destitution of 
the authority of sense or of sense as authority, and entry into the unheard of 
.. 
All of this has just 
barely begun 
- 
although it has been underway since Nietzsche, and even since before him 
.. 
But 
today this is where there is some sense: in saying sense is absent, in saying that this absence is 
what we are exposed to and that this exposition constitutes what I will call not only our present 
history, but along with Rimbaud, our re-found eternity. " Nancy, J-L., 'You ask me what it 
means todayT, Paragraph, 16.2, July (1993): 109-110. 
10 Nancy plays upon and re-articulates at length, the difference between sense and sense, 'idea' 
and 'material world' in his book, The Sense of the World. Here Nancy seeks to tackle head-on, 
across various 'philosophical' topics the fundamental problem of 'sense'. If modernity presents 
an attendant collapse of any transcendent meaning, or teleology or 'absolute' value, which would 
provide an essential summation and meaning to existence in a 'mythic' sense, then the relative 
world of existence and actuality appears to lose meaning, to the extent that the nihilism of the 
abyss of the desire for sense, not yet attained, in turn becomes absolutised as 'myth'. It is this 
oscillation between the figuring of satisfaction, in which the desire for meaning is resolved in the 
absolute given of sense as myth or the possibility of satisfaction is negated in the endlessly 
undoing of the desire for meaning in the endlessly seýf-undoing of desire as the truth of nihilistic 
dissolution, that has to be addressed. In both cases the punctuality to 'truth' prevails in this direct 
opposition between sense and its loss. See particularly 'Gift, Desire: Agathon' and 'Pain, 
Suffering, Unhappiness' in Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the World. Trans. Librett, J. S. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997), 50-53 and 143-153. Librett's foreword to this 
text articulates Nancy's thought of sense and world in relation to aesthetics and politics by 
recognising that the sense of neither is subordinate to the other, hence the undoing of that 
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Nancy extrapolates on this re-thinking of sense in terms of fundamental 
philosophical questions of being, community, history, the political and the 
political subject and the aesthetic. He demonstrates the extent to which the 
consideration of the loss or fragmentation of these tenns is still premised upon a 
desire for the 'whole' or transcendent meaning or subject, including the 
'collective subject' of history and thus retains an 'immanentism', or closure, 
which denies the fundamental ontology of being as 'being with' or 'being 
singular plural'. These latter terms, combined with exposure or ex-position, dis- 
position, partage (sharing), articulate the re-thinking of sense and world and all 
that follows from it, including aesthetics and politics on the basis of an always 
already in-common exposure to 'alterity' ; an alterity in the sense of always, the 
'with', or on the basis of a singularity which only ever 'is' in accordance with 
this exposure to plurality, being-with, right at or right on the level ofexistence, 
with no recourse to any prior or future transcendental or 'end' term including 
that of the 'Other" 1 
opposition between the aesthetic isation of politics and the politicisation of the aesthetic, argued 
by Walter Benjamin, and that the sense of each should not be totalised even as the history of 
political philosophy and aesthetics suggests otherwise, in that the thinking of the political and the 
thinking of the aesthetic has always veered towards a unifying or 'communal' concept, even as it 
has embraced the idea of the relative or relational or fragment as opposed to 'whole'. It is this 
veering towards the pre-conceived unity of/or communal sense that belies the actual truth of the 
'being-with' and relationality of the political and the aesthetic, as an absolute relativisation as 
part of a 'fundamental' ontology of being singular/plural or the singular plurality of being. See 
Librett, J. S., Foreword to The Sense ofthe World, especially xv-xxvi. 
" Nancy's thoughts on aesthetics, politics, community, history and being derive from this 
fundamental ethical relation of shared division each of/to the other; a being-with, to be thought of 
in contrast to any sense of common essence; an ontology of the 'social' before, more originary 
than 'society'; 'individual'; 'self'; essence of being, "What comes to light then, is not a 'social' 
or 'communitarian dimension' added onto a primitive individual given, even if it were to occur 
as an essential and determining addition. (Just think of the numerous circumstances of ordinary 
discourse in which this order is imposed on us: first the individual, then the group; first the one, 
then the others; first the rights-bearing subject; then the real relationships; first 'individual 
psychology' then 'inter-subjectivity' 
- 
as they astonishingly persist in saying). It is not even a 
question of a sociality or alterity that would come to cut across, complicate, put into play, or alter 
the principle of the subject understood as solus ipse. It is something else and still more. It does 
not so much determine the principle of the ipse whatever this may be ('individual' or 'collective', 
insofar as one can speak in these ways), as it codetermines it with the plurality of ipses, each one 
of which is co-originary and coessential to the world, to a world which from this point on defines 
a coexistence that must be understood in a still-unheard-of-sense, exactly because it does not take 
place 'in' the world, but instead forms the essence and the structure of the world. It is not a 
nearness or community of ipses, but a coipseity; this is what comes to light, but as an enigma 
with which our thinking is confronted. " Nancy J-L., Being Singular Plural. Trans. Richardson, 
R., & O'Byme, A., (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2000), 44. For Nancy, artworks can 
provide a site, a spatio-temporal setting for thinking and facing this enigma. They can present, or 
give presentation to or keep open what Nancy terms (amongst other terms) the 
'incommensurable', which is at the same time shared out and divided (partage) or, put differently 
in Nancy's terms, the aesthetic is the (un) doing of duration and spatialization by the 
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Derrida and Nancy are inspirations for this re-reading of Marx and Marxist 
criticism and their thought is threaded through this account, but of course, such 
Marxist criticism has already undergone its inflections, re-inscriptions and re- 
workings, which are also addressed in this chapter. 
The focus on Clark's 'Preliminaries... ' article is two-fold. First, the appearance 
of his writing in Screen marks a significant moment in the, discipline of art 
history in Britain, when it might be said the existing disciplinary protocols were 
undone. Second, the article marks an intervention in the particular trajectory of 
Screen, away from a studied approach to representations as empirical entities 
reflecting or articulating social relations, towards an intensified theoretical 
discipline able to demonstrate the extent to which signifying practices produce 
meaning and the sense in which subjects relate to the social world. This 
sharpened the focus of the 'Preliminaries... ' article into an interventionist 
polemic against certain traits of thejournal and its 'avant-garde' project, with 
well-chosen quotes from other Screen articles in support, provoking a latter 
response and subsequent riposte from Clark. All of this manoeuvring indicates 
the extent to which artworks were the subject and substance of critical debate 
within the interstices of interpretation of Marx. 12 
Clark had already made his'Case for a renewal of the great tradition of the social 
history of art with his article, 'The Conditions of Artistic Creation', published in 
incommensurability of the always coming and spacing, as the instituting and at the very same 
time undoing of its singularity by its dispersal at the very moment of its trace. 
12 The actual form of the debate in 1980 was a series of Screen articles beginning with 
'Preliminaries' Volume 21: 1: 1841, responded to by Peter Wollen, 'Manet: Modemismand 
Avant-garde', Screen2l: 2, Summer (1980): 15-25, incidentally 'billed' on the front cover, 
provocatively as 'Modernism Defended'; followed by a response from Clark tucked away this 
time as 'A note in reply to Peter Wollen', Screen 21: 3 (1980) 97-100. The debate here was 
between opposed positions on the interpretation of Marx's concept of contradiction. Broadly, 
Wollen takes Clark to task for not giving avant-gardism its due for expressing the 
'contradictions' of social life under capitalism, whilst Clark is of the view that it is precisely this 
lure of 'contradiction' that obscures real conditions of existence. Later, Charles Harrison, 
Michael Baldwin and Mel Ramsden of Art & Language criticise both for not fully grasping the 
significance of Marx's concept, C. Harrison, M. Baldwin and M. Ramsden, "Manet's Olympia 
and Contradiction" Block, no. 5 (198 1). " To be drawn into this now would be a diversion, but I do 
note a similarity between the Wollen-Clark debate and Derrida's own issue, which runs as a 
thread through Specters ofMarx, with Marx himself concerning the 'spectral' which Derrida 
suggests, Marx continually seeks to suppress in favour of 'the real'. 
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the Times Literary Supplement in 1974 13 
, 
where he argued for the re-focussing 
of the discipline on the relationship of works of art to the 'ideological materials' 
with which and upon which they work. He had put this into practice with his 
books, The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France 1848-1851 and 
Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution. 14 He had argued 
against an oversimplified Marxist analysis of art, 
I believe that access to ideology is always incomplete 
- 
and it is the 
lack of finish that counts, in our explanation of artistic production. The 
notion of the 'representative' artist, who gives us a complete depiction 
of the 'possible consciousness' of a class 
-a notion dear to a certain 
brand of Marxist history 
- 
seems to me a figment. (It's their constant 
awareness of these facts that makes Walter Benjamin's work on 
Baudelaire or Sartre's Conscience de Classe chez Flaubert so much 
more useful than most of their 'scientific' opponents. )' 5 
But also against a merely diversified art history with the social history of art, 
"taking its place alongside the other varieties 
- 
formalist, 'modernist', sub- 
Freudian, filmic, feminist, 'radical', all of them hot-foot in pursuit of the New. "16 
The article in Screen was thus likely to be something of a polemic against the 
trajectory that the journal was taking to forge a 'politics' of cultural production 
and a reception that sought the inter-relationship between various theoretical 
perspectives and 'radical' cultural practices, across a broad spectrum of 'cultural 
formations' 
- 
film, television, photography, fine art, in order to (re) establish a 
politically engaged practice of criticism supportive of historical and 
contemporary critical practices. 
If this was a litany of 'isms' in hot-pursuit of the new, it nevertheless brought to 
the attention of its readership a range of debates about art and literature from 
13 Clark, T. J., 'The Conditions of Artistic Creation', Times Literary Supplement, 24-05 (1974), 
561-2. 
14 Clark, T. J., The Absolute Bourgeois: Art and Politics in France 1848-1851 (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1973); Clark, T. J., The Image ofthe People, Gustave Courbet and the 1848 
Revolution (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973) 
" Clark, T. J., 'The Conditions of Artistic Creation', 561-2. 
16 Ibid., 561-2. 
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Russia in the twenties and Germany in the thirties, and enabled some art 
historians to feel part of a radical groundswell of critical, politically engaged 
debate against what were perceived as the traditional orthodoxies, weakened 
social critique and abstracted aestheticism of the discipline, sufficient to justify 
the term 'The New Art History'. The introduction to a book which collected 
together examples of these new perspectives neatly summarises the situation, 
"for the first time since the thirties, intellectuals were promised a role in British 
culture instead of merely enduring it while they awaited the revolution. " 17 
Clark's work has been concerned with the attempts of art to respond to the 
conditions of modernity. These conditions, put simply by Herman Rapaport, 
commenting upon Clark's readings, were of a changing life-world that "is never 
, 
18 
stable enough to be seen as a thing in itself 
. 
Where Rapaport is speaking in 
general philosophical terms of an epistemic shift characterising 'modernity', 
Clark, articulates it more precisely in historical terms in the 'Manet' book, 
What is visible in modem life, in other words, is not character but class, 
And yet of course the culture presented its own set of obstacles to the 
recognition of the fact, or to taking it seriously. In the case of the artists 
that concern us, the obstacle took the form of an ideology: the avant- 
garde appears to have been persuaded by the view that modernity was 
no longer characterized by a system of classification and control but, 
rather, by niixture, transgression, and ambiguity in the general conduct 
of life. It seems to me that this was to mistake the real and important 
margin of error in capitalist society for an overall loosening of ties 
... 
The 
perfect heroes and heroines of this myth of modernity were the petite 
bourgeoisie. They appeared in many ways to have no class to speak of, 
to be excluded from the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and yet to thrive 
17 This moment of possibility for the discipline was really captured by the publication of Rees, A. 
& Borzello, F., The New Art History (London: Camden Press, 1986), where the positions in 
pursuit of the 'new' noted by Clark, were first collected within discipline-specific literature. The 
introduction to this volume, which seriously and by no means uncritically traces the genesis of 
the new perspectives on the discipline, acknowledges both the influence of T. J. Clark and the 
debt the discipline owes to those art historical 'greats' referred to in Clark's 1974 article as well 
as the impact and trajectory of Screen amongst others. See Rees, A. L. and Borzello, F., 
introduction to The New Art History London, Camden Press, 1986 pp. 1-10. For a personalised 
insider account of the internal debates within Screen in the latter half of the seventies, which 
largely polarised around the steer of the journal towards Lacanian psycho-analysis and the 
provenance of the journal vis-i-vis art-house or popular Hollywood cinema, see McCabe, C., 
'Class of '68' in Tracking the Signiflier: theoretical essays: film, linguistics, literature (Minneapolis:, University of Minnesota Press, 1985): 1-32. 18 Rapaport, H., 'Vulgarity, He Said: T. JClark's Modernism' New Formations 44 Autumn 
(2001): 163-164. 
34 
on their lack of belonging. They were the shifters of class society, the 
connoisseurs of its edges and wastelands. And thus they became for a 
time the alter egos of the avant-garde 
... 
depended upon for a point of 
insertion into modem life. I believe that sometimes in depicting them 
the painters discovered the limits of and insufficiency of their own 
ideology and in some sense described these people's belonging to the 
class systern. That only happened occasionally. 19 
Clark's reading as a Marxist one ultimately critiques the artwork of 'modernity' 
from the point of view of that which it addresses and to whom it gives address 
and that which it opens onto in terms ofnecessity in the social or 'real conditions 
ofexistence'. These conditions are understood in terms of social relations, and 
not reductively economic ones, premised upon the concept of class, which are 
lived through the possibilities and limitations of ideologies that can nevertheless 
be recognised as such and rendered intelligible and contestable. The possibilities 
and limitations of ideologies are key elements in Clark's finding a particular, 
complicating and 'middle' way between a vulgar Marxist economic-base 
analysis and an over-simplifying and, as such, over-rating of the intrinsic weight 
and power of 'signifying practices', 
It sounds right 
- 
it corresponds to normal usage 
- 
to say that any social 
order consists primarily of classifications. What else do we usually 
mean by the word 'society' but a set of means for solidarity, distance, 
belonging and exclusion? These things are needed pre-eminently to 
enable the production of material life 
- 
to fix an order in which men and 
women can make their living and have some confidence that they will 
continue to do so. Orders of this sort appear to be established most 
potently by representation or systems of signs, and it does not seem to 
me to trivialize the concept of 'social formation' 
-or necessarily to give 
it an idealist as opposed to a materialist gloss 
- 
to describe it as a 
hierarchy of representations. That way one avoids the worst pitfalls of 
vulgar Marxism, in particular the difficulties involved in claiming that 
the base of any social formation is some brute facticity made of sterner 
and solider stuff than signs 
- 
for instance the stuff of economic 
life 
... 
Economic life 
- 
the 'economy', the economic realm, sphere, level, 
instance, or what have you 
- 
is in itself a realm of representations. How 
else are we to characterize money, for instance, or the commodity form, 
19 Clark, T. J., The Painting ofModern Life, Paris in the Art ofManet and hisfollowers 258 
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or the wage contract? I believe it is possible to put this kind of stress on 
representation and remain, as I want to, within the orbit of historical 
materialism. Everything depends on how we picture the links between 
any one set of representations and the totality which Marx called 'social 
practice'. In other words, the notion of social activity outlined so far can 
be sustained only if we simultaneously recognize that the world of 
representations does not fall out neatly into watertight sets or systems 
or 'signifying practices'. Society is a battlefield of representations, on 
which the limits and coherence of any given set are constantly being 
fought for and regularly spoilt. Thus it makes sense to say that 
representations are continually subject to the test of a reality more basic 
than themselves 
- 
the test of social practice. Social practice is that 
complexity which always outruns the constraints ofa given discourse, it 
is the overlap and inter fierence of representations; it is their 
rearrangement in use; it is the test which consolidates or disintegrates 
our categories, which makes or unmakes a concept, which blurs the 
edge of a particular language game and makes it difficult (though 
possible) to distinguish between a mistake and a metaphor 
... 
it too-social 
practice itself-is analyzable, at least in its overall structures and 
,, 
20 tendencies. 
For Clark, class and ideology are central conceptual tools, which give shape not 
only to the relationship between social practice and its representations, but to 
social practice itself With reference to the terms by which he describes 'social 
practice', as that which outruns any discourse, as that which constitutes and de- 
constitutes representations, on what basis can social practice be understood as 
both more 'real' than representations and a social totality, as opposed to social 
practice as a mobile, fluid, contingent set of discursive inter-relations? How does 
social practice effect and be the condition of possibility for representations and 
concepts, other than by a hypostasis of more concepts? Class and ideology have 
to be primary concepts, even as Clark goes some way to saying that they are not. 
They are fundamental, whilst adaptable in their range and scope in accordance 
with the changing circumstances of social relations under capitalism, and have 
an ontological privilege over other conceptual appropriations. This is why for 
Clark, along with the Situationists, the 'society of spectacle', as the key concept 
through which to understand the conditions of existence of modernity under 
20 Ibid., p. 6. 
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capitalism identified as such in the Manet book, has to be 'the illusion' of social 
relations articulated through the 'image'. 21 
This concept, coupled with the role of Situationism in relation to Clark's work, 
was a means to theorise the extent of capitalism's penetration into the very 
interstices of everyday life, public and private, work, family and leisure, such 
that 'lived reality' became more and more actualised through the 'appearance' of 
a reality brought about by capitalism's increasing self-production without end; 
its manufacture of the very time and space through which reality was 
experienced, crystallized through the 'image'. In Clark's view, this condition of 
modernity, insofar as it rendered class relations more 'invisible' and unstable, 
requires the understanding of class relations with increasing urgency. To 
recognise the malleability of class and the increasing fragmentation of relations 
within the social totality within the 'spectacle', which is capitalism, rather than 
render the concepts of class or ideology inadequate or redundant, in fact 
demands their re-invigoration. In this sense, for Clark, any theory where the 
starting point and endpoint is the exigencies of capitalist fragmentation at the 
level of the fragment and the shifting, constitutive or de-constitutive operation of 
signs and meaning is vulnerable to being symptomatic ofcapitalism rather than a 
critique of it. But this is to 'measure' 'modernism' in accordance with the 
possible revelation or production of, in the sense of a genesis and teleological 
path to, 'things as they really are' and the 'truth' of history under the aegis of 
'class' and, in Clark's terms, 'social practice'. 
The argument of this chapter is that to consider the relationships between history 
and the political and art and the artwork as one in which, the historical and the 
political are pre-given and outside of the artwork or as a ground; the historical 
and the political as that to which the artwork gives address as a history already 
there and 'resumed' or 'revealed' in the artwork, ultimately depends upon a 
presumed or founding 'Idea' of history. Bound up with this is the question of the 
truth of history, as revealed and in the case of Manet's Olympia, with its veiling 
21 The concept was developed primarily by Guy Debord and formulated in his book The Society 
ofSpectacle. See Debord, G., The Society ofSpectacle (London: Rebel Press, Aim Publications, 
1985), passirn. 
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or unveiling of truth in the figure of the (classed) woman; thus repeating a 
metaphysical and 'mythic' idea of truth. 
Whether in terms of the artist's work in the work or its reception, within such a 
model, the consideration of the work as historical depends on a division between 
the subject and object of history, the interaction of which drives the unfolding of 
'history' towards its telos or end in 'truth'. This, to put it bluntly and for the 
moment risk begging more nuanced questions, is to put the politics before the art 
rather than see the inter-relation differently; not art as an effect of politics or 
politics as an effect of the art which runs all the risks of the aestheticisation of 
politics, but what Librett calls, speaking about Nancy, an "agnosticism in 
aesthetics and politics". This perhaps awkward terrn, refers to the 're-treating' of 
the political and the aesthetic that I have already referred to above, (see n8 page 
8 of this text). The nub of the matter for Nancy of the opposition between 
absolutisation. and relativisation is at the heart of the vexed question of the 
relation between aesthetics and politics. 22 
Nancy, in broaching the fragmentation of the aesthetic (without 'end term') and 
the politics of non-self sufficiency (without the pre-emptive 'subject' of the 
22 Librett elaborates, "For Nancy, then, it can no longer be fundamentally a question, as it still 
was 
- 
at least manifestly 
- 
for Walter Benjamin in 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction' of a choice between (right-wing) "aesthetic ization' 'and (leftist) "politicization" as 
terms whose values we could somehow compare with each other to figure out which we valued 
most or which was most important or, rather, all-important, absolutely desirable 'in the last 
instance'. In Nancy's text, this choice no longer appears possible because aesthetics and politics 
no longer appear as either local or absolute values in themselves. Rather, both aesthetics and 
politics are internally structured as the impossible dialectical oscillation between the 
absolutization of value and its relativization. 
The choice, in sum, within both aesthetics and politics is the choice between the perpetuation of 
this dialectical oscillation of absolutization and relativization (under the doniination of the 
absolutization of the relative), on the one hand, and its deconstructive, liminal interruption, on 
the other hand. That is, on the one hand, there is the dialectical mirror-play between the 
absolutization of the relative (the designation of some particular relative term or terms as 
adequate presentation of the absolute) and its dialectical opposite, the relativization of the 
absolute (in the sense of aftnite or relative relativization). This dialectical opposite, the 
relativization of the absolute is itself, however, merely one example of what it opposes, the 
absolutization of the relative, because it always relativizes in terms of some absolute point of 
reference in turn, for example, by reducing religion to psychology or history, by reducing 
psychology to history or history to psychology, by reducing epistemology to aesthetics or 
rhetoric, by reducing aesthetics to politics or the reverse, and so on and so forth. On the other 
hand, marginally outside of this dialectic, on and as the border between its two terms, there is 
Telativization 'as such', absolute relativization (or infinite finitization), which does not conclude 
by arriving at any (relative) term, including the nihilistic term of a given, total absence of value 
or total presence of pure desire. " Librett, J., 'Translator's Foreword' in Nancy J-L., The Sense of 
the Morld, p. xxv. 
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political, whether it be understood as the classed, gendered, racialiseý or 
sexualized subject), affirms the 'absolutizing relativization', such that there is no 
'end' to this project inasmuch as the absolutization ofrelativization also belongs 
within the dialectic it interrupts as the border where each term is 'transformed 
into its other'. 23 
But precisely because of this, aesthetics and politics, and how they relate to an 
emancipatory project, can be thought otherwise. To re-cap, the political 'subject' 
and the aesthetic have to be thought fundamentally differently. It is still a matter 
of distinguishing between 'real conditions of existence' and image in the 'society 
of spectacle', but Nancy is taking another tack and starting point. The 'real 
conditions of existence' are fragmentation with spectacle as their 
representational 'disguise'. What matters is the're-cognition' of fragmentation as 
the absolute relativization of the being-with, not the search for the presumed 
'common bond', be it class, gender, race or sexual orientation, which art might 
somehow give shape to. From Clark's position this might give rise to scepticism 
that such a 're-treating' of the contemporary political is prey to the symptoms of 
modernity rather than capable of a critical position towards it. I speculate here, 
but this is Clark from the Manet book: 
... 
[M]odemist painting accepted and reworked a myth of modernity in 
which the modem equalled the marginal. Shifting and uncertainty were 
thus taken to be the truth of city life and of perception, the one 
guaranteeing the other. I have spent my time trying to suggest the 
strengths and limitations of this belief, and have put more stress than is 
usual on the latter. In particular I have argued 
... 
that this painting did not 
find a way to picture class adequately; though adequately here should 
not be understood to mean simply or unequivocally. It was not able to 
devise an iconography of modem life, one capable of being sustained 
and developed by succeeding generations. That failure derives above all 
I think, from its mistaken sense of what class was and how it showed 
itself, its belief that the founding categories of social experience could 
only appear 
- 
or could only be represented 
- 
as an absolute presence on 
the other side of codes and conventions, or as a glimpse, a flickering 
into visibility, itself part of the general elusiveness 
... 
that sense of class 
23 Ibid., xxvi. 
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just outlined is basic to bourgeois ideology and [that] a contrary 
imagery would have to be based on some form of identification with the 
interests and values of other classes in capitalist society 
... 
if certain 
bourgeois artists now wish to succeed the modernist frame of reference, 
this will involve them in discovering what remains of modernism might 
still be used to represent the point of view of the proletariat. 24 
Is Nancy's retreating of the contemporary an 'acceptance' in Clark's terms? 
What might the representation of the point of view of the proletariat (have) come 
to mean? 
In sum, Nancy is saying we work with this existence and politicise that by way 
of re-treating as opposed to a 'retreat of' or mouming of the political; the politics 
of memory versus the memory of politics. 
It is a fine line, and I myself face the difficulty of re-reading a Marxist position 
that was enormously influential on my own practice as a thinker about, reader 
and historian of art. Having set out at some length the context of my approach to 
Clark's texts, I am conscious of a certain leap I have made from Clark's position 
as I am characterising it, to a deconstructive one, but it is necessary to return to a 
closer critical exposition of the political context of Clark's 'Preliminaries... ' 
article in order to understand how that deconstructive turn came to matter in the 
consideration of art and politics and what, for the want of a better word, its 
antecedents were. What was it that was setting the scene for receptivity towards 
the 'positions' of Derrida and Nancy9 
Intelligibility, mimesis and Marxist reading 
I want fiTst of all to characterise a Marxist reading of art, which persists 
throughout subsequent debates within the parameters of Marxists' positions on 
art, as one that is driven by the question of intelligibility. Such a reading 
necessarily wants to render intelligible the specificity of products of art, as 
'human sensuous activity' within an account for their historical determination 
and the nature and extent of their determining effects. 
24 Clark, T. J., The Painting ofModern Life, 259-260. 
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The approach, I suggest, requires teleology of intelligibility and, for the most 
part, a political, critical reading was conceived in terms of 'ideological critique'; 
one which can, in accordance with the Marxist analysis, result in the opening of 
new fields of knowledge; that is to say, expose the workings of ideology in a text 
and reveal the relationship between the meanings that an image/work produces 
by way of its appearance as an object to the subject, in order to bring about a 
real transformation whether in the production of works of art or in their social 
Gconsumption'. 25 
The classic Marxist model for this intelligibility is the base-superstructure 
distinction. The intelligibility of a work of art is ultimately derivable from the 
material conditions of the economic base; the actual relations, already existing, 
among which the economic relations are ultimately the decisive ones. This 
model was fundamental for understanding the relationship between economically 
based social relations of production and culture; formations and symbolic 
systems; i. e. those areas associated with 'ideas'. The superstructure was the 
realm which, according to Marx, consisted of "the legal, political, aesthetic or 
philosophic 
- 
in short, ideological forms in which'men become conscious of this 
conflict [between the means of production and social relations of production] 
and fight it OUt. tý 26 The superstructure thus consisted of forms of social 
consciousness or 'appearances', which was causally linked to the economic base 
and, through which, men and women perceived the realm of social relations. 
This model, I argue, is a mimetic one, inasmuch as art either equates to the 
'ideological', or by some means, relates to the real, ('things as they really are'); 
in Marxist terms, the 'real', as the underlying forces and relations which 
structure human interaction on the basis of material conditions. Even in respect 
of those positions within Marxism which seek to re-think the base-superstructure 
distinction and argue the case for the relative autonomy of art, such a basis for 
reading has to remain metaphysical and sustain a Platonic mimetic division, 
25 Adapted from Macherey, P. & Balibar, E., 'Literature as an ideological form: Some Marxists 
Propositions', Oxford Literary Review, 3.1 (1978): 4. 
26 Marx, Karl, 'Preface to A contribution to the critique ofpolitical economy(l 859)' in Marx, 
Karl., and Engels, Frederick., Selected Works Volume One (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1983): 504 
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which operates under the same logic as Plato's division between the 'idea' and 
the 'appearance, or the 'intelligible' and the 'sensible', inasmuch as a causal 
link has to be maintained between the 'appearance'-as-material of the work and 
the 'ideology' or indeed the ... ideological/real' struggle" to which the text refers. 
This follows whether the reading is operating at the level of the generality of the 
concepts of 'art' and 'society', or at the level of signification and the material 
'marks' that constitute the work. I question such an approach on the basis of 
intelligibility and its required subject/object dualism, as a reading, which seeks 
to incorporate its 'object' under its logic. This is also the logic, as suggested 
above, of 'presumed' or teleological history. 
The philosopher John Sallis has succinctly set out some of the key issues I 
address. He suggests that following Plato, the intelligible has always governed 
the sensible. This has always been a problem in that the 'intelligible' itself has 
always been a 'figure'; in that sense, already a representation. 
... 
the figure constitutive of metaphysics is the distinction, the 
hierarchical opposition, between the intelligible and the sensible 
... 
There 
is in turn, an extended chain of oppositions linked to this opposition 
(universal/particular, form/matter etc) in a linkage that is quite complex 
and not readily reducible to a difference merely between primary and 
secondary or fundamental and derived. For the very sense of 
fundamental is at stake in these oppositions. As also is the very sense of 
concept, of figure, indeed of sense itse E 27 
Suggested here is the very problem at the heart of philosophy, also at the heart of 
Marxist reading, which cannot be overcome by any kind of mere inversion of 
terms, whether that inversion is, as per Marxism, the material over the ideal, 
objective conditions over subject-centred reason, etc. The very idea of meaning, 
has always involved a 'model', a type, within which the 'idea' has taken on an 
appearance. Given the paradoxical insistence of the intelligible as a model, how 
does one interpret the sensible as "a new kind of interpretation capable of 
27 Sallis, J., 'Double Truths: Interview with John Sallis', Pasanen, 0., Man and World, 30 (1997): 
108 
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avoiding all the traps that would merely lead back to the old distinction in some 
new guise? 91 28 
Marxist reading and "Screen" 
In order to consider this problem of intelligibility in terms of a particular 
historical conjuncture in the seventies and eighties in Britain, it is important to 
both set the tone of that historical moment and articulate something of the 
historical context and ferment of debate within, out of, beyond Marxism, which 
was typified by the shifts and turns in the 'position' of Screen. 'Preliminaries... ' 
has emerged, for me, as existing at the turning point of this ferment, seeking as it 
did to defend in an almost 'last redoubt' sense, a relation between art and 
politics, which continued to rely upon notions of agency and class-based signs 
and meanings, defending such agency, from an encroaching disquiet and a turn 
towards ideas of identity that were less presumptively 'visible' and pre- 
determined. These latter notions of identity or agency were more the outcome of 
'invisible' and less 'stable' unconscious processes of interpellation through 
signification and psychic process understood as operating like a language. 
This conjuncture saw a remarkable set of crosscurrents appearing within 
contemporary intellectual life and the academy, which brought together a 
powerful interweave of radical critical theorisations of culture, at a time when 
the political right was building its popular and state hegemony. Perry Anderson 
refers to this as "a culture in contra flow". 29 As he suggests, whilst an 
authoritarian populism established itself outside, inside, "[the Right's] attempt at 
a Gleichschaltung of the academy tended to raise up the very adversaries it 
sought to stamp out, even as its drive to impose the values of the counting house 
and constabulary on society swept forward elsewhere 
.,, 
30 The terms by which 
this might be considered a culture in contra flow remain somewhat tenuous in 
Anderson's account. He links this leftwards shift in the academy to "the turmoil 
of the late sixties and early seventies [which] threw up in its turn its own 
28 Ibid., : 108 29 Anderson, P., 'A Culture in Contra flow', English Questions (London: Verso, 1992), 192-301. 
30 Ibid., 200. 
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political generation, whose characteristic form of expression became the critical 
journal, generally produced on the edges of the academy and against it", 
connected with, "... a buoyant press of counter-cultural leisure born from the 
same moment 
... 
3199 and 
... 
finally, overlapping from the late seventies onwards, there emerged 
feminism, which, unlike its counterpart in the U. S. A, was always 
predominantly a movement of the left in Britain. In the neo- 
conservative eighties, its persistent dynamic helped to ensure that a 
radical public sphere did not lose ground even in a time of deepening 
political reaction. 32 
But what Anderson's account tends to miss, in line with his general overview, 
are the debates within the 'left' concerning precisely just how and how far the 
critical culture of the academy connected with a wider sense of the political and 
the public sphere. 
Arguably, it was through feminism, which Anderson, somewhat briefly, 
acknowledges, that this debate between the 'inside' of the academy and the 
sphere of the political 'outside' was most demonstrable and in particular 
sharpened the divide between what Anderson alludes to as, "one a movement 
towards the social, or the democracy of significations, the other a shift towards 
the metaphysical, or the instability of significations"33 in relation to the critical 
project of, as Anderson has it, "reconnecting the symbolic processes and 
shapings of subjectivity in social life to the unfinished political struggle for 
equality and emancipation. 9,34 
I am not accepting Anderson's division between 'the social' and the 
'metaphysical' here, as, in terms of the argument suggested above, the social is 
just as capable of being metaphysical in the connection made between 'symbolic 
processes' and the politically emancipatory project of democracy. However, his 
remarks do point to the political struggle over the 'site' of meaning, which took 
31 Ibid., 196 
32 Ibid., 196 
33 Ibid., 242 
34 Ibid., 242 
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place within the academy, as well as the abiding problem between representation 
or signification, the subject and the social, which so marks T. J. Clark's 
intervention. It is salutary that neither Anderson nor Clarkfully draws upon these 
debates within feminism, as somehow paradigmatic of this cultural debate at the 
time. 35 
What the feminist debates opened up was the point at which, and means by 
which, one rendered 'class', 'gendered' or 'racialised' positions 'intelligible'. 
They did this by exploding the tensions between 'democracy' and 'instability' of 
significations, 'visibility' and 'invisibility' of gendered subjects, 'central' and 
4marginal' tenets, 'naturalised' and 'socio-cultural' positions; the social and 
metaphysical as such. At the same time, theoretical perspectives brought into 
3,5 Anderson mentions feminism once, and he singularly fails to refer to some of the seminal 
feminist interventions into those critical journals he deems so important in establishing the very 
culture in contra flow he upholds, such as Laura Mulvey's 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema', Screen, 16.3 Autumn(1975),: 6-18, reprinted in Mulvey, L., Visual and Other Pleasures 
(London: Macmillan 1989): 14-26, the argument of which, analysing cinema from the point of 
view of its structural incorporation of 'masculine' (from Freud) scocophilia and voyeurisni, 
became seminal in debates concerning precisely the relationship between "symbolic processes 
and shapings of subjectivity in social life" to which Andersen alludes. Reference to this article 
and its influence was also a significant omission from Clark's work. However, Clark 
acknowledged the criticism of his book, The Painting ofModern Life, which came from 
feminism in the Preface to the revised edition of the book, published in 1999. His 
acknowledgement is a serious one. "More substantively, I agree that the problem of modernity's 
eternal revolution around the figure of 'Woman' is not explored enough in the book. How to do 
so without questions of gender in practice displacing questions of class remains an issue for me, 
and for the feminist work I admire 
... 
I believe we agree that the problem is not solved by constant 
evocation of class in the abstractý as a horizon or matrix of symbolic reproduction, without the 
invocation leading to specific descriptions of class's constraining and enabling force. For all 
kinds of reasons, the latter is hard to do. Roland Barthes's phrases still ring in our ears: "'The 
bourgeoisie is defined as the social class which does not wish to be named. 'Bourgeois', petit- 
bourgeois', 'capitalism', 'proletariat', are the locus of an unceasing haemorrhage: meaning flows 
out of them until their very name becomes unnecessary, "' ('Capitalism' has lately become the 
exception to Barthes's rule, but that is because capitalism is for the moment triumphant, and 
thinks that singing its own praises is the best way of making the other terms 
-c continuing gross 
facts of privilege and powerlessness 
- 
disappear. ) Class is still the category, that is to say, most 
systematically muted or deleted in our understanding of human relations. Which is not to say that 
gender gets any better treatment overall. In its case, the regime of invisibility gives way to other, 
cruder forms of representational violence 
- 
to endless rehashing of stale half-truths, to ever new 
feats of freezing and hypertrophy. Working on class and gender, I am therefore convinced, will 
not get far without fresh attempts to think of the two sets of terms as always overlapping and 
interfering 
- 
as revealing one another's false colours. That is why Marxism and feminism go on 
being uneasy (in the light of history, justifiably suspicious) allies. " Clark, T. J., 'Preface to the 
revised edition', The Painting ofModern Life: Paris in the Art ofManet and hisfollowers, 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), xxix. This gets Clark off the hook in some respects, but at 
the same time demonstrates his avoidance of those debates within feminism which took to task 
both the categories of 'woman' and 'class', as they were assumed to be or might become in 
accordance with a 'teleology', and went some way towards those specific descriptions of the 
constraining and enabling force of class/gender ascriptions. 
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tension with each other in this debate each had their own limits inasmuch as they 
were, some more readily than others, caught up in a politics of 'identity' and the 
valency of 'intelligibility' and a certain giveness or finiteness of identity which 
such a politics subtends. Thus I am not proposing a feminist argument as a 
counter to Clark or indeed any other of the perspectives he lists in his litany in 
the 1974 article. But the feminist debates and indeed Clark's response to them in 
the Manet book did demonstrate what the problems were at that historical 
conjuncture. They highlighted that tension between the argument for a 
collectively focussed politics to counter the oppressive reshaping of social life by 
'free market' individualism and trenchant conservatism (to counter the 
systematic muting and deleting of social categories, as in Clark's 
-argument) 
whilst at the same time arguments were coming from various quarters about the 
break up of traditional authority structures and social units and those binding 
'meta-narratives' of historical progress and a philosophical questioning and 
displacement of the 'subject' as the determining centre of meaning and history. 
As part of this, the institutions of culture were a site for theory and critique of the 
subject as universal and totalising and a site for the articulation of an emergent 
refiguring of the political in identity politics. Hence the particularity of the 
conjuncture and its paradox, on the one hand un-grounding 'the subject' and, on 
the other, contesting the ground asking whose identity, whose subjectivity was at 
stake here; the paradox of an un-grounded, non-universalising subject 
instantiating 'fragments' of subject-identity positions. 36 This was marked by the 
division, which emerged within feminism between a politics premised upon 
visibility and one premised upon discursivity. On the one hand there is the 
political figuration of the 'visibility' of subject positions as a force within a 
36 Jeffrey S. Librett in his foreword to Jean-Luc Nancy's Sense of the World points to the analogy 
between this paradox and that of the "autonomous work of arf' after Romanticism, whereby 
fragmentation becomes its own 'absolute' instantiating 'whole' fragments, each in their own 
completeness and 'finish'. Librett quotes Nancy, "Disruption transforms itself 
.. 
into the gathering 
of itself into itself of the broken piece. The latter converts its finitude 
- 
its interruption, non- 
completion, and in-finitude 
- 
into finish. In this finish, dispersion and fracture absolutize their 
erratic contingency: they absolve themselves of their fractal character. " 'Art, a fragment' Nancy, 
J-L., The Sense of the World, 124-125, and makes the analogy thus: "An analogue of the 
autonomous artwork 
... 
would be the given cultural identity seen as a product of the given, 
collective cultural subject. Where multiculturalism imposes itself as an absolute value, it 
demands relativization of values (and their subjects) but in identity politics this relativization 
stops at the level of given cultural groups, whose values are then supposed to count as absolute. " 
Librett, J. S., 'Translator's Foreword' in The Sense of the World p. xvii and note 9,170. 
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social project of resistance, under what might be termed the model of the power 
of oppression and a counter-movement to challenge it and a politics of 'women'- 
how women are represented and mediated as a 'category' within society, its 
structures, institutions and cultural formations and yet can act as agents of social 
change and challenge to these representations. On the other hand, there is a 
politics of 'difference' which involves the recognition of the instability of the 
terms of identity itself, such as the term 'woman' and recasting the political at 
the level of the discursive and signification and the relation between psychic and 
social power structures and force fields brought about by language, such that the 
very terms under which the 'political' might be addressed are not given in 
advance of the contingency of such terms in an inherently unstable network of 
language relations. 
The 'oppression and counter-movement 37 model seeks to totalise by drawing 
together differing spaces and sites of oppression as representative of the 
overarching power relations of capitalism, rendering them visible and 
contestable, whilst the alternative view calls this model into question for its 
deployment of an assumed and pre-given categorisation of subjects, social 
relations and presumed conceptualisations of the spaces and levels in which 
power relations cohere and oppression and its counter-movement take place. 
According to this alternative view, power and power relations are never as stable 
and assumed within institutional spaces as the model of oppression and counter- 
movement suggests. It is through their articulation, as dispersed in and across 
various discourses that exclusionary practices and formative differences and 
discriminations occur. If the principle is to resist exclusionary practices, to make 
visible and vivify oppression and its contestation, then a political discourse to 
this effect cannot take any of its analytical categories for granted, and its politics 
cannot be programmed in advance of this openness to the question of the 
contingency of subject positions and power relations. It is upon this principle of 
contingency that both the contestation of oppressive power relations and a 
politics open to difference can be based. Counter-assertions with regard to 
Gconcrete material reality' against the privileging of 'language' or discourse 
37 This 'model' was suggested via Coole, D 'Feminism Without Nostalgia' in Radical 
Philosophy 83 (1997) 17-24 
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were contestable insofar as this very concrete material reality, and the terms of 
its political theorisation and politicisation, was in turn a signification, which in 
assuming a descriptive and empirical force, necessarily produced boundaries and 
38 limits, exclusions and remainders, which were put beyond question. 
In broad terms, these were, or were going to be, the stakes of the contemporary 
political debate as Screen was positioning itself at the forefront of criticism as 
political practice. Already the journal had set out to understand the identity of the 
disciplines of film studies, literary theory, cultural studies and art history as 
relational under a general premise of the 'structural' relationship between forms 
of representation in culture and ideology as kinds of 'signifying practice' rather 
than discrete 'disciplines', with all these entail in terms of disciplinary protocols 
and inclusive histories; and, as part of this, an argument held that such forms, 
whilst embedded in history and in the social, had their own effectivity at the level 
of signification. The influence at that time was predominantly Althusser's 
Marxism, but it would not be long before the psychoanalytic element in 
Althusser gained greater force, and language would be looked to not only for its 
effects in 'constructing' identities in a field of relations, but also for its effects in 
destabilising identities in a field of perpetual potential difference. 
Clark's text comes at a moment in the political critical project of Screen. Oneof 
the key positions for Screen, in the debates within British Marxism, was its 
particular emphasis upon the ideology of 'form' as signiji'cation. This involves 
how form, as signification, produces meaning, and is not a mere vehicle for 
meaning. Throughout the seventies, this position was increasingly allied to 
Althusserian and Lacanian notions of how signifying practices and the symbolic 
contributed to the reproduction of the dominant order through the interpellation 
ofsubjectivities (as I discuss in more detail below) 
. 
39 Hence, critical in this 
debate was the extent to which 'founding' Marxist concepts of class, class 
38 See Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the discursive limits ofSex. (London: Routledge, 
1993) 
39 The concept of interpellation is found in Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses' in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B Brewster, (London and New 
York: New Left Books, 1971) 
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consciousness and ideology were re-thought by Althusser, but then more 
radically put into question by so-termed structuralist and poststructuralist 
theorisations of the relationship between structure, sign and subject and how that 
is extrapolated by way of signifying practices. 
There is a history, a genealogy, to this moment that must be sketched here. These 
questions were debated within the context of a British appropriation of Western 
Marxism, and a further re-evaluation of the relationship between cultural forms 
and politics after the insurgencies of 1968. 'Post-I 968' brought about a re- 
invigoration as well as a problematising of Marxist concepts. 
Whilst 'Western Marxism' as a broad term includes significant divergences in 
thought, it nevertheless identifies a major reconfiguration and formal shifting of 
the fundamentals of Marxist thinking, which had been politically mobilised in 
the revolutionary situations in Europe emergent from the First World War. 
Where those revolutionary upheavals sought the concrete realisation of Marx's 
theory (the praxis) of the logic of capitalist development in the overthrow of 
capitalism by proletarian revolution; the ensuing failure of international 
revolutionary socialism, the rise of fascism, the consolidation of communism 
under Stalinism in the Soviet bloc, the further entrenchment of capitalism under 
the guise of democracy in the West all called for a reconsideration of Marxism. 
In those Western states where the logic of capitalist development appeared to 
have taken a turn not theorised in Marx the position of economic determinism, 
and especially economic reductionism, was inadequate. 40 
The fundamental shift, which took place within Western Marxism, was towards 
the role that the superstructures played in determining the persistence of 
capitalist social relations and in effecting class-consciousness. Allied to this was 
the question of method and a reconsideration of the philosophical basis of 
Marxism. Out of this emerged some major innovations in Marxist thought. 
Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony explained the mechanism by which a 
ruling class obtained popular consent by way of the ensemble of ideologies, 
40 This history is explored in the work, amongst others, of Perry Anderson in the 1970s, See 
Andersen, P., Considerations of Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976). 
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transmitted through cultural institutions with the support and agency of 
intellectuals. Resistance to dominant ideology had to be considered in tenns of a 
'war of position' to secure hegemonic status. 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse of the Frankfurt School challenged the 
Marxist view of historical progress and the development of the forces of 
production as a progressive emancipation of human society. Capitalism's 
scientific and technological advances brought with them further social and 
psychic repression of 'the masses. 41 Freud's thought was significant here, most 
explicitly in Marcuse. The 'abundance' of capitalism, including the 
commercialisation and industrialisation of culture within class society, produced 
particular forms of 'surplus repression' (Marcuse). Where the technological 
development of advanced capital offered the potential for libidinal emancipation, 
actual history produced the inverse of this through the repressive de-sublimation 
by commercialised gratification, including the incorporation and neutralisation 
of critical artistic impulses. The 'abundance' of capital enabled the integration of 
the proletariat into an order of 'mass conformity' disabling its consciousness of 
itself as a separate, exploited class. 42 
This theme preoccupied Adomo, but he sought to re-think the criticality of art in 
the context of mass commercialisation. This required a radical re-think of the 
'disenchantment' of society in relation to the 'disenchantment' of art. For 
Adomo, the rationalisation of society bore a supreme irony, whereby "[An] 
abstraction, the tool of enlightenment, treats its objects, as does fate, the notion 
,, 43 of which it rejects: it liquidates them. Progressive disenchantment has led to 
the power of instrumental reason over all aspects of life and, as Jay Bernstein 
puts it, "... the stamping of the world by the instrument is making it a mirror of 
our subjectivity, making a world 'for us' [but], in becoming a world 'for us' the 
44 
world became no longer 'for us' at all and we are no longer for ourselves" 
. 
In 
the face of this, the 'truth' of art is in the non-sublatable negative dialectic of 
41 See Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, H., Dialectic ofEnlightenment. Trans. Cummings, J., (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1972). 
42 Marcuse, H., One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Books 1964) 
43 Adorno, T. & Horkbeimer, H., Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 13. 44 Bernstein, J., 'The Death of Sensuous Particulars: Adomo and Abstract Expressionism', 
Radical Philosophy 76 Mar/April (1996), 10. 
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illusion and non-illusion. In that sense it is unable to effect a symbolic 
reconciliation and is strewn between mimetic expression and construction. 
Adomo's use of illusion and non-illusion differs from a critique of the mimetic 
as privileging an original presence and constituting a will to identity and 
resemblance as representation and 'model' as installing the logos as truth. For 
Adorno, mimesis is that which undermines the reification of thought in any 
subject/object dualism. It harks back to a primordial reason and, in so doing, 
demonstrates that rationality has never been fully realised. It connects with 
expression as the dissonant resistance to 'harmony', a resistance rooted in 
suffering. In that sense, mimesis is the resistance to the ideological forgetting of 
real pain, which is characteristic of an art of consolation or reconciliation. At the 
same time, however, mimesis as expression has to be supplemented by 
construction (spirit), but this supplementarity is a process that remains in 
irresolvable tension. 
This tension, socially and historically, is marked by, on one hand, the striving of 
art to achieve self-sufficiency, to separate itself from the irrational rationality and 
false reality of the laws of exchange, by pursuit of the technical laws of 
autonomous art and, in so doing, offer hope for the future; on the other hand, the 
failure of art to do so, is a mark of its imperfection. The 'failure' of art to 
produce self-identity (any sense of wholeness of 'it-self') reveals the pain of 
damaged life, through its dissonant features. As Michael Newman puts it, "in the 
mode of illusion of art and specifically in the modernist work, which turns 
against its own illusoriness in a sublime self-destruction which gestures towards 
,, 
45 the truth, that, as art, still it lacks. It is this tension that Adorno knew was 
always in danger of being overridden by the pressures of instrumental rationality 
upon construction and the withering away of mimetic expression into the 
mimesis of mythic imitation. 
45 Newman, M., 'Suffering from Reminiscences' in Postmodernism and the Re-reading of 
Modernity. (eds). Barker, F., Hulme, P. & Iversen, M.,, (Manchester: University of Manchester 
Press, 1992): 98 
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However, as long as it remains as aporetic, where the interdependent distinction 
between synthesis and dissociation cannot be resolved, the work of art maintains 
the negative dialectic as a site of resistance to the mythic and 'magical' (re) 
enchantment ofart. This is also the basis for Adorno's objection to what he read 
as Walter Benjamin's undialectical reading of the technologies of mass 
mediation vis-A-vis 'autonomous' art. As Adorno puts it in his letter to Benjamin 
in response to Benjamin's, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction', 
I now find it disquieting 
... 
that you now casually transfer the concept of 
magical aura to the 'autonomous work of art' and flatly assign to the 
latter a counter-revolutionary function. I need not assure you that I am 
fully aware of the. magical element in the bourgeois work of art 
(particularly since I constantly attempt to expose the bourgeois 
philosophy of idealism, which is associated with the concept of 
aesthetic autonomy as mythical in the fullest sense). However, it seems 
to me that the centre of the autonomous work of art does not itself 
belong on the side of myth 
... 
but is inherently dialectical; within itself it 
juxtaposes the magical and the mark of freedorrL.. Dialectical though 
your essay may be, it is not so in the case of the autonomous art work 
itself; it disregards an elementary experience which becomes more 
evident to me every day in my own musical experience 
- 
that precisely 
the uttermost consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws of 
autonomous art changes this art and instead of rendering it into a taboo 
or fetish, brings it close to the state of freedorn, of something that can be 
consciously produced and made 
... 
The reification of a great work of art 
is not just loss, any more than the reif ication of the cinema is all loss. It 
would be a bourgeois reaction to negate the reification of the cinema in 
the name of the ego, and it would border upon anarchism to revoke the 
reification of a great work of art in the spirit of immediate use- 
values 
... 
Both bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements of 
change 
... 
Both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which however 
they do not add up. It would be romantic to sacrifice one to the other, 
either as the bourgeois romanticism of the conservation of personality 
and all that stuff 
.. 
or as the anarchistic romanticism of blind confidence 
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in the spontaneous power of the proletariat in the historical process -a 
proletariat which is itself the product of bourgeois society. " 46 
I dwell on this connection between Adorno and Benjamin in relation to Clark, 
because of their commitment to an immanent criticism, and the drawing upon the 
potential for art, or the mediation of the social by art, which Clark shares or 
desires. Adomo and Benjamin also demonstrate the struggle involved in the 
immanent critique of art, to resist the passing of art into the (re)-enchantment of 
the commodity form, or more exactly, in the case of Benjamin, to prize open that 
hardened commodity and recognise its origin 'dialectically' as a dynamic 
between a hidden past and an unknown future. The work of Adorno and 
Benjamin is imbued with a certain melancholic imaginary, possibly more 
positive in its terms of reference than that detectable in Clark, with his over- 
riding premise of thefailure of modernity and a presaged memory of politics and 
mourning of arL47 
But this strand of Marxism had to stand side by side with, perhaps holding its 
ground against, another branch of Marxism. Gramsci and Althusser began to 
hold sway in the burgeoning discipline of Cultural Studies in the late seventies 
and eighties. Both Gramsci's concept of hegemony and Althusser's concept of 
'interpellation' attested not so much to the 'damaged life' brought about by 
capitalism, but to the more subtle operations by which power gained consent and 
even constructed identities. 
"Adomo, T., 'Letter to Walter BenjaminMarch, 1936' in Aesthetics and Politics. (eds). Bloch, 
E., Lukacs, G., Brecht, B., Benjamin, W., Adorrio, T., trans. Taylor, R., afterword by Jameson, 
F., (London: New Left Books, 1979), 121-123. 
471 sometimes wonder if this is true even of Benjamin in his most optimistic texts, which are 
coming up to the front line of the enemy, but never quite shaking off the spirit of the 'last 
redoubt'? Clark appears to 'declare' this in the title of his book, published in 1999, which 
reworks and reconfigures a project, which he has sustained over some thirty years, as Farewell to 
an Idea. See Clark, T. J., Farewell to an Idea: episodes in the history ofModernism. The impact 
of the book seems to derive significantly from the depth of Clark's engagement in the 
inconsistencies and limits of representations, which are put to the test by, and almost expose, 
what Clark refers to in the Manet book as "a reality more basic than themselves" and "the test of 
social practice", and comes up again in Farewell... as a (possibly) mournful gloss on 
modernism's failed possibilities to transform seeing beyond capitalism's envisioning. This begs 
the question of what the 'reality more basic' and 'social practice' might be presumed to be and 
the extent to which art is that which n-dght present the 'Idea"'of 'the real'. 
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Freudian and later Lacanian concepts were important for Althusser, 
- 
suggesting 
how the social totality, and the place of the subject within it, could be considered 
in ways other than those that Althusser took to be a misplaced humanism or 
empiricism. Here were the beginnings of a key shift in the understanding of 
structure and agency, which questioned the fundamental Marxist tenets of 
ideology and consciousness. For Althusser, society is not an expressive totality, 
but a structured ensemble of practices, which, including those classically thought 
of as super-structural, are read as exercising relatively autonomous influence 
upon the social formation as structures-in-dominance, in accordance with the 
concept, borrowed from Freud, of over-determination. It is the mutual 
interdependence and different permutations of contradiction between these 
practices that brings about social formation and change with the positioning of 
social subjects, not the conscious will of the subject. Ideology- like the 
unconscious 
- 
is an immutable structure and practice within society. Wis the 
structural and material articulation of the imaginary relationship of social 
subjects to their real conditions of existence. Ideology works in all types of 
society as a means of adapting men and women to their conditions of existence, 
securing the reproduction of the relations of production. It does not operate at the 
level of a 'false consciousness' but is, in a specific sense, 'profoundly 
unconscious'. It is the way in which men and women experience their worlds, a 
matter of the 'lived' relation between men and women and their world; that 
which connects a 'real relation' with an imaginary or 'lived relation'. Ideology 
is an inescapable, functional system of imaginary representations, by way of 
concrete institutions and social practices, because all social structures are 
necessarily opaque to those occupying places within them. Further to this, 
utilising Lacan's concept of the subject's 'imaginary' identification of self, in the 
4mirror stage', this functioning of ideology works through the interpellation of 
the subject as subject. Ideology 'constitutes' concrete individuals as subjects; 
analogous to Freud's 'unconscious' as 'initiated' by the objective structure of the 
family. 48 The rapprochement with Freud and Lacan enables Althusser to link 
48 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in Lenin and Philosophy and 
Other Essays, trans. B Brewster, Lenin and Philosophy (London and New York: New Left 
Books, 197 1) 
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Freud's concept of 'negation' with Lacan's '(mis) recognition'. As the film 
historian David Rodowick explains: 
For Althusser, the classical subject of philosophy 
- 
defined by self- 
identity, self-consciousness and non-contradiction is of no use for 
comprehending [the] problem (of subjects adherence to roles which are 
constituted by and in ideological apparatuses). Rather one must turn to 
psychoanalytic models of identification and the construction of 
subjectivity that describe the subject as divided within itself and capable 
of acting on contradictory relations of knowledge and behaviour. 49 
Freud's 'negation' enables an understanding of how an individual can hold 
mutually contradictory beliefs, both affirming and denying the 'truth' of an event 
without acknowledging contradiction. Lacan's imaginary splits the subject 
between recognition and mis-recognition, such that a subject submits to ideology 
either as a recognition of self or an idealised mis-recognition, 'given' as an 
idealised ego-category of subjectivity. Such recognition enables the subject to be 
sustained in practical knowledge but, crucial to Althusser, is the stance that it is 
only scientific, theoretical practice, which produces actual knowledge. The 
science of society will not coincide with the 'lived relations' of its social 
subj ects. 
For Althusser, empiricist epistemologies conflated the 'real' with the 'thought- 
of-the-real' in a 'pre-scientific' ideology of the 'perceiving subject'. Theory 
itself is a practice, transforming raw material into a product. Only the theory of 
theoretical practice (dialectical materialism) is able to criticise ideology in all its 
guises, including those of theory itself. Subsequently, through his reading of 
Lenin, Althusser politicised theoretical practice by aligning philosophical 
idealism with bourgeois class dominance, in opposition to Lenin's theoretical 
practice of proletarian scientific materialism. Theory itself became a site of class 
struggle. 50 
49 Rodowick, D., The Crisis ofPofitical Modernism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 
31. 
50 Althusser, L., Lenin and Philosophy(London: New Left Books, 197 1. 
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That said, Althusser returns the concrete, material practices of ideology to the 
single, ultimately determinative principle-determination in the last instance by 
the economy. This produces a flaw in his system. Returning the structures and 
functions of the social totality to the ultimate determining principle of the 
economic, and retaining the concept of ideology with all that it implies in terms 
of the relationship between the economic and political moments of the social, 
renders the concept of overdetermination and the interpellation of subjectivities 
compromised. Overdetermination is limited to the point of redundancy inasmuch 
as the economic as the single determinative principle determines structures and 
functions as necessary, so that the field of over-determination is not constitutive 
but merely that of contingent variation. Similarly, with ideology operant within a 
structure already determined by the economic, no matter the means by which it 
functions as a practice, its function remains that of positioning/interpellating 
subjects in and on the terrain of class positions, constituted elsewhere by the 
econoMy. 51 
Nevertheless, it is the radicalisation of over-determination, and a closer 
adherence to its conceptualisation within Freud's psychoanalysis, later allied to 
Lacan, which is one of the key elements in opening up the closure and limits of 
theorisations of the social as a totality, particularly in relation to the 'discursive' 
as the productive site of identity, and its cultural meanings and differences, no 
52 
matter how contradictory that identity formation might be. 
51 Althusser, L., 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' in For Marx (London: Verso, 1979), 89- 
116. This was the critique of Althusser coming 'from the other side', as it were, which took his 
reference to "culmination of 'contradictions'-some of which are radically heterogeneous 
- 
of 
different origins, different sense, different levels and points of application... " (Tontradiction and 
Overdetermination', I 10) as evidence that there was no necessary correspondence between 
different levels of contradiction, their effects and the economic. Hence the critical argument that 
if the 'economic' returns as a 'necessity' in Althusser's theory, the theory's entire conceptual 
basis is undermined. 
52 This radicalisation in one formulation takes the next step from 'no necessary correspondence' 
to 'necessarily no correspondence'. As Stuart Hall points out, "Althusser allows me to think 
'difference in a particular way which is rather different from the subsequent traditions which 
sometimes acknowledge him as their originator. If you look at discourse theory [and here Hall 
particularly identifies Screen], you will see there, not only the shift from practice to discourse, 
but also how the emphasis on difference 
- 
the plurality of discourses, the perpetual slippage of 
meaning, the endless sliding of the signifier 
- 
is sometimes pushed beyond the point where it is 
capable of theorizing the necessary uneveness of a formation, or even the 'unity in difference' of 
a complex structure. " Hall, S., 'Signification, Representation, Ideology' in Cultural Studies and 
Communications (eds). Curran, J., Morley, D., Walkerdine, V., (London: Arnold, 1996), 12. 
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It was the utilisation of Freud's psychoanalysis and Lacan's bringing together a 
theorisation of subjectivity with language as a signifying practice, instrumental 
in the production of subjectivity, which, for feminism especially, offered a 
challenge to the Marxist paradigm, which provided no theory of the subject, 
other than as 'class subject' and no adequate account of the specificities of the 
position of women within the economically determined stratifications of the 
social. It was this coming together of psychoanalytic theories of the subject and 
structuralist accounts of meaning as produced in signification, which were 
questioning Marxists' historical accounts of ideology and class-consciousness. It 
is here that the debates within feminism seem to me to most forcefully come into 
play, although the terrain of the feminist debate and its influence in relation to 
wider issues of the aesthetic and the political was not always acknowledged or 
connected up within the pages of Screen. 53 
From the critique of signification, following Althusser and the implication of 
ideological practices as signifying practices, there derived a perspective to treat 
the differing practices, be they scientific, aesthetic or social, as texts, in order to 
uncover the materiality of textual production which 'idealist' reading obscures. 54 
This fed into, to bring us back to that moment of Screen, the newly invigorated 
politics of culture, in the wake of the political activism of 1968 and the early 
53 This of course went further than putting 'woman' into the framework of Marxist analysis. As 
noted elsewhere in this thesis, within feminism the thcory/practice conjuncture in the seventies 
and eighties brought about an increasing divergence between a feminism premised upon the 
visibility of woman and a feminism premised on discursivity. Considering feminism politically 
had become divided between a politics of 'women' 
- 
how women are represented as a 'category' 
within society, its structures, institutions and cultural formations and yet how women, as such a 
category, can act as agents of change and challenge to these representations and a politics of 
difference, which involves the destabilising of the term, the meaning of 'woman' itself. This 
rethinking of the subject in terms coming from psychoanalysis and especially the 'split' between 
'language' and 'body' which Lacanian psychoanalysis enabled to be thought, meant a recasting 
of the political at the level of the discursive and signification, in as much as neither 'woman', 
'gender' 'the social' or 'the political' are given terms in advance of the contingency of discursive 
relation and signifying practice. 54 This was particularly evident in the influential journal Tel Quel, which brought Althusser and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, by way of Julia Kristeva, together in a rethinking of 'textual' analysis 
as a 'semiotic' as, "the material character of the signifier and the practice of writing as the 
subversion of conventional codes, especially those of representation and a destructuration of the 
conscious subject in favour of a subject fissured or split by articulation with the order of the 
unconscious and his or her own body". See Wollen, P., 'Ontology and Materialism in Film', 
Screen, 17.1 (1976): 13, quoted in Rodowick, D., The Crisis of Political Modernism, 32. 
57 
seventies and its subsequent decline. The debates were on again, in the seventies 
with significant reference to earlier historical moments; Russia in the twenties, 
Germany in the thirties, 55 but they were here also being problematised by the 
radicalisations of Althusser and structuralism and post-structuralism. Lines were 
being drawn between, on one side, that of meanings being attributable to 
consciousness, arising from 'pre-given' class formations, as the conditions of 
existence for consciousness and which the meanings of cultural artefacts 
grepresent' or articulate and, on the other side, with the impact of those 
influences from and poststructuralist radicalisations of Louis Althusser's 
'structural' Marxism, the argument that such consciousness and meanings were 
not prior to, but were constituted and potentially 'de-constituted' by the very 
practices of signification. 
Within the journal at that time, there were a number of positions drawn 
increasingly in support of 'counter-cinema'; films which, by way of self- 
reflexive devices and distanciation, or what were referred to (by Clark) as 'dis- 
56 identificatory' practices 
, 
put into question the ideologically constitutive effects 
of representation, precisely through reference to their own material devices for 
producing meaning; or 'counter-ideological' cinema which, whilst ostensibly 
fon-nally coherent as ideological production, under the scrutiny of 'symptomatic' 
reading, reveals cracks and fissures; the splitting through internal tension, 
making 'the ideology' itself present in the film. Clark asks in his article "do dis- 
identificatory practices matter? " and, it seems to me, this was at the heart of 
various positions in the Screen debates. 
55 The debates in the seventies and eighties either directly drew upon or evoked remarkable 
similarities to those earlier twentieth century debates on aesthetics, which were characterised by 
a broad opposition between modernism and realism; those between Bertolt Brecht and Georg 
Lukacs were seminal. To oversimplify, in terms of the 'translation' of thirties debates in the 
context of the seventies, 
, 
the debate was a contestation between two types of form, which were 
considered mutually exclusive epistemologically. The 'realist' text assumes a transmission of 
knowledge to the reader, whose position is stabilised through a more or less invisible discursive 
apparatus. The 'modernist' text disturbs the unified view or self-presence of the reader by 
working against identification, especially by drawing attention to the workings of its own textual 
processes. See 'Brecht against Lukacs' and 'Afterword' by Jameson, F., inAesthetics and 
Politics London, 196-213. 
56 Clark, T. J, "Preliminaries... " 37 
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Laura Mulvey's seminal article, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', makes 
a clear stake for an 'avant-garde' or 'counter' cinematic practice, in as much as 
her analysis articulates a 'masculine' look as the premise for representation or 
'interpellation' of subjectivities. Insofar as the aesthetic text may 'interpellate' 
subjects within the structures of voyeurism and scocophilia, as identified by 
Freud, the imaging of woman presents a potential 'threat' to the process of denial 
and idealised ego identification upon which such interpellation depends. Hence 
the necessity for the mastery of this contradiction through the 'norms' of (realist) 
identificatory symbolic processes constituting the pleasures of 'mainstream' 
cinema and, in consequence, the need for 'politically and aesthetically avant- 
garde cinema', which will undercut the satisfaction and reinforcement of the ego 
and negate the transparency of the narrative device; "to free the look of the 
camera into its materiality in time and space and the look of the audience into 
dialectics and passionate detachment". 57 
57 Mulvey, L., 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', 26.1 am not necessarily going along with 
the binary opposition between 'realist' and 'avant-garde' practices which preoccupied Screen and 
its influences and the reference to dialectics suggests some ultimate 'reconciliation' of the 
cinematic practice with identity, albeit negatively. Indeed, I suggest hat Mulvey's 'counter' 
example points to something beyond received notions of 'avant-garde' cinema and the framing of 
pleasure' by Freudian concepts. Jean-Luc Nancy, writing on Kant's difference between the 
aesthetic of the beautiful and the sublime makes this distinction and, along with it, identifies 
something like the 'end' and 'beginning' of art. "Indeed, the beautiful is perhaps only an 
intermediate, ungraspable formation, impossible to fix except as a limit, a border, a place of 
equivocation (but perhaps also of exchange) between the agreeable and the sublime, that is, 
between enjoyment and joy 
... 
If a transport of the beautiful into the sublime is indeed the 
counterpart or reversal of its sliding into the agreeable 
... 
and if in the agreeable the beautiful 
ultimately loses its quality of beauty (for in enjoyment, the beautiful as satisfied or satisfying 
, the beautiful is finished 
- 
and art along with it), then one must expect the beautiful truly to attain 
its 'proper' quality only in another sort of departure from itself 
- 
into the sublime. That is, the 
beautiful becomes beautiffil only beyond itself, or else it slides into the space this side of itself. 
By itself, it has no position. Either it achieves itself 
- 
in satisfaction, or philosophy 
- 
or it 
suspends itself, unachieved, in the sublime (and in art, or at least in art that has not been sublated 
by philosophy). " [One might add or psychoanalysis, or structuralism, or structural Marxism] 
Nancy, J-L., 'The Sublime Offering' in Of the Sublime Presence in Question (eds). Courtine, J-F. 
et al, 
, 
(New York: SUNY, 1993), 33-34. Add to this, however, a more recent meditation by 
Nancy on cinema, "Cinema is marked by the heaviest and most ambiguous of signs 
- 
myth, 
mass, power, money, vulgarity, circus games, exhibitionism and voyeurism. But all that is carried 
off in an endless movement to such an extent that evidence becomes that of passage rather than 
some epiphany of meaning or presence. Cinema is truly the art-in any case the technique 
- 
of a 
world that suspends myths. Even if it has put itself in the service of myths, at the limit, it finishes 
by taking them away; it carries off all epiphanies of meaning and of immobile presence in to the 
evidence of movement. " Nancy, J-L., The Evidence offilm (Brussels: Yves Gevaert 
publications, 2001), 78. 
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TJ Clark's reading and Marxism 
Clark's text is an intervention within this arena, which brings to bear his 
scepticism towards readings that attempt to politicise art works solely on the 
basis of their formal devices or their medium, and to that effect, pronounce them 
'avant-garde'. Such readings devalue accessibility and some kind of 'intelligible; 
or, more precisely in Clark's account, 'vivid' mode of address, which reaches 
beyond 'medium'. 
Clark's text begins what he would continue the next year in his critical encounter 
with Clement Greenberg's discourse on ModerniSM. 58 Suffice to say, it is the 
debate with Greenberg and, to a lesser extent, with Michael Fried, which has 
carried more weight in art history circles. The Screen text, and perhaps more 
significantly, why it appeared in Screen at all, has barely been referenced in the 
annals of this conjuncture in art history, suggesting that the project of 
understanding 'signifying practices in structural relationship to other signifying 
practices in a culture', together with a criticism focused on "the regimes of 
looking allowed to the spectator by texts and their institutional placing 
... 
effected 
by a serniotic analysis which insisted on the artistic text as the product of a social 
practice rather than a naturalised representation of reality"59 and Clark's attempt 
to address the implications of this in terms of the theoretical terrain that appeared 
to go with this project was quickly subsumed as part of a pervasive move 
towards 'identity politics'. 
Central to Clark in this article is the presentation of an argument for an 
intelligibility and determinateness of the art object, which seeks to address an 
historical situation 'outside of itself', to address a class formation, and a site of 
class struggle in the 'real', which is to say, an art object which is intelligible 'for 
the class', which is resistant to the dominant class, and resists its own 'decline' 
58See Clark, T. J. 'Clement Greenberg's Theory of Art', Critical Inquiry, 9.1,, September (1982): 
139-156. This edition of the journal was a special issue based on the symposium, 'The Politics of 
Interpretation' held at University of Chicago, 198 1. Michael Fried's 'How Modernism Works: a 
response to T. J. Clark' was delivered at the symposium and also published in the same issue of 
Critical Inquiry. Clark' response to Fried, 'Arguments about Modernism: A Reply to Michael 
Fried' was published in Mitchell, W. J. T. (Ed) The Politics of Interpretation, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 239-248. All three articles are included in Frascina, F. (ed) Pollock 
and After. - The Critical Debate. (London: Harper and Row, 1985), 47-88. 
59 See 'Editorial' to Screen, Vol. 21, No. 1, (1980) in which Clark's article appears. 
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into self-negation in the face of the abandonment of art to the commodity, by the 
class that first gave art its social base. His position here, to an extent, reflects the 
views of the Frankfurt School that the 'class of capitalism' was producing the 
decline of its own culture in its intensification of 'industrialised entertainment' 
and commercialised gratification, as referred to above. That said, his position on 
an art, which resists decline as empty negation, is different from Adorno's. 
Adomo holds out for an art that resists commodification and 'spectacularisation' 
by means of the integral tension between its autonomous 'laws' of production 
and mimetic resolution in 'harmony'. It is precisely through its failure, its 
dissonant resistance to harmony, that art resists the power of re-enchantment into 
capitalist commodity. Clark's position is marked by his involvement with the 
Situationist International and their theorisation and condemnation of the 'Society 
of the Spectacle'. In his book on Manet, Clark cites Guy Debord and argues that 
Paris in 1865 represented the beginnings of such a society, whereby "The 
, 
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spectacle is capital accumulated until it becomes an image'. Clark's particular 
take on modernism, modernity, Marxism and art cannot be separated from this 
Situationist history. The Situationist project was driven by the necessity to think 
and undo the regimen of representation under capitalism, in which art was 
inevitably caught up, even more so in its separation from everyday life. 
According to Situationism, an 'avant-garde' art as a negative dialectic offering 
the last redoubt against or the only possible hope in the face of capital's 
representational insurgencies, as per Adorno, asked the wrong questions of and 
provided the wrong solutions for art. 
In fact the industrialisation of art is already a fait accompli 
... 
Alienated 
society, by revealing its perfect compatibility with the work of art and 
growing dependence on it, has betrayed the alienation of art in the 
harshest and least flattering light possible. Art, like the rest of the 
spectacle, is, no more than the organisation of everyday life in a form 
where its true nature can at most be dismissed and turned into the 
60 As Clark points out in his gloss on 'spectacle' in the introduction to the Manet book, the 
concept is not 'cut and dried' but was the mainstay of the Situationist International's attempt to 
theorise the extent of capitalism's penetration into the very interstices of everyday life, public 
and private, work, family, leisure such that 'lived reality' became more and more actualised 
through the 'appearance' of a reality brought about by capitalism's increasing self-production 
without end; its production of the very time and space through which reality was experienced. 
See Debord, G., Society of the Spectacle, passim. 
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appearance of its opposite; where exclusion can be made to seem 
participation, where one way transmission can be made to seem 
communication, where loss of reality can be made to seem realisation. 
61 
The influence of Hegel, young Marx and Georg Lukacs's History and Class 
Consciousness on Situationist thinking, in terms of the relationship between the 
alienation of self-consciousness and reffication and modes of representation, 
cannot be overlooked. Debord's text is punctuated with references to Hegel and 
9 62 young Hegelianism'. This, too, will persist with Clark. One might consider, 
however, that the logic of the Situationist's position on art calls for the 
dissolution of art ý11 together, as separate activity, as representative of the 
capitalist 'totalitarianism of the fragment' and its sublation into a 'truly' creative 
practice of 'everyday life. Clark acknowledges the irony of the position of 
Situationism in the Manet book, 
The notion of spectacle 
... 
was designed first and foremost as a weapon of 
combat, and contains within itself a more or less bitter (more or less 
resigned) prediction of its own reappearance in some such form as this, 
between the covers of a book on art 
... 
I wish at least to alert the reader to 
the absurdity involved in making 'spectacle' [as a concept working at 
and pushing at the margins of a 'handed-down' Marxism (my comment)] 
part of the canon of academic Marxism. 63 
Clark will make his position tenable through his academic attempt to unravel 
something like the beginnings of 'spectacle' in "a shift 
- 
to some extent an 
oscillation 
- 
from one kind of production to another' 9 64 in nineteenth century 
Paris, mapping modernism on this. (Clark's later book Farewell to an Idea will 
expand the terrain of both). The map is (precisely) not a close fit. His abiding 
61 From Clark, Gray, Radcliffe, Nicholson-Smith, 'The English Section of the Situationist 
International (1967)', The Revolution ofModern Art and the Modern Art ofRevolution, (London: 
Chronos Publications/ Boomerang Pamphlet Series, no. 3), 13. 
62 The dependence of the concept of 'spectacle' upon a Hegelian logic of the coming to 
consciousness of the inherent contradictions of capitalism and the commodity form in order to be 
overcome, combined with Lukacs' thesis of the recognition by the proletariat of its alienated and 
reffied existence has been well documented by Anselm Jappein: Jappe, A., 'The Concept of 
Spectacle. ' Guy Debord. trans. Nicholson-Smith, D., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), 143. 
63 Clark, T. J., The Painting ofModern Life, 10. 
64 Clark, T. J., The Painting ofModern Life, 9 
62 
interest is in how modem art negotiates this burgeoning spectacle (and its own 
precipice of becoming/being the commodity-form par excellence), at the same 
time as confronting the inconsistencies, the paradoxes, even the 'deviation' 
between painting and representation as such. In this sense he certainly reads 
painting. But such a reading is framed by an 'arche' principle or telos of 
intelligibility in terms of the real; for which think 'real conditions of existence'; 
the realm of necessity; class struggle, 'out there', or 'more basic; true. This is 
attested to throughout Clark's work; from the Screen article: 
... 
artistic practice will have to address itself to the specific positioning 
of the body in the economic, political and ideological practices 
... 
it has 
to articulate the relations between its own minor acts of disobedience 
ands the major struggles 
- 
the class struggle 
- 
which define the body 
and dismantle and renew its representations. Otherwise its acts wili be 
insignificant 
- 
as Manet's were, I believe, in 1865.65 
It is articulated with more nuances in the Manet book: 
But if class could be shown to belong to that body; if it could be seen to 
remake the basic categories of nudity and nakedness; if it became a 
matter of the body's whole address and arrangement, something read on 
the body, in the body, in ways the spectator could not focus 
discrirninately 
- 
then the circuit would be broken, and the category 
courtesan replaced by others less absolute and comforting. The body 
and money would not be unmediated terms any longer, intersecting in 
the abstract, out there in the hinterland of images; they would take their 
place as determinate facts in a particular class formation 
... 
Of course, it 
is not very likely that a picture on its own could do any such thing. 
Ideologies are not magically dismantled in single works of art; and if 
paintings try too hard to anticipate social process, they run the risk of 
ending up speaking to nobody, neither those inside the world of 
ideology nor those existing at its edges. It remains to be seen how 
successful Olympia was in redescribing the nude. And whether the price 
of success was too high. 66 
65 Clark, T. J., 'Preliminaries to a possible treatment of Manet's Olympia in 1865', 38. 66 Clark, T. J., 'Olympia's Choice', The Painting ofModern Life, 118-119. 
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It resumes variously in Farewell to an Idea. This example, removed from the 
context of Bolshevik utopianism, illustrates Clark's debate with the art of 
Malevich and El Lissitzky and the subsequent (horrific) 'failure' of the utopian 
moment. 
Part of the utopianism I sympathise with. Particularly the implication 
that there is a deep connection between the representational order 
called capitalism and the belief (which we would call for short 
Sausserian) that all representational orders are systems of difference, of 
pure exchange values generated out of the relations between the 
elements of a signifying system. Marxists would say that the insight 
here 
... 
occludes the further problem of the sign-system's materiality, 
and thus their belonging to patterns of material production and 
reproduction which we call social practice. (The stress here is on the 
historical, material place and determination of the whole language 
game, not just the phenomenal 'stuff' of any one token within it. 
Obviously the least modernist or serniotician is capable of recognizing 
-I would say, fetishizing - the latter. ) 
... 
the point is that the further field 
of problems is what, within the signifying regime we belong to, has not 
to be thought. Everything about the forces and relations of symbolic 
production under capitalism encourages the fantasy that meanings are 
the product of a self-enclosed circuit or system, opening nowhere onto 
the realm of necessity. Pure presence wars eternally with pure absence, 
the latter winning hands down. Signification is imagined always under 
the sign of money or nowadays of similar action (conversion) at a 
distance, happening in the 'ether' of information 
... 
It takes a very 
special (and no doubt terrible) moment for these structures to be 
thinkable as socially determined. 67 
And then 
. 
..... Art, in our culture, finds itself more and more at the limits, on the 
verge of emptiness and silence. So that practitioners have continually been 
forced to recognize how little space, or representational substance, they are given 
to work with (my emphasis) in the all-consuming world of goods. 68 
I come back to this again in this chapter as what I am setting out here as Clark's 
'position' manifests itself in other contexts, that of the Screen article and his 
67 Clark T. J., Farewell To an Idea, 259-260. 
68 Ibid., 407. 
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books, but also as stated previously, his debates with Greenberg and Fried. 69 The 
point of my emphases is to indicate the extent to which, for Clark, putting it 
bluntly and crudely here, the 'world' of the social relations of production 'comes 
before art', as that which art both is a part but has to work with, and in the best 
of cases, opens onto necessity, in some meaningful sense, which can escape the 
subterfuge of ideology (and capitalism's mechanisation of social relations) and 
accede to 'knowledge' of these social relations (and how they might be 
otherwise, or perhaps not now). This position certainly recognises the extent to 
which symbolic production is, as Nancy puts it, "the self-suppression of capital" 
as "the self-surpassing [that] takes place as the symbolisation of production 
itself, which allows for coexistence only in the form of the technical or socio- 
economic co-ordination of the various commodity networks". 70 But it does not 
allow for a thinking of symbolic production otherwise than in accordance with 
the thinking of appearance versus idea; sense versus intelligibility; thus the 
notion that an artwork might or might not 'dismantle ideology', a kind of 'good 
mimesis' versus 'bad mimesis' argument. 
The significant and recurring themes throughout Clark's 'Olympia' text in 
Screen are the importance of historically situating Manet's Olympia as an object 
addressing a public (and the ensuing incomprehension of this audience); the need 
69 For Greenberg see below. Clark's ongoing debate with Michael Fried, who has also written on 
Courbet and Manet, has been focussed on Fried's insistence upon a phenomenological 
materialism in his reading of art, such that the history of modernism is a history of the artist's 
'problem' of painting and the body (the artist's body) and that of the beholder who is, of course, 
both the artist him/herself and the beholder as 'other'. Courbet's 'realism' and Manet's 
'modemism' are historically distinct but nevertheless versions of this approach. See Fried, M., 
Courbet's Realism, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Fried, M., Manet's 
Modernism: theface ofpainting in the 1860s, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
Around the time of writing the Screen article, Clark appeared to have little truck with such an 
approach, as evidenced in his response to Fried's riposte to Clark's polemic against Greenberg's 
theory of modemism. Clark wrote, "It is not enough in this connection, for Fried to deny that he 
posits 'a distinct realm of the pictorial', since his critical practice so insistently reinstates one, in 
the same sentence we find him saying that painting's engagement 'with what it is not', though 
inevitable, 'places in jeopardy its very identity'. But why on earth should it? And isn't an account 
of painting which sees it as gaining its various identities through engagement with what it is not 
automatically foreclosed by Fried's formulations? Won't he rule out my account of Picasso say, 
on the grounds that it does not grasp how separate and sustaining the 'enterprise of painting' was 
for the artist in question? In critical practice, isn't any account of modem art's engagement with 
what it is not dismissed as being beside the great ontological point? And when it comes to 
ontology, all the nods to Merleau-Ponty cannot save Fried's prose from sounding like old-time 
religion. " Clark, T. J., 'Arguments about Modernism: a reply to Michael Fried', published in 
Frascina, F., ed Pollock and After, 86. 
70 Nancy, J-L., 'Being Singular Plural', 50. 
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to l9cate this address in the specificities of a complex historical situation where 
the former ideological certainties securing the social order and the orders of class 
position and sexual exploitation as, in Clark's terms, part of that ordering of 
classes, were beginning to break down. Here again it is significant to note the 
absence from Clark's text of any critical engagement with the 'feminist' 
ideology of sex, despite its increasing presence as a challenge to Marxist 
orthodoxies; the need to resist an affirmative reading of signifying practice of 
Manet's Olympia as a set of 'self-reflexive devices' resistant to ideological 
effects and thereby inaugural of a politically challenging modernist art; and the 
corollary to this, the need to question whether Manet's Olympia risks situating 
itself; situating the body of 'Olympia' within a representation which resonates 
with other social practices 'outside' of 'art'; or whether it remains within the 
'self-declared' confines of art as a form of negation, emptying itself of meaning, 
ultimately reconciling itself to the society of spectacle which had abandoned it to 
its own devices in the first place. This historical reading of Manet is clearly 
meant to have its effects as an intervention within the contemporary debates in 
Screen and I contextualise this more closely below. 
The argument I present in respect of Clark's reading is that, in his need to contest 
the claims for modem art as politically effective, and to present the limitations of 
those arguments which support 'modernist self-reflexive' practices and the 
'foregrounding of medium', which is the basis for his article in Screen, with 
Manet's Olympia as his example, he argues a Marxist position which comes up 
against its own limits. 
In arguing the case for intelligibility, in his particular sense of address, 
belonging, vividness and knowledge, Clark has to posit a distinction between the 
intelligible and the sensible, but he then must absorb the sensible into the 
intelligible. He assumes that art does/should resonate with other social practices, 
as part of its position within the social totality, but in so doing, he falls into a 
mimetic logic and an argument for an originary site of meaning, whereby, it is 
those other social practices, which give 'meaning' to the work, from their 
position, outside of it. As such, it is those other 'meanings', already existent, 
4pre-given' in the formed class-consciousness, which the work should address. 
66 
Under such a logic, if Clark were to read Olympia as both 'exposed to' its-self 
(in its stricture between art and commodity) and to other social practices and 
meanings, which are themselves 'exposed' and caught at the limit of meaning, 
not existent as essentialised class positions and forms of class consciousness, this 
is negative reading. He does not read Olympia as a site of an 'event' of meaning 
that might still breach the closure threatened by the emptying of meaning into 
spectacle, but which, as an 'event' is unpredictable, the effects of which cannot 
be read off in advance, nor necessarily assumed as fully readable 'after the 
event'. In his reply to Peter Wollen, who defended modernism in response to 
Clark's article 71 
, 
Clark argues for an art that has vividness for someone, with 
inconsistencies and contradictions, which nevertheless "strike the viewer or 
reader as qualifying a meaning in some pertinent way" (my emphasis). 72 This 
confirms that mimetic relation; that the work addresses that ultimate meaning, 
(still) existing elsewhere, presupposed as able to be grasped by the consciousness 
of the ('classed') viewer. 
We might find ourselves asking more often than is usual in modernist 
practice and commentary, questions of the form: Who is this work of art 
for? Who might its public be (who did it want or intend to take that 
curious part? ) and how does it address them? How and how 
appropriately? Do its modes of address confirm certain kinds of 
dominance and misunderstanding, or refute them? Does thework attain 
to vividness for anyone? 73 
Clark explains this more in terms of social relations in his response to Clement 
Greenberg. 
There is an art 
-a modernist art - which has challenged the notion that 
art stands only to suffer from the fact that now all meanings are 
disputable. There is an art 
- 
Brecht's is only the most doctrinaire 
example 
- 
which says that we live not simply in a period of cultural 
decline, when meanings have become muddy and stale, but rather in a 
71 Wollen, P., 'Manet 
- 
Modernism and Avant Garde', 15-26. 
72 Clark, T. J., 'A note in Reply to Peter WolIen', 98. 
73 Jbid 
, 
98 
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period when one set of meanings 
- 
those of the cultivated classes 
- 
is 
fitfully contested by those who stand to gain from their collapse. There 
is a difference in other words between Alexandrianism and class 
struggle. The twentieth century has elements of both situations about it 
and that is why Greenberg's description, based on the Alexandrian 
analogy, applies as well as it does. But the end of the bourgeoisie is not, 
or will not be, like the end of Ptolemy's patriciate. And the end of its art 
will be likewise unprecedented. It will involve and has involved as part 
of the practice of modernism 
-a search for another place in the social 
order. Art wants to address someone, it wants something precise and 
extended to do; it wants resistance, it needs criteria; it will take risks in 
74 
order to find them, including the risk of its own dissolution. 
Two interacting logics are prevailing here in Clark's reading. One is the 
philosophical-political presupposition of a social order and the dialectical 
interplay between the 'collapse' of one hitherto dominant part of that order and 
its 'overcoming' by another hitherto repressed part; the Hegelian-Marxist 
ontology of being as 'community', as conflicting social relations. The other is 
art's mimetic relation to this. That these logics are inter-related derives 
ultimately from the philosophical metaphysical unifying principle of the logos, 
which predominates in the thinking of both the social (community) and art as 
essence as opposed to, as Jean-Luc Nancy insistently re-thinks, the principle of 
the being-with of existence as a singular plural. 75 
74 Clark, T. J., 'Clement Greenberg's Theory of Art', Frascina F., ed. Pollock and After, 60. 
75 Nancy considers 'the social' and 'art' in relation to his idea of the 'singular plural', as the event 
of the 'being-with' of existence, right at the existence of the 'with' prior to or otherwise than any 
abstraction into an 'idea', whether that be 'class formations' or Heidegger's Dasein. Both these 
concepts of Being, as Nancy argues, ultimately depend upon an originating 'essence' or a 'one' 
even as this 'one' unfolds in negotiation with an 'other'. Nancy wants to think the being 'one' as 
always already other at the same time. In terms of the argument I am setting against Clark here, 
this means re-thinking an 'originating' social 'order' 
- 
even as that 'order' is shifting and 
complex, dissolving and re-forming in ways that are difficult to grasp and measure, as Clark has 
it, and an art that relates to this. For Nancy, social being is other than an originating 'position' 
vis-i-vis an 'other', but a continuing 'dis-position' 
- 
"The very simplicity of 'position' implies 
no more, although no less, than its being discrete, in the mathematical sense, or its distinction 
from, in the sense of with, other (at least possible) positions, or its distinction among, in the sense 
of between, other positions. In other words: every position is also a dis-position and considering 
the appearing that takes the place of and takes place in the position, all appearance is co- 
appearance. This is why the meaning of Being is given as existence, being-in 
-oneself-outside- 
oneself, which we make explicit 
... 
for the totality of beings. " Nancy, J-L., 'Being Singular Plural', 
12. Art and the social, the social and art are in a relation which is not ideological, dialectic, 
negative or affirmative, but is the continually untying and tying of relations which are always 
already both together and apart. Or, we might say Nancy's non-model of the continually 
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It is this re-thinking that I am gradually mobilising contra to what underlies 
Clark's reading of modernism and leads him to bid 'Farewell to an Idea', to the 
idea that art might address itself to that shifting field of social relations still 
governed by the arche-principle of class formations, in some coherent and vivid 
way, but also contra to those inflections of Marxism and structuralism which 
provided the context for Clark's intervention in Screen. With regard to the latter, 
as Nancy points out, we are by no means done with the ultimately logo-centric 
model of the social and the subject. 
So it is that in all quarters, the subject of the unconscious, the subject of 
history, the language-subject, the machine-subject, the text-subject, the 
body-subject, the subject of desire (and everywhere the subject declared 
to be the simple-effect-of-the-subject, have produced thus far only the 
aggravation, or even, to put it more simply and more imposingly, the 
exacerbation of the status of the SubjeCt. 76 
By thinking thus, one can avoid that opposition between a modernism of empty 
negation, which is that very negativity of the subject which the substratum of the 
subject subtends, and a modernism of political memorialisation or future telos 
which might 'address' the pre-surned subject of history and instead re-think 
history, memory, subject, art entirely differently in terms of the event of differ- 
ance, singular plural and a spatio-temporality of the giving of Being, beyond an 
economy of exchange or dialectic or past and future present 
. 
So now to turn to a 
more detailed account of Clark's reading of Manet's Olympia in order to uncover 
fragmenting, effracting of 'model' applies to both, in so far as they by means of this absolute 
fragmentation 'create' a world. 
76 Nancy, J-L., Ego Sum, Paris, Flammarion, 1979, p. 30 quoted in James, I., 'The Persistence of 
the Subject'Paragraph, 25.1, March (2002): 129 In contrast to the seeming impossibility of 
avoiding the 'exacerbation' of the Subject, Nancy proposes or exposes, prior to the philosophical, 
political or psychoanalytic subject, the 'spasmic' movement of the subject which aporetically 
withdraws as it emerges, disappears as it appears, is, only in so far as 'it' is this rupture both prior 
to and in excess of any thought ofthe subject; a kind of extension of space as a spacing which is 
an incommensurable extension of thought, as Ian James points out, and which returns to the idea 
of the 'singular plural', "Nancy is re-inscribing existence, each iff eplaceable human existence in 
ternn of singularity, one which is not subject to the law of the symbolic, the bar of castration and 
an economy of lack (and not it might also be said 
- 
subject to the subject of the materialist 
conception of history, in so far as the symbolic is always tied to (self) production. ) Nancy allows 
us to think of space, of, if you like the giving of Being 
... 
[A] singularity exists as such in relation 
to other singularities-thus we come to think space not as an objectifiable, mathematizable 
extension or presence, but as a temporal unfolding in which singularities, prior to any logic of the 
subject expose themselves to each other. " James, I., 'The Persistence of the Subject', 137. 
69 
the metaphysical philosophico-political position, I argue that it subtends. This 
will be done by weighing up the argument Clark has with strands of modernist 
criticism, be it the Althusserian-structuralist leanings of Screen or the ongoing 
debate with modernist art criticism, reconsidering the model of the social 
formation and class conflict which underpins Clark's position on art and the 
social in the light of 'post Marxist' radicalisations of certain Marxisms 77 ; this is 
further problematised by extrapolating on Derrida and Nancy's arguments 
concerning singularity and existence. 78 
Clark's reading 
I want to pose this as a problem for Marxist readings, as exemplified by Clark 
and now turn to a more detailed consideration of Clark's reading. Clark's interest 
was in investigating the critical reception of Manet's Olympia at the time of its 
entry to the Salon in 1865. Clark's concern was to try to unravel the 
circumstances which led to an unprecedented incomprehension on the part of the 
critics and as Clark suggests a 'failure to mean' of the work. 79 
He charts this through his interpretation of the failure of the critics to establish 
any reading of the work within the usual frames of reference and norms of 
critical vocabulary; he cites the scarcity of any reference to historical precedent 
77 Primarily Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's rethinking of the 'social' as a system of 
differences, only 'temporarily' articulated into a 'movement' or 'prevailing discourse' by way of 
a hegemonic relation. Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a 
radical democratic politics, (Londow, Verso, 1985). 
78 Broadly, and for the sake of my exposition, the distinction between Derrida and Nancy here on 
the question of 'singularity and existence' resides in emphases upon time and space by each in 
consideration of a shared re-thinking of spatio-temporality and Being and the being of the subject 
prior to' or in 'excess of' the modalities of thought handed down by the tradition of 
metaphysics. If, for Nancy, singularity and existence have to be re-treated politically right at the 
point of the 'with' of being-with, outside of any presumed thought of the totality or telos of 'pro- 
duction', for Derrida singularity and existence are spatio-temporally riven by an extreme 
temporality between a past that has never been present and a wholly unpredictable future; a past 
and future of the subject prior to any thinking of the presence of the subject; the 'secret' to which 
any linguistic act is always already a response without our 'knowing' this. Derrida has articulated 
this variously as 'differ-ance', the 'secret' of the 'spectre' and, whilst this thought of 'being' has 
always been political, it has been given greater political significance since Specters ofMarx 
made the distinction between an ontology of b6ing on which to base a politics and a 'hauntology' 
of being which takes account of this singular spatio-temporal dimension. See Derrida 'Passions: 
an oblique offering' especially pp. 24-31 in On the name. (trans). Wood, D., Leavey, J., McLeod, 
I., Palo Alto: University of Stanford, 1995), 3-3 1. 79 Clark, T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 38. 
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and the tradition of the Nude; the scarcity of reference to Manet's previous 
works; the failure (with perhaps one exception) to make any sense of the 
connection between the painting and its accompanying piece of poetic text; the 
4silent' or 'unspeakable' reaction to Olympia as a representation of prostitution. 
All such frames of reference, Clark suggests, would be a normal part of the 
network of ideological discourses available to critics, through which a reading 
and meaning of the painting might have been constructed. And yet, according to 
Clark, Olympia remained recalcitrant 
. 
80 The terms in which any critic was able to 
articulate a reaction to Olympia bordered on the inarticulate. Clark examines 
what he reads as this awkward response of the critics to Olympia in relation to 
the signs in the painting. Olympia's signs, he suggests, do not cohere, do not add 
up to a 'finished sentence'. Clark examines what amounts to the ineffectiveness 
andfailure to signify of the work and he seeks to position this politically, by 
questioning whether there were signs 'outside' of the painting, 'out there' in the 
society that Olympia could have articulated to different political effect. 81 
Clark's exegesis on the critical reception of Olympia centrcs upon art, class 
ideology, and sex. His aim is to situate the painting as a moment in a particular 
historical conjuncture and examine its 'political' effectiveness. 
In the Screen article, as I suggest above, this is in part a polemic against some 
versions of 'political effectiveness' allied to 'modernism' prevailing in Screen. 
Clark studies the evidence of the critical reception of the painting and folds into 
that, or folds that into his own close reading of the work. Clark is, of course, 
basing his critical investigation on a Marxist theory of art. The work of art is a 
social production, the meaning of which has to be read in accordance with the 
historical circumstances and ideological positions which effect and structure it, 
on the basis of class positions within the social totality, which is its ultimate 
determination. What follows from this and will be investigated here is that a 
Marxist political reading of the work will want to insist upon the connection 
between appearance/image; ideology; history; and class and will want to make 
that connection intelligible. Further, as its political project, a Marxist reading 
will want to present the case for the possibility (or not) of the 'political' art work. 
go Ibid., 22 
81 This brings the argument back to'his arguments with Clement Greenberg, as suggested above. 
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Such principles underline Clark's reading. I consider that he carries them 
through a critique of Manet's Olympia as (certainly in the Screen article) a 
'failure' as a political work, inasmuch as the work did not address itsetrto the 
historical conjuncture of prostitution and class struggle, in Paris in 1865 in 
sufficiently clear terms; sufficient to accede to knowledge. This, of course, is not 
to do with Manet as a painter, as such, or his particular class position, but to do 
with the position art and artists found themselves in, and the resources with 
which they had to work, vis-A-vis a society of burgeoning "spectacle". 
Clark meticulously interrogates the signs, as markers of sexuality and class and 
how these might or might not map onto each other, in a painting which 
ostensibly refers to the tradition of the nude, whilst at the same time referring to 
the 'scene'; the accoutrements of sex for sale, prostitution. There are, I suggest, 
two overlapping conflicts at work, one of which is clearly tested in Clark's 
reading, that of prostitution and class (and the tradition of the nude's complicity 
in emptying this conflict out of the equation) and that of woman as threatening, 
powerful in her refusal to be made abject, versus woman as compliant and being 
abject (this last is the nude's 'stock in trade'). Clark wants to approach the latter 
named conflict through the former. He wants to think about Olympia outside of 
its 'game' and 'play' within the 'image'; within the 'artistic tradition', wherein 
the imaginary relation of 'woman' has persistently been at stake, and situate it 
elsewhere; "... not in some magic re-prescritation, on the other side of negation 
and refusal, but in signs which are already present 
- 
meanings rooted in the 
actual forms of life: repressed meanings, the meanings of the dominated. " 82 
Clark wants to show how, at the level of the sign; Olympia's signs resisted being 
comprehended. He argues that what is at stake in that resistance is the work's 
political effectiveness. Olympia remains 'in' that realm of the imaginary, which 
is 'art'; referring to that realm, whilst refusing to take "her"place there, but also 
refusing to take a place anywhere else. That is, refusing to address, to somehow 
take a place for or on behalf of the dominated. As remarked above, he again 
92 Clark, T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 38. 
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qualifies this as a matter of effect and address, of where (or perhaps to whom? ) 
the work belongs. 83 
Clark reads how, in the painting, the signs of sex/'woman' as site of 'imaginary 
relation' are incomplete or drawn up in a contradictory order. He focuses on 
three aspects: "the question of access and address 
... 
the 'incorrectness' in the 
drawing of the body 
... 
the handling of hair and hairlessness". 84 
In terms of the first, Olympia "contrives 
... 
stalemate, a kind of baulked 
,, 
85 invitation. In comparison with Courbet's realism, which had "invented a set of 
refutations" for the "placing of the spectator in a position of imaginary 
knowledge" by its deliberate sabotage, 86 in Olympia the spectator is given no 
established place for viewing and identification, nor offered "tokens of exclusion 
,, 
87 
and resistance. 
This lack of access occurs through Olympia's gaze and the uncertain placing of 
the body within the picture's composition. Her gaze is "poised very precisely 
between address and resistance", so that, "it comes to be read as aproduction of 
the depicted person herself 
.. 
it is her look, her action on us, her composure, her 
composition of herself " Her body is "at a height, which is just too high, 
suggesting the stately, the body out ofrelation to the viewer's body: and yet not 
stately either 
... 
looking directly out and across with a steadying, dead level 
,, 
88 interpellation. Such a 'stalemate of placings' is compounded by the 
composition of the body itself. 
83 See Clark, T. J., 'A note in Reply to Peter Wollen', 98. 84 Clark, T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 33-37. 
85 Ibid., 34. 
86 "Courbet's Bather is an attempt to make the nude, of all unlikely genres, exemplify the signs 
orders of social class 
... 
meant to be read as a bourgeoisie, not a nude 
... 
searching for ways to 
establish the nude in opposition to the spectator, in active refusal of sight... [Where] the pose and 
the scale and the movement of the figure end up being a positive aggression, a resistance to 
vision in normal terms. " Clark, T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 34. 87 Ibid., 34. 
88 Ibid., 35. 
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In this second aspect, "the body is constructed in two inconsistent graphic 
modes, which once again are allowed to exist in too perfect and unresolved an 
equilibrium. One aspect is 'emphatically linear'... smooth hard edges, deliberate 
intersections" and yet, "at the same time the image was accused of lacking 
definition. It was 'unfinished', drawing 'does not exist in it'; it was 'impossible', 
elusive, 'informe ...... 89 As Clark reads it, "two systems co-exist; they describe 
aspects of the body and point to aspects of that body's sexual identity, but they 
do not bring those aspects together into some single economy of farm. "90 
This occurs similarly in the third aspect: Manet's treatment of hair and 
hairlessness. Apart from the hints at and displacements of signs of hair on the 
body, there is a crucial reversal of ten-ns with regard to Olympia's head of hair. 
Hair let down in the painting of the nude is a permissible sign of the disorderly 
and unkempt, an invitation to Woman's sexuality. Here, Olympia's face is 
ostensibly framed by the brown Japanese screen, which "makes the address and 
concision of the woman's face all the sharper" 91and suggests a lack of loosened 
hair. Yet there is a shock of auburn hair to the right of Olympia's head, barely 
visible in relation to the brown of the screen. The visual difficulty in seeing this 
hair further confuses the "orders" of sexuality. 
The face and the hair cannot be fitted together because they do not obey 
the usual set of equations for sexual consistency, equations which tell us 
what bodies are like, how the world is divided into male and female, 
resistant and yielding, closed and open, aggressive and vulnerable, 
repressed and libidinous. 92 
In sum, as Clark has it, "The signs of sex are there in the picture, in plenty, but 
drawn up in a contradictory order; one that is unfinished, or rather, more than 
one; orders interfering with each other; signs which indicate quite different 
places for Olympia in the taxonomy of Woman; and none of which she 
,, 
93 
occupies. 
89 Ibid., 35. 
90 Ibid., 36. 
91 lbid., 36 
92 Ibid., 37. 
93 Ibid., 37. 
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This last point is the crux for Clark. It is a question of place. Olympia appears to 
resist the established 'taxonomy' of woman, but to what end? Where does this 
resistance and recalcitrance take 'us'? Is there another place, a place of 
intelligibility, where the painting gives form to that intelligibility and goes 
beyond a self-referentially and inter-textual reference to the imaginary. Does 
Olympia merely perform the "dance of ideology" as Clark calls it, whereby the 
painting "erodes the terms in which the normal recognitions are enacted" (the 
imaginary relation woman/nude/prostitute) but "leaves the structure itself 
intact"? 94 
Clark seems to want the painting to situate itself "somewhere else [where 
woman/prostitute is] part of a fully coded, public and familiar world, to which 
fantasy has entry only in its real, uncomfortable, dominating and dominated 
form. "95 As Clark elaborates, 
One could imagine a different picture of a prostitute, in which there 
would be depicted the production of the sexual subject 
... 
even, perhaps, 
the production of the sexual Subject in a particular class formation [and 
as such] (she) would have to be given, much more clearly a place in 
another classed code 
-a place in the code of classes 
... 
a place in the 
world which manufactures the Imaginary, and reproduces the relations 
of dominator/dominated, fantasiser/fantasised. [to do so] what would be 
needed would be, exactly another set of terms 
... 
which would 
themselves have to be settled, consistent, forming a finished sentence. " 
96 
Clark's call for a work that goes beyond or undercuts the "dance of ideology", as 
he puts it in the particular context of this article, has to be considered in relation 
to debates within Marxism concerning the position and effects of art as a practice 
within the social. I have already referred to some of the issues and it is apparent 
that, while he here adopts the terminology of Althusser's 'imaginary, 'lived' 
relation, Clark is making a distinction between that world of 'signification' and 
94 Ibid., 39. 
95 Ibid., 38. 
96 Ibid., 39. 
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'codes'; that world known through signifying practices and the 'actual' world, 
where those imaginary relations are produced. He is not accepting the 
'productive' power of signification, as such, nor is he suggesting that the 'actual' 
world where those imaginary relations are produced is the unconscious. He is 
demanding that the last instance of determination by the economic and the 
essential social class relation actually does comes to underpin the theorisation of 
signifying practice and ideology as 'Imaginary' and that representation presses 
itself up against the actual world; the 'real everyday life' of class domination. 97 
This provokes a counter-argument in respect of Derrida's 'differance' and an 
interrogation of structuralism and serniotics from the 'other side', as it were. 
Clark's reference in Farewell to An Idea to the fetishisation of the 'sign' is 
pertinent here. 98 Derrida would certainly agree that 'signs' are socially produced. 
Derrida would disagree, however, with the implication here that you can 'get at' 
this social production outside of any further network of 'traces' and 'differance', 
except by calling a halt to their play by some conceptual categorisation, which is 
yet another form of network or 'text'. Derrida's argument is not to fetishise the 
text, but to both recognise how the 'text' is always already in some sense a 
'fetish' and to demonstrate the fetishisation at work in the seeking after a 
'transcendental signified' and plenitude of meaning prior to the 'text' which the 
text represents. As Derrida has variously exposed, if language is a system of 
differences without positive terms and any and every sign is the effect of 
difference from other signs, there can be no knowable term, concept, idea or 
ultimate sign that determines or grounds language as a presence (or re- 
presentation), even within some implied 'field' of 'social determination'. The 
effects of difference which are language are 'named' as opposed to conceptually 
categorised by Derrida as 'differance', as the movement of spatial differentiation 
and temporal delay by which any sign also bears with it the trace of that which it 
97 As was shown above, Clark wants to make a distinction between signification and its social 
determination, outside of or prior to any 'text' by means of which that social determination is 
ýiven form. 
. See previously in this thesis, Clark T. J., Fareivell To an Idea, 259-260. 
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is not and thereby prevents any assumption of full presence or full being, except 
by violating the non-full identity implied in differance. 99 
This has become a well-known 'quasi' concept from Derrida, and I present it in 
order to make the link between what has often been understood as a linguistic 
pre-occupation with Derrida and a philosophico-political frame of reference. 
Alternatively put, I am trying to locate what links the 'Differance' essay with, 
for instance, 'Specters of Marx'. 
TJ Clark, 's Marxist reading and the debates within Marxist criticism 
My point is to examine T. J. Clark's assumptions with regard to the art 
work/image, which assume that the locus of a work is in ideology, but in the 
work giving form to that ideology it can render that ideology intelligible and 
available 'to-be-read' on the grounds of the founding totality and 
determinateness of the social. Due to the positioning of his 'preliminary' text, it 
is also necessary to consider more closely his position in the context of debates 
within Marxist criticism at that time and to refer more directly to those moments 
when these debates enter his text. 
I have suggested that Clark's reading wants to reaffirm a particular kind of 
determination in establishing the political effectiveness of art works. For the 
99 As Derrida has it in his essay Tifferance', 
"It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called 
6present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other 
than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of a past element and already letting itself be 
vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is 
called the future than to what is called the past, and constituting the present by means of this very 
relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified 
present. An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be 
itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must by the same token, divide the present in 
and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis 
of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the 
subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called 
spacing, the becoming space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). And it is 
this constitution of the present, as an originary and irreducibly non-simple (and therefore stricto 
sensu nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protensions (to reproduce 
analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will 
reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-trace, or differance. 
Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization. " Derrida, J., 'Differance' in Margins 
ofPhilosophy. Trans. Bass, A., (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf Publications, 1982), 13. 
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most part he wants to re-instate something of a 'representational' position in the 
sense that he wants the work to provide an 'adequation' to the real. This it seems 
is what underlies his call for determinateness and address to other 'meanings', 
other social practices, inasmuch as these are already class-based, socio- 
economic determinations. Indeed, I would suggest he argues for representation in 
a Platonic sense of 'good' mimesis, presenting in appearance, the 'truth' of 
being, which is not to say that he is calling for a 'transparent' realist work, but 
that there has to be some point of reference to something determined in the 'real' 
that gets you out of the 'imaginary relation' to appearance, that shows how that 
relation is constructed, that challenges that construction of the imaginary by 
giving the viewer another determined place, at the site of the conflict of classes. 
Underlying this assumption is the idea that 'reality' (as object) determines the 
place of the subject within it and the subject's condition of experience of the 
appearance of 'reality'. It follows that it is the 'text' that produces meaning (by 
way of the appearance of the object) for the subject, but not, of course, in 
Marxist terms, a meaning independent of the 'ideologies' generated within the 
social formation, which inform the work, but upon which the work works to 
represent another 'appearance' of that 'reality'. 
According to this view, the object is available to, and is recognised in, the (false) 
consciousness of the subject, on the basis of the subject's experience of it. It is 
thus the task of ideological critique, as political critical reading to unravel the 
ideological appearance ofineaning of the object. This is done, for instance, by 
exposing the loose ends and gaps, the 'cracks in the work' disrupting the attempt 
at seamless 'reality' or coherence, or, demonstrating how a work runs counter to 
or works the 'prevailing ideological discourses', offering a different view of 
another 'visibility' of 'reality'. This is such that the work; the aesthetic, as 
political is read as articulating ideology and knowledge, as the aesthetic working 
of ideology accedes to 'knowledge of' the ideological. 
The task of criticism is to display how these ideas, as appearances, are 
historically detennined as ideologies, or counter-ideological positions, which 
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have their effect in the relation of the subject to the object (reality). The 
assumption being that the object (real) is in principle knowable. 
Such thinking, I argue, despite its clear acknowledgement of the relative 
'autonomy' of the aesthetic, resumes the model of thought exemplified in the 
base-superstructure distinction: which is a mimetic relation; the 
work/appearance, as super-structural, represents the intelligible (mis)recognition 
of the social formation which the given subject can experience; there can be 
posited a relation of 'identity' of the super-structural appearance i. e., the 'work' 
with the founding principle: socio-economic relations. The critique sets out to 
expose the identification between the 'work'/ appearance and ideology on the 
basis of this founding, 'originary' principle, 'outside' the work, having a 
determining effect upon its 'inside'; the work as a 'work'. 
Here the questions for criticism are, "what meanings are produced within the 
text/appearance and, as such, emanate from it, to the extent that they represent an 
ideological position? " and "how can we read and, through this reading, find 
within the text a counter-ideological position, which can 'expose' the 
construction of this ideological stance as a 'false'/(mis) recognition derivedfrom 
the ideas emanating from the social relations (of production) or present the text 
as the critique of these on the basis of such social relations? " Clark's reading of 
Olympia suggests that the work here falls short of 'exposing' the construction of 
an ideology, fails to work the ideology to accede to knowledge of the 
ideological, and remains caught in a play of its (the ideology's) terms. 
As previously indicated, Clark's reading is an intervention in the 
contemporaneous debates within Marxist criticism, which had been stimulated 
by the need to break with the base-superstructure distinction and its model of 
determination and to establish another kind of detennination, by way of the 
relative autonomy of ideological practices. 
Prior to the publication of Clark's article, there had been, in the Marxist 
consideration of art, a significant move away from the point of view of 
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meaning's production in and by the text as an attributed mimetic 
expression/reflection of 'reality' experienced by the subject. 
There were two aspects to this move. One is suggested by Colin MacCabe, who 
Clark quotes in his article: 
Marxism's abiding problem has always been to explain the way in 
which capitalist relations reproduce themselves in non-coercive ways. 
Throughout the seventies there were many who felt that the key to such 
an understanding lay in an analysis of culture which would not simply 
read it off as an effect of the economic base but would understand its 
ability to reproduce subjectivities, a reproduction finally determined by 
the economic relations but the mechanisms of which had to be 
comprehended in their own right. too 
The move was towards a consideration of the relation between text and audience 
and the claim was to think of this as an interactive space, aproductive site of 
meaning. This was the shift from the thinking of the production of meaning as 
representation-as-reflection of 'the real'-as-ideological, to thinking of meaning 
as constituted by a 'relatively' autonomous relation between 'image' and 
spectator, in which spectators were 'constituted as' subjects of ideology. 
This move was implicitly or explicitly responding to Louis Althusser's 
problematising of what he considered to be a reductive Marxist empiricism. It 
was Althusser's furtherance of the relative autonomy of the superstructures and 
the relative independence of their effectiveness, and, as he argued, 
deterininateness as ideological apparatuses, constitutive ofsubjects' imaginary 
relation to the relations of production, which set Marxist criticism towards a 
reading of works as a relation between text and spectator, as the site of 
'imaginary' meaning. But, as previously suggested, if we think of Althusser's 
retention of the notion of 'detenninateness', that relation between text and 
spectator being is one in which texts produce by way of the 'interpellation' of 
subject positions under detenninate conditions. 
loo Rodowick, D., The Crisis ofPolitical Afodernism,. 5. 
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However, what I might term as a second move, further radicalised the efficacy of 
texts. The influence of serniology opened the way to a critique of Althusser's 
theory as one that fell back into the mimeticism and realist empiricism he had 
sought to critique. Inasmuch as it is logically necessary in Althusser's theory that 
ideological forms necessarily reproduce the subject's imaginary relation to the 
relations of production, he had to retain a concept of representation. Only 
through such a concept can the social relations at 'origin' be guaranteed to be 
secured in the ideological forms effecting imaginary (mis)recognition. There has 
to be some way of determining their determinateness. As such, relative 
autonomy is a logical contradiction. 
The 'semiological' argument suggested that, when the relatively autonomous 
effectivity of texts in positioning subjects was read through serniology, the 
arbitrary relation between signifier and signified was emphasised as opening up 
the possibility of the independence of action of the signifier over the signified, 
such that the securing of subject positions and meaning can no longer be thought 
of on the basis of an a priori guarantee of relation between 'essence' and 
cappearance'. 101 
The securing of subject positions, it was argued, had to be thought of differently, 
no longer in terms of a pre-conceived determinacy, but as a consequence of the 
political struggle over meaning and subject positions. However, what emerged 
was a politicised modernist criticism, which valorised those (modernist) texts, 
which interrogate 'themselves' by presenting the very disjunctures between 
signifier and signified; that is to say, those texts, which reproduce gaps and 
fissures and disjunctive moments between signifier and signified in the work. 
But, on these terms, the 'struggle' takes place (already) in the work and this 
active serniosis is passed on to the reader in the difficulties and complexities of 
reading for the spectator i. e., the gaps and fissures 'self-exposed' in the work are 
101 See again, Stuart Hall's criticism, "... you will see there, not only the shift from practice to 
discourse, but also how the emphasis on difference 
- 
the plurality of discourses, the perpetual 
slippage of meaning 
... 
The endless sliding of the signifier is sometimes pushed beyond the point 
where it is capable of theorizing the necessary unevenness of a formation, or even the 'unity in 
difference' of a complex structure. " Hall, S., 'Signification, Representation, Ideology'. 
, 
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either made visible to the spectator or reproduced in the spectator's 
consciousness. 
This yet again returns to a mimetic relation. The gaps/fissures in the work are 
represented and modelled in the reading of the spectator. As Rodowick 
suggests, referring to Rodolphe Gasche: 
... 
reflexivity 
... 
always relies on a version of negativity which, by 
inscribing within the text the process of its own construction, will render 
'visible' to the reader the suppressed elements of the textual work. But 
is [this] not precisely the measure of a self-evidential representation that 
the discourse of political modernism set out to criticize in illusionist 
[cinema]? Rather than a difficulty in reading, which is supposed to 
encourage a productive and active serniosis in the spectator, is it not the 
case that what is asserted in place of a mimetic theory of representation 
is in fact a 'negative' identity theory where contradictions produced 
'semiotically' within the modemist text are said to be reproduced as 
'gaps and fissures' in the spectator's consciousness? As an 
epistemological relation, (and here I would add political relation) 
reflexivity can only be awkwardly considered here either according to a 
standard that equates visibility with self-evidence in the sen-iiotic 
constructedness of art, or as the doubling of a reflexive situation in the 
spectator whose conscious activity mirrors that of the text.... reflexivity 
becomes an envisioning of the spectator as a specular reflection of the 
internal dynamics of the forms of the text. 102 
Colin MacCabe, who Clark quotes, was sceptical and critical of such political 
weight being given to the signifier, 'independent of the signified, insofar as it 
leads to a valorising of the text which 'interrogates itself' and the intelligibility 
of which is no longer measured against its representation of a socially and 
culturally recognisable reality, as if that in itseýr'exposed' the workings of, or 
broke with, ideological representation. MacCabe noted in relation to 'realism' in 
film, the 'classic realist' text would now be read negatively as only ever placing 
the spectator in a position of 'imaginary' knowledge and depriving the viewer of 
any position of political or social action. Hence we might sun-nise that the 
question is still for MacCabe, as quoted by T. J. Clark, "[to provide] a materialist 
102 Rodowick, D., The Crisis ofPolitical Modernism, 60. 
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reading [specifying] articulations within the [picture] on detenninate 
grounds. "' 03 
However, MacCabe's position, I suggest, re-iterates that central problem of 
determinacy and representation, and remains caught in the problems of the 
Althusserian dilemma between representation and signification. 
As MacCabe wrote, "If one is concerned to analyse art in its social and political 
context, then one of the absolute necessities is to give an account of the ' 
processes of identification and disidentification, the methods by whichfictions 
bind us into representations of both world and set(" 104 
All this is important for situating Clark's text. The conviction Clark and 
MacCabe share, I think, is that the logic of signification has still to be understood 
as a logic of representation. This is a logic, which presumes a locus for 'identity' 
on the basis of a causal determination. The emphasis given tofictions that bind 
here, which find resonance in Clark's wish for determinacy, the 'code', 'the 
finished sentence', appears to evade or fall short of the issue, made evident by 
psychoanalysis, that identification is bound up in a process of the retreat of 
identity, which prevents identity from ever approximating the status of an 
ontological given. Identification may provide the illusion of the 'bound' stable 
identity, but is the process of the splitting of 'self' in order to 'recognise' self. It 
is also the case that, whilst following Freud, it can be said that psychic 
identification and the social order are indispensable to each other, it is another 
question to consider the role that identification plays in politics. It may be argued 
that subjectivity and ideology interact, or are one and the same as per Althusser, 
but, given identification as an erotic investment, premised on (in Freud), the; 
substitution of one for another occurring at unconscious as well as conscious 
levels (hence continually open to fantasy), the meaning of any particular 
identification is going to exceed any of its social, historical and political 
determinations. 
103 Clark, T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 30. 
104 Rodowick R., The Crisis ofPolitical Modernisni, 32. 
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Psychoanalysis has shown that, despite Freud's own efforts to separate 
identification and desire, and at the same time show their indissoci ability (as 
'required' by the social order), Freud himself at times accedes to the collapse of 
the distinction, and others have shown that identification is desire, as the desire 
to have the desire of the other. 105 
Further, disidentification can be interpreted as a 'disavowal' of an identification 
already made in the unconscious, 106 and finally, as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy have shown, the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
politics is not one of proximation, but of distance. It is the unlikeness, which is 
the mark of identification, to be like but not the same as; it is that difference 
which gives rise to politics, as the desire for an illusory sameness. 107 
Hence, following this latter argument, if Macabe is here suggesting that art be 
thought of as a site for 'identification', it cannot be in a political context as such, 
for already, if it is the site for identification, it is the provocationfor politics. In 
that case, the Salon criticism in Paris, in 1865, or indeed the pages of Screen in 
1980 are not the political contextfor Olympia; Olympia is the provocation for a 
political act to make meaning. 
I shall consider Clark's article in more detail and suggest that here Clark still 
reads the work and the relation between text and audience in accordance with a 
logic of representation. He wishes to retain the distinction between text and 
audience as a subject/object relation, by which he can read the work for its 
'adequation' to the 'originary' 'real' outside of the work, where the meanings 
are already established for Clark, as a conditionfor the processes of 
identification on the part of the spectator. 
This logic runs through Clark's article and the implications of this I shall take up 
and want to measure. The logic of Clark's position sits along with the position he 
105 See Borch-Jacobsen, M., 'Dreams are completely egoistic' in The Freudian Subject. Trans. 
Porter, C., (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1988), 10-52. 
106 See Butler, J., 'Passing, Queering' in Bodies That Matter, (London: Routledge, 1993,167- 
186. 
107 See Lacoue-Labarthe P., and Nancy J-L., 'The Unconscious is destructured like an Affect' 
(Part I of 'The Jewish People do not Dream') Stanford Literaq Review 6, Fall (1989): 191-209. 
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is more or less explicitly criticising throughout: that of a politicisation of 'self- 
reflexivity' and the 'dis-identification', which is present in the argument for a 
4 political modernism'. Both positions, I argue, install a mimesis; but as a 
mimetic assumption of an originary identity, appearing and made visible for the 
viewer to 'take up. Both positions continue to hold a 'fixed' concept of 
ideology and its operation within the social totality. The arguments depend upon 
this fixity of concepts, such that the politics of their reading is reduced and 
limited in its effectiveness. 
Clark's reading, discursivity and the social 
Here, I focus particularly on a more radicalised conceptualisation of the social, in 
order to expose the limits of the concept of social totality upon which Clark's 
reading depends. 
As I have previously noted, Clark begins his article by remarking upon the lack 
of critical response to Manet's Olympia on its submission to the Salon jury in 
1865. "If we apply the test not merely of approval, but of some sustained 
description of the object in hand-some effort at controlled attention to 
particulars, some ordinary mobilisation of the resources of criticism in 1865 
- 
then response to Olympia simply does not exist, except in a solitary text written 
by Jean Ravenel". 108 A response was comically articulated in caricatures and 
some art critics themselves attempted some kind of comic response but, as Clark 
says "jokes, in this case, were rarely productive of knowledge. "109 This emphasis 
on the relationship between a work, its spectators and the production of 
knowledge, that something about the work is in principle (and, I suggest, this 
operates as an apriori principle), knowable, and that it can be brought to 
knowledge, from its position of 'hidden' meaning, is fundamental to Clark's 
reading and continues to re-emerge throughout his text. 
Clark situates his article as one that seeks to investigate the relation of texts to 
spectators as part of the ongoing debate within the pages of Screen. I have 
'" Clark T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 20. 
109 Ibid., 20. 
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already alluded to this debate. Here I would reiterate those factors, which appear 
to be of particular importance for T. J. Clark. One is that any consideration of the 
relation between reader and text should still adhere to some notion of 
determinacy. If it follows for Clark that whilst spectators are not constructed by 
texts, and nor are they simply positioned in relation to them on the basis of 'class 
outlooks', neither are spectators' readings 'free-floating'; spectators have 
predispositions, informed by the array of their experience of other discourses. 
These discourses, I take Clark to interpret as representations on determinate 
grounds with their 'origins' in ideology, in history, which on encountering 
another text re-work that reading and seek to 'determine' meaning on the 
grounds of this new encounter, forming a newly configured 'inter-textual field' 
of representations, in history and ideology. 
Clark quotes film theorist, Peter Willemen, 
The activity of the text must be thought in terms of which set of 
discourses it encounters in any particular set of circumstances, and how 
this encounter may restructure both the productivity of the text and the 
discourses with which it combines to form an intertextual field which is 
always in ideology, in history. Some texts can be more or less 
recalcitrant if pulled into a particular field, while others can be fitted 
comfortably into it. ' 10 
That is to say, for Clark, within this 'discursive field', although the concept 
'ideology' is deployed here, it remains privileged as the element in which 
discourses are situated, and forms the 'set of circumstances' of the inter-textual 
encounter and the conditions by which, ultimately, a text may be determined as 
grecalcitrant' or otherwise. Ideology in this sense is the mis-recognised essence 
of the social. The attribution of positivity to ideology is co-extensive with an 
attribution of positivity to the social. It is this thinking of the social as an 
underlying principle or system of ideological mediations that Laclau and Mouffc 
110 Clark T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 22. This quote from Peter Willemen comes from an earlier 
edition of Screen. See Willemen P., "Notes on Subjectivity 
-On Reading Subjectivity Under 
Siege"' Screen 19.1,1978: 55. 
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unravel in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy I 11, and I shall make use of Laclau 
and Mouffie to demonstrate what I consider to be the limits of Clark's reading, in 
its consideration of the social and political. 
Clark continues his examination of the critical reception of Olympia by setting 
that 'failed' reception against the prevailing 'discourse of Woman', available to 
the critics as an intersecting set of terms 'Woman/Nude/Prostitute', but also 
appearing in their responses in spasmodic and awkward references. He reads 
these categories as the available 'historical' representations, which is to say 
'ideological' representations. 
Clark sets these out as a set of circumstances, which, although he suggests are 
'unstable', nevertheless can be assumed for the arguments sake, as he posits 
these discourses as possible preconditions of readability for Olympia. 
I think it is clear that two main discourses were in question: a discourse 
in which the relations and disjunctions of the terms 
Woman/Nude/Prostitute were obsessively rehearsed-and the complex 
but deeply repetitive discourse of aesthetic judgement in the Second 
Empire. These are immediately historical categories of an elusive and 
developing kind. 112 
The instability of these discourses is clear; the disjunctions, the necessity to 
rehearse and repeat; and yet in order to read Olympia's 'failure', Clark has to 
establish (in the familiar manner of the historian) a sense of their 'normal 
functioning' and 'the regular ways in which these discourses worked' as 
ideologies within a social order and as forms of 'mis- recognition'. So, of 'the 
prostitute', he writes 
She was maintained 
- 
anxiously and insistently as a unity [Clark's 
emphasis], which existed as the end-stop to a series of differences which 
constituted the feminine 
... 
the courtesan was a category in use in a well- 
established and ordinary ideology; she articulated various (false) 
relations between sexual identity, sexual power and social class 
... 
at the 
Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: tolvards a radical democratic 
ýolitics (London: Verso, 1985), 2 2 Clark T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 23. 
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same time she was declared to be almost umnentionable 
- 
at the furthest 
margin of the categorisable 
- 
but that only seemed to reaffirm her 
importance as a founding signification of Woman". 1 13 
Similarly, the nude is 'non-nally' a point at which the discourse of sex and art 
criticism intersect, "[And] the one provides the other with crucial 
representations, forms of knowledge and standards of decorum 
... 
[the forrn] in 
which sexuality is revealed and not-revealed, displayed and masked, made 
unproblematic 
... 
she can be known, in her nakedness, without too much danger 
of pollution. "' 14 
Olympia seriously disturbed the fragile 'normal' operation of these discourses, 
so as to generate, as Clark has it, a series of significations provoking a 'non- 
reading' and 'negativity'. I have already indicated his analysis of the perplexing 
inconsistencies and 'contradictory' economies of form in the work. These 
'contradictions' generated, 
For instance the various figures of uncleanness 
... 
and the way these 
figures cannot be maintained as descriptions of sexual and moral status, 
but always teeter over into figures of death and decay. Or the figures 
which indicate the way in which the hand of Olympia 
- 
the one spread 
over her pubic hair 
- 
disobeys, crucially, the conventions of the nude. 
The hand is shamelesslyflexed 
.. 
improper 
... 
in thefbým ofa toad.. dirty. 
It is in a state of contraction. It comes to stand for the way Olympia's 
whole body is disobedient: the hand is the sign of the unyielding, the 
unrelaxed, the too definite where indefiniteness is the rule, the non- 
supine, the concealment which declares itself as such: the 'unferninine' 
in short. Or again the figures of physical violence done to the body, or 
of hideous constraint: a woman on a bed, or rather someform or other, 
blown up like a grotesque in India rubber, a skeleton dressed in a tight 
jacket made ofp1aster outlined in black, like the armature of a stained 
glass window without the glass 
... 
115 
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So that "Olympia was not given a meaning that was stabilised long enough to 
provide the framework for any further investigation 
- 
for some kind of 
knowledge, for criticism. "' 16 
Further to this, Clark comments on how, in relation to the criticism of Jean 
Ravenel, who did read the affinity to Baudelaire in the painting and named 
Olympia as "petitefabourienne "a working-class prostitute, 
The identification of class is not a brake on meaning: it is the trigger, 
once again, of a sequence of connotations which do not add up, which 
fail to circle back on themselves, declaring their meaning evident and 
uniform. It may be that we are too eager, now to point to the illusory 
quality of that circling back, that closure against the 'free play of the 
signifier'. Illusion or not, it seems to me the necessary ground on which 
meanings can be established and maintained: kept in being long 
enough, and endowed with enough coherence, for the ensuing work of 
dispersal and contradiction to be seen to matter 
... 
to have matter, in the 
text, to work against. 117 
Clark's text sets up opposition to any reading that does not operate within the 
terms and grounds of 'identity' and within the terms and grounds of an 
intelligible structure ofsignifications, which refer us to, and are anchored in, 
'identities' 'out there' in the social. He eschews any reading that might suggest 
an oscillation between avowal and disavowal of the image. He appears to be 
asking for a final signified, or that 'ultimate horizon of meaning' to which any 
connotations will extend. For Clark, contingency must always have a point of 
determination. 
In Clark's final treatment of Olympia, he puts forward a somewhat different case 
for the work's recalcitrance. He seems to say that it is Olympia's nakedness, 
which both signifies a class position and confounds critical reading. Nakedness 
and class are given an 'analogous' reading: 
116 Ibid., 25 
117 Ibid., 30. 
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Class is the name, I take it for that complex and determinate place we 
are given in the social body; it is the name for everything which 
signifies that a certain history lives us, lends us our individuality. By 
nakedness I mean those signs 
- 
that broken, interminable circuit 
- 
which say that we are nowhere but in a body, constructed by it, by the 
way it incorporates the signs of other people. 118 
The critic's perplexity lies in the fact that Olympia's class is nothing but this 
body; its 'whole effect', with no place or space for imaginary relation. 
They were perplexed by the fact that Olympia's class was nowhere but 
in her body; the cat, the Negress, the orchid, the bunch of flowers, the 
slippers, the pearl ear-rings, the choker, the screen, the shawl-they were 
all lures, they all meant nothing in particular. The naked body did 
without them in the end and did its own narrating. If it could have been 
seen what signs were used in the process 
- 
if they could have been kept 
apart from the body's whole effect 
- 
they might still have been made 
the critic's property? They would have been turned into objects of play, 
metaphor, irony, and finally tolerance. Art criticism might have begun. 
119 
It appears at first that here Clark has his 'circling back' to his 'materialist 
reading, on determinate grounds'. The body does its own narrating, but, this is 
the hi-story/class 'given identity', fixed in the social which lives the body. The 
looked for material, terminal signifier, which brings the 'interminable' play to a 
(temporary) halt. Body and class meshed together in the history, which lives 
them, as the final signified, the 'end' (goal) of its politics to show 'real 
conditions of existence'? 
But this does seem at odds with his 'lament' over Manet's seeming 'dance of 
ideology' in the article for Screen. Does it remain a 'failure' in Clark's terms 
because, "She came from the lower depths. The images of sickness, death, 
depravity and dirt all carried that connotation but they stayed as passingfikures 
118 Clark, T. J., The Painting ofModern Life, 146. 
119 Ibid., 146. 
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ofspeech precisely because the critics could not identify what in the picture told 
them where Olympia belonged ,? 120 
What does it mean to say 'The naked body 
... 
did its own narrating'? Did it or did 
it not narrate 'class'? Did it narrate at all? 
"[I]n order that the painted surface appear as it does in Olympia, the self- 
evidence of seeing 
- 
seeing the world, seeing Woman 
- 
had to be dismantled, 
, 
421 
and a circuit of signs put in its place. 
Olympia's nakedness divorced from 'a circuit of signs' offers a 'heterogeneous' 
reading. The principle of there being afounding meaning or signified is the logic 
of Clark's text. Why else read critics' awkward attempts at criticism as 
perplexities, because Olympia did not 'add up'to a 'fixed' signification or 
meaning? Can we read Olympia otherwise? 
What if he were to take the discourse of woman/female sexuality, in which 
Olympia takes part, to really be discursive? In such a case the notion of a 
founding signification cannot be maintained. If 'woman' 'is' those ways in 
which 'she' is in discourse, where do we find the founding moment? If we 
dispense with the ultimate horizon of meaning or founding signified, then the 
whole question of the political effectiveness of the artwork has to be thought 
through differently. Rather than asking for deten-ninacy on the basis of a 
founding principle, the political will derivefrom the need to make meaning set 
against the indeterminate and contingent undermining of fixity, generating an 
exposure of reading to the risk of the 'perhaps', each time 'anew', articulating 
meaning which cannot be predicted in advance or predicated upon an assumed 
prior 'knowledge' of the social. 
Clark speaks of opposition and contradiction. As Laclau and Mouffe 
demonstrate, both these conceptualisations derive from objective relations on the 
assumption of a 'fixed ground'. An opposition is a state of 'A 
- 
B', where each 
120 Ibid., 146 
121 Ibid., 139. 
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tenn has its positivity, independent of its relation with the other. A contradiction 
is a state of 'A 
- 
not A', where the relation of each term with the other exhausts 
the reality of both. Hence we can speak of a 'contradiction in terms' at the 
logical-conceptual evel, where logically each term 'cancels out' the other. 
This is not to say, however, that contradictory positions are not 'held to be true' 
in 'reality'. But the point is that, as Laclau and Mouffe state, 
in both cases [opposition and contradiction], it is something that the 
objects already are which makes the relation intelligible. That is in both 
cases we are concerned with full identities. In the case of contradiction, 
it is because A is fully A that being-not-A is a contradiction 
... 
In the case 
of real opposition, it is because A is also fully A that its relation with B 
produces an objectively determinable effect: i. e. Opposition. 122 
But as Laclau and Mouffe argue, this statement of 'objective relations' can say 
- 
nothing of the lever by which opposition or contradiction becomes social conflict 
or social antagonism, as defined by Marx as the principle of historical 
development. Closer to home, Clark himself acknowledges the need to 'posit' a 
ground against which contradiction might have some 'force', i. e. a discursive 
relation, 
It may be that we are too eager, now to point to the illusory quality of 
that circling back, that closure against the 'free play of the signifier'. 
Illusion or not, it seems to me the necessary ground on which meanings 
can be established and maintained: kept in being long enough, and 
endowed with enough coherence, for the ensuing work of dispersal and 
contradiction to be seen to matter 
... 
to have matter, in the text, to work 
against. 123 
But where, in a discursive relation (and Clark himself proposes the 'discourse' 
woman/sexuality), do you detennine the point at which that 'closure' takes place 
and objects are determined and maintained as if they 'already are'? 
122 Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 122. 
123 Clark T. J., 'Preliminaries... ', 30. 
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This is where Laclau and Mouffe's thinking of 'antagonism' exposes the limits 
of a reading centred on intelligibility as objectively determinable in a founding 
'being present'. In a discursive situation, we can think of identities as 
'antagonistic' relations, whereby the presence of the 'other' prevents any identity 
from ever being totally 'itself'. This is a process of endless deferral of identity. 
No object can be 'fixed' or 'sutured' or attain pure difference. This is because, 
by the definitional limits of antagonism, the relational chain of differences, being 
as it is always 'interrupted' by the 'other', can never be traced back to or 
projected towards the 'ultimate horizon' of a fully fon-ned 'object', identity or 
signified, that can be unaffected by the discursive context in which that object is 
situated. 124 
As Laclau and Mouffe propose, the terms would be differential relations, always 
partial and only ever 'temporarily' sutured into moments, which could be 
considered 'unities' only by a process of hegemony. This would apply at the 
level of the signification 'Woman', and at the level of the differentiating 
instances, considered to be 'identities', as woman; nude; prostitute. For instance, 
let us suppose the term 'prostitute', which is the key term of Clark's reading, is, 
as Clark puts it, 'anxiously' maintained as a unity. How does this process work? 
In Clark's terms, each singular instance of 'prostitute' is caught between an 
'imaginary relation' (ideological) to a class position ('courtesan), and a 
reference back to a conflict of class positions, established in the 'actual forms of 
life' of prostitution. This is the 'dance of ideology' of which Clark speaks a 
'two-step' oscillating between imaginary (mis) recognition and the 'truth' of 
prostitution in the socio-economic order. 
For Clark, the social has to be thought of as a totality constituting its parts, in 
order for this 'dance of ideology' to be in place. There has to be an order of 
class and an order of ideology, produced by the structure of the social. This has 
to be understood as a 'totality' in order that the 'orders' of class, ideology and 
their representations can be causally linked. 
124 Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 105-122. 
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Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate a different thinking of the social, which 
deconstructs the oppositional logic, upon which a reading such as Clark's 
depends. They present the social as a discursive field of differential relations in a 
process of hegemonic articulation, which establishes a relation between elements 
such that their identities are modified as a consequence of that articulation. In the 
course of articulation, differential elements are stabilised to the extent of 
becoming 'nodal points' or 'moments' which partially fix meaning and allow for 
an 'identity' which never achieves 'literality'. 
Laclau additionally presents this, in reference to the problem of ideology. 125 
Taking this concept as a starting point, he shows the 'impossibility' of society as 
an essential totality. The concept of ideology has had two 'classic' approaches. 
In one, ideology is thought to be a level of the social totality; for the other, 
ideology is false consciousness. The validity of the first approach, clearly, 
depends upon a concept of the society as an intelligible totality, a structure upon 
which its elements were founded. The validity of the second approach depends 
upon a concept of human agency 
-a 'subject' whose misrecognition is the 
source of ideology. 
As Laclau points out, the first approach, as a holistic one "had been to fix the 
meaning of any element or social process outside itself i. e. in a system of 
relations with other elements. In this sense the base-superstructure distinction 
was ambiguous; seemingly a relation, but also having a. centre. " 126 
But the other important aspect to this was the requirement that the structural 
totality had a positivity of its own, such that it operated as an underlying 
principle of intelligibility of the social order; afounding totality presenting itself 
as an object of knowledge. But, 
Against this essentialist vision we tend nowadays to accept the 
infinitude of the social that is the fact that any structural system is 
limited, that it is always surrounded by an 'excess of meaning' which it 
125 Laclau, E., 'The Impossibility of Society' in Laclau, E., New Reflections on the Revolution of 
Our Time. (London: Verso, 1990), 89-92. 
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is unable to 'master', and that consequently 'society' as a unitary and 
intelligible object which grounds its own partial processes is an 
impossibility. 127 
Having accepted the principle of a system of relations, it follows that identities 
within it are differential relations, (as per Saussure's linguistic theory) and if 
these relations are no longerfixed, then "the social must be identified with the 
infinite play of differences that is discourse. , 128 It follows from this that, as there 
has to be some meaning to the social, there has to be an attempt to effect this 
ultimately impossible fixation. "rhe social is not only the infinite play of 
differences. It is also the attempt to limit that play, to embrace it within the 
finitude of an order". 129 
This attempt, which is by definition unstable and precarious, is the attempt to 
tact' upon the "social", to hegemonise it.,, 130 This is the process, as previously 
mentioned, of the relative fixing of the social through the institution of nodal 
points. An important consequence of this is that these 'nodal points' cannot be 
predeten-nined for all possible social formations (which would reintroduce an 
essential principle element). 
Each social formation has its own forms of determination which are 
always instituted through a complex process of over determination and 
therefore cannot be established a priori. With this insight, the base- 
superstructure distinction falls, and along with it the concept of ideology 
as a necessary level of every social formation. 131 
Similarly, with regard to the thinking of ideology as false consciousness, which 
necessarily requires a social agent whose identity is fixed and non-contradictory, 
(it is only on the basis of recognising its true identity that we can assert that a 
consciousness is 'false'), two things have tested its limits. One is the increasing 
gap between 'objective class interests' and the actual consciousness of 
individuals. Secondly, the very identity of social agents has been questioned, due 
127 Ibid., 90. 
128 Ibid., 
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to the flux of differences, which have made apparent that the homogeneity of 
social agents is an illusion. 
The same excess of meaning, the same precarious character of any 
structuration that we find in the domain of the social order, is also to be 
found in the domain of subjectivity... if any social agent is a decentred 
subject, if when attempting to determine his/her identity we find 
northing else but the kaleidoscopic movement of differences, in what 
sense can we say that subject's misrecognise themselves? 132 
Following this, ideology as 'false' consciousness is dissolved, but then what of 
ideology? Clearly misrecognitions still exist. Otherwise there would be no need 
to deconstruct them. But what is ideological now has to be thought completely 
differently. 
The ideological would not consist of the misrecognition of a positive 
essence but exactly the opposite. It would consist of the non-recognition 
of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any 
ultimate suture. The ideological would consist of those discursive forms 
through which a society tries to institute itself as such, on the basis of 
closure, of the fixation of meaning, of the non-recognition of the infinite 
play of differences. The ideological would be the will to 'totality' of any 
totalising discourse. And insofar as the social is impossible without 
some fixation of meaning, without some discourse of closure, the 
ideological must be seen as constitutive of the social, [given that] the 
social only exists as the vain attempt to institute that impossible object: 
society 133 
Hence, Clark's reading is necessarily, itself ideologicaL The number of 
references Clark makes that attest to his 'will' to 'totality', in an attempt to 
6suture' art and the social affirm this. 
That said, Laclau ends his essay on the 'Impossibility of Society' by stating, 
"Utopia is the essence of any communication and social practice". 134 If the 'will 
132 Ibid., 92. 
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to totality' or to 'identity' is the essence of any communication or social practice, 
then iftells us that our political goals are already 'contaminated' by ideology, so 
it becomes a matter of how one understands the 'contamination; of this goal, but 
also how one understands that any attempt at the establishment of meaning, at 
establishment as such, as a politics, is always already exposed to chance and risk, 
insofar as social identification, individual identity, is riven by its 'other-than- 
identity'; its 'absent' (yet not 'pure' absent) other. 
Laclau's position is premised on an understanding of society as a force of 
transient social relations, none of which are a priori privileged. Contrary to Clark 
whose premise, as outlined earlier, is to call for the necessary intensification of 
'ideological struggle' in 'class terms' in the face of social fragmentation, as 
exemplified in 'spectacle'. Laclau's 
... 
challenging and controversial thesis is that these phenomena [the 
effects of late capitalism with the decline in organising power and 
credibility of traditional structures and the rise of differing social 
interest groups] of dislocation and fragmentation not only lead to a 
proliferation of political possibilities, but are also the conditions under 
which something like freedom is possible; that freedom is a 
consequence of dislocation. 135 
This appears to be another position that takes up and reads 'positively' the 
fragmentation of class into diverse interest groups and, through the radicalisation 
of the concept of hegemony, presents an 'inversion' of the orthodox Marxist 
reading of 'class struggle' and the 'battle of ideologies'. 
However, I think there are important differences between Laclau's position and 
that of Derrida or Nancy. In order to think a radical hegemonic articulation 
whereby diverse 'force fields' of interests in a system of differences without 
positive terms are politicised into an emancipatory project, Laclau follows a 
Lacanian model of an 'absent fullness' at the hub oý any social relation (like the 
Lacanian 'Real'), which, in a system of differential signs that 'are' only in so far 
as they differ from, are 'other to' each other, can only be a negative 'term' 
133 Critchley, S., 'On Derrida's Specters of Marx', Philosophy and Social Criticism 21.3 (1995): 
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outside of signification as such. The hegemonic articulation is in this sense 
mobilised by way of a particular sign (concretely representative of one particular 
interest), emptying itself out to take the place of, to become a marker for the 
generalised space of the absent fullness at the hub of the system of relations. 136 
Laclau characterises this process as 'phantasmic'. So in respect of say 'the 
dance of ideology' and 'free play of the signifier' with which Clark critically 
engages in 'Preliminaries... ' summarised in his statement, 
The signs of sex are there in the picture, in plenty, but drawn up in 
contradictory order; one that is unfinished, or rather, more than one; 
orders interfering with each other, signs which indicate quite different 
places for Olympia in the taxonomy of Woman and none of which she 
occupies. 137 
We can surmise in Laclau's terms, a 'phantasmic' positioning of Olympia as a 
tquasi' spectral offering to an articulation of 'meaning' in a political stance, 
unable to be predicted in advance of this articulation and precisely not occupying 
a position in the taxonomy of Woman 'before' the hegemonic relation has done 
its work. 
Laclau claims this structure as being akin to Derrida's 'spectralisation' of Marx 
via the 'concept' of hauntology. But Laclau's own account of Derrida's 
'spectres' and the relation to his own model of phantasmic, emancipatory 
politics, demonstrates the difference between the two positions. In 'The time is 
out ofjoint' 138, Laclau both affirms the kinship between his own radicalised 
hegemony with Derrida's 'spectral' reading of Marx and the difference between 
Derrida's position as an ethical one, whereas Laclau's is apolitical one, or more 
forcefully, hegemony potentially provides a political content and structure to the 
'realisation' of Derrida's ethical injunction (so far as it goes? ). 
136 Laclau, E 
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Laclau explains how Derrida's deconstructive reading of Marx, via the principle 
of a hauntology, opens onto the undeconstructible notion ofjustice. This unfolds 
via 'the logic of the spectre' and 'the question of the messianic'. 
[T]he spectre is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a 
certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. It becomes, rather, 
some 'thing' that remains difficult to name; neither soul nor body and 
both one and the other. For it is flesh and phenomenality that give to the 
spirit its spectral apparition, but which disappear right away in the 
apparition, in the very coming of the revenant or the return of the 
spectre. There is something disappeared, departed in the apparition itself 
as reapparition of the departed. 139 
As I have previously stated, what is made clear by Laclau, is that anachronism, 
or a time out ofjoint, is essential for spectrality, "the spectre, interrupting all 
specularity desynchronises time. 9440 Such anachronism or spatio-temporal 
disjunction renders undecidable both 'spirit' and 'body', ideology and 'the real'. 
Marx's chasing down of the spectre in favour of an ontology of the emerging 
proletariat, dispelling ideology and putting an end to a need for 'politics' as the 
articulation of 'the real present' against ideological obfuscation, constitutes a 
'suppression' of the spectral relation, a refusal of the 'other' of being, both 
anterior past and open future, which the logic of the spectre constitutes as the 
opening forjustice. This deconstruction of Marx, demonstrating that which 
prevents Marx from establishing a non-haunted ontology other than by 
suppressing that which constitutes the ethico-political dimension of his thought, 
begs an alternative reading of politics. The link here, for Derrida, is between the 
logic of the spectre and the structure of the 'messianic'. 
What remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as 
undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, a 
certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the 
formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, 
even a messianic without messianism, an idea of justice 
- 
which we 
distinguish from law or right or even human rights 
- 
and an idea of 
"9 Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, 6. 
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democracy 
- 
which we distinguish from its current concept and from its 
determined predicates today. 141 
As Laclau explains, 
By the messianic we should 
... 
understand something belonging to the 
general structure of experience 
... 
linked to the idea of promise 
... 
the 
promise implicit in an originary opening to the 'other', to the 
unforeseeable, to the pure event which cannot be mastered by any 
aprioristic discourse 
... 
This is entwined with the notion of 'justice' as 
linked to an absolute singularity, which cannot be absorbed by the 
generality of law. The chasm between law and justice cannot be 
closed 
... 
on the basis of these premises, Derrida elaborates 
... 
democracy 
to come, a venir 
... 
[without] any teleological assertion 
... 
without 
eschatology 
... 
without determinate content 
... 
Singularity as the terrain of 
justice involves the radical undecidability which makes the decision 
possible 
... 
142 
However for Simon Critchley, in what is quite a symbiotic, whilst richer in 
detail, reading with Laclau on Derrida's Specters, the alternative reading of 
politics, as such is still left begging by Derrida. 143 
My question would be: is the passage from the messianic appeal for 
justice to laws and norms and rules (a politics no less] always a fault, 
always in default? If so, why is it a fault and what sort of fault is it? 
Clearly for Derrida, to refer to the messianic appeal for justice to moral 
and legal conditions is a transgression of the apparent priority, or indeed 
as priori antecedence, of the messianic 
- 
what Derrida elsewhere calls 
'the universal dimension of experience' 
- 
but is this transgression not 
also a necessity 
... 
namely the moral, legal-social instantiation of justice, 
the a posteriori and particular instance of the a priori status of the 
messianic? Isn't the question not whether to totalize but how to totalize; 
that is how to link the a priori and the a posteriori, the universal and the 
particular, the transcendental and the empirical? 
... 
Is not this faulty move 
from justice to law precisely that which is thought by Levinas in terms 
14 1 Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, 59. 142 Laclau, E., 'The time is out of joint' in Emancipation(s), 74. 
143 Critchley, S., 'On Derrida's Specters of Marx', 1-30. 
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of the move from the other (autrui) to the third party (le tiers), from 
ethics to politics? 144 
Critchley will situate the possibility of what he sees as the 'transition' from 
ethics to politics within a radicalised hegemony. 
If deconstruction is the attempt to show the constitutive undecidability, 
radical incompletion or untotalizability of textual, institutional, cultural, 
social and economic structures, then hegemony is a theory of decisions 
taken in the undecidable terrain opened up by deconstruction, and 
which, in my view, is precisely that way in which we might begin to 
think about the politics of deconstruction. The burning question here is 
whether and how we can combine the logic of deconstruction with the 
logic of hegemony; does undecidability paralyse the possibility of the 
decision or does it, on the contrary enable it? 145 
Laclau, somewhat differently from Critchley, but with more or less the same 
outcome suggests, 
... 
it is no longer a question of finding a ground from which an ethical 
injunction should be derived (even less to make such a ground of 
undecidability itself) [surely something that Derrida is at great pains to 
avoid? ]. We live as bricoleurs in a plural world, having to take 
decisions within incomplete systems of rules 
... 
and some of these are 
ethical ones. It is because of this constitutive incompletion that 
decisions have to be taken, but because we are faced with incompletion 
and not total dispossession, the problem of a total ethical grounding 
- 
either through the opening to the otherness of the other, or through the 
metaphysical principle 
- 
never arises. 'The time is out of joint' but, 
because of that, there is never a beginning 
- 
or an end 
- 
of time. 
Democracy does not need to be 
- 
and cannot be 
- 
radically grounded. 
We can move to a more democratic society only through a plurality of 
acts of democratization. The consurnmation of time 
- 
as Derrida knows 
well 
- 
never arrives. Not even as a negative idea. 146 
144 Critchley, S., 'On Derrida's Specters... ', 16. 
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This may be debating finer points of interpretation of ethics and politics, but it is 
important not to obscure what is key to both Derrida's thinking here and to a 
different historical aesthetics and politics of memory that I am trying to work 
out. Both Critchley and Laclau appear to reify'undecidability' and 
'deconstruction as justice. Both attribute a transcendental status which must 
either be traversed (Critchley) or conceived otherwise (Laclau). This is to deny 
the fact that Derrida never attributes a transcendental status to justice, but is 
always scrupulous about its place in the undecidable terrain of mutual 
contamination between the transcendental and empirical, justice and law, 
universal and particular; the outcome of which can never be predetermined. 
Indeed, contrary to Laclau, Derrida does not develop any theory of decision 
based upon, as Laclau's logic of hegemony appears to pre-suppose, a full 
'absence', a Lacanian 'real', as the fulcrum for hegemonic articulation. 
Even these sympathetic readings of Derrida want to turn his deconstruction, 
deconstruction of Marx's thought, deconstruction as justice, into a political 
programme, however 'ungrounded' it might be. Derrida confounds and frustrates 
by alluding to a 'politics' that 'is almost secret'. The 'logic' of the spectre and 
the messianic is the (a) logic of the secret; the secret of inheritance, but also, I 
suggest "the secret" of singular plurality and 'exposition' in Nancy. 
Let us consider first the radical heterogeneity of an inheritance, the 
difference without opposition that must mark it, a 'disparateness' and a 
quasi-juxtaposition without dialectic 
... 
you must 
... 
inhabit it in 
contradictory fashion around a secret 
... 
One would be affected by it as by 
a cause-natural or genetic. One always inherits a secret, which says, 
'Read me, will you ever be up to itT 147 
This secret is not an enigma. For Derrida in this instance, I think it stands for 
what I have been attempting to trace throughout this chapter as a connection 
between aesthetics and politics that avoids preconceptions that foreclose on 
'meaning' and programmatic 'reading' and enables, to put it in somewhat 
telegraphic and banal terms, an openness and hospitality for the 'other'. This for 
147 Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, 40. 
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Derrida amounts to a certain 'politics of memory', which Laclau and Critchley 
prefer to separate as an 'ethics' which I now need to rewind more closely in 
relation to the reading of art works and art history, picking up the threads that I 
have already interwoven into this critique of T. J. Clark's reading. 
Going back to the positions of Laclau and Critchley two things strike me. One is 
that Laclau's position ultimately depends upon recognition of the difference 
between signifier and signified whereby one 'term' can 'empty' or 'phantasmise' 
itself to act as a 'transcendental signified' around which a politics can begin. 
"The chasm between law and justice" becomes somehow 'filled' with a 
begemonic articulation. Derrida's position throughout his work is one that seeks 
to resist and destabilise both the distinction between signifier and signified and 
especially any notion of transcendental status to signification. This comes to 
mark an ultimate referent or 'anterior' to the work of the mark, as a form of 
presence which guarantees, here 'the political' from the 'outside'. Similarly, 
with Critchley's argument for the question being "How to totalize? How to form 
the link in terms of some forin of political presence, instantiation ofjustice9" is, 
I suggest, missing the point about undecidability. It seems to me that 
undecidability is not another word for incompletion or untotalisability as some 
kind of 'state of things', with which we have to deal as part of the 'ends of man' 
as finite, against infinite possibilities. As Geoff Bennington suggests, we need to 
be mindful of, "Derrida's refusal of the classical account of the impossibility of 
totalization on the grounds of the empirical finitude of man, faced with the 
148 inexhaustible richness in experience. " 
, 
and avoid, 
The paradox of traditional political thinking of all colours that by 
taking its model from conceptual thinking... projects freedom as a state 
at the end of a progress ideally oriented by calculable and 
programmable laws. Freedom is ejected from now except in the 
negative form of unforeseen obstacles. 149 
148 Bennington, G., 'Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very Idea)' in Legislations: The 
Politics ofDeconstruction (London: Verso, 1994), 42. 
149 Ibid., 45. 
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The point is that undecidability is not a modulation within the order of 
calculation that we can cancel out or ignore as an obstacle. It 'is' that mutual 
contamination of transcendent and empirical, precondition and condition, that 
mobilises the event of any decision, nomination, call, making of a mark or 
reading, for that matter, and that more than once. In this sense, with reference to 
Critchley's question, there is no sense in which undecidability is an obstacle and 
there is no choice. Bennington quotes Derrida from Parages: 
... 
where, the criteria for decidability ceasing to be assured, a decision 
can, finally engage and the event take place. More than once 
... 
ventures 
beyond the too-well-received divides between performative speech and 
constative speech, into those environs where a borderline begins to 
tremble. It regularly undecides itself, between the event of citation, in 
advance divisible and iterable, and the desire of the coming itself, 
before any citation. But the event-meeting, decision, call, nomination, 
initial incision of a mark-can only come about from the experience of 
the undecidable. Not the undecidable which still belongs to the order of 
calculation but the other, which no calculation could ever anticipate. 
Without this experience, would there ever be the chance of a step taken; 
a call for the event, a gift, a responsibility? Would there be any other 
thing, any cause then other than causality? Would not everything be 
ý150 delivered over to the programme r 
It is within this ethico-political 'arena', and on these 'terms' that Derrida's 
readings on art and literature lie. Just as Derrida is wary of any political 
programme that would pre-empt that anachronistic 'hauntology', that crossing of 
absence and presence that is the demand of the here and now, 'outside' of any 
ontology, so too is he wary of any philosophical, sociological or aesthetic 
'programme' that denies the work of differance or the 'trait' when it comes to 
art. 
In The Truth in Painting, Derrida speaks of writing four times around the truth in 
painting. Characteristically, Derrida's 'around' is within and from out of the 
problematics of any discourse on painting and how far that discourse is deemed 
separate from, but 'contaminated' by, that which 'exceeds' or is the excess of its 
very object. From the beginning, Derrida asks questions of what it means to talk 
150 Ibid., 46. 
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of 'the idiom in painting', 'to owe' or 'tell' the 'truth in painting' and the 
relationship between stating and performing (constative and performative, saying 
or doing) as speech acts, when it comes to painting and the entire question of the 
'trait' 
-the characteristic, as per idiom belonging to painting, the mark, and the 
broaching at origin, as the trace, differance. Derrida, both in terms of presenting 
his argument and graphically in the arrangement of the interrupted and 
interrupting 'marks' (which David Wills calls 'half crochets', referring to 
graphic marks in fifteenth century printed bibles separating text from 
commentary), which, in Derrida's chapter on Kant's Aesthetics entitled 
Parergon, are remarkable for their signifying or half-framing an absence in the 
text, indicating by the very lemma that which is absent from Kant's discourse, 
produces a discourse or commentary on the frame itself. ' 51 As Derrida indicates 
in his preface entitled passe-partout, as that which separates and interrupts 
framing, the 'partition at the edge', the feature of divisibility, the frame will be 
the central question in his discussion of the work of art. 
Four times then around painting 
... 
to recognise and contain, like the 
surrounds of the work of art, or at most its outskirts: frame, title, 
signature, museum, archive, reproduction, discourse, market, in short 
everywhere where one legislates on the right to painting by marking the 
limit, with a slash marking an opposition which one would like to be 
indivisible 
... 
The common feature of these four times is perhaps the trait. 
Insofar as it is never common or even one, with and without itself. Its 
divisibility founds texts, traces and remains. 152 
To legislate on the right to painting begs the question of the differance between, 
I would say, justice and the law figured in the trait, wherein one might say the 
trait is both within and without, and exceeds the 'legislature' of framing. 
Discourses on painting are perhaps destined to reproduce the limit 
which constitutes them, whatever they do and whatever they say; there 
is for them an inside and an outside of the work as soon as there is a 
work. A series of oppositions comes in the train of this one, which, 
15 1 see Wills, D., 'Lemming' in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader. (ed). 
Cohen, T., 
, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 1), 111. 
152 Derrida, J., The Truth in Painting. Trans. Bennington, G., andMcLeod, I., (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987), 11. 
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incidentally, is not necessarily primary (for it belongs to a system whose 
edging itself reintroduces the problem). And there the trait is always 
determined as an opposition-slash. But what happens before the 
difference becomes opposition in the trait, or without its doing so? And 
what if there were not even a becoming here? For becoming has perhaps 
always had as its concept this determination of difference as opposition. 
So the question would no longer be "What is a trait? " or "What does a 
trait become? " or "What pertains to the trait? " but "How does the trait 
treat itselP Does it contract in its retreat? " A trait never appears, never 
itself, because it marks the difference between the forms and contents of 
the appearing. A trait never appears, never itself, never for a first time. 
It begins by retrac(t)ing. Follow here the logical succession of what I 
long ago called, before getting around to the turn of painting, the 
broaching of the origin: that which opens, with a trace, without 
initiating anything. 153 
Derrida's broaching of the subject captures the 'breach' of the trait in the figure 
of the passe-partout. 
One space remains to be broached in order to give place to the truth in 
painting. Neither inside nor outside, it spaces itself without letting itself 
be framed but it does not stand outside the frame. It works the frame, 
makes it work, lets it work, gives it work to do 
... 
the trait is attracted and 
retrac(t)ed there by itself, attracts and dispenses with itself there 
... 
it is 
situated. It situates between the visible the visible edging and the 
phantom in the centre from which we fascinate 
... 
Between the outside 
and the inside, between the external and the internal edge-line, the 
framer and the framed, the figure and the ground, form and content, 
signifier and signified and so on for any two faced opposition. The trait 
thus divides itself in this place where it takes place 
... 
I write on the 
passe-partout well known to picture framers. And in order to broach it, 
right on this supposedly virgin surface, generally cut out of a square of 
cardboard and open in its 'middle' to let the work appear. The latter can 
moreover be replaced by another, which thus slides into the passe- 
partout as an 'example'. To that extent, the passe-partout remains a 
structure with a moveable base, but although it lets something appear, it 
does not form a frame in the strict sense, rather a frame within a frame. 
Without ceasing 
... 
to space itself out, it plays its card or its cardboard 
153 Ibid., 11. 
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between the frame in what is properly speaking its internal edge and the 
external edge of what it gives to see, lets or makes appear in its empty 
enclosure: the picture, the painting, the figure, the form, the system of 
strokes (traits) and of colours. 154 
Derrida's figure of the passe-partout seeks to complicate any assumed simple 
concept of the aesthetic or the conceptual framework of any discourse on 
painting inasmuch as we cannot easily divide the 'inside' and the 'outside' of 
any such discourse. As David Carroll puts it: 
Derrida argues that, for Hegel and an entire history of philosophy, the 
empirical existence of (the) work of art has provided a starting point for 
the philosophical investigation of the meaning and origin of art. The 
purpose of the philosophy of artý in this context, is to raise the empirical 
nature of art to a higher level and endow it with historical and 
philosophical meaning to negate and transcend the specifically. aesthetic 
elements of art. The aesthetic object is, in this way, predetermined in 
terms of the historical-philosophical end it is made to serve. But even if 
such an end were not imposed on art if it were possible to approach art 
only on its own terms, with art as its own end, the questions that would 
then be asked of the 'non-determined concept' of art, argues Derrida 
would in themselves predetermine what one means by art. This holds 
true not just for traditional philosophical questions (such as what is the 
truth of art? its meaning? its origin? ) but also for 'modem' questions 
concerning the form of the work, its internal functioning, its 
performative effects. Each of these questions assumes, at the very least, 
an opposition or set of oppositions-truth/falsehood, meaning/forrn, 
intemal/extemal, saying/doing-that limits and predetermines the 
definition of art and how it will be treated. Art could be considered as 
predetermined therefore 
- 
not only in theories whose purpose is to have 
art serve some exterior end or purpose, but also in theories whose 
purpose is to have art serve only its own internal purposes. 155 
The corollary to this is, yes, that "The question Derrida pursues in his essays on 
art is how to break out of the enclosure determined by this inside/outside 
opposition 
-not in order to destroy all notions of aesthetic specificity, but to 
154 bid., 12. 
155 Carroll, D., Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard. Derrida. (London: Methuen, 1987), 134-135. 
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conceive ofspecificity in some other manner; not to diminish the status of theory 
but to make it more critical and effective"156 (my emphasis) and accords with his 
reference elsewhere to the 'third term': 
at the same time the place where the system constitutes itself and where 
this constitution is threatened by the heterogeneous and by a fiction no 
longer in the service of truth. What particularly interests me here is that 
which participates in participation and non-participation. And the 
regular return to this theme 
- 
which is also the theme of art, of mimesis 
- 
betrays a double postulation in my work, and a raising of the stakes 
- 
since we find at the heart of the third as participation that which in no 
case allows itse6r to be re-appropriated by participation, and thus by a 
philosophical system. 157 (My emphasis) 
But the key point is why should this matter, what are the ethical and political 
stakes as well as the aesthetic or indeed theoretical ones? If Derrida's reading 
puts into question such binaries as a text/context division upon which T. J. 
Clark's reading of Manet and modernism ultimately depends, why will an 
approach to aesthetics and politics along the lines of a radicalisation of 
hegemony not do? After all, here the engagement with the aesthetic and the 
political is on an undecidable terrain, of radical incompletion and 
differing/deferring of "textual, institutional, cultural, social, economic 
structures", as suggested by Laclau and Critchley above. It will not do because in 
the end we encounter another framing, which turns the singular to an example, 
the particular of a universalising hegemonic condition. It is in terms of 
singularity that Derrida importantly re-reads and deconstructs the 'aesthetic' and 
thereby can proffer a reading ofjustice 'before' the law and 'outside' the 
thinking of totality. 
I have briefly here concentrated on the 'passe-partout' section of The Truth in 
Painting, precisely because it sets the scene for what is a mode of reading and 
inscribing on the 'right to painting' and the aesthetic that, to my mind, accords 
with Derrida's approach to the ethico-political as an act of thinking before and 
156 Carroll, D., Paraesthetics, 135. 
157 Derrida, J., and Ferraris, M., A Tastefor the Secret, 5. 
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between the difference between justice and the law and resisting presumptive 
ontological or phenomenological frameworks or teleological programmes. In 
that sense, to do justice to the aesthetic and to mark its singularity, is to 
recognise that spacing 'before' the law, and recognising but without falling 
entirely for the trace of absolute alterity 'beyond' the law. It is this working of 
the frame across the aesthetic and the ethical and political that interests me. 
To approach this requires a linkage between Derrida's writing on aesthetics and 
his deconstructive gestures in relation to the 'frame' 
- 
as a starting point for 
consideration of the 'work' of art, the self portrait and the rights of inspection of 
the photographic image and his other interventions concerning hospitality, the 
supplement and the messianic. Derrida's writings on the aesthetic are not 
confined in their reverberations to aesthetic questions, but is there an aesthetic 
question without an ethical and political one? Such a linkage has been suggested 
in an article by Ranjana Khanna, ' 58 which deploys Derrida's deconstructive 
reading of the frame and Kant's 'Parergon', together with his ethico-political 
meditations on hospitality, exemplarity, community (as, for Derrida, always 
something to parenthesise, in resistance to its totalising, exclusionary force) and 
justice in relation to the 'postcolonial', the key issues being the relationship 
between the 'frame', 'host' and 'supplement', the distinction between the 
particular as an example of the 'universal', or part to whole, and the singular as 
being unassimilable to this part-to-whole 'context' and how the singular as a 
supplement of the supplement troubles received wisdoms of 'community' and 
notions of hegemonic articulation. 
In The Truth in Painting's chapter on "Parergon", Derrida writes on the parerga 
of the 'frame' and 'the example'. These are supplements and supports for that 
which is thought 'intrinsic' to the aesthetic and the beautiful. As such they are 
both necessary to the intrinsic in order to determine what is intrinsic and what is 
extrinsic but, at the same time, they are denied, naturalised or simplified by the 
philosophical discourse. 
158 Khanna, R., 'Frames, Contexts, Community, Justice' in Diacritics, 33.2, (2003), 114 1. 
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A frame deten-nines and 'hosts' a work, but may be denied existence on its own 
terms. Insofar as Derrida gives us to think of the frame as giving rise to the work, 
with its own materiality it is a 'prosthesis' at origin, an originary supplement, 
doubling any simple origin. As much as the frame gives host to and 'protects' 
meaning, it is permeable and open to the other (unknowable, promise or threat) 
outside of the frame, or a singular event exceeding the frame 'from the inside', 
like Barthes'punctum, an unknowable effect that wounds and lingers as an 
ungraspable memory. 
This piercing, for Barthes, is at first unlocatable, as if it is responding to memories or 
nostalgia etched into the body of the viewer, thus causing an interruption in the force field 
of the stadium. It also introduces a different time-frame, and a spectral presence that 
indicates being out-of-joint. 159 
Khanna connects the puncturn effect both to the "spectral presence that indicates 
being out-of-joint" with Derrida's reading of Kant's 'without' of the 'pure cut' 
- 
the 'essence' of the beautiful and the aesthetic as such in the finality-without- 
end. 
In a section on the notion of beauty in Kant, he [Derrida] explains that the "cut" caused by 
something outside of the force field of the work contains the unknown. The "cut" does not 
simply engender an already formulated alternative. It opens the work up to the possibility 
of a different intervention or response as yet unknown, and is stripped of recognizable 
utility 
... 
The aesthetics of the parergon is especially concerned with this cut or 
interruption. It is a nonknowledge intervening in the force field of the work enclosed 
within a frame. 160 
Derrida analyses Kant's frame of the beautiful, premised on the 'without' of the 
pure cut, enclosing the object in its 'finality-without-end'. The cut opens the 
'work' to the 'without', which is necessarily unknowable as without end or 
purpose. This is an open 'without', which has an edge. It is tfie 'without' marked' 
by the edge, that counts for beauty; the inassindlable 'other' without, which cuts 
to both form and give 'force' at the border. The frame is thus the 'law' which 
139 Khanna, R., "Frames, contexts... " 18 
160 Ibid., 18 
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inscribes and delimits but, at the same time, it exposes to the without (limits) of 
the law beyond law. 
We cannot deny, naturalise or 'dialectise' the antinomy of the frame. But frames 
can be worked otherwise, are liable to openings, twists, unhingings, gaps in the 
joints thus out ofjoint. Openings about which we may hypothesise as to the law 
of unconditional, absolute hospitality, but in reference to Laclau and Critchley, 
above, to hegemonise would surely impose another frame, or substitute a 
particular example, rather than a singular instance. 
It could of course at some level be supposed that the singular can serve as an 
example. An example (for Kant) is a particular instance supporting a general or 
universal 'law'. Derrida points out that the frame or the passe-partout can allow a 
number of examples to substitute within its boundaries. But for Derrida, the 
singular and the particular themselves form something of an antinomy. 
To recap on 'singularity', singularity involves recognising a work as 
both unique and necessarily repeatable, iterable, thus operating in a 
4general economy' But it is in the insistent 'gap' between the singular 
and the general, each time 'anew', that the singular event of the work 
're-marks' and demands response, which is also a responsibility of 
reading. This is what I am trying to capture by the ten-n 'aporetic (de) 
structure', which necessarily crosses time, thought as the present or the 
presence of the work or text, inasmuch as it re-marks an un- 
thernatisable and un-phenomenologisable 'other' anterior to its 
4institution' as a work (and thus it could be said that a work is always 
already 'in mourning' for this absent 'other') and, by the logic of 
iterability, is still to come in an incalculable way. 
Singularity bears with it an ideality that is irreducible to any framework or 
context that, nevertheless, lets it be and is thus in turn irreducible to the 
particular and/or the example. It cannot be explained by its context but, as a 
singularity, it cannot be understood other than through its particular instantiation. 
This is the aporia through which responsibility has to take place and, insofar as 
singularity bears a certain loss in relation to context, this 'response' has 
ill 
something of the structure of mourning about it. For Derrida, however, this is 
neither a mourning of introjection nor a melancholia of incorporation in the 
strictly Freudian sense. Mourning is mourning for the inassimable 'other', 
respecting its radical alterity and within the structure of 'tim e-out-of-joint' 
bearing a relationship to an 'other-to-come'. It is in these senses that art and 
literature are analogous to the historical and political in Derrida's terms. A 
response to literature is akin to a responsibility towards justice for the 'other' 
before the 'law' in the important double sense of 'before' and at the same time 
the literary event can articulate the anachronism and 'out ofjointness' of time 
constitutive of history and the 'politics' ofjustice. To articulate this (de)structure 
within a logic of hegemony is to perform something of a double-framing. First it 
is reduce the singular to the example or particular instance of a general 
(universal) tendency, and then it is to expect that particular instance to 'perform' 
that generalising, universalising gesture. 
To read Olympia on the basis of undecidability around the question of 
woman/prostitution as generalisable into a (another) potentially (unifying) 
political position (frame) is perhaps the inverse of Clark's determination (in the 
last instance) by class. 
Whereas the concepts of counter-hegemony and hegemony emphasise 
alternative modes of new power structures, that of hospitality returns 
one to the openness to damage, caused by the arrival of the supplement 
and to undoing rather than building an alternative of recentralized force- 
fields. Less about building hegemony or community, it listens for 
fractures so as to understand how a force of criticism functions in the 
supplement politically and ethically. 161 
In response to (the) painting, we need to hypothesise around a certain 
'blindness', a passivity to the 'other' which damages the 'frame' of sight and 
carries an inassimable force, thus instigating a certain 'exposure' and unravelling 
of seeing that disables a return of the other to the same, whether that 'same' be 
signified by a political position or aesthetic effect or self-reference. 
16 1 Khanna, R., 'Frames, Contexts, Community, Justice', 34. 
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Derrida brings this into play with the 'scene of drawing' in Memoirs of the 
Blind. 162 Derrida thinks the trace directly in relation to the drawn, and then the 
painted, mark where he posits that the act of drawing involves a 'primary' or 
'anterior' blindness; a necessary passivity towards the rupture by absence, the 
'invisible' trait at the beginning of any tracing of the mark, the absolute 
singularity of the event of drawing, which makes possible the mark, as re-mark, 
the delimiting and the withdrawal of the mark and the necessary exposure of the 
mark to chance. 
This has repercussions then, both for the 'event' of drawing and the 'signature'. 
The 'event' of the trace is both absolutely singular and with-draws, but at the 
same time 'is' in the trace as re-mark in the spatio-temporal work of differance. 
The event is thus both subject to an 'otherness' outside of any simple thinking of 
space and time and appropriation by consciousness, while it is also inside the 
differentiating structure of differance. Similarly, the signature, the gesture, the 
self-presentation of the artist, and here we can think on any making of the mark 
as a kind of 'self-portrait' and model for self-consciousness, has to go through 
and be deferred by the pre-original trace of the other, making its full presence to 
'itself' impossible. 
Derrida illustrates this through his account of the particularity of the self- 
portrait's necessary detour through the 'other'. The self-mark of the artist is 
dependent upon its designation by an 'other', the viewer, while the viewer is 
dependent upon the designation of the mark (artist's self-mark/self portrait) as a 
'work'/ 'self-portrait' by a title or signature as part of the 'framing' of the work, 
as work. The subject as self-present identity is deferred both by the other of the 
viewer and by language and signification. Self-possession is always impossible 
in its dependence upon the other, whilst the attempt at self-possession is 
necessary in order for there to be a relation to the other. 
Derrida's remarks here on the event and the signature bear upon the passivity 
and blindness of witnessing and the ethics and politics involved in bearing 
witness to the other. This makes us think of painting as a bearing witness to the 
162 Derrida, J., Memoirs of the Blind 
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event, the 'truth', the 'world', or writing on painting as bearing witness to the 
witness. And in both cases, witnessing and witness are effaced by the trace that 
at the same time makes them possible. Witnessing always comes after the event, 
even in the instance of eye-witnessing, because its account can only be an 
originary supplement to the event which is always already 'absented', but made 
possible through its tracing. The event, in that sense, cannot be seen, known, re- 
presented or adequated and thus, bearing witness to the witness requires a 
response to that which withdraws; that which is unrepresentable and 
unknowable. Witnessing of painting, in painting, mourns or receives the 
effacement of the other, which is not present, presentable or of a presence, but 
neither is a pure absence. 
Derrida's work as one reads and re-reads it across time, offers an alliance 
between the singularity of artworks and the aesthetic (as that which participates 
and at that same time does not participate in the conceptual order, affirms and at 
the same time denies by its very heterogeneity and re-marking the mimetic 
relation, traces and at the same effaces in the trace thus exposing the absent 
presence) with the aporia of time, which 'links' the absolute past, immemorial, 
unrestitutable, with the absolute future, without horizon, without telos, 
incalculable, and thereby the inscribing that which is lost to history, in the name 
ofjustice, by virtue of this (a)temporality. 
From another but related perspective, Nancy's work re-inscribes the aesthetic as 
contiguous to an absolute relativisation of the spacing of the in-common, as a 
completely otherwise thought ontology of being as existence. Derrida wants to 
complicate the thinking of being as ontology by crossing it with a 'hauntology'. 
Nancy wants to complicate the thinking of being as common essence with a re- 
thought ontology as a 'being-with', which is the exposure of singularity to 
plurality without recourse to or return to an immanentism of the 'in-common'. 
In both we derive a. relationship between the aesthetic and the political thought 
'otherwise'. 
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So I return to the reading of Manet's Olympia. The body is undialectisable, not 
in terms of a collapse of dialectic, but more in terms of the resistance to dialectic 
as image in the unsublatable 'remainder', the spectral 'revenant' of Derrida, or 
the discontinuity, the surprise fragmentation of sense and our 'norms' of sense- 
making in terms of 'received' notions of subjectivity, grouping, class, gender, 
sex- boundness, as per Nancy's inoperable 'community' of reading to which 
twe' are exi)osed. absolutelv relativised in that sense. an interrul)ted dialectic. 
Still, 
The ruin is not in front of us; it is neither a spectacle nor a love object. It 
is experience itself neither the abandoned yet still monumental fragment 
of a totality, nor, as Benjamin thought, simply a theme of baroque 
culture. It is precisely not a theme, for it ruins the theme, the position, 
the presentation or representation of anything and everything. Ruin is 
rather the memory open like an eye, or like a hole in a bone socket that 
lets you see without showing you anything at all, anything of the 
all-There is nothing of the totality that is not immediately opened, 
pierced or bored through 
... 
The naked face cannot look itself in the 
face 
... 
but because the other, over there, remains irreducible because 
(s)he resists all interiorization, subjectification, idealization in a work of 
mourning, the ruse of narcissism never comes to an end 
... 
163 
163 Derrida, J., Memoirs ofthe Blind 69 
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Chapter Two: The Promise of Death: History and Memory in Hiroshima Mon 
Amour 
There is no doubt that Derrida's politics includes a work of mourning. But the 
tspectral' relation he articulates in Specters ofMarx and casts similarly in other 
texts, 164 makes clear that his notion ofjustice for the other, only graspable 
through a 'time-out-of-joint', suggests a past and a memory, which cannot be re- 
presented as a past-present, nor predicated upon and calculated on the basis of 
known future-present or 'final judgement'. The past is an inheritance and a 
memory which is an endless task in the here and now, without ever 
'overcoming'. Thus there can be no work of memory, which would signal the 
completion of memory. If, for Derrida, there is a 'work of mouming', this is 
always both singular and 'at large', exterior to any singular death and our 
singular response of mourning 'in us', to this death. Whilst such interiorisation 
cannot be denied, neither can it be complete, as it is always exceeded by the 
absolute alterity of the mourned 'other', such that mourning begets a 
reorganisation of space, rendering 'aporetic' the division between inside and 
outside, self and other. 165 
Within the philosophic and psychoanalytic tradition, with reference to Freud, 
there derives a sense that mourning can be completed and death sublated into 
history and memory. 166 Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested that this is the sacrificial 
logic, which has not only been at work in the event of collective memory and 
commemoration, but has informed the very thinking of community and the 
politics it subtends, which is an overcoming and surmounting of human finitude, 
66 a beyond and surmounting of 
.. 
the unravelling that occurs at the death of each 
164 For instance, Derrida, J., Memoiresfor Paul de Man, trans. Lindsay, C., Culler, J., and 
Cadava, E., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) and Derrida, J., Cinders trans. 
Lukacher, N., (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1987). 
165 In Memoiresfor Paul de Man, Derrida. makes the point that there is in the passage and 
moment of transition in any act of memory, that which resists the recuperative powers of 
memory, as a 'failure' of recollection, which, whilst being the negative and finitude of memory, 
is also the very opening of difference. The difference between an ontology of memory in an 
origin and a 'rhetoric' of memory as the 'traces' which 'preserve' but occupy no presence and 
always remain 'to come'. Op. cit, 70. 
166 Freud, S., 'Mouming and Melancholia' in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psycholigical Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, Vol XIV 1968 239-258 
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one of us 
- 
that death [which] when no longer anything more than the death of 
the individual, carries an unbearable burden and collapses into insignificance. "167 
This is the logic of the community of immanence, signified by figures like the 
lovers who commit suicide together, which "accomplishes the infinite repricocity 
of two agencies", and thought of by Hegel as the principle of the State, residing 
in the fact of "having in another the moment of one's own subsistence, [an other] 
whose reality is never more present than when its members give their lives. " 168 
Death in such a community, is not the unmasterable excess of finitude, 
but the infinite fulfilment of an immanent life: it is death itself 
consigned to immanence, it is in the end that resorption of death that the 
Christian civilisation, as though devouring its own transcendence, has 
come to minister to itself in the guise of the supreme work. 169 
For Nancy, death is appropriate to the thinking of community, but in an entirely 
other sense. As Derrida suggests, death presents an absolute alterity, which, in 
Nancy's application to the thinking of community, is the profound sense that 
death reveals that the community is an impossible communion. Death reveals the 
impossibility of immanence, the impossibility of subjects substantiated into a 
collective subject. As Nancy suggests, we can only experience ourselves as 
existent, as our 'non-experienced experience' of the death of others. "What 
community reveals to me, in presenting my birth and my death is my existence 
outside of myself. 99170 Our being is always finite, as the 'experience' of birth and 
death is always 'outside of' and 'other' to self, whilst being inalienably 'proper' 
to self as existing. What we share is not the substantiated T hypostasised as a 
167 Nancy, J-L., 'The Inoperative Community' in The Inoperative Community, Ed. Connor, P., 
(Minneapolis:, University of Minnesota, 1991), 7. In this text Nancy responds to both the 
thinking of death and community in Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit whereby the 
consciousness of death is something more than mere annihilation, but testimony to the necessary 
overcoming of particularity and externality in the passage of the 'spirit' towards the absolute 
reconciliation of the universal with its particular embodiment, realised politically in the 
overcoming of the individual in the body of the state and its 'inversion' in Marx, where the state 
is the realisation of a dialectical materialism as opposed to idealism, which has its own share of 
sacrifices along the way. 
'68 Ibid., 12. 
169 Ibid., 13. 
170 Ibid., 26 
117 
'we'. What 'we' share is the 'exteriority' to the self, the 'other-to-self 
, 
which is 
an unenclosable exposure to others. 171 
It is in the light of these thoughts from Derrida and Nancy, which bring together 
death and the politics of the subject and community in an entirely other sense, 
that I have approached the film Hiroshima Mon Amour. I argue that the film 
questions the completion of memory and posits that memory will exceed the 
means by which it is re-presented by and for the subject, at the same time 
questioning the premise upon which a collective memory can be given to, or on 
behalf of, a community. However, in terms of Marguerite Duras's reading of the 
film she scripted, it ultimately resolves these questions by a passage through a 
series of negations and ambiguities within an auto-critique of the image of 
cinema, which culminates in the truth of the non-truth; the impossibility of 
knowing or talking about the truth of Hiroshima other than by a 'fictive' 
narration which bespeaks a nihilism. However, if, out of the telling of this 
narrative, a catharsis takes place and a collective survival emerges, I argue that 
this ultimately sublates the event of Hiroshima and forecloses upon its future 
memory and the thought of the future, which an event of such enormity 
demands. 
Using Derrida's radicalisation of memory and the future to come, and Nancy's 
re-thinking of the subject and subject of community, and aside from Duras's 
reading, the film offers the possibility of another reading. This reading 
recognises that no cinematic representation can contain the singularity of the 
historical event, which is always in excess of and unassimilable to any 
completion by memory. But, as such, thejustice, which the memory of the event 
demands, remains in the uncloseable tension between the event and its memory 
and is thus receptive to an open future, the subject, politics and community of 
which cannot be assumed in advance or be thought to arise out of the working 
through of the memory of Hiroshima. 
17 1Here Nancy is elaborating upon and bringing together Heidegger's notion of Being as "ek- 
stasis", as an "immanent transcendence" and therefore an "impossible" immanence, Heidegger's, 
arguably "undeveloped" notion of Being as Mitsein (being with) and Heidegger's notion of 
"authentic" being as "being-towards eath". See Nancy, J-L., The Inoperative Communityl4-15 
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The first part of this chapter is a commentary on the film studied through Duras's 
own reading of the film as evidenced in her synopsis, the script and her 
'notations' for the film. Taking a cue from these, I read the film in relation to the 
eroticism and the love affair upon which the film is premised. It is this erotic 
relationship intertwined with a memory, which appears to put seeing, knowing, 
memory and (re) presentation in question. But to what end? It is this question, 
which reverberates through the second part, where philosophical and critical 
debates emerge considering the place of art in memory of an event where ethical 
and political questions ofjustice come to the fore. This returns me again in the 
third part to the film and the very question of the 'event' in the film, which 
prompts another reading. 
"Sacrilegious recollection" 
Hiroshima Mon Amour was first released in France in 1959, directed by Alain 
Resnais with a script by Marguerite Duras. Resnais had been commissioned by 
the French Ministry of Culture to make a film about the dropping of the atom 
bomb on Hiroshima by the Americans in 1945. Resnais had previously made a 
documentary film about the Nazi Death-Camps (Night and Fog, 1955). He gave 
up on the initial idea of a documentary on Hiroshima, "just another Night and 
Foe' and enlisted the help of Marguerite Duras. That does not mean to say that 
elements from Night and Fog are not present in Hiroshima Mon Amour. One of 
these is Resnais's interest in how memory and mental images of the camps relate 
to the actual documented footage, at what point does this documented past 
become the past and for whom? The other is the reference to French 
collaboration in the process of internment. The questions of 'how you 
remember? ' and 'whose sense of the past is it? ' are central to Resnais. 
Hiroshima Mon Amour produced a "sort of false documentary" as Duras termed 
it. From the outset of her synopsis, it is clear that this film is to. approach the 
horror of Hiroshima by way of a calculated subversion of the genre of 
documentary, which in its reliance upon the repetition of received images 
reduces, by its very amplitude, the horror to banality. "Impossible to talk about 
Hiroshima, one can only talk about the impossibility of talking about 
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172 Hiroshima" 
, 
she states. This is the effect of documentary cinema and the 
paradox that ensues from it; that you can talk about Hiroshima anywhere. "One 
can talk about Hiroshima anywhere, even in a hotel bed, during a chance, an 
adulterous love affair", 173 but to what point or effect? Hiroshima becomes a 
word on the lips of 'the world', but what about meaning and significance 'now' 
and for the future? The film's approach to the proposition of 'false documentary' 
is to place a love story at the site of Hiroshima twelve years after the bombing, a 
chance affair between a Japanese man and a French woman, a story, which is 
itself overwhelmed by the female protagonist's personal memory of love and 
death in her home town of Nevers; in France, as this previously repressed 
memory is provoked by the new love affair. Formally it is a false documentary 
in that it is a film, which foregrounds its own apparatus with an elaborate 
montage of images from newsreels and reconstructions of the aftermath of the 
bombing and the exhibits in the Hiroshima museum with a voice-over dialogue 
which, contrary to the norms of documentary, disputes rather than confirms the 
relationship between what is seen and knowledge of the event. In addition, the 
female character is an actress visiting Hiroshima to make a film about peace, and 
the film elaborately shows the location sets and all the cinematic machinery 
involved in constructing this commemorative film. 
The story, which comes to engulf the present of Hiroshima, is narrated via the 
conventions of flashback images, which echo or imitate scenes from the 
Hiroshima newsreels and Museum. This contributes to the complex 'time' of the 
film and the difficulties of distinguishing between what is 'real' and what is 
'imaginary'. On the one hand, the woman's personal memory appears to be 
provoked by and continues to be imaged by her through the later images of 
Hiroshima, on the other hand her memory images serve as an artistic device 
through which the collective images of Hiroshima are re-thought and given a 
personal connection and a 'truth'. It uses the devices of cinema, which can play 
upon the ambiguity between perception and knowledge, what is seen and what is 
imagined, what is believed to be real and 'true'. 
172 Duras, M., 'Synopsis', Hiroshima Mon Amour (Screenplay). (New York: Grove Press, 1961), 
9. 
173 ibid., 9. 
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The story that is provoked by the French woman's chance encounter with the 
Japanese man, at the site of Hiroshima, is of her previous tragic love affair with a 
German soldier, who is shot dead during the Occupation of Nevers. Her 
fragmented recounting of her madness at his death and subsequent punishment, 
as her head is shaved for collaborating with the enemy, in images which, as 
noted above, borrow from and repeat those of Hiroshima's aftermath itself, 
disrupts and pervades and at the same time intensifies her love affair in the 
present, as the Japanese man is drawn by the threads of this story into 
identification with the dead German lover of the past. The affair in the present 
appears equally riven with separation and loss, as the lovers have met in the 
interrupted time of a chance encounter and have to 'kill time' before her 
imminent departure. Having told her story and in that sense 'forgotten' her 
German lover by identifying through and thereby consigning him to a narrative, 
the film appears to end with the separation that has been there all along. She 
admits to 'beginning to forget' the Japanese man. He is desperate for her to stay, 
yet treasures a 'memory of forgetting'. In the end, 
,... nothing happens. Both are reduced to a terrifying mutual impotence 
... 
They simply call each 
other once again. What? Nevers, Hiroshima. For in fact, in each other's eyes, they are no one. 
They are names of places, names that are not names... 174 
There are different versions of the reactions to the film on its first release and 
whether it was or was not withdrawn from the Cannes competition. But there is 
some agreement amongst historians of film that it caused a scandal. 175 The 
objections 'officially' raised concerned the anticipated displeasure from the 
Americans over images of Hiroshima, but the film intertwines a number of 
'scandals'; the plight of the 'fernmes tondues', women whose heads were shaved 
like sacrificial scapegoats for their sexual collaboration with the enemy during 
the Occupation; the subtle yet pointed reference to the Hollywood film 
Casablanca, which sets love and maverick American resistance against Vichy 
France at a time (194 1) when America's attitude towards the Vichy was at best 
174 Ibid., 13 
175 See Higgins, L., New Novel, new wave, new politics. (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 
1996). 
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ambivalent; the association of harrowing images of death with an erotic 
encounter. The film still generates unease because of the apparent analogy it 
makes between the personal anguished memories of a woman's tragic love affair 
and subsequent punishment, and the collective commemoration of a nuclear 
devastation. Can these be commensurable? In Duras's terms the answer may be 
'yes' and 'no', in the sense that in both cases the suffering can be deemed to be 
'absolute' (and thereby incomparable). Yet this personal distress is inextricably 
bound to the world-historical events of World War Two, "To shave a girl's head 
because she has loved 
- 
really loved 
- 
an official enemy of her country, is the 
ultimate of horror and stupidity". 176 
The discussion of the film in 1959 by Cahiers du Cinema critics, among them, 
filmmakers Godard, Rohmer and Rivette, hailed it as a modernist film, 
reconstituting reality out of a 'kind of splintering' and creating disequilibria for 
the spectator. "Tracking shots are a question of morality, " says Godard., 77 This 
elliptical remark, which Godard borrowed from elsewhere, at the same time goes 
to the heart of the matter of the film's form in relation to its subject and 
Resnais's resistance to the familiar modes of documentary signification. This is 
taken up much later in film theory by Marie-Claire Ropars who would go on to 
term Resnais's approach as employing a highly self-conscious and self-reflexive 
film 'syntax', a film-writing, a style, which effects a form appropriate to its 
subject matter (atomic explosion) and which, in its simulated memory images 
and repetition of traces from one context to another, Hiroshima to Nevers, 
demonstrates the necessity whilst inadequacy of reference to the event by way of 
the distinctive conjuncture of a disruptive literary mode with a disruptive 
cinematic mode. 
176 Duras, M., 'Synopsis', 12. The film, in Duras' hands, is a positioned 'anti-war' text, which 
refuses to disconnect the atrocity of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima with the atrocious 
behaviour of some of those in France at the time of the Liberation. The violence, conflict and 
shame of Liberation is a 'truer' picture than the nationalist fervour of celebration with De Gaulle 
as a national hero which went on to legitimise the government of De Gaulle in 1958 in the wake 
of the war against Algerian independence. 177 Hiller, J., (ed). 'Hiroshima, notre amour'. In The 1950's: Neo-Realism, Hollywood New 
Wave. Cahiers du Cinema, 59-70. Cambridge, Massachuetts, Harvard University Press 1985: 62 
1 
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Crossing the cinematic-literature frontier, conflating the reality-fiction distinction, 
Hiroshima Mon Amour points, more obliquely, to the new division which has opened up 
in the field of representation between the referring of the real to the writerly urge and the 
reduction of the real to a referentializable narrative. The fact that the event of Hiroshima 
is at the centre of this division gives the film its specifically historical dimension, whereby 
history recognizes itself as tributary to a discourse whose narrative growtb is no longer 
self-evident. 178 
The Cahiers group referred variously to its use of abstraction and the 
juxtaposition of abstracted shots out of which a 'unity' emerges or to a rhythm to 
the film, which effects simultaneously extreme opposition and profound 
harmony. Godard was keen to note how far the film's approach was from that of 
Rossellini (despite some inter-textual references to Rome, Open City). "That's 
the exact opposite of Rossellini's procedure 
- 
he [Rossellini] was outraged 
because abstract art had become official art. So, Resnais' tenderness is 
metaphysical, it isn't Christian. There is no notion of charity in his filins., 479 
All this indicates, at the time of the film's first reception, a debate around issues 
of style, aesthetics, ethics and politics 180 ; suggesting that in Resnais we 
encounter an aesthetic which, in being 'abstract', if we take the Cahiers view, is 
resisting any kind of redemption for an historical experience which has itself 
become 'unrepresentable' or, more exactly, 'urimeaningful' by straightforwardly 
realist means. Resnais's interest in problematising the relationship between 
seeing and knowing, and his preoccupation with how we come to know and 
remember, produces a particular kind of aesthetic text, which, both in terms of its 
form and its content refuses any clear appropriation, easy possession or 
identification with the characters in action by the viewing subject. 
... 
even the narrative, with its pauses and ellipses, its vagaries and its open ending, 
declared the coming of a new narrative convention which would project the subjectivity of 
the characters through the representation of objects and places 
... 
characters ippear... 
178 Ropars-Wuilleumier, M-C., 'llow history begets meaning: Alain Resnais' Hiroshima Mon 
Amour( 1959)' in Hayward, S. and Vincendeau, G., eds French Film: Texts and Contexts 173-186 
London Routledge 1997: 178-179 
179 HilIer, J., Cahiers du Cinema, 68. 
180 This included a somewhat inconclusive discussion as to whether Resnais was 'on the right' or 
'on the left', which surprised me, but everything has its resonance. 
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constructed but they divide into two interweaving networks; the remorseless diffraction of 
the editing breaches the film open to an audial and visual space which the action cannot 
saturate. "' 
For Resnais, any precipitous appropriation would collapse the question between 
seeing and knowing; a collapse upon which cinema usually relies. Resnais's re- 
marking of images, appearing similarly yet differently across time and space; the 
'abstraction' of content into a 'fonn' of viewing, (atomic/erotic, for instance); 
the disturbing rhythm which problematises both the flow of images or their 
closure; the, at times, incompatibility between visual and verbal cues; the 
moments of spatial distance and temporal 'weariness' between the protagonists 
despite their attraction to each other, all serve to produce something like a loss of 
mastery and 'mutual impotence' between film and viewing subject, which 
echoes that of the protagonists, caught up in a hypnotic world of discontinuous 
memory images sustained by the power of cinematic time. 
The film's considerable impact is found in its opening sequence (Indeed it was 
this section which, more than any other, provoked objections from the actual 
survivors of the bombing). ' 82 Rather than straightforwardly documenting the 
effects of the atomic bomb, the opening 'figures' the bomb's effects by way of 
the oscillation between two sweat-drenched, fragmented bodies (we only see 
torsos, arms and hands) in erotic embrace and these same bodies desiccating 
under showers of atomic dust. These 'abstracted' eroticised forms, which strike 
the viewer with their smooth silk-like quality whilst turning to dust, thus first 
evoke the horror. This is followed by the 'disputed' testimony of the woman's 
voice over the archive images of flayed skin, burnt flesh and disfigured limbs, 
combined with images of the Hiroshima Museum, which continue to be 
interrupted by these smooth erotic bodies, which finally 'dematerialise' into a 
sexually charged movement of tracking shots through modem Hiroshim 
, 
a. Thus 
in the move from horror to love, the public testimony to Hiroshima appears to be 
abandoned. 
18 1 Ropars, M-C., 'llow history begets... ' 173 
182 Wood, N., 'Memory by Analogy: Hiroshima Mon Amour' in The Liberation ofFrance: Image 
and Event. Eds. Kedward, MR. and Wood, N. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1995), 318. 
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With this montage of images the male voice-over contends that despite the 
woman's voice-over affirmation of the archive footage, she has seen 'nothing' at 
Hiroshima. Seeing/looking at the representations of the aftermath of the bombing 
is refuted both thematically and operationally. The cinematic camera lens and 
projection screen 'plays' between technological devices and emotional/corporeal 
states; the camera movement and editing producing an erotic or atomic charge, 
ending with the orgasmic declaration of love voiced over the 'Universal 
banality' 183 of scenes of modem Hiroshima. The viewer is invited to understand 
the focus on the skin of these bodies and the disturbance of the senses it 
provokes, as a critique of the usual form of visual representation as a means by 
which a collective response to mass death is instituted. If the erotic touch upon 
skin disturbs vision as part of a critique of visual representation's dissimulation 
of the truth, this is accompanied by an orchestration of cinematic effects 
designed to disorient the spectator. As suggested previously, the idea of 
testimony is put into question as the woman's voice-over declarations of the 
truth of what she has seen are denied by the man's voice-over. 
What she is testifying to, of course, are the images and museum exhibits, already 
remains, 'empty' cadavers of the event. It is here that the film does all it can to 
foreground the application of the temporal and spatial dynamics of cinema and 
its apparatus to these objectifications. Tracking and panning violently collide 
with close-ups of Museum exhibits; charred remains, hair damaged and lost by 
radiation, bodies stopped in their tracks by the conflagration, 'shadows cast in 
stone' and inter-textual reference to Resnais' own famed tracking shots in Night 
and Fog, and the walking feet of the Museum visitors which are, perhaps, 
deliberately reminiscent of Rossellini's Rome, Open City. There is deliberate 
confusion between the 'captured' instant and the flux, when the spectator is lured 
to confuse a photograph with an 'actual' body, a 'charred landscape' with a 
scale-model, and the theatrical with the literal in the inability to distinguish 
between 'actualities' and reconstructions. All set within the sharp, clean, 
$relentless' ultra modernist architectural space of the 'new' Museum. This 
foregrounding of the cinematic apparatus is reinforced later by the woman's role 
183 Duras, M., Screenplay, 24. 
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as a film actress and the scenes on the set for the film about peace, with their 
emphasis on the machinery and artifice of filmmaking. 
But this is not just a critique of museums and reconstructions as institutional 
forms of commemoration, because the form and idiom of these images is 
repeated in the woman's personal testimony and narration-by-images of her past, 
a fragmented account of her encounter with death and her incarceration and 
mutilation, presented via the cinematic convention of flashbacks, which interrupt 
the scenes of her affair with the Japanese man. In fact what is disturbing, in 
retrospect, is the extent to which the voice-over dialogue and the skew of some 
of the images from Hiroshima, appear as her 'vision' and testimony. The viewer 
is reminded that we are always spectators and not witnesses as recipients of 
cinema through both this inauthentic appropriation of the received images of 
Hiroshima as 'her' memory and the difficulty of assimilating these images in the 
way of 'made to order' documentary. But neither can the viewer assume that this 
Japanese man has a more authentic account, privileging national identity as the 
singular possessor of its past, assimilating it to this one point of view as 'truth'. 
Indeed, the Japanese man is cast 'without a memory'. His refutations of her 
knowledge of Hiroshima are wholly negative and spoken in "an unbearable, 
impersonal way", ' 84 reinforcing the inaccessibility and unknowability of the past 
of Hiroshima in the present. This is underscored in the fiction by the fact that he 
was absent from Hiroshima, fighting in the war, at the time of the bombing. He 
is an architect concerned with designing the present Hiroshima, to move on from 
its past, and most significantly, he apparently willingly forgoes his memory for 
hers. 
Her fragmented narrative is one, which, as she remembers her past as if in the 
idiom of 'images' of another past 'recollected' in the present combination of 
reconstructions and a new (love) life in Hiroshima, thus questions the possibility 
of a 'true' memory; one that is interiorised and introjected as a process of 
mourning. For the images of Nevers appear to be both a memory emerging from 
a deeply interiorised (traumatised) event and the interminable exteriorised 
184 Duras, M., Screenplay, 8. 
126 
repetitions of death at Hiroshima. And yet it is here that the Japanese man 
appears to seek a meaning for memory, somewhere else, in the French woman 
and her desire to forge a link with the experience of Hiroshima. 
"It was there that I seem to have understood, that you were so young 
... 
so young you still don't 
belong to anyone in particular. I like that 
...... 
(or-. ) 
"It was there, I seem to have understood, that I almost 
... 
lost you 
... 
and that I risked never knowing 
you 
...... 
(or else. ) 
"It was there, I seem to have understood, that you must have begun to be what you are today". 185 
Thus, inversely, it is the memory of Nevers and the "overlapping of Nevers and 
love, of Hiroshima and love"186 that will "probe the lesson of Hiroshima more 
deeply, "' 87 because it is this intertwining of events which is 'out of time' with the 
'what happened' at Hiroshima that enables the Japanese man to make a memory, 
one based on love and eroticism with the French woman. 
It is this characteristic of the film that became significant for "testimony" studies 
and the importance given to a re-alignment of testimony with trauma and the 
impossibility as well as possibility of testimony and the recognition of the mode 
of reconstruction enabled via the encounter with the 'other'. 
He listens to her, that is, out of his own not knowing, out of the impossibility of 
confrontation with his own past and out of a lack of self that is spoken in his question. 
And it is precisely because he speaks from an impossible place, and, asks a question that 
he himself does not fully own, that he can also enter her story, that he makes the answer to 
her story speak more that it can possibly tell. Not because he knows her truth but because 
he does not know his own, he can discover, even as she tells him of the impossibility of 
her own life, the survival of another for whom she unwittingly speaks in the double 
testimony of her response. 188 
185 Duras, M., Screenplay,. 5 1. 
186 Duras, M., 'Synopsis',. 12. 
187 ibid., 9. 
188 Caruth, C., 'Duras, Resnais, Hiroshima mon amour' in Caruth, C., Unclaimed Erperience: 
trauma, narrative and history 25-56, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press 1996 4041 
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Hiroshima present, as the time and place of the new lovers, is made as elusive as 
the past, despite the clear references to chronological time, the hours passing and 
remaining, a time that in the end the lovers have to 'kill', and the identified 
meeting places, hotel, his house, tea-room, Casablanca bar. This is not only 
because of the dissolving of the present into the past and the past returning to the 
present in those moments of remembering, or is it forgetting, to which the 
Japanese man bears witness or at which he might appear as both a 'spectator' 
and 'performer', as he is compelled by and drawn into identifying with the story. 
It is also because of the distancing and spacing between the lovers, a distance, 
which increases as their intimacy, and at the same time their departing, 
intensifies. The lovers seem not wholly part of the historical present of 
Hiroshima. Intimate scenes are played against the background noise of the city's 
traffic or nightlife, to which they are, or become, increasingly oblivious once the 
story of Nevers 'overlays' that of Hiroshima. As they meet, then depart, at 
different transitory sites within the modem city, the distance between them is 
augmented by wide-angle shots in street scenes and cut-away shots to wide 
angles within interior space. As the film proceeds, the viewer is more and more 
deprived of the shot-reverse-shot, so that the lovers look at each other less in an 
intimate way and increasingly into a distance. The present external reality 
already appears 'somewhere' else, indicative of leave-taking and their 
acceptance that they are 'in between time' and 'killing time'. The relationship 
appears enacted in its own time, staged at these different points of (non) contact 
and re-enacted. She is an actress, re-enacting her Nevers' love affair with a 
stranger and foreigner at the site of Hiroshima's re-enactment, and her meeting 
with the Japanese man is ironically re-enacted, when she is alone at the 
Casablanca bar. It is as if, in their intimacy, touching turns to the memory of 
touch; bodies that emerged from darkness into day turn to the grey of memory; 
time passing turns to killing time; the space of Hiroshima recedes to that of 
Nevers. 
What are we to make of this cinematic representation, as readers talk about the 
impossibility of talking about Hiroshima? The film does and does not talk about 
Hiroshima, or perhaps it is talking about Hiroshima all the time, as in talking 
about Hiroshima you are always going to be talking about it from somewhere 
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else, its memory being 'impossible' and yet, as Duras states, "Hiroshima will be 
the common ground (perhaps the only one in the world? ), where the universal 
factors of eroticism, love and unhappiness will appear in an implacable light. "' 89 
I want to suggest that Duras draws upon eroticism as a disturbance to the sense 
of sight. This eroticism, however, comes to present, through the woman, the 
unfalfillable desire for a 'truth' of memory, which the film critiques. My 
question is whether by way of this, by displacing vision as a dissimulation of 
truth, the film pursues a greater truth, taking memory as exteriorisation in images 
to its limits, in order to present the truth of impossibility; the truth of Nothing, 
the impossibility of talking about Hiroshima? This 'impossibility of talking 
about Hiroshima', is the impossibility of sublating death, of overcoming it by 
assimilating it in a way that could re-present it 'truthfully'. Woman, as it is in the 
woman protagonist that the force of the film coheres, becomes thus the figure of 
the ultimate truth of non-truth, true memory's impossibility; nihilism, truth only 
by fiction. But the question remains, to what end? 
Having set up this dichotomy of truth/appearance, the film appears to pursue the 
greater truth of the non-truth of fiction and a fictional time manifest in the work 
of art. Duras states in the synopsis to the film, that one of its "principal goals" is, 
to have done with the description of horror by horror, for that has been 
done by the Japanese themselves, but to make this horror rise again 
from its ashes by incorporating it in a love that will necessarily be 
special and 'wonderful', one that will be more credible than if it has 
occurred anywhere else in the world, a place that death had not 
preserved. 190 
Duras further suggests that this incorporation of the descriptive memory of 
Hiroshima into a literary 'work', a love story, which takes the event beyond the 
given 'fact' of Hiroshima, may well be deemed 'sacrilege'. But such profane 
treatment may point to a resistance to that other sacrilege evoked by those 
images of horrific events, which seek to 'preserve' while at the same time 
sublimate the deaths that that they announce in a realism, which assumes a 
189 Duras, M., 'Synopsis', 10. 
190 Ibid., 9. 
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possible relation to and knowledge of these deaths of the other through visual 
representation. 
Duras appears to be eschewing the kind of logic that is implied in a visualisation, 
which seeks to determine the complicity of the spectator in a 'truth' through the 
direct visual representation of the event. This is of course to separate 'truth' from 
appearance in a Platonic sense, suggesting that Duras and Resnais are positing a 
more essential, originary truth, behind appearance posing as fact. It also accords 
with Resnais's distrust of documentary for its power to fix events in the past, as 
past and determine memory, disallowing the question of memory and a memory 
in the present which can allow for the moment when the past becomes past. But 
it also, as suggested above, brings the entire issue of testimony into question. 
Instead, the film is to take the event into the time and space of the aesthetic in 
which: "Nothing is 'given' at Hiroshima. Every gesture, every word, takes on an 
aura of meaning that transcends its literal meaning. " 191 Thus it seems the film 
seeks a greater 'truth', in the work of art, and we are perhaps caught in the 
oscillation from the politicisation of the aesthetic to the aestheticisation of the 
political, ' 92 inasmuch as Duras wants to question the relativisation of the 
aesthetic to the assumptions about the political that the realist repetition of horror 
by horror makes; that this repetition in itseýf contains a moral imperative of 
gnever again' and speaks to an assumed collective world that has already been 
191 Ibid., 9. 
192 This is an enormous question of course. Put simply here, we may understand this distinction 
as that between art being given its value and meaning relative to the political, thus the 
meaning/value of the work is judged by a combination of the politics of its subject-matter and the 
way the aesthetic serves the wider political project of emancipation, that is to say politics is the 
'truth' by which the value of the aesthetic is judged, as against the aesthetic giving truth and 
shape to the political, as the source of the value of the political. The phrase is from Walter 
Benjamin's 'Art Work' essay, BenjaminW., 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction' in Benjamin, W., Illuminations (London, Fontana 1973) 219-253, where 
Benjamin discusses the political, and indeed revolutionary, possibilities of photography in 
destroying alienating aesthetic aura and providing the means by which the working class can 
articulate its consciousness of itself (and we might add here the means by which a class testifies 
for itself), whilst also pointing out how that very same technology can be mobilised by a fascist 
regime to give shape to its political project of massification. Adomo thought Benjamin had given 
up too much in his 'destruction of aura' thesis and had failed to appreciate the critical potential of 
art to intervene between technology and the mass audience. A succinct insight into this debate 
occurs in an exchange of letters between Adomo and Benjamin in Jameson, F., (ed). Aesthetics 
and Politics. (London: New Left Books, 1979): 110-134. For a detailed explication of this 
distinction in relation to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy see Librett, J., 'Translator's Forward' in 
Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the Morld, vii-ix. 
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cast as the age offfiroshima, but instead wants to put an aestheticised 'world' of 
the cinematic time of memory and narration in its place. 
Duras's desire that the horror "rise again from its ashes", appears to address, but 
also to 'repeat' to the point of the dislocation of meaning, the cinematic ordering 
of vision in a dramatic narrative. The voice-over comments, which punctuate the 
archive footage early in the film, are termed by Duras, "an operatic exchange". 
But this voice-over principle remains, as the conventions of flashback are 
accompanied by the lugubrious speech of the woman over the scenes from 
Nevers, and the images emerge from the past, but hold the lovers more and more 
apart in their increasing intimacy, at the various sites of re-enactment of the 
woman's previous encounter with love and parting. The 'now' of Hiroshima is 
split between a past and an imminent future, which neither fixes the past, nor 
relinquishes it affect. It is as if the horror might rise again from its ashes, but 
again and again, reminiscent but different and perhaps 'not yet'. This implies a 
history, and a memory, that is never simply consigned to the past and that 
'exceeds', or is 'outside, the borders between past, present and future, the 
structures of chronological time and continuity. But my question is whether this 
excess of time ultimately becomes contained, as the duration of this love affair 
appears as a mirror image of the duration of the death and forgetting of the 
German soldier. 
Duras makes it clear that if desire and death are co-mingled in this 'excess' or 
repetition of memory, they are so as impossible relations. To think that one can 
know the horror of Hiroshima by the repetition of it in images upon which one 
fixates is an illusion. To consider that one can somehow die with the other, at the 
very same time, is also an illusion. If the erotic bears with it the fantasy of 
ecstaticfusion with the other, its fialfilment would be the end of desire; that is 
death, but the fantasy that drives erotic desire in effect underscores the 
impossible relation of the erotic, the impossibility of dying with the other. The 
film appears to bring eroticism into proximity with death and the dis-order of 
memory both to show the desire for a relation between self and other, which 
would realise a kind of ultimate 'truth' and the very impossibility of this. What 
emerges from this is the greater truth of survival. 
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Of the German lover's death, the woman states, 
I stayed near his body all that day and then all the next night. The next 
morning they came to pick him up and they put him in a truck. It was 
the night Nevers was liberated. The bells of St. Etienne were ringing; 
ringing 
... 
Little by little he grew cold beneath me. Oh! How long it took 
him to die! When? I'm not quite sure. I was lying on top of 
him 
... 
yes 
... 
the moment of his death actually escaped me, 
because 
... 
because even at that very moment, yes, even afterward, I can 
say that I couldn't feel the slightest difference between his dead body 
and mine. All I could find between this body and mine were obvious 
similarities, do you understand? 193 
At this moment we might think of the mythic 'suicide of lovers' or of the 
possibility of dying with the other, but Duras, in her notes to the script, entitled 
'Nocturnal Notations', qualifies this scene, 
One might believe her dead, so completely has his death drained all life 
from her. He tries to caress her hips, as he had caressed her while 
making love, but he cannot. It is as though she were helping him to die. 
She doesn't think of herself, only of him. And he consoles her, almost 
apologises for having to make her suffer, for having to die. When she is 
alone, in the same spot where a short while before they were together, 
pain had not yet taken hold of her life. She is simply utterly amazed to 
find herself alone. 194 
This scenario, as it unfolds in the last sentence, is re-enacted at the end of the 
film. Duras's commentary, in italics, is here written into the screenplay. 
They are standing in the room, facing each other, their arms at their 
sides, their bodies not touching 
... 
It is now full daylight... They say 
nothing. They look at each other 
... 
In the distance, Hiroshima is still 
sleeping 
... 
All of a sudden, she sits down. She buries her head in her 
hands, clenches herfist, closes her eyes and moans. A moan of utter 
sadness. The light of the city in her eyes... 
193 Duras, M., Screenplay, 65. 
194 Duras, M., Screenplay, appendix 'Nocturnal. Notations', 87. 
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She: I'll forget you! I'm forgetting you already! Look how I'm 
forgetting you! Look at me! 
He takes her arms, shefaces him, her head thrown back. She suddenly 
breaks awayfrom him. He helps her by an effort of sel6abstraction, as 
ifshe were in danger. He looks at her, she at him, as she would look at 
the city, and suddenly, very softly, she calls him. She calls him from 
afar, lost in wonder. She has succeeded in drowning him in universal 
oblivion. And it is a source ofamazement to her. 195 
Thus one cannot know the death of the other and one cannot die with the other. 
The death or departing of the other brings the amazement of an utter solitude on 
the death of the German soldier and universal oblivion at the 'forgetting' of the 
Japanese man. 
Duras had already qualified the first moment of death through the woman's non- 
chronological telling of her madness after her lover's death and her refusal to 
separate her body from his; her desire to taste his blood in hers; her desire to 
retain the pain of death above all else, whilst imprisoned in the cellar. It is at this 
point when 'her' story suggests a state of undecidability and incomprehensibility 
between living and dying that the Japanese man 'identifies' with the German 
lover and can take on and repeat Hiroshima through Nevers as she recounts her 
gradual emergence from this undecidable state into the distinction between life 
and death and her survival. Her trance-like state as she subsequently relates the 
moment of death is violently broken by the Japanese man slapping her face. This 
interruption appears to mark the point of the beginning of the lovers' memory of 
forgetting each other. Caruth marks it as the transition from traumatic narrative 
to history, suggestive of a work of mourning: 
What takes place in the disruption of the slap, then, is precisely the beginning of a 
history 
... 
This marking of a difference [between the German soldier's death and the 
Japanese man's life] does not take place, indeed, in a corrected seeing or in the mere 
physical reality of a seen hand, but in the very way in which the hand, in its slap, surprises 
sight and interrupts the continuity of the face-to-face encounter of the lovers locked in a 
narrative-without-history. The slap indeed interrupts the pathos and the ahistorical sense 
195 Duras, M., 'Scenario', 83. 
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of "firstness" in the cry-"He was my first love"-and thus interrupts the isolated self- 
enclosure of the narrative of firsts 
... 
This interruption and this shock ofsight thus 
establishes within the film the opening of a history that had not yet truly taken place. The 
possibility of history arises 
... 
as the interruption of understanding in a brutal shock of sight 
that ineluctably connects the history of Nevers with that of Hiroshima. The traumatic 
histories of the two lovers can emerge, that is, only in their relation to each other and only 
in the way in which the relation creates, precisely a break within the mutual understanding 
of their address. 196 
Having given him a memory of Hiroshima by way of herjourney through death, 
memory and survival, this subjective gift can objectify again into 'Hiroshima' 
and 'Nevers' for the future. This marks the eternal return of abandonment. 
Ropars will similarly identify a transition to history, memory, forgetting and 
mourning. 
... 
the donation of story telling goes hand-in-hand with the abandonment of that which was 
narrated; and the narration, in separating life from death, completes the mourning work by 
severing the link between Eros and Thanatos. Once the story has been told, all there 
remains for Nevers is the cantata of oblivion, where the subject 
... 
expels the Nevers 
memory and exchanges it for views of modem Hiroshima. 197 
Paradoxically it is through the journey to obliteration that Hiroshima is known 
and remembered. Both Caruth and Ropars from different perspectives suggest an 
albeit non-simple passage to mourning and memory that the film itself're- 
marks'. 
Such as it is generated in the prologue, the explosion at Hiroshima eludes both the subject 
and the object, both the word and the direct figuration, only a trace remains. Projected on 
to the streets of Nevers, and linked to a narration that takes its place, the scar of Hiroshima 
enters in turn into the domain of oblivion whose exclusive memorableness the film 
guarantees. The process of obliteration is double-edged, and the itinerary which inscribes 
Hiroshima into a story remains reversible: although circumscribed, the fragmentation of 
the editing can always let filter through, under the known and named present, the 
resurgence of the unnarnable that the writing has focused on the name Hiroshima, and 
where the film is dispersed. This then is the final paradox, whereby, the writing completes 
196 Caruth., C'Duras, Renais, Hiroshima 42 
197 RoPars, M-C., 'I low history begets' 181 
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its task of ordering into signs or, in other words, its double task of signification and 
obliteration. 19' 
I want to suggest however and explore further in this chapter that there is 
something "mythic" in the sense that Nancy will critique "myth" and the sense 
of a Hegelian "overcoming" of death, in Duras's protagonist's survival. I want to 
consider this by way of considering in more detail the significance of the film's 
treatment of the horror of Hiroshima in the context of a Deleuzian reading of the 
film. 
Gregg Lambert, reads the film by way of Gilles Deleuze on the basis of Deleuze 
key philosophical appropriation of Nietzsche's notion of the "true world become 
fable". 199 Deleuze makes a connection between the time and memory of cinema, 
with Resnais as a certain representative, and his acknowledgement of 
Nietzsche's nihilism. This, especially, in relation to the 'power of the false' and 
'the true world become fable', opens up a different thought of art, beyond its 
metaphysical determinant as adequation to the 'Truth'. From this basis I take 
issue with Duras's interpretation of nihilism by way of the 'community of 
lovers', as a means of absolutising the relationship between the politics of 
history and memory and art as. the 'truth' of nihilism, the eternal return of an 
oscillation between oblivion and survival, as a kind of inverse Hegelianism, 
whereby 'survival' becomes a possession of the subject, in-itself and for-itself, 
by working through the encounter with the 'other'. 
Lambert's reading traces some key themes from Deleuze using Hiroshima Mon 
Amour as an exemilary 'text'. Deleuze's writing on cinema, in Cinema Two: 
The Time Image, is profoundly influenced by Nietzsche's destruction of the 
pretension of philosophical metaphysics to know the truth 
. 
200 Deleuze sees 
198 Ropars, M-C., 181-182 
199 Lambert, G., 'How the true world finally became fable. ' In The Non-Philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze (London: Continuum, 2002), 102. In this chapter of his book on Deleuzc, Lambert traces 
the genesis of Deleuze book on cinematic time from Nietzsche's reflections upon the crisis of 
truth and the will to power. 
200 Lambert summarises this thus: Philosophy and Christianity are exposed by Nietzsche as 
producing nothing but the history of error, in the guise of truth, by way of the different ways of 
thinking about the relationship between truth and appearance, which has been at the core of 
philosophical and Christian thought from Plato to modernity, "Truth is accessible to the sage, the 
virtuous and religious man; it lives in him, whose figure is identical to the true world qua 
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cinema as itself taking up the problem of truth, centrally concerned as it is, in its 
very technique, with 'the world of appearances' and its relation to the 'real 
201 
world'. 
What is cinema after all, but a world constructed by pure appearances? 
However it is precisely the relation between this world of pure 
appearance and the so-called 'real and true world' that recapitulates the 
philosophical problem recounted [from Nietzsche] in a striking way; 
each director and film-maker must therefore take up and resolve this 
problem in a singular manner 
... 
According to Deleuze, it is precisely at 
that moment in the history of cinematographic narration when the 
movement image is abandoned in favour of the time image that cinema 
resolves the problem of its dependence upon 'the real and true world'. 
expressed: 'I, Plato, I am the truth'. This is followed by the several avatars who substitute for 
this original identification of truth [with] 
... 
the truthful man. In the second stage, represented by 
the Christian world 
... 
the 'true world' is inaccessible in the present, but is permitted to the sage 
and virtuous man through suffering and penance. In the third stage, the true world becomes both 
inaccessible and undemonstrable, it cannot be promised 
... 
although it can be imagined, and this in 
itself becomes a kind of consolation. [qua Kant's philosophy]. In the fourth stage, the 
inaccessibility of the 'true world' becomes itself open to question and philosophy finds itself 
offended by the idea that the source of obligation and truth would derive from an unknown and 
unconscious source [qua positivism]. Finally, in the fifth and sixth stages, the idea that was found 
offensive and contradictory in the fourth stage now appears useless and no longer bears any 
power of obligation; it is no longer worthy of belief or of faith. It is Nietzsche himself who 
represents both these moments under the name of Zarathustra, a moment, which bears a Janus- 
face that casts a glance both forward and backward, and encompassing the entire unfolding of 
'truth as a history of error'. Thus, the character of Zarathustra represents the twilight of the 
concept of truth, the death of the truthful man and the collapse of every model of truth (that is, 
the entry into the long night of insomnia, pessimism and even nihilism); however on the other 
slope his appearance marks the dawn that breaks into the long night of insomnia and promises 
the return of good sense and a spirit of happiness and joy (that is the affirmation of this world 
which comprises the meaning of the Eternal Return). " Ibid., 92-93. The ambiguity between these 
two slopes of 'passive' and 'active' nihilism, summed up in Nietzsche's aphorism, that with the 
vanquishing of 'the true' world the world of appearances vanishes as well, marks the very 
character of a certain cinema and literature in Europe post-WW 11, of which Hiroshima Mon 
Amour is a key example. 
201 Deleuze, G., Cinema Two: The Time Image. Trans. Tomlinson, 11. and Galeta, R., (London: 
Althone Press, 1989. Resnais features amongst Deleuze's list of post-World War II filmmakers 
who represented an entire shift in cinema from the 'movement image; to the 'time image'. Pre- 
war cinema could orientate itself to the combination of percept, affect and action in the creation 
of a unity between movement/action and situation. The crisis in time and history brought about 
by the horrors of World War 11 precipitates a crisis in thought reflected in cinema as a critical 
engagement with time. Action gives way to the complexities of time and memory, which belie 
the straightforward notion of the image as reflecting the external world and the subject of 
consciousness. This puts into question the relationship between seeing and 'reality' and truth and 
fiction. and this question becomes central to cinema, along with its preoccupation with the 
internal relations of time within the cinematic event. This is clearly relevant to Hiroshima Mon 
Amour. 
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That is, cinema no longer seeks to represent the latter through the 
movement-image, which 'is linked to (real) sensory-motor 
descriptions', or through truthful narration, which is 'developed 
organically, according to legal connections in space and chronological 
relations in time', but rather, 'moves from pure description to falsifying 
narration from the point of view of the direct time-image'. As Deleuze 
writes 
. 
..... the new regime of the image (the direct time-image) works 
with pure crystalline optical and sound descriptions, and falsifying, 
purely 'chronic' narration. Description stops presupposing a reality and 
narration stops referring to a form of the true at one and the same 
time 
... 
description becomes its own object and narration becomes 
temporal and falsifying 
... 
[inasmuch as] [T]he representation of a truth in 
itself is revealed as a purely conventional means of establishing a 
relation between terms or elements of a given narration 
... 
the formal 
perspective of an elsewhere which is posited as being exterior to the 
plane occupied by appearances and which sets all appearance qua 
appearance in movement around its position which is virtual... However 
in the absence of this elsewhere, cinema discovers a new means of 
producing description that, although it unfolds in the proximity of a 
'world' or 'a subject', does not find itself organised or coordinated by 
the terms that are located there, as if cinema has found the means of 
disconnecting itself from the 'true world' and becomes immanent to 
itself, a world of pure appearances. 202 
The point to note from this reading of the 'falsifying' function of cinema and its 
power through the time-image is that it undermines and renders ineffective any 
distinction between 'true' and 'false' in a 'moral-juridical' sense. On the 
contrary, it demonstrates the extent to which that which is deemed 'true' is that 
which has hidden appearances "and provides them with an alibi,,. 203 In the 
context of Hiroshima this is a crucial question in terms of the effectiveness of a 
representation of the event, 'the showing of horror by horror', as the means by 
which the event can be known. So, if mempry becomes a function of purely 
cinematic time for Resnais, it provides the opportunity to 'forge' an articulation 
of memory that allows for the exploration of those ethical-political questions 
concerning exactly how, for whom and by whom memory is 'produced', where 
202 Lambert, G., op. cit p. 94. The quotes from Deleuze are from Cinema Two: The Time Image, 
132-135. 
203 Deleuze, G., Cinema Two: The Time Image, 146. 
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the lines are drawn between past, present and future and how we can go beyond 
or get 'inside' the mere repetition of 'what happened' in the past tense. 
Lambert demonstrates how the 'power of the false' is put to effect in the film. He 
takes up much of Duras's reading, which sets the film against the 'impasse' of 
the representational image, as found in the 'made to order documentary'. 
Different instances or 'types' of banality are interwoven. The 'universal banality' 
of Hiroshima204 is put in conjunction with the most banal of literary/cinematic 
themes; the 'brief encounter" or 'one-night stand', "a banal tale, one that 
happens a thousand times every day. The Japanese is married, has children. So is 
1205 the French woman, who also has two children. Theirs is a one-night affaie 
which is itself inflected with the 'war-torn' lovers scenario, "... Silly little 
girl/Who dies of love at Nevers/ 
... 
Three-penny story/As it was for him, oblivion 
will begin with your eyes/Just the same/ 
... 
Then, as it was for him, it will 
,, 
206 
encompass you completely/Little by little/You will become a song. This 
particular conjunction of 'banal repetition', as Lambert says, "implicates one 
level of banality in another, producing variations within each order of repetition 
and causing an entirely different series to unfold around the name of 
Hiroshima. 1207 
, 
which undercuts its characteristic "globalised or epochal 
,, 
208 
representation. 
Then there is the voice-over dialogue/debate accompanying the 'recollection- 
images' of Hiroshima, which both confuses and refuses the status of the 
representations of the event. 
HE: You saw nothing in Hiroshima. Nothing. 
SHE: I saw everything. Everything. 
SHE: I didn't make anything up 
204 "Banality expresses the kind of repetition which occurs when something is repeated a 
thousand times a day all over the world in which what is repeated bears both a minimum of 
difference and a maximum of amplitude. Therefore banal repetition, or 'the description of horror 
by horror' sees nothing since it represents a kind of representation that is too general, vague and 
amorphous. ", Lambert, G., op. cit, 97. 
205 Duras, M., 'Synopsis', 9. 
206 Duras, M., 'Screenplay', 80. 
207 Lambert, G., op. cit, 97. 208 Ibid. 97 
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HE: You made it all up. 
SHE: Listen 
... 
I know. I know emything. 
He: No. You know nothing. 209 
These exchanges question both the 'authenticity' of the constructed images of 
Hiroshima and the woman's appropriation of them as 'her' memory. The 
dialogue also raises the issue of the 'recollection-image' as an effect of cinematic 
representation, which cannot claim to present that which gives cause to, but 
withdraws from the image. Lambert puts it thus: 
If the past cannot be the object of representation, because it functions as 
its profound cause, then any attempt to construct a series of recollection- 
images in order to gain access to 'what happened' at Hiroshima, in short 
to 'Remember Hiroshima' necessarily leads to an impasse 
- 
Nothing is 
464given' at Hiroshima , 210 
_ 
and actually projects a false image or a 
sterile double of the past that is evacuated of all its force (that is, the 
duration that connects it to the living body of the present), producing 
instead its corpse, or an empty and dead zone in time. 211 
However, it is precisely 'her' appropriation of these images for 'her memory' 
which is to provide Hiroshima with its connection to 'the living body of the 
present', and this theme becomes increasingly evident in Lambert's argument. 
He produces, I suggest, an ultimately Hegelian argument of 'overcoming' death, 
through its 'passage through' the particular 'body' to the universal of 'survival' 
which becomes the 'force' of truth against the 'falsity' of recollection images. 
Whether Duras herself endorses such a reading will be part of the argument I 
develop further, but here I continue with Lambert. 
The 'crisis of representation', which marks the inadequacy of the 'recollection- 
image' is further reinforced by the 'mirroring' of the documentary by the 'film 
about peace' within the film. The artifice constituting this venture is well marked 
in the film, but an additional element of fantasy is also introduced. The 'eternal 
209 Duras, M., 'Screenplay', 15-21. 
2 10 Duras, M., 'Synopsis', p. 9. 
21 1 Lambert, G., op. cit, 100. 
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nurse in the eternal war 212 herself a fantasy figure, appears to be playing in a film 
in which a significant element, the political protest, emerges like a 'baroque 
parade', a peculiar, dreamlike 'festival procession' of the world. The woman, 
sleeping on the set where construction is underway, resembles a resting figure in 
the comer of a painting and reinforces the dream-like quality. Of course, the 
collective protest staged in the film is rendered as banal as it is fanciful. Its 
repetitious nature, re-marking the empty repetition of 'Hiroshima', and 
Hiroshima as a moment to be eternally repeated, is so far away from the event 
itself, that the event becomes reduced to the time it takes to say or chant 
'Hiroshima'. Thus foregrounding the protest as an artificial construction of 
cinema both renders it and refers to it as impotent. The fact that the lovers are 
outside of this empty time and against the tide of this political reductionism is 
made evident by their struggle against the crowd, which gathers in momentum 
and menace as it moves in the opposite direction, thus offering another love- 
story cliche. 
Such is the power of the false and the film's intent to demonstrate the falsity of 
documentary narration and all it subtends. But it is necessary to look more 
closely at what documentary narration does subtend, what is wrong with it and 
what Duras and Resnais put in its place? 
It has already been suggested that the woman's view and memory come to skew 
the film away from the 'documenting' of the horror of Hiroshima and, indeed 
between love and personal memory, Hiroshima appears abandoned. Lambert 
argues that the opposite is the case. It is the 'made to order' documentary images 
that abandon Hiroshima. Lambert suggests the realistic documentary images 
produce an impasse. They are in effect, "a convention that is made in order to 
avoid or turn away from the subjective condition of mutual past moments, all of 
which converge around an artificially constructed present , 213 
, 
but as realist 
repetition, they imply a logic and claim a moral force, which suggests that the 
repetition of horror by the representation of horror contains an imperative of 
gnever again', combining an informative with a prohibitive function. However, 
212 Duras, M., 'Synopsis' 10 
213 Lambert, G., op. cit, 108. 
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such representation has become "naturalised by its moral purposiveness and 
prohibitive function", [such that], "... although it intends to prevent the event it 
represents from being actualized, it must nonetheless assert the 'nullity' (the 
horror) of the event by reducing it to information that can be endlessly repeated 
without touching the place where the past actuauy resides. " 214 
It is this "prohibitive and pedagogic function which it projects upon future 
actors"215 
, 
that renders those actors both passive be, fore the image and 
confronting a future which is vague and indeterminate, on the basis of this 
passivity. Rather, as Lambert sees it, such "tautological imageS,, 216 might be seen 
as* ... a sheet of the past' encapsulating a moment when things might have been 
different, 'when time could have taken a different course. ', 217 But in order to do 
so, as Lambert argues such a "sheet of the past" has to be confronted by a living 
connection. 
Here, Lambert's insistent criticism of the documentary image leads to a certain 
set of assumptions concerning the function of the lovers' encounter and the 
remembering of the death at Nevers. Lambert reads the encounter as a moment 
when the past can become past for each of the lovers by way of a 'living 
connection' and the creation of a 'memory for two. 
Contrary to this [the impasse of the recollection-image] we might see in 
'her' story, as well as in his, a certain 'living connection' that is 
established with the past.; the desire to seek out the memory of 
Hiroshima where it was 
- 
at Nevers 
- 
and to establish a living 
connection that is signalled by the transference of the past of Nevers 
onto the past of Hiroshima. 218 
This produces, in my view, both an ultimately Hegelian view of the overcoming 
of death at Hiroshima (negation, preservation, supersession), thus following a 
Hegelian logic, even as it is eschewing a Hegelian account, and a somewhat 
'innocent' view of Duras' thoughts on love, death and community. Lambert's 
214 Ibid., 108. 
215 Ibid., 109 
216 Ibid., 109 
217 Ibid., 109. 
21S Ibid., 112. 
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Deleuzian reading is Hegelian in its logic inasmuch as it is reading that, whilst it 
is at pains to qualify any notion of a subjective point of view or personal 
psychology as the driving force of the film, and in fact, makes the claim towards 
an 'impersonal' or more exactly 'pre-personal' and 'pure' cinema, nevertheless it 
makes a number of claims for the force ofparticular memory transcending its 
particularity by gathering universality to itself, by way of what can be construed 
as a dialectical engagement with the 'other'. This can be understood here as the 
'other' of memory, which by virtue of this Deleuzian account is also the 'other' 
of cinema, the struggle with and crisis of the representational image. 
It is as if the very falsity of the representational image is negated and 'taken up' 
by the particularity of the cinematic narrative of Nevers, such that the woman's 
desire for a memory both for itself and in itself is fulfilled by its very 
reconciliation with a higher goal. "It is as though, through them, all of 
Hiroshima was in love with all offevers. , 219 
"Deleuze raises the possibility that in their each forgetting his or her own 
memory and making a memory together, memory itself was detached from their 
persons and was now becoming world memory. 99220 
Indeed, in the true Hegelian fashion of particular or familial bodies, sublating the 
individual 'death', they necessarily traverse the passage to find their highest 
fonn of consciousness and being in the State. Lambert ends thus: 
... 
their personal identities undergo a transformation as well, as if 
through the transformation of nothing in common to the common 
memory of Hiroshima-Nevers, the Japanese are present to the French, 
the East to the West 
... 
since these people are no one it raises the chance 
of seeing film as the story-telling function of a new society, of a people 
to come 
... 
221 
2 19 Duras, M., 'Synopsis', 9. 
220 Lambert, G., op. cit, 112. 
221 Ibid, 113. 
142 
This is additionally underscored by Lambert's treatment, through Deleuze, of the 
erotic in the film, Duras's sacrilege in conveying continuing 'love for the dead' 
instead of mourning them in accordance with the morally-juridical-permitted 
rituals of repetition. Lambert relays Deleuze's account of transference: 
Concerning this necessary presence of transference (i. e. the eroticization of memory) 
within any 'living relation' to the past, Deleuze writes that: 
... 
it is necessary to seek out the memory where it was, to install oneself in the past to 
accomplish a living connection between the knowledge and resistance, the representation 
and the blockage 
... 
the more theatrical and dramatic operation by which healing takes 
place-or does not take place-has the name of transference. Now transference is still 
repetition 
... 
if repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it also 
frees us, terrifying in both cases by its 'demonic' power. All cure is a voyage to the 
bottom of repetition. 222 
The erotic becomes another vehicle for transference of memory from its abstract 
to its living dimensions, in order to dialectise the relationship between the two. It 
is the erotic that establishes the memory 'right where it was', where the living 
dwell, as opposed to the 'in-itself' of abstract repetition. Eroticised repetition, i. e. 
transference, will 'heal' the trauma which is occluded by abstract repetition by 
the process of working through, however 'demonic' or 'painful' these 
dimensions of the erotic may be. Such an interpretation of the erotic appropriates 
it in terms of a necessary immanent embodiment, ofjoy, pain, and suffering felt 
right on the body in order to transcend them, transformed in survival. 
By passing through all these stages represented by the journey that is 
enacted from Riva's [the woman's) point of view, Hiroshima is thus 
transformed from the name of death to the proper name of love that 
survives the horror of its own past. Thus the story is that of a survivor, 
one who survives the end of the world and who must live after 
Hiroshima. In telling her story she offers a way out of Hiroshima by 
filling the place with a love that is 'wonderful' as Duras writes. 223 
222 Ibid., I 11 
223 Lambert, G., op. cit 110. 
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This reading of the erotic and its relation to embodiment and the sublating of 
death re-invokes Hegel's thought on Incarnation and the body as the 'site' for an 
ontology of being which philosophy assumes as having an inside and an outside. 
On the basis of this, its beauty or decay, or its sheer corporeality, can be 
transcended and, on the basis of this, it can be understood to convey a certain 
communication and communion, one body to another. 
On the basis of this account by way of Deleuze and Duras we encounter the 
problem of the memory becoming the possession of the subject subsequently 
universalised, or in this instance globalised as Hiroshima and Nevers, East and 
West, in a further move of transference. What is at stake is precisely how the 
film is understood as an aesthetic object, that itself recognises the "crisis of 
representation" to which it has to respond and how its response relates to an 
aesthetics and politics of memory. 
The ultimate return to the possession of the embodied subject subsequently 
universalised recalls Hegel's onto-theology involving the body of Christ as a 
prime mediator between existence and transcendence that Jean-Luc Nancy 
argues, Hegel presents as the ultimate 'immanentism', transcending the 
particularity of body-as-appearance in its resorption in the continuing 
(universally grasped) life beyond this particularity. Here the necessity of the 
death of Christ's body is also the necessity of the resurrection and passing of the 
individual body to the 'body' that is the community living on. In works such as 
'Corpus' 224 
, 
Nancy demonstrates the persistence of this ultimately Christian 
philosophic-theological economy of the body. Whilst the inside/outside divide 
was pre-eminent in Plato, with the body as the mutable cavern of projecting 
shadows obscuring the true light of the soul, the theme persists in Hegel, with the 
exception that the 'cavern' is turned inside out, as the soul/spirit/idea exteriorises 
itself in particular forms to return itself to itself. Incarnation persists in the 
consideration of community as a body whereby the individual achieves self- 
realisation through the community that both protects and absorbs individuality. 
Difference and concrete individuality are thus subsumed and assimilated under a 
224 Nancy J-L., 'Corpus. ' In The Birth to Presence. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993), 
189-207. 
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logic of (en)closure and embodiment, as the community is the collective Subject 
as a work of interiority, always drawing its horizons by a process of the self- 
negating sclf-appropriation of cxteriorisations in order to interiorise, to return the 
Subject to itself, where difference, individuality and even loss arc sublatcd. 
Literature and art are entwined in this as works, as mimetic 'embodiments'. They 
are that in which sense is given or as that out ofwhich sense emerges, as the 
form enclosing the Idea or the form of the Idea itself. Or they are as interactions 
with other bodies, especially insofar as they are thought of as inter-subjective 
communications on the basis of a Hegelian inspired notion of the subject as for- 
itself in the other, in-itself and especially if they are also thought as signifying 
that which ultimately transcends their own substance. 
Hegel did not equate art (in its highest vocation) with the Incarnation, but, 
arguably, he saw art as prelude to it, inasmuch as he sustains an eidetic reading 
of art, even as he acknowledges the aesthetic. He shares with Kant the idea of 
art's internal consistency, its finality without purpose and distinctiveness from 
cognition or appetitive desire. He shares Kant's impression of aesthetic sense; 
sensuous presentation has nothing to do with representation, description or 
conceptual clarification and transparency, but where he differs from Kant is in 
the necessity for this sense to be overcome. Where Kant accords to the aesthetic 
the role of the free play between the imagination and understanding; the 
imagination and sensibility as a mode of suspension in contemplation in the 
mode of the withdrawal of the objectivity of being and the pure scintillation of 
appearing, such that there is no essence or presence in this offering of the 
imagination but the appearing as such, Hegel understands this 'shining' that is 
beauty as an ontological vision or horizon in which and through which there is 
spirit. The aesthetic, thus for Hegel, even if it does not and cannot represent, but 
presents, expresses. That is its limit and limitation and precisely because art is 
sensuous and particular this is both its opacity and its end as if it is always 
already passing away in the face of the clarity and transparency of conceptual 
thought. This thought of art is an integral part of Hegel's mastery of the negative, 
which is a mastery over the necessary passing away, the death of the immediate 
and sensuous in the attainment of self-consciousness. 'Death' for Hegel is the 
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ineluctable and necessary 'end' surpassed and contained within the progress of 
spirit. This is the death that Jean-Luc Nancy inveighs against in The Inoperative 
Community, precisely because in claiming a philosophically authentic relation to 
death, it both idealises and refuses death as existent. Such idealisation is 
premised on a subject of self-consciousness to whom all 'others', including the 
very sense of the world, are returned as to the self-same. This applies even when, 
or especially when, considering the relation to the other as one of recipricocity or 
inter-subjective recognition. 225 
The entire process of signification and here bodies as significations rests upon 
this, inasmuch as signification involves something as something and thus 
appropriates the thing for the subject of signification in the manner of its being- 
within, or being-elsewhere, as the signified. The signifier must be surpassed or in 
some way returned to an origin or an 'end', either by spectacularly reflecting 
upon itself, erasing itself, or collapsing itself into the signified; Hence, the 
implication of literature and art, in so far as they have been philosophically 
determined. As Nancy states in 'Corpus': 
... 
literature therefore offers us one of three things; either fiction, 
which is by definition bodiless, with its author, whose body is absent 
(in fact, we are imprisoned in his cave, where he gives us the 
spectacle of bodies); or bodies covered with signs, bodies that are 
only treasuries of signs (the bodies of Balzac, Zola or Proust 
... 
); or 
else writing itself abandoned or erect like a signifying body-such as 
for Roland Barthes 'the beating (enjoying) body' of the writer, the 
body signifying to the point of non-significance. In this way, we do 
not leave the horizon of the sign, of sense and of mimesis. Literature 
mimes the body, or makes the body mime signification 
... 
or mimes 
itself a body. 226 
225 Elsewhere, Nancy captures it thus, this time, in an argument with and against Heidegger, 
"Negativity is the operation that wants to depose Being in order to make it be: sacrifice, the 
absent object of desire, the eclipse of consciousness, alienation 
- 
and, as a result, it is never death 
or birth, but only the assumption of an infinite supposition. As such then, Being is infinitely 
presupposed by itself, and its process is the reappropriation of this pre-supposition, always on 
this side of itself and always beyond itself. " Nancy, J-L., 'Being Singular Plural' in Being 
Singular Plural,. 91. 
226 Nancy, J-L., 'Corpus', op. cit, 193. 
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Hegel's thoughts on signification go to the heart of this matter. For all that a 
signifier may be incorporeal, "[it] recaptures its subjectivity out of an object, out 
of something lifeless when we read, " nevertheless, "The simile would be more 
striking if the written word were read away, if by being understood it vanished 
as a thing... " says Hegel. (Emphasis added) 227 
My point is that the readings of Hiroshima Mon Amour, by way of a return to the 
signification of the body and its transference cho this persistent problem of 
acceding to transcendental meaning even as they deny it. Do we always come 
back to the body and sense acceding to intelligible sense? 
Nancy has argued with regard to Hegel that the separation of idea from sensuous 
presentation with the passage to the immanence of religion and then philosophy 
and the concomitant exposure of the aesthetic to sheer exteriorisation, releases 
the aesthetic as precisely, in Nancy's terms, a force of exposure. 
Hegel's 'reading as communion' is something to which we are constantly drawn, 
but the aesthetic, as the materiality of the signifier, is not so easily dispensed 
with. Hegel's speculative philosophical system both depends on and is ruined by 
it. Neither can Hegel overcome this by subjecting the aesthetic to the 'science of 
art'. As Nancy points out in Hegel's reading of the end of art as spirit and its 
227 Hegel, G., Early Theological Writings. Trans. Knox, T. M., Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1948), 185, quoted in Barnett, S., 'Eating My God. ' In Hegel After Derrida. Ed. Barnett, 
S., (London: Routledge, 1998), 143. Stuart Barnett brings this thought precisely into the context 
of Incarnation, with the move in Hegel's thought from Christ as particular body to Christ as sign, 
a 'written' body inscribing his absence and necessary vanishing, recognised as such by the most 
wayward of those in the community, that is Mary Magdalene, who performs the aesthetic act of 
anointing Christ's feet, presaging this death. "Not only did they [the disciples] fail to grasp the 
situation but they even did injury to the holy outpouring of a loving heart. "why do you trouble 
her, " says Jesus, "she has wrought a beautiful work upon me, " and this is the only thing in the 
whole story of Jesus which goes by the name of beautiful. " [emphasis added] Hegel's dilemma is 
that he needs the aesthetic, as body-as-sign, with the signifier as the mark of finitude, the 
'already' passing away, the transcendent, but he also needs this to pass away. Hence the key 
moment in religion is the Last Supper whereby the love for the finite being, Christ, passes into 
the love of Spirit, love as such in Hegel's terms, as the founding of true community, in the eating 
of 'His' essence, the bread and wine. But in order to grasp this thought he needs both reading as 
eating and eating as reading, "the simile would be more striking, if the written word were read 
away... " 
"just as in the enjoyment of the bread and wine not only is a feeling, for these mystical objects 
aroused, not only is the spirit made alive, but the objects vanish as objects. " 
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passing away into the human form, as Christ, we are left with what Hegel sees as 
the memory of art's spirit, but right on the surface, as it were, of art, as art, as the 
aesthetic that cannot be spirited away, the material 'remainder' that cannot be 
228 
sublated. 
The works of the Muse [now in the 'Museum'] now lack the power of 
the Spirit, for the Spirit has gained its certainty of itself from the 
crushing of gods and men. They have become what they are for us now 
- 
beautiful fruit already picked from the tree, which a friendly Fate has 
offered us, as a girl might set fruit before us 
... 
So Fate does not restore 
their world to us along with the works of antique Art, it gives not the 
spring and summer of the ethical life in which, they blossomed and 
ripened, but only the veiled recollection of that actual world. Our active 
enjoyment of them is therefore not an act of divine worship through 
which our consciousness might come to its perfect truth and fulfilment, 
it is an external activity 
- 
the wiping off of some drops of rain or specks 
of dust from these fruits, so to speak 
... 
And all this we do, not in order 
to enter into their very life but only to possess an idea of them in our 
imagination. But, just as the girl who offers us the plucked fruits is more 
than their nature 
- 
because she sums all this up in a higher mode 
- 
in the 
gleam of her setf-conscious eye and in the gesture ofoffering [emphasis 
added here], so too, the Spirit of the Fate that presents us with those 
works of art is more than the ethical life and actual world of that nation, 
for it is the inwardizing recollection in us of the Spirit which was still 
exalienated in thern. 229 
It is not here possible to consider in detail Nancy's discussion of this extract, but 
it is evident, as he suggests, that at the moment that Hegel wants to give us art's 
dissolution, as religion, he reincamates it, as a plasticity which gives us 'more 
than' historical description or the 'prose of thought', to 'possess an idea in our 
imagination', and in so doing, draws our attention not to incarnate form, but to a 
moment that can only be that of the sensuous as art, as such, no matter how 
much Hegel wants to immediately spirit it away as an inwardising recollection, 
the gleam and brilliance of the eye and the gesture of offering. 
228 In Nancy's essay 'The Girls that succeeds the Muses' he 
229 Ilegel, G., The Phenomenology of the SpiritlPhenenjonolgie de Vesprit. (Paris: Aubier, 
1991), 455-456, quoted in Nancy, J-L., 'The Girl Who Succeeds the Muses. ' In The Muses. 
Trans. Kamuf, P., (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1996), 45-46. 
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It has not been said, it has been kept secret, that the girl has her 
provenance in art: she behaves like the concrete and contingent 
individuality of the son of man who would be God, pure spirit. But 
everything points to the fact that her silhouette is in effect copied from 
an album; it is an engraving whose line, quickly effaced, traverses or 
pierces for an instant the page of writing. She is herself a technique of 
writing whereby one is made to touch the fruits that no discourse can 
touch. 230 
These fruits are nothing but art as such, made brilliant by the painted eye. 
The eye of the girl 
- 
and the gesture it lights up, by which it is lit up in 
its turn 
- 
this presented eye of presentation is nothing less than entirely 
expose interiority, but at the point at which it no longer even refers to 
itself as to some content or some latent presence, having become on the 
contrary the patency of its very latency and thus irreconcilable with any 
interiority. 231 
The girl presents the Muses, and in that very presentation which is not a 
representation but an offering, a gesture 'she', as 'figure of presentation', 
suspends the sense of the dialectic, which would spirit her away, the dialectic of 
sense over sense. In Nancy's essay The Sublime Offering, the gesture is brought 
into incisive contact with limit. 
At the limit, one does not pass on. But it is there that everything comes 
to pass, it is there that the totality of the unlimited plays itself out, as 
that which throws into relief the two borders, external and internal, of 
all figures, adjoining them and separating them, delimiting and 
unlimiting the limit thus in a single gesture 
... 
The union with which one 
has to do in the sublime does not consist in coupling absolute greatness 
with finite limits; for there is nothing beyond the limit, nothing either 
presentable or nonpresentable. It is indeed this affirmation, 'there is 
nothing beyond the limit', that properly distinguishes the sublime (and 
art) from dialectical thought (and the end of art as its completion) 
... 
But, 
there is only limit, insofar as the latter sets itself off, sets itself up, and 
230 Nancy, J-L., 'The Girl Who Succeeds the Muses. ' op. cit, 53. 231 Ibid., 54. 
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upsets itself incessantly on its border, and consequently insofar as the 
liriiit, the unity divides itself infinitely in its own presentation. 232 
It is the thought of the reverberation of limit, the gesture, the offering, the sense 
that is always divided from itself, singular but immediately exposed in/as a 
plurality, that runs through Nancy's reading of art and politics and resists a 
thought of closure into a formal whole or the sublation of this plurality into a 
substantive essence or the assimilation of this sense into a figure that completes 
itseýf The point is whether there is a way of reading Hiroshima Mon Amour that 
can engage with this limit and resist closing it as another "work of mourning". 
I want to attend to Duras's reading of the film and suggest that her account of it 
presents an inverse Hegelianism, by way of a nihilism turned 'absolute'. In 
acknowledging the impossibility of "knowing" Hiroshima, it takes this 
impossibility to the extremes of nihilism, in what can be thought as an 
apocalyptic desire, culminating in survival. This is the eternal return of the 
ecstasy of oblivion, as anything else would foreclose upon the 'other', both in 
terms of the memory of Hiroshima and the sort of community that it is 
(im)possible to think after Hiroshima. 
The entire question of the way Hiroshima Mon Amour may be understood as a 
work of ar t233 may rest on the limit, as argued by Nancy, between art and the 
political in the time of nihilism. How does one address mass death, injustice, 
through art, after its 'death', after the gods have flown? 
232 Nancy J-L., 'The Sublime Offering', op. cit., 
. 
41-42. 
233 1 am begging the question here as to what falls under the 'name' of art, cinema as an 'art' 
form, its relationship to literature and the entire question of the 'false documentary', as named by 
Duras and more, and will return to this point. For the moment, from Derrida, here speaking of 
literature, which has had a different history of institution and dissemination, but perhaps the 
argument can apply 'elsewhere', "No exposition, no discursive form is intrinsically or essentially 
literary before and outside of the function it is assigned or recognized by a right, that is, a 
specific intentionality inscribed directly on the social body 
... 
Before coming to writing, literature 
depends on reading and the right conferred on it by an experience of reading. One can read the 
same text 
- 
which thus never exists 'in itself' 
- 
as 
-a testimony that is said to be serious and 
authentic, or as an archive, or as a document, or as a symptom 
- 
or as a work of a literary fiction 
that simulates all of the oppositions that we have just enumerated. " Derrida, J., Demettre: Fiction 
and Testimony. (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2000), 28-29. 
150 
It might be argued that the aesthetic can no longer address death in a way that 
can thernatise it, and thus encapsulate it in a truth, in a system of values, which 
would pronounce the profundity or life and death and give shape to our sense of 
the world and community. Also, as Nancy has argued, an aesthetic freed from its 
role in presenting the absolute or the ideal existing elsewhere and thus an 
'autonomous aesthetics' such as we understand by modernism, may yet restitute 
another fonn of absolute nihilism become myth. 234 
With regard to Hiroshima Mon Amour is Duras's 'nothing' of representation 
ultimately a negative Hegelianism, which encloses the otherness of death, history 
and memory in the finishing of art, "in its proper 
- 
and (this time) empty 
concept", 235 supported by the figuring of woman as the truth of this 'nothing' of 
truth? Is the oscillation between death and love, love and death, inscribed upon 
the very skin of the protagonists at the beginning of the film and operating 
throughout, as each touch is at the same time a loss and separation and a kind of 
death and 'impossible' relation to the other a sign of an aesthetic interiorisation, 
self-reflectively critiquing representation and bound up with its own 'truth'; that 
is to say as a literary/cinematic poetics leading to its poetic absolutisation? 
Alternatively, is this a literary/aesthetic exteriorisation which presents the 
impossibility of any meaning and sense or retreivability in the wake of loss, as 
the 'truth' of truth's annihilation, a nihilism, bent on revealing the lack in the 
image, which standsfor (represents) a lack of resolution or of any 
'compensation' for these historical conflicts or prospect of change? Or, does the 
film utilise this cinematic narrative and images of the 'disappearing' love to 
expose us to a different thinking of the relation to the other, which escapes the 
aesthetic alienation possibly implied in the two alternatives just mentioned? 
Does the film avoid the aestheticised pathos of a 'truth' of pain, suffering and 
unhappiness, of loss and lack, inscribed in the figure of woman? That is to say, is 
there a sense in which this story and its central female protagonist can lead us, 
234 In The Sense of the World, Nancy argues that the aesthetics of fragmentation, which is to say 
that of artworks no longer bound to the absolute totality, pace Ilegel, precisely because it has 
taken on its own 'wholeness' and completeness, as autonomous fragment, and has, in turn 
become absolute and thus mythic, contributing to the myth of nihilism, the absence of sense, 
which is the myth of our time. Nancy, J-L., 'Art, a firagment. ' In Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the 
World, op. cit., 123-139. 
235 See Nancy, J-L., 'The Vestige of Art. ' In The Muses, op. cit., 91. 
151 
not to something like mere pathos, but to a re-examination of an ethical and 
political relation to the other, which resists the assumption that we can master the 
death of the other and resists a sheer nihilism of unmasterability, instead posing 
another question of memory, survival and responsibility at/on the limit? 
I approach this by following a distinct closeness, yet critical difference, between 
the thought of Derrida and Maurice Blanchot. It seems to me that Duras's 
reading has strong associations with Blanchot's approach to the impossibility of 
representation and the understanding of literature's relation to death as refusing 
any thought of a dialectical overcoming or sublation of death through the 
'literary' work, with any attendant mythicisation or claim to catharsis. I contend 
however, that Duras does not avoid the latter. 
Given that Hiroshima Mon Amour is a visual work of art, the attention to Derrida 
and Blanchot focuses upon the 'force' of the image. In his meditations on 
photography and mourning and the force of 'the image' in mourning, Derrida 
has argued that any inscription of the other, as a phenomenon, requires a 
structure of inscribed absence in its presence, and the peculiar power of 
photography is that the referent adheres as an absent presence producing in and 
of itself a spectral quality like the return of the dead. As such, the image, and 
particularly the photographic one, can indeed look back at us, but also 'come 
back', in memoriam, in us. This 'in us' is not an interiorisation. What 'is' in us is 
that which remains 'without', as image, as the dynamic or 'force' of the image, 
as the absolute other, the immemorial, so that the photograph or image, in its 
'force' is a metonym for 'our' finitude, and in memoriam for the irretrievable 
deaths of all others, a singular plurality. 
It would indicate an absolute excess and dissymmetry in the space of 
what relates us to ourselves and constitutes the 'being-in-us' the 'being- 
us', in something completely other than a mere subjective interiority: in 
a place open to an infinite transcendence. The one who looks at us, in us 
- 
andfor whom we are 
- 
is no longer; he is completely other, infinitely 
other, as he has always been, and death has more than ever entrusted 
him, given him over, distanced him, in this infinite alterity. However 
narcissistic it may be, our subjective speculation can no longer seize and 
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appropriate this gaze before which we appear at the moment when, 
bearing it along with every movement of our bearing or comportment, 
we can get over the mourning oftim only by getting over our mourning, 
by getting over, by ourselves, the mourning of ourselves, I mean our 
autonomy, of everything that would make us the measure of ourselves. 
That is the excess we bear in ourselves 
... 
Far away in us. In us, there 
where this power of the image comes to open the being-far-away. This 
excess also brings about the limitless enlargement of the image. Its 
power of dilation gives its greatest force in the mourning of the absolute 
of 'force'. 236 
This is the power, a certain passive power, a weak force, indeed a passion of the 
image, a coming into presence which is at the same time a withdrawal, a 
spectrality, which precisely does not return us to ourselves and as such, as 
Benjamin well knew, requires a certain vigilance of reading; hence the holding 
in tension, without dialectic, the phenomenality of the photograph and its 
apparatus, the 'physis' from the 'techne', and its internal (dis)articulation, its 
'force' as such. 
It becomes then a matter of how we read the images of Hiroshima Mon Amour in 
their refusal of dialectical resolution, their force which appears to resistany easy 
transference between viewer and text; leaving the viewer 'impotent' in relation 
to the deferral and distance, the 'nothing' that happens. Is it a question of 
whether this refusal amounts to a perpetual irresolvable melancholy or a certain 
resistant vigilance against the overcoming of the other, its force being in its very 
withdrawal from spectacle? 
As previously discussed, in Derrida's meditation on the image, he articulates the 
(de)structuring of the subject, in as much as it is always crossed by the other, the 
absolute other of (im) possible interiorisation, the trace which 'is' in its very 
effacement, which he demonstrates in Meinoirs of the Blind by way of the 
paradigm of the self-portrait in ruins and the dynamic of blindness and vision in 
236 Derrida, J., 'By Force of Mourning. ' In The Work of Mourning. (Chicago: Chicago Univeristy 
Press, 2001), 161. 
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bearing witness to the other. 237 The 'other in me' is an event lost to sight, which 
is also the condition of any testimony and which, necessarily, requires an 
affirmation and a promise, as ajust response to this anachronic, absolutely 
singular other 'to come'. 
In Memoirs, Derrida considers this event of the 'other' to be so singular as to be 
withdrawn from and anterior to the presence required of 'seeing'. If so singular 
and anterior how can it be witnessed? How to testify? Faced with an anterior 
blindness to the singularity of the event, seeing and witnessing must be posed as 
'hypothetical'. There can be no measure of the adequacy of its being seen and no 
ground upon which it can be based. The response is always already, 'anteriorly' 
blinded. Derrida's focus on drawing in Memoirs might suggest thinking of the 
trace as the appearance of the empirical mark in drawing, but the trace as always 
already re-mark, does not appear. It is the condition of the (im) possibility for the 
phenomenological and it is not phenomenalisable. Thus drawing of the event, in 
its possibility, is at the same time the drawing of the not seeing by the not seeing. 
This is where the self-portrait comes into play, but this is the self-portrait as ruin, 
the writing of its own 'blindness' into its seeing. The event's (as self-crossed-by- 
other) withdrawal cannot be separated from the self-appropriative act of drawing. 
The cxteriority of the event necessarily passes into or through the self- 
consciousness of the one who draws. That self-consciousness meets its limit and 
its ruin in that both the anterior alterity of the event and the withdrawal of the 
event in the act of inscription which precede the subject makes full closure or 
interiorisation of the event/seeing impossible. 238 Bearing witness to the event is 
effaced by the withdrawal of the trace, which at the same time makes it possible. 
All witnessing is 'blind'. 
Witnessing substitutes narrative for perception. The witness cannot see, 
show and speak at the same time 
... 
No authentification can show in the 
present what the most reliable of witnesses sees, or rather, has seen and 
now keeps in memory 
- 
provided he has not been borne away by 
fire 
... 
239 
237 Derrida, J., Memoirs of the Blind, op. cit. 
238 Ibid., especially 57-69. 
239 Ibid., 104. 
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But in this very effacement lies the necessity to countcr-sign, to bear witness to 
the witness in the tracing of the trace, a response to that which withdraws from 
the narration and makes it possible. This is where thefinitude of the other is at 
stake. For in 'blindly' (not) witnessing the retrait of the trace, in the blink of the 
eye, we receive and moum the death of the other and the witness whose 
witnessing has disappeared; the trace of the other of whom next-to-nothing 
remains, the ash (for those who have perished in the fire), neither pure absence, 
nor pure presence. Derrida connects this finitude of the other, as ash, to the 
relation to the other in the gift and the 'radical forgetting', the destruction of 
4memory' in 'impossible' mourning. The gift is the interruption of the economy 
of exchange; that which is received by not being returned, which cannot be 
calculated or pre-determined; that which also interrupts the economy of sacrifice, 
the giving of life and death. 240 It is this gift, which requires the promissory 
'hesitation' of double affirmation: the anterior 'blindness in' affirmation, and the 
pledge to affirm again. But there is a need to say more about the eroticism in 
this; to answer the question of Hiroshima not only as work of art or testimony, or 
art as testimony, but also as a story of love. 
"... universal oblivion" 
It is here that I take one further step (not) beyond Hiroshima Mon Amour, a 
greater distance to bring a greater proximity, which will return again to the film. 
This step is to bring Derrida's dynamic of blindness and vision into proximity 
with that of Maurice Blanchot, to attend more evidently to a certain desire to see. 
Michael Newman, in comparing this dynamic in Derrida and Blanchot, draws 
attention to Derrida's concern to interrupt or break with the dialectic between 
transcendence and sacrifice, (the great Hegelian theme and all that has been 
suggested up to now about art, politics and community); the sacrifice of vision 
and its desire, for the sake of the transcendental law, which Derrida refers to as 
the necessary blinding in order to transcend to a higher vision, 241 (the mythology 
of the blind 'seer', but also the logic of transcendence as immanence in Hegel 
240 For extended meditations on the gift and sacrifice see Derrida, J., The Gift ofDeath. Trans. 
Wills, D., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 24 1 Newman, M., 'The Trace of Traunia: blindness, testimony and the gaze in Blanchot and 
Derrida. ' In Maui-ice Blanchot, the demand qfuriting. Ed. Bailey-Gill, C., (London: Routledge, 
1996), 153-173. 
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and the logic of the signified, the 'truth' within, or over, the externality of the 
signifier). Derrida shows in Memoirs that there is no sacrifice without an 
undialectisable, an unsacrificable remainder. It is precisely the undialectisable 
absence/presence of the (de)structuring trace that breaks the sacrificial logic and, 
which, Derrida metonymically materialises in 'tears', the exorbitant ex-position 
of the eye, as affirmation of the other, desire crossed by fidelity as 'dififerance', 
justice 'before' the law. 242 
Newman compares this with Blanchot's similar yet different articulation of 
blindness and vision, which suggests omething other than the affirmation to 
which Derrida commits. 243 Rather than Derrida's ethical differance, which 
deconstructs the dialectic of transcendence and sacrifice and involves an 
affirmation of the other as the trace, Blanchot's concern is located in the desire 
for the source of vision vis-A-vis seeing, in the terms of Lacan, the 'Real' vis-A- 
vis the 'gaze', the desire to see and not to see, the dynamic between desire and 
its prohibition, 
The motif of vision and blindness in Blanchot is fundamentally 
concerned with the relation to desire and enjoyment. We shall find that 
in its absolute character, enjoyment (orjouissance) is connected on the 
one hand with death, and on the other with the indeterminate, the 'there 
is... ' that is un-negatable being 
... 
this enjoyment would infect the 
ethical purity of any witness to the relation of the other as absolutely, 
irreducibly other. In other words 
... 
we need to supplement the 
philosophical account 
- 
whether transcendental or ethical or both 
- 
with 
one nuanced by the distinction between vision and gaze. 
244 
Newman tracks the ways in which Blanchot returns in his writing and as his 
writing to this dynamic, the desire for the truth of seeing, which is necessarily 
242 See Derrida, J., Memoirs of the Blind op. cit, 127. Derrida calls this the 'abocular' hypothesis, 
"The revelatory or apocalyptic blindness, the blindness that reveals the very truth of the eyes, 
would be the gaze veiled by tears 
... 
Between seeing and weeping, he sees between and catches a 
glimpse of the difference, he keeps it, looks after it in memory 
- 
and this is the veil of tears 
- 
until finally, and from or with the 'same eyes', the tears see. " 
243 What needs to be kept in view here is that this 'affirmation' takes place in the most 
hypothetical and aporetic of circumstances. I wonder if Newman gives that which is affirmed too 
much presence? 244 Newman, M., op. cit, 155. 
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'lost' in the telling. He refers to two episodes from Blanchot's writing, each of 
which relates to Blanchot's re-interpretation of myth (and his preoccupation with 
the relationship between myth, writing and the 'mythic', in the sense in which 
Nancy has defined it, is also pertinent here). In the fragments, which make up 
245 The Writing ofDisaster 
, 
Blanchot reinterprets the Narcissus myth. Other 
interpretations miss the fact that Narcissus does not fall in love with himself, as 
he has no self, but instead falls in love with an image "and because the similitude 
of an image is not likeness to anyone or anything: the image characteristically 
resembles nothing. , 246 
Narcissus falls in love with the 'nothing' that is an image, but why? 
"... because the image as such 
- 
because every image 
- 
is attractive: the image 
exerts the attraction of the void and of death in its falSity"247 
Narcissus is attracted to the source, the void at the heart of vision, and 
transgresses the 'law' of desire, the distancing of the symbolic and the screen of 
the gaze, in favour of the immediacy of the Real. Narcissus does not die, as such, 
as he never really 'lived', but his 'fate' presages that of a 'man' who, in too 
much desiring the truth is consigned to the repetition of a 'dying' language in the 
interminable 'last words' of the*echo. This myth is recast in Blanchot's version 
of "(A primal scene? )", 248 where the child looks out of the window and at first 
sees the everyday reality of the garden and then 'the same sky', 
suddenly open, absolutely black and absolutely empty, revealing (as 
though the pane had broken) such an absence that all since always and 
forevermore been lost therein 
- 
so lost that therein is affirmed and 
dissolved the vertiginous knowledge that nothing is what there is, and 
first of all nothing beyond. 249 
This (pre-symbolic) child sees beyond the gaze into the void, and it is a source of 
"the feeling of happiness 
... 
the ravaging joy to which he can bear witness only by 
245 Blanchot, M., The Writing ofDisaster. Tran. Smock, A., (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995). 
246 Ibid., 125. 
247 Ibid., 125-126. 
248 Ibid., 72: As titled in Blanchot's fragment, in brackets, with a question mark. 
249 Ibid., 72. 
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tears, an endless flood of tears. If the child sees the void of the origin and 
end, the glimpse of finitude, the absolute other of death, which is an 
overwhelming darkness of nothing, a blinding, it provokes an elation (and 
Newman worries about this ecstasy in the face of death) but one which is 
witnessed in tears, the ineluctable stuff of existence. But if this is affirmation of 
the other in the blinding, fleeting recognition of finitude, of the ability to die, it is 
immediately lost, "He says nothing. He will henceforth live in the secret. He will 
weep no more". 25 1 The secret is that there is no secret that can be told, no 
affirmation, which could put an end to the irremissibility of dying, or speak the 
"other of death" which is absolutely "with-out" relation (nowhere and 
everywhere), to any language of testimony (unpronounceable, unavowable) or 
dialectical law of transcendence. 
So where might this leave an ethical relation, if the immemorial other, which 
Derrida affirms, but as a matter of a call to believe (Do you believe this 
... 
Tears 
that see 
... 
Do you believe? I don't know, one has to believe 
... 
) in the retrait of 
the trace, is for Blanchot forever 'outside', without relation? 252 What happens to 
testimony and art? 
If the child becomes adult, keeps the secret of the other night, art, writing, the 
artist and writer are perhaps consigned to Yhe Madness of the Day. In this recit, 
250 Ibid., 72. 
251 Ibid., 72. 
252 Memoirs of the Blind begins with an epigraph quotation from Diderot, "I write without seeing. 
I came. I wanted to kiss your hand 
... 
This is thefirst time I have ever written in the dark 
... 
not 
knowing whether I am indeedforming letters. Wherever there will be nothing, read that I love 
you" Diderot, Letter to Sophie Volland, June 10,1759 and there follows the question, 
-"Do you believe this? " in the context of skepticisrn. "But skepticism is precisely what I've been talking to 
you about; the difference between believing and seeing, between believing one sees and seeing 
between, catching a glimpse 
- 
or not. Before doubt ever becomes a system, skepsis has to do 
with the eyes. The word refers to a visual perception, to the observation, vigilance, and attention 
of the gaze [regard] during an examination. One is on the look out, one reflects upon what one 
sees, reflects what one sees by delaying the moment of conclusion". The translators point out 
that "Do you believe this? " repeated again in the next to last line of the work can be read in a 
number of ways, from the every day "Do you think so? " to the more literal "Do you believe? " to 
the more incredulous "Do you really believe this? " and that the opening phrase of the substantive 
text can refer, be a response to, both to the epigraph (as an outside inside the text) and the 
conversation which makes up the text. The matter of response, vigilance, attentiveness, reflection 
as delay are all matters of appeal to the reader, the receiver of testimony, affirmation (or not) as 
the countersignature. See Memoirs of the Blind, op. cit, 1.1 am not sure that the difference 
between Derrida and Blanchot is quite as Newman suggests. It may be a matter of how one reads 
and an infinitesimal point of translation within the same thought, which nevertheless may be a 
great deal. 
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there is another connection with the recasting of myth, that of Orpheus and 
Eurydice. The "laW' of desire that would circumscribe the artist to the bringing 
of darkness into light, is transgressed by Orpheus, who chooses to look back 
upon Eurydice and therefore loses her forever. The paradoxical demand of 
writing is that it compels the law of the gaze and that which it prohibits, the 
'other night' and, as such compels, the measureless desire for Eurydice-as-lost, 
the impossible mediation of the absolute other. The 'work' which 'unworks' at 
the same time is thus "consecrated in impossibility"'. 253 Such a scene is played 
out again in The Madness ofDay, in which the 'man' is almost blinded by the 
shards of glass crushed in his eyes. Seeking the condition of possibility of 
seeing, the gaze, as such, it implodes in his eyes, as the pas au dela, the step 
(not) beyond, desire and punishment in one, the passion (desire/suffering) of 
writing. Blanchot ends this recit, in which the man, or more exactlyjustice in the 
man ( 
... 
one of her aims was to make me "see justice done"), is caught between 
desire (for) the "feminine element 
... 
insatiably intent upon my glory 
(jouissance)" and the 'law' intent upon his telling the story, "Tell us, just exactly 
what happened", followed by the non-affirmative injunction (or is it an appeal? ) 
"A story9 No. No stories, never again. , 254 The irony, of course, is that he has 
'just' told the story which is the story we are reading and which is 'out-of-time' 
with the 'law' of chronology, "That was the beginning 
... 
Now get down to the 
facts. " But the moment, the event, has already happened and yet is expected still 
to come. And the double irony is that "No stories, never again" is already uttered 
in a story. 
Newman suggests this self-cancelling gesture marks an abyssal never-present 
which, absorbs the entirety of text, cancelling both the narration, which is an 
inevitable betrayal of the unpresentable other, always too late and 'missing the 
point of time' and cancelling the possibility of the moment of blindness as the 
retrait, the alterity of the trace, the blinding blink of the eye, as the resistance to 
closure, the reference to an always already absent presence in Derrida. 
253 Blanchot, M., 'Orpheus's Gaze. ' In The Space oftiterature. Trans. Smock, A., (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 174. "The work is everything to Orpheus except that 
desired look where it is lost. Thus it is only in that look that the work can surpass itself, be united 
with its origin and consecrated in impossibility. " 254 Blanchot, M., 'The Madness of the Day. ' in The Station Hill Blanchot Reader. Trans Davis, 
L., Auster, P., Lamberton, R., (Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 1999), 199. 
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Derrida insists upon a remainder or residue as a reminder of the non- 
present in the very presencing of the present. In the act of transcendence 
- 
as is stressed over and over again by Derrida 
- 
sacrifice does not join, 
make possible a certain economy, without an excluded, forgotten 
remainder, even if that remainder is less than nothing, ash, cinders 
... 
It is 
the other who comes to ruin 
- 
and makes possible 
- 
the self-relation of 
the self-portrait, at once ruined [no return to the self-same] and made 
possible by the other person and by the alterity of the law, and beyond 
the law, the pleurantes 
-a ruin which in turn makes possible the 
exposure to the other, the pledge of faith, the witness given and the 
avowal, aveu. In witness as avowal and response, Derrida moves 
towards an affirmation that Blanchot does not allow himself, except in 
the form of enjoyment, in tearý, of the 'Primal scene', always already 
lost since it occurs even the first time as an absence, to be remembered 
in an Orphic art which, by a paradoxical double movement seeks to 
grasp the lost object in its very withdrawal. 255 
Newman's argument is that rather than move to an 'outside' the law, brought 
inside as the remainder which ruins the dialectic of transcendence and sacrifice, 
Blanchot moves to another form of 'transcendence'. This is an absolute, by 
seeking the condition of the possibility of seeing, which can never be seen, a 
transcendental blinding driven by desire, blind writing which can only be a blind 
vigilance, "No stories, never again" as the refusal to testify by way of a narrative 
mediation, or an empirical present, to that which has never been present. 
... 
a refusal precisely to give up an enjoyment which would have to be 
sacrificed for the sake of the writing of the recit; the deferment of 
immediate enjoyment would be the condition of writing. The refusal to 
testify coupled with the fantasy of the law being personified as a lover, 
suggests an unwillingness to take up a place as a subject of the law and, 
indeed the necessity of transgression 
... 
If there is affirmation, it can only 
be of loss, of absence, of the 'nothing' that circumscribes a void that is 
not itself nothing but rather something unspeakable 
... 
the traumatic 
moment is where the work encounters the impossibility of its origin in 
the absence of any present. This must be, for Blanchot, the sense of 
Judaic prohibition of images, which is the very condition of vigilance 
without expectation, living on in a vigilant blindness or blind 
255 Newman, M., 'The trace of Trauma', op. cit, 166-7. 
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vigilance 
... 
expecting nothing... Consequently, waiting and watching, 
for suddenly awakened and, knowing this full well henceforth, never 
wakeful enough. 256 
Newman's argument perhaps puts too much emphasis on the refusal of the 
present and refusal to testify, neglecting the structure of time in the recit, as an 
'impossible' combination of the alreadypast and the imminent. It is no simple 
refusal, but a much more enigmatic resistance to a certain 'law' of presence and 
testimony, complicated by the narrated rejection of narrative, "No stories, never 
again". 
In taking a different tack, I refer to the responses of both Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe and Derrida to Blanchot's later text, The Instant ofMy Death. 257 
Without going into detail, as I only wish to draw upon certain key elements in 
this recit, this is a story (possibly autobiographical) narrated by 
(possibly)Blanchot, of an incident in the Second World War in which a young 
man of noble birth is ordered from his Chateau by a Nazi Lieutenant and set 
before a firing squad. The narrator attempts to articulate the feelings of the 
young man at this instant, facing a firing squad: 
I know 
- 
Do I know it 
- 
that the one at whom the Germans were already 
aiming, awaiting but the final order, experienced then a feeling of 
extraordinary lightness, a sort of beatitude (nothing happy however) 
- 
ssovereign elation? The encounter of death with death? 
In his place, I will not try to analyze. He was perhaps suddenly 
invincible. Dead-immortal. Perhaps ecstasy. Rather the feeling of 
compassion for suffering humanity, the happiness of not being immortal 
or eternal. Henceforth, he was bound to death by a surreptitious 
friendship. 258 
At the moment he is to be shot, "Comrades from the maqui" create a disturbance. 
The firing squad, which turns out to be made up of Russian collaborators, let him 
256 Ibid., 169. 
257 Blanchot, M., The Instant ofiny Death. Trans. Rottenberg, E., (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), page numbers? 
258 Ibid., 5. 
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escape. Three young farmers are killed instead, their farms burned to the ground, 
in a conflagration. The Chateau is left intact save for the loss of a manuscript. 
Feeling "the torment of injustice" at this situation, there remained still for the 
young man, as the narrator attempts to testify: 
the feeling of lightness that I would not know how to translate: freed 
from life? the infinite opening up? Neither happiness nor unhappiness. 
Nor the absence of fear and perhaps already the step beyond. I know, I 
imagine that this unanalyzable feeling changed what there remained for 
him of existence. As if the death outside him could only henceforth 
collide with the death in him. I am alive. " No, you are dead. 
259 
Later, marked by a blank in the page and a change of 'voice', 'he' returns to 
Paris and the hub of French intellectuals at the end of the war and meets 
Malraux. He, too, had been captured and lost his writings. But "It was only 
reflections on art, easy to reconstitute, whereas a manuscript would not be. " The 
story ends with a change to the first person, recalling "the instant of my death". 
"What does it matter? All that remains is the feeling of lightness that is death 
itself or, to put it more precisely, the instant of my death henceforth always in 
abeyance. ý260 
In responding to this text, Lacoue-Labarthe points to "two matrices or two 
6primal scenes' [which] dominate the West and its literature, or the West as 
literature. Both of them have their origin in works by Homer: the scene of anger, 
which the Iliad inaugurates, and the scene of experience 
... 
whose truth is 
illuminated at the very centre of the Odyssey, the fwnous nekuia, Ulysses' 
descent into hell, his crossing of death. " The primal scene of myth cannot be so 
easily cancelled out or avolided; indeed, the dread is that experience and its 
testimony may only be accounted through an 'imitatio' of myth. 261 
259 Ibid., 8-9 
260 Ibid., 11 
26 1 Lacoue-Labarthe, P., 'Fidelities. 'Oxford Literary Review 22 (200 1). Lacoue-Labarthe recalls 
Thomas Mann, writing in 1936 "... 1 am feeble or naYve nough to believe in the accuracy of 
Thomas Mann's remarkable analysis that he presented for Freud for his eightieth birthday in 
1936 (a key date in the Fascist era of our time), on 'life in myth' as a 'life in quotation marks' 
- 
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Lacoue-Labarthe identifies these two 'primal scenes' in Blanchot, "... neither is 
it so difficult to see how precisely these two scenes are conjoined in LInstant de 
ma mort where a protest against injustice 
... 
is combined with the astounding 
t1262 joyfulness of the infinitely paradoxical experience of death. But Blanchot 
makes a discrete turn away from myth in his very reference to its 'primal 
scenes', connecting with the question of testimony. The very conjunction of 
these two primal scenes disturbs the 'literary' order, but if we examine this 
conjunction and its recurrence in the story, each time it is expressed, whilst it 
may first follow the mystical 'language', the rhythm or the tone of a 'mythic' 
description of a near death experience, we cannot help but recognise the passion 
of Christ the first time it occurs, it says something very different from out of this 
vocabulary, it puts it in doubt and into question, and gradually effaces its 
'mythic' connotations by the final 'erasure' of the 'as if' of representation, 
without of course erasing it, as we are reading, in the mode of the "as if' and are 
still drawn to the narrative voice. 
The greatest hesitation and doubt is cast by the "I know 
- 
Do I know" of the first 
passage, followed by a series of questionings, then the 'perhaps' and the "I will 
not try to analyze" until the shift of ground and tone, the assertive "Henceforth, 
he was bound to death by a surreptitious friendship. " Again, the same movement 
in the second passage, from I would not know how to translate", then a series of 
question marks, "I know, I imagine" then "perhaps", the "unanalyzable", the "as 
if', until the impossible affirmation, the affirmation of the impossible, "I am 
alive. No you are dead"; then the third time, no question, affirmation and even 
precision and in the first person, "the instant of my death henceforth always in 
abeyance". 
an imitatio, if you like, and a sacred repetition, a religion in the sense of re-legere, is nothing less 
than repetition itself 
.. 
According to Mann, our historical attitude, as well as our so-called daily 
existence, just as much as literature, are bound by this compulsive law (to say nothing precisely 
of the unconscious). " One must recall here Walter Benjamin, another writer writing in 1936 
about the mythic power of technological representation as that which gives the masses not their 
right, "but instead a chance the express themselves". 
262 Lacoue-Labarthe, P., 'Fidelities. ', op. cit., 138. 
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This appears to be a move from myth to 'truth', the truth of a testimony which 
would reject the mythic, 'life as imitation' and the 'mythic' experience of 'near 
death' as a sharp "deliverance from this world" or an immortality in being inured 
of death. And these latter 'experiences', the stuff of myth, Blanchot both 
borrows from and resists. 
What Blanchot demonstrates is the extent to which testimony, too, is qualified by 
speculations, hesitations, questions, these gestures towards grasping the 
ungraspable, with which Blanchot seeks to undermine myth, in favour of the 
anachronic distance between the absolutely anterior and the imminent, which is 
also beyond the 'norms' of testimony. 
This is to neither give in to myth nor to suggest that testimony is inevitably 
mythic, (although it is necessarily something of a representation, whereby the 
absolute singularity of the event has to enter into the general structure that is 
language), but instead, this is to hold myth and testimony, fiction and truth at a 
discreet distance, without collapsing one into the other, without dialectising, in 
order to think the 'other' of testimony, just as the instant is divided from the 
instance, but nevertheless abides in the trace, both the insistent imminence and 
the "always already past" trace of testimony. 263 That is why there is no present, 
which is not to say that there is simply absence or a void, but a distance, ever to 
be held open between the "neither 
... 
nor". This is the distance out of which the 
9 other' can be thought and indeed the absolutely other from/for whom there can 
be no testimony, except the trace of testimony. 
263 Derrida's response to Blanchot's text is a constant meditation on the matter of testimony. On 
the 'instant' he says, "When I commit myself to speaking the truth, I comn-dt myself to speaking 
the same thing, an instant later 
... 
But this repetition carries the instant outside of itself. 
Consequently the instant is instantaneously, at this very instant, divided, destroyed by what it 
nevertheless makes possible 
- 
testimony", and refers to Blanchot's statement concerning, "The 
imminence of what has always already come to pass" thus 
. 
..... an unbelievable tense... [but 
unbelievable in the context of the belief which normally conditions lestimony]lt seems to deport 
what has always, from all time, already taken place toward the coming of the to-come. Indeed 
one must say unbelievable, for insofar as all testimony essentially appeals to a certain system of 
belief, to faith without proof, to the act of faith summoned by a kind of transcendental oath, well, 
faith, faith in the temporal order, in a certain commonsense ordering of time, is what guarantees 
the everyday concept, especially the juridical concept and the dominant concept of attestation in 
European culture, that in which literature has been established, thus confirming or disturbing the 
very order that conveys it. " Derrida, J., Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, op. cit., 49 and passint. 
164 
The Neuter, the gentle prohibition against dying, there where, from 
threshold to threshold, eye without gaze, silence carries us into the 
proximity of the distant. Word still to be spoken beyond the living and 
the dead, testifyingfor the absence ofattestation. 
264 
Certainly here is a resistance to myth, but to affirm the other as the negative of 
myth in its place runs the danger of signifying the other, as myth's 'vital 
negation', and we are back with Hegel, metaphysics and eschatology all over 
again. Unable to escape myth entirely, Blanchot writes from the 'outside' inside 
the mythic, to exact the reserve, the distance, out of the mythic, which is the 
enigmatic remaining and itself dying, "I am alive. No, you are dead". 265 Desire, 
the erotic, its jouissance and the 'innocence' of that which is before language 
(hence the child in the 'primal scene') conjoin with the ungraspability, the 
impossible necessary instant of death, in the anachronic moment of the anterior 
and the instant always in abeyance, the abiding instant of death, to exact the 
difference, which is to refuse the ecstasy of survival, the punctual view of death 
as the" final' end, or any other view of death, which would in a sacrificial way, 
give meaning to life. Lacoue-Labarthe puts is thus: 
If we deliver deliverance from its metaphysical and eschatological 
excess (the liberation from this world), if we refrain from dreaming in 
death, of the hope of living on 
- 
what we have is an innocence, this 
happy state before language-... before muthos... 'A Primal Scene' states 
perhaps nothing other than this hope for in-nocence (a completely 
different hope from that of a survival) and perhaps offers us nothing 
264 Blanchot, M., The Step Not Beyond. Trans. Nelson, L., (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1992), 76. Blanchot has referred to the question of the neuter, the other and 
'distance' variously throughout his work, for instance: "The other is neither one nor the other, 
and the neutral that indicates it withdraws it from both 
... 
always establishing it outside the term 
the act or the subject through which it claims to offer itself. " Blanchot, M., The Infinite 
Conversation, trans. Hanson, S., (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 385. "The 
Other does not let itself (to? ) be thought either in terms of transcendence or in terms of 
immanence; an experience which one must not be content to say that language only expresses it 
or reflects it, for it only arises in the space and time of language. " Ibid., 101. 
265 This reserve is articulated in Blanchot again in reference to the neuter, thus: "withdrawing 
from [the work] every privileged point of interest (even afocal) 
... 
not allowing it to exist as a 
completed whole 
... 
to speak at a distance, preserving this distance without mediation and without 
community, and even in sustaining the infinite distancing of distance 
- 
its iffeciprocity, its 
irrectitude or dissymmetry. " Blanchot, M., The Infinite Conversation, op. cit., 386. 
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other than, at the edge of silence, the discreet effacement of myth. 
V; Mch is to say of evil? 266 
If Lacoue-Labarthe's reading moves towards hope (a completely different hope) 
as against Newman's less hopeful movement, perhaps there is a need to make 
more of the ambiguity at stake in Blanchot, which brings me closer to Hiroshima 
Mon Amour. This ambiguity, cryptically expressed in the negative of 
"neither 
... 
nor" to differentiate it from the positive ambiguity of meaning, 
modulates, I think, even Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of a prior 'in-nocence'. 
In Blanchot's texts there is an equivocation between the word and its 'shadow', 
the 'otherness of sense'. It is as if in order to overcome that punctual duality 
between life and death, sense is suspended, not in the way the Nancy argues that 
the 'essence' of sense is suspended in favour of existence (which does not mean 
the erasure of the non-existent), but that sense is suspended, is rendered 
equivocal, ambiguous, nothing but the resemblance of distance, some what in 
javour ofnon-existence (here I am aware of swinging back to Newman's 
argument). Yes, it is the desire for the 'memory', which cannot be memory in the 
dusual' sense, with all that implies in terms of time, but instead, the insistent 
anachrony of anteriority and imminence of the non-existence, which must be 
acknowledged as 'in us'. How does that helps us, not to 'end', no final end or 
teleology intended, not to dialecticise, no 'end' in the absolute fulfilment of the 
idea even as the idea of nothing ? 
It is perhaps a fine line between evoking justice for the dead, an ethics of 
remembering and the other, which does not reduce the other to the same and 
desiring this as something abyssal. Blanchot knows this only too well and says 
as much with, direct reference to Marguerite Duras, in a footnote no less, (thus 
refusing to end), a footnote to 'The Narrative Voice', in which Blanchot 
describes the equivocation in language, that resistance to affirmation that is 
there, if we listen for it, where, 
266 Lacoue-Labarthe, P., 'Fidelities', op. cit., 149. 
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... 
it could be that telling (writing) is drawing language into a possibility 
of saying that would say without saying being and still without denying 
it either 
... 
establishing the centre of gravity of speech elsewhere, where 
speaking is not a matter of affirrning being nor needing negation in 
order to suspend the work of being... the narrative voice 
... 
the most 
critical one that can communicate unheard 
... 
that is why we tend, as we 
listen to it, to confuse it with the oblique voice of unhappiness or the 
oblique voice of madness. 267 
Then the footnote. It is worth quoting in full, as it perhaps sums up Hiroshima 
Mon Amour in one tentatively written paragraph, 
This voice 
- 
the narrative voice 
- 
is the one I hear, perhaps, rashly 
perhaps, rightly, in the tale by Marguerite Duras that I mentioned a short 
while ago. The night forever without any dawn 
- 
that ballroom in which 
the indescribable event occurred that cannot be recalled and cannot be 
forgotten, but that one's forgetting retains 
- 
the nocturnal desire to turn 
around in order to see what belongs neither to the visible nor the 
invisible, that is to stay for a moment, through one's gaze, as close as 
possible to strangeness, where the rhythm of reveal-oneself-conceal- 
oneself has lost its guiding force 
- 
then the need (the eternal human 
desire) to bring about acceptance in another person, to live once again in 
another person, a third person, the dual relationship fascinated, 
indifferent, irreducible to any mediation: a neuter relationship, even if it 
implies the infinite void of desire 
- 
finally 
, 
the imminent certainty that 
what has happened once will always begin again, will always betray 
itself and reject itself. these really are, it seems to me, the 'co-ordinates' 
of narrative space, the circle where, as we enter it, we incessantly enter 
the outside. But who is telling the story here? Not the reporter, the one 
who formally 
- 
and also a little shamefacedly 
- 
does the speaking, and 
actually takes over, so much so that he seems to us to be adintruder, but 
rather that which cannot tell a story because it bears 
- 
this is its wisdorn, 
this is its madness 
- 
the torment of impossible narration, knowing (with 
a closed knowledge anterior to the reason-unreason split) that it is the 
measure of this outside, where, as we reach it, we are in danger of 
267 Blanchot M., 'The Narrative Voice. ' in The Station Hill Blanchol Reader, M., Trans. Davis, 
L., Austei, P., Lamberton, R., 
, 
(Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 1999), 468. 
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falling under the attraction of a completely exterior speech: pure 
extravagance. 268 
This is a primal scene of literature again, the Orphic myth, writing itself, art 
itself, testimony to the 'outside', but if Blanchot stays on the brink of the void, 
does Duras succeed by falling? 
"She has succeeded in drowning him in universal oblivion. And it is a source ofamazement to 
her 
.. 
They look at each other without seeing each other. Forever. ', 269 
If the Hiroshima Mon Amour ends by returning us to the beginning, the universal 
oblivion that the bombing of Hiroshima is, if the film shows this, where does it 
leave us? Is the image, as Blanchot says, 'intimate' because, 
"... it makes our intimacy an exterior power that we passively submit to: outside 
of us, in the backward motion of the world that the image provokes, the depth of 
our passion trails along, astray, brilliant. 270 
Is it always a backward motion of the world? Is it not also, as Nancy says a 
matter of a 'stance'. an 'attitude' and a 'deportment' ? 271 What way is she facing, 
how does she stand vis-A-vis the world? Arguably the woman in the film is 
driven by a desire, which is not an openness or exposure to the happenstance of 
the world as it 'is' with all its pain and suffering. Despite the 'chance' encounter, 
her desire is premised upon that which has already constituted her 'being', as 
one who touched death, as one who lost the opportunity to die for love and gives 
268 Ibid., 469. 
269 Duras, M., 'Screenplay', op. cit., 83. 270 Blanchot, M., 'Two versions of the Imaginary. ' In The Gaze of Orpheus. Ed. Adams Sitney, 
P., Trans. Davis, L., (Barrytown: Station Hil Press, 1981), 82-85. 
9 
271 See Nancy, J-L., 'Pain, Suffering and Unhappiness. ' In The Sense of the World, op. cit., 148. 
Although Nancy quotes Blanchot, I think he takes a slightly different stance, "Neither happiness 
nor unhappiness [the Blanchot quote] but another happenstance, neither negative sense nor 
negation of sense, giving their due to both resistance and suffering 
... 
and for this reason ceasing to 
sublate the evil in the good, taking a break from all theodicy or logodicy, and calling finally for 
another stance of sense or for another stance in the face of sense. For the whole question can be 
summarised like this: what attitude to adopt before, or in, self-differing and self-deferr ing 
sense.... it is always a question of maintaining oneself in the face of the eclipse, fainting, 
syncopation, or collapse of sense... It is always a matter of this. But all modes of deportment have 
been altered 
... 
it is necessary to invent how to give some kind of deportment to existence 
- 
to 
nothing but existence 
... 
The structure of existing is 
... 
the toward. Neither toward happiness nor 
toward unhappiness without being, first of all toward the happenstance that the world is". 
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to the Japanese man her survival as a possession. Her encounter with death, 
touched by the outside, is enclosed within the horizon of being that she is, her 
survived 'self. 
... 
What she tells the Japanese is this lost opportunity which has made her what she is. The 
story she tells of this lost opportunity literally transports her outside herself and carries her 
toward this new man. 
To give oneself, body and soul, that's it. 
That is the equivalent not only of amorous possession, but also of a marriage. 
She gives this Japanese 
- 
at Hiroshima 
- 
her most precious possession; herself as she now 
is, her survival after the death of her love 
- 
at Nevers. 272 
There is something mythic about this. Her desiring body and its skin, to recall 
the motif introduced earlier, already circumscribes within its horizon, her body, 
as survived self, the death that she has borne within, "indescribable event 
... 
that 
one's forgetting retains 
... 
impossible narration", until the moment when that 
'already-given' can be given again, sacrificed to the abyssal 'void of desire'. If 
that anachronic moment is already the possession of one who would give it, then 
it is already circumscribed within the horizon of a self, and she becomes the 
embodiment of truth. Her desiring body, her skin undergoes a Christ-like 
passion. 
As Nancy has argued, we can arrive at a mythic absolutisation from the point of 
view of an extreme relativism, an absence of all value which we can understand 
as nihilism. The relativism of nihilism becomes the absolute myth of out time. 273 
Because of this there is no reason to be convinced that we have moved beyond 
the Hegelian problematic and the sensible presentation of the idea, which haunts 
visual representation and this is why, if we read the film with Duras, the skin and 
bodies which provoke the viewers sense of touch in Hiroshima mon Amour do 
not displace or evade the problem of visual representation. In the beginning of 
the film the viewer is touched by the skin of bodies as they positioned in time, 
space, movement and appearance in relation to the viewer and as the viewer 
views these bodies they turn to ash before the viewer's eyes. I have begun to 
272 Duras, M., 'Appendices: Portrait of the French Woman' in 'Screenplay', op. cit., 112. 273 Librett, J., Translator's foreword Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the Morld Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press 1997 x 
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consider this a metonym for the whole film from Duras's perspective. The ash 
relates to Hiroshima and the "nothing" and "mutual impotence 9274 that befalls 
the lovers, the memory of love and our historical memory; the nothing that Duras 
pursues as an "Idea7in the work of art. Touching turns to the memory of touch; 
bodies that emerged from darkness into day turn to the grey of memory; time 
passing turns to killing time; the space of Hiroshima recedes to that of Nevers, 
, 9275 
until "she has succeeded in drowning him in universal oblivion. 
The lover and the room disappear as she enters 'the world' and the survival that 
she will "give". Duras appears to present the sacrifice of love, the historical 
singularity of Hiroshima and Nevers, time, space, light and darkness to a higher 
implacable light of truth; the truth of. "Impossible to talk about Hiroshima. All 
one can do is talk about the impossibility of talking about Hiroshima". 276 Skin 
and body are here sacrificial (the Christ-like passion) but is this to the 'void'? 
This does not escape the metaphysical assumption of art and the presentation of 
the Idea for here we have nihilism become absolute in the quest for the 
presentation of the Idea of "nothing" as the gift of survival. 
People want to signify- world, filth, technics and silence, subject and its absence, body, 
spectacle, insignificance, and pure will-to-signify 
... 
Thus the demand or the postulation of 
the idea lets itself be grasped in its nakedness, in the flesh. All the more naked and laid 
bare in that these demands and postulations are the more deprived of both referents and 
codes for those referents (which in the past were religion, myth, history, heroism, nature, 
feeling 
... 
sensation itself 
.. 
right up to self-referential form). Where this demand for the 
Idea is displayed 
... 
art exhausts and consumes itself, all that remains is its metaphysical 
desire 
... 
the gaping hole stretched towards its end 
... 
A nihilisrn, therefore, but as the 
simple reversal of idealism, If for Hegel art is finite because the Idea comes round to 
presenting itself in its proper element, in the philosophical concept, for the nihilist art 
finishes itself by presenting itself in its proper- and empty- concept. 277 
But as Nancy has said, skin is neither the source of the full presence of sense 
(mythicism) nor the source of the full absence of sense (nihilism). Skin is the 
organ of touch and exposure. It is, Nancy states, "continually passing from one 
to the other, always coming back to itself without either a locus or a place where 
274 Duras, M., 'Synopsis' 13 
275 Duras, M., 'Scenario' 83 
276 Duras, M., 'Synopsis'9 
277 Nancy, J-L., The Muses 91 
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it can establish a self, and so always coming back to the world, to other bodies to 
which it is exposed, in the same gesture that exposes them to itself " And "the 
, 9278 
minutest look is a touching that brushes against it, and exposes it once more. 
Skin does not in this sense belong to a subject. It is detached attachment. It is 
9 attachment by its detachment' (exposed to the outside) and touching is the 
gesture at the limit. Touching/being touched is self-touching and its interruption, 
but there is no subject/self prior to touching. The 'subject' comes to his/herself at 
the moment s/he is touched, as we might say, from Nancy, in a singular/plural 
being-in-the-world. That is what exposure (to, as) world is. This is existence 
without any call or nostalgia for a founding or grounding essence or presumed 
subject. Neither is it a veiled nihilism. It is not gesture towards something to 
dissimulate a nothing, the abyss. It is the ineluctable 'happenstance' of being 
toward the world with others. 279 
In that sense, skin, body and soul as sipifiers of an impossibility, are not 'hers' 
to give, other than insofar as she appropriates exposure as 'her survival' and 
turns it, in a metaphysical gesture into a gift of desire, but within an economy of 
possession and exchange, the gift against which Nancy argues, in favour of the 
offering. 
The appropriation of giving and the giving of the inappropriable 
configure the originary chiasmus of philosophy 
- 
and of sense 
... 
Thus 
neither the desire nor gift but, rather the following: that the desire of the 
gift should desire essentially not to appropriate its 'object' and that the 
gift of desire should give that which cannot be given and should give no 
'subject' of an 'object'. The one offered to the other 
... 
left to the 
discretion of a chance and/or decision whose agent or actor, neither 
desires nor gives but merely exists. 280 
There is a need to think the non-knowledge, the out-of-time moment, that 
unbelievable extremity between an absolutely anterior and an imminent, outside 
of any circumscription or horizon of body or destiny, or desire. Yet "people want 
278 Nancy J-L., 'Corpus', op. cit., 205. 279 Nancy, J-L., 'Pain, Suffering, Unhappiness. ' In The Sense of the World op. cit., 152. 
280 Nancy, J-L., 'Gift, Desire, "Agathon. ' In The Sense of the World, op. cit., 52. 
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to signify, '281 and are drawn to the metaphysical gesture of 'redemption' even via 
an absolutisation of nihilism. However: 
We do not know if expectation prepares the coming of the to-come or if 
it recalls the repetition of the same, of the thing itself as ghost 
... 
This 
non-knowledge is not a lacuna. No progress of knowledge could 
saturate an opening, which must have nothing to do with knowledge. 
And therefore not with ignorance either. This opening must preserve 
this heterogeneity as the only chance of a future affirmed or rather re- 
affirmed. It is the future itself, it comes from the future. The future is its 
memory 
... 
the to-come can only be announced as such and in its purity 
from a past end: beyond, if it is possible, the last extremity. If it is 
possible, if there is any, future, but how to suspend such a question or 
deprive oneself of such a reserve without concluding in advance, 
without reducing in advance, the future and its chance? Is there not a 
messianic extremity, an eskhaton whose ultimate event (immediate 
rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of infinite surprise, and 
heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, at each moment, 
the final term of a physis, and the labour, production and telos of any 
history9 282 
To paraphrase from a comment on Derrida by Geoff Bennington; that means a 
here and now (of the 'singularity' that is Hiroshima) that requires thinking a 
moment, which is not only not present, in the presence of the present, but is not 
recoverable (to rise again from its ashes) as the felos of any process, including 
that of love (incorporating it in a love that will necessarily be special and 
'wonderful', one that will be more credible than if it had occurred anywhere else 
in the world 
... 
), an eskhaton without salvation or redemption. 283. 
And yet 
- 
it should not be forgotten that what I am trying to explore here in 
everything said up till now, is an ethical and political moment of art that is a 
question of reading as well as writing. If Duras reads the film as ultimately akin 
to a survival that can be possessed and given again as a forrn of redemption, it 
can be read otherwise, in fact the very structure of reading is that which both has 
28 1 Nancy, J-L., The Muses 91 
282 Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, op. cit., 36-7. 283 See Bennington, G., 'Is it timeT In Interrupting Derri(la. (London: Routledge, 2000), 137. 
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to be presupposed and yet necessarily undennines the reading of possession and 
redemption. For the structure of reading is that anachronic moment and temporal 
dislocation (the always anterior with the imminent), which a teleology may seek 
to contain, but will always be exceeded by it. 
As Bennington suggests, a reading is at all times going to be 'out-of-time' with a 
text, 
... 
reading is necessarily in a relation of delay with respect to the text 
read; however minimal that delay, reading always comes after the 
writing it reads. But that irreducible belatedness goes along with a sort 
of internal dislocation, whereby reading is always remembering and 
anticipating on reading in order to function 
... 
If this is so then teleology 
cannot ever quite reduce the moment we are calling 
... 
messianic, and to 
that extent can never quite be teleological, so that the programmed ends 
do not quite come out at the appointed time, so that it is never quite 
tiMe. 284 
We have seen that Hegel would that the word was read away, that he could 
reduce reading altogether. Blanchot would write reading into his texts to the 
point of the abyssal beyond or prior to any reading of writing altogether. Duras 
ultimately gathers up the complicated temporal structure of past, present and 
future that is reading and impossibly bearing witness, as a possession to be 
given, one more time, but this is never time enough. 
The past always remains before us as an endless task. 
284 Ibid., 138. 
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Chapter Three: Art in the Age of Tele-technological Communication 
In Derrida's Specters ofMarx there are two strongly interconnected themes. One 
is the necessity to re-think Marx's ontology, a reflection upon being, 
consciousness, the socio-economic premised on a metaphysics of the 'living 
present', past present or future present, in favour of a hauntology, a 
deconstructed time, figured by the 'ghost', which produces an anachronistic 
crossing of time opening a space for the 'living on' of an absolute past and an 
open future. The other is the necessity to re-think the hegemonic power of 
another ghosting, this time as the apparent present, in the virtual domain of tele- 
technologies. Derrida is certain that the question of technology is a political 
question requiring a reconsideration of the inheritance of Marxism. This 
interconnecting of themes is pertinent to this thesis, considering the inter- 
relationship between the thinking of technology and the thinking of art both 
historically and contemporaneously; how that relationship has tended to pit the 
one against the other, and what we might the say the pervasiveness of technology 
now demands in terms of modes of (re) thinking aesthetics and politics. 
There is first of all the culture called more or less properly political (the 
official discourses of parties and politicians in power in the world, 
virtually everywhere Western models prevail, the speech or the rhetoric 
of what in France is called the 'class politique'. 
There is also what is rather confusedly qualified as mass-media culture: 
6 communications' and interpretations, selective and hierachised 
production of 'information' through channels whose power has grown 
in an absolutely unheard of fashion at a rhythm that coincides precisely, 
no doubt not fortuitously, with that of the fall of regimes on the Marxist 
model, a fall to which it contiibuted mightily but 
... 
in forms and modes 
of apparition and at a speed that also affect in an essential fashion the 
very concept of public space in so-called liberal democracies 
... 
the 
question of media tele-technology, economy and power, in their 
irreducibly spectral dimension should cut across all our discussions. 
What can one do with the Marxist schema in order to deal with this 
today 
- 
theoretically and practically 
- 
and thus in order to change it? 
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These schemas appear both indispensable and insufficient in their 
present fomL 
There is finally scholarly or academic culture 
... 
whose discourse is itself 
relayed by the academic and commercial press, but also by the media in 
general. For no one will have failed to notice that the three places, forms 
and powers of culture that I have just identified 
... 
are more than ever 
welded together by the same apparatuses or by ones that are 
indissociable from them. These apparatuses 
... 
communicate and 
cooperate at every moment toward producing the greatest force with 
which to ensure the hegemony or imperialism in question 
... 
As it has 
never done before, either to such a degree or in these forms, the 
politico-econornic hegemony, like the intellectual or discursive 
doniination passes by way of techno-mediatic power, this power cannot 
be analysed or potentially combated, supported here, attacked there, 
without taking into account so many spectral effects, the new speed of 
the apparition (we understand this word in its ghostly sense) of the 
simulacrurn., the synthetic or prosthetic image, and the virtual event, 
cyberspace and surveillance, the control, appropriations and 
speculations that today deploy unheard-of powers. Have Marx and his 
heirs helped us to think and to treat this phenomenon? If we say that the 
answer to this question is at once yes and no, yes in one respect, no in 
another and that one must filter, select, differentiate, restructure the 
questions, it is only in order to announce, in too preliminary a fashion, 
the tone and general form of our conclusions: namely that one must 
assume the inheritance of Marxism, assume its most living part 
... 
that 
which continues to put back on the drawing board the question of life, 
spirit, or the spectral, of life-death beyond the opposition of life and 
death. 285 
As Simon Critchley points out in his reading of Derrida's Specters ofMarx, 
"Derrida (mis) understands hegemony negatively in its traditional sense as 
domination. ""' Rather than taking on board the political dynamics of the concept 
between, "how certain relations became fixed... [as] the product of contingency, 
antagonism and power" but on the other hand "leaves the future radically open 
and indeterminate, which means nothing is guaranteed, but neither is anything 
28' Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, op. cit., 52-54. 
286 Critchley, S., 'On Derrida's Spectres ofMarx', op. cit., 22. 
175 
lost, at least not yet, " Derrida appears to opt for a straightforward domination 
thesis. 287 
It is perhaps surprising; the ineluctable link Derrida casts between domination 
and tele-technologies. However, as Richard Luckhurst suggests, it is as if 
Derrida is at pains to drive home two forms of the spectral that we need to think 
as defining by way of "haunting" contemporary experience and politics; a 
double spectre at play; two modes of being and time in the tele (sending) of 
technology. 288 On the one hand there is "the spectral of life and death beyond the 
opposition of life and death", the untimely arrival of the unexpected, the coming 
of the 'other' (although hardly an 'other' as that which one can pit against a 
constituted 'self) to disrupt the 'network' and rupture the self-identity of the 
present, instituting a differential temporality, 'time out ofjoint', making 
possible, yet impossible, the 'unfolding' of time. In Derrida's thinking, this is the 
other who will brook no return, no exchange, no dialectic of subject and object, 
the other of insistent obligation and ethical demand constitutive of the subject in 
a terrifying unpredictability and exposure; the other as always out of place as 
well as time, irrecoupable under any ideality or materiality, spirit or matter, 
unassignable to any category or space, unhomely and uneconomic. This is the 
other demanding justice as opposed to the law, and the law of the 'tele' coming 
from an immemorial past or an incalculable future. Who knows from whence or 
where a spectre may come, or whether it comes as a promise or a threat? But this 
is an 'other' which must not be chased down or chased away; Hence Derrida's 
critique of Marx's rootedness in an ontology and Derrida's valuation of the 
heritage of Marx in terms of 'the messianic', the coming of the other, the 
absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant 
-asjustice' 
The other spectre is the unanalysable 'speed of the apparition', the tele-technique 
of the simulacrum, actuvirtuality, the irrefutable timeliness of the tele in 
technology today. As Luckhurst states: "Spectral tele-technology transforms and 
217 Ibid., 2 1. 
288 Luckhurst, R., '(Touching on) Tcle-technology. ' In Applying: to Derrida. Eds. Brannigan, J., 
Robbins, R., Wolfreys, J_ (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 171-183. 
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in part pre-programmes the event, while the other spectre is the unforsecable and 
ungraspable trembling of the event itself. 9ý289 
What is more, Derrida affirms this divide by distinguishing between "the 
singular 'who' of the ghost and the general 'what' of the simulacrum". 
But also at stake is the differential deployment of teckhne, of techno-science or tele- 
technology 
.... 
It obliges us to think 
... 
another space for democracy; for democracy to come 
and thus for justice. We have suggested that the event we are prowling around here 
hesitates between the singular 'who' of the ghost and the general 'what' of the 
simulacrum. 
... 
in the genýral dis-location to which our time is destined 
... 
the messianic 
trembles on the edge of this event itself. It is this hesitation, it has no other vibration, it 
does not 'live' otherwise, but it would no linger be messianic if it stopped hesitating; how 
to give rise to and to give place 
... 
without killing the future in the name of old frontiers? 
290 
The 'time out ofjoint' of the messianic (messianicity without messianism), the 
entirely open 'to come' ofjustice, is Derrida's key political concept. 
The kind of justice I am referring to here is paradoxical enough, 
impossible enough not to reassure every moralist. I am not being 
unfaithful to the tradition of materialist critique by the likes of Marx, 
Freud and Nietzsche by invoking an appeal to justice. What I mean by 
this 
... 
is that there is in Marx what I call a Messianic appeal to justice but 
not one with a religious content. There is a Messianism in the idea of 
democracy. 'To come' is a Messianic gesture, it's an appeal to justice. 
Promising is Messianic; a very simple promise implies that the other 
will come. There is a Messianism of some sort, of different kinds, in the 
critiques by Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx and I see no break with them 
when mentioning the appeal to justice. 291 
This thesis has sought to articulate a reading of art in contiguity with this 
concept. The question here now, is whether it is possible to think the 'to come' 
ofjustice, which Derrida characterises as a spectrality; a hauntology in Specters 
289 Luckhurst, R., '(Touching on) Tele-technology', op. cit., 174. 290 Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, op. cit., 169. 
29 1 Derrida, J., 'On Responsibility: an interview with Jacques Derrida (1993). ' In Responsibilities 
ofDeconstruction. Eds. Dronsfield, J., Midgely, N., and Wilding, A., May 1993 in Dronsfield, J., 
and Midgely, N., eds., Warwick Journal ofPhilosophy 6 Summer (1997): 27. 
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ofMarx, together with that other apparition, the 'unanalysable' tele-technique of 
the simulacrum. that is contemporary technology, without resorting to a division 
and oscillation between the "overvaluation and denigration"292 which has 
characterised the discourse on technology. Is it possible to think the 'on time' of 
technology as always potentially crossed by the 'out of time'? Can we consider 
the speed of space-time compression as other than the collapse of the differential 
temporality and forgetting of the other? 
These are important questions for history, politics and art, given the extent to 
which tele-technologies pervade and 'spectrally' shape culture, putting to the test 
art history, its disciplinary contexts and its relation to the need to 'select, 
differentiate, restructure (its) questions'. 
I want to explore these issues in this chapter from the point of view of thinking 
of 'art' and art history today. In Farewell to an Idea, T. J. Clark broaches the 
question of 'modernity', 'information technology' and capitalism thus: 
Everything about the forces and relations of symbolic production under 
capitalism encourages the fantasy that meanings are the product of a 
self-enclosed circuit or system, opening nowhere onto the realm of 
necessity. Pure presence wars with pure absence, the latter winning 
hands down. Signification is imagined always under the sign of money, 
or nowadays of similar action (conversion) at a distance, happening in 
the ether of information. 293 
In the end he summarises modem art's response to the then entrenchments of 
capital, of which infonnation technology is now a part: 
For partly [this book] has been about modernism's continual two- 
facedness 
- 
its inward-turning and outward-reaching, its purism and 
opportunism, its centripetal and centrifugal force. I think this 
292 Overvaluation and denigration are terms used by Freud to characterise the connected but 
divided cathetic investments which he analyses in 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in 
the Sphere of Love (1912)', 1 In On Sexuality. Ed. Richards, A., Penguin, Freud Library, Vol. 7 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 243-341. See Luckhurst, R., '(Touching on) Tcle- 
technology', op. cit., 171. 293 Clark, T. J., Farewell to an Idea, op. cit, 260. 
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doubleness has to do with the fact that art, in our culture, finds itself 
more and more at the limits, on the verge of emptiness and silence. So 
that practitioners have continually been forced to recognize how little 
space, or representational substance they are given to work with in the 
all-consuming world of goods. 294 
In a later article for Octoberjoumal, Clark updates his position: 
I want to talk about the nature of modernism with the following 
question always in mind: 'If this was modernism, then what would 
escaping from it to another paradigm of artistic production look fike? 
Are we in the process of such an escape? Wo Id I not agree that 
modernity has been reconfigured in the last thirty or forty years? 
Reconfigured to the point of becoming something else 
... 
And is not part 
of 
-that reconfiguration a new 
form of visuality spreading like a virus 
through the culture at large 
-a new machinery of visualisation, a 
tipping of the social balance from a previous regime of the word to a 
present regime of the image?... Will the closeness of visual art to the 
actual present instrumentation of power 
- 
the current means of 
production of subjects 
- 
turn out to be not closeness but 
identity? 
... 
Modernism's motto was the great phrase from the young 
Marx's critique of Hegel: Modernists believed that it was necessary for 
any art, any Realism to take the forms of the present deeply inside itself; 
at the risk of mimicry, almost ventriloquism; but that out of that might 
come the possibility of critique, of true destabilization 
- 
they would 
'teach the petrified forms how to dance by singing them their own 
song. '... The question 
... 
is whether such a possibility is still open to art? 
What is the difference between dead minticry and live (uncanny) 
$giving voice'? 295 
I do not profess to providing an answer to this situation, but I am interested in 
considering ways of gaining a critical purchase on the issue and its impact upon 
art history and criticism. 
Before returning to the two 'spectralities' identified by Dcrrida, it is necessary to 
conkder the difficulties encountered in thinking on technology and art. One 
294 Ibid., 407. 
295 Clark T. J., 'Modernism, Postmodernism and Steam. ' Octoberl 00, Spring (2002): 160-162. 
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reason why it is difficult to consider these together lies in the difficulty in 
thinking outside of the metaphysical division and ordering of the root of 
technology; the Greek word techne. The division of this word into poiesis, as a 
bringing forth, a prod-duct into being and techne as the activity of production 
sets in train through various inflections, the well known distinction between the 
'bringing into being of a work' and 'technique'. 296 Philosophically speaking, we 
arrive at the differentiation of the unique work of art as against the continual 
differentiation and variation of techniques; the singular divided from the plural 
of art. Both share the mimetic relation to nature, but art becomes 'separated' 
from technique and is given its sense elsewhere. For instance, where Plato 
thought the craftsman carpenter, with quantifiable measures and a model of the 
whole, closer to the idea of truth than the painter with a mere reflection of a 
point of view 
-just surface and colours and dissimulation, Michelangelo would 
insist that the painter had 'disegno' as an intellectual skill and was able to invent 
ý 297 from 'fantasia' and produce "what has never been found' 
. 
Aristotle had introduced the idea of techne as the supplementary perfection to 
physis, perfection understood here as a 'finishing', and he produced the 
distinction between poiesis and praxis, understood as willed activity rooted in 
biological necessity. 298 In the crossings over of this praxis between pro-duction 
and technical production we get the willed activity of the creative genius and the 
willed sensuous activity of the self-production of man. Art is thought as the 
unicity of 'Art' as the sensible presentation of the idea in the finite finished 
operations of art and its aesthetic repose. The still persisting 'religion' of art and 
the notion of the creative will of genius dissolve the 'technique' from art. 
'Techne' is the unity of the infinite operation of technological processes of 
production. Technology is thought as a means to an end, but as a means it now 
appears without end, endless. 299 
296 See Nancy, J-L., 'Why are there several arts and not just oneT, The Muses, op. cit., 
. 
6. 
297 Summers, D., Michelangelo and the Language ofArt. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981), 261. 
298 See Agamben, G., 'Poiesis and Praxis. ' In The Man Wthout Content. Trans. Albert, G., (this 
name may be reversed? ), (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1991), 71-72. 299 See Nancy, J-L., 'Why are there Several Arts? " in Nancy, J-L, The Muses op. cit 1-39 
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To gain an historical purchase in the first instance, I turn to two very different, 
but seminal, thinkers on the relationship between history, art and technology: 
Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin. I turn first to Heidegger's mediation on 
art, specifically his 'The Origin of the Work of Art', recognising its intimate 
connection with the overall 'project' of his thought and, in particular, his later 
meditations on technology. 
Heidegger's lecture presents a meditation on truth and art and the conditions by 
which art can 'originate' and reveal a truth, in contradistinction to Plato's 
concern that art is confined to the reflection of mere appearance, as opposed to 
the craftsperson's making of an object from an originating 'Idea', which is thus 
closer to the ideal form and requires greater knowledge. 300 The notion of the 
work of art as origin will play a key part in Heidegger's interventions concerning 
technology. 
If Plato's example is a bed, Heidegger chooses a Van Gogh painting of shoes to 
make his point: 
The equipmental quality of equipment was discovered. But how? Not 
by a description and explanation of a pair of shoes actually present; not 
by a report about the process of making shoes; and also not by the 
observation of the actual use of shoes occurring here and there, but only 
by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh's painting. This painting spoke. 
In *the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we 
usually tend to be. The artwork let us know what shoes are in truth. 
301 
Towards the end of his lecture, Heidegger reflects: 
In such knowledge, which can only grow slowly, the question is decided 
whether art can be an origin and then must be a head start, or whether it 
300 Plato, The Republic (Part Ten, Book Ten). Trans. Lee, D., (London: Penguin, 1974), 362-364. 
301 Heidegger, M., 'The Origin of the Work of Art. ' In Poeny Language Thought. Trans. 
Ilofstader, A., (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 35. 
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is to remain a mere appendix and then can only be carried along as a 
routine cultural phenomenon. 
302 
Heidegger's text ends with something between a question remaining open and a 
call to a decision at some point. I shall return to this. For Heidegger the question 
and the decision, in the context of his writings in the Thirties relates to the 
question and decision of history and historical destiny. Heidegger's concem for 
history and historical destiny is sharpened at this time, in response to historical 
and political events, but also in the sense of his understanding of metaphysics in 
terms of the 'oblivion' of being, to which the historical destiny of the West has 
been bound. Inasmuch as the 'origin' essay both retraces and seeks a non- 
metaphysical conception of art in which aesthetics is radically put into question, 
it is part of the 'turn' in Heidegger's thought from the 'meaning' of being, for 
Dasein, to the essence or truth of being. That turn marks a recognition in 
Heidegger's own thought, not only that the truth of being cannot be read simply 
from Dasein as the locus of the understanding of being, but also, and perhaps 
more fundamentally, that the event is not simply the event of being as the event 
of truth as disclosure, but that such 'disclosure' involves simultaneously the 
concealing of being. The history of metaphysics as an enquiry into the truth of 
being has been, at the same time, a history of the oblivion of being. 
For Heidegger the task is the 'destruction' of the history of metaphysics, by way 
of a renewed thinking of being, especially as it was articulated in early Greek 
thinking. This is by no means an entirely philosophical question. For Heidegger 
the historical trajectory of the Western world is the consequence of the way 
being reveals itself. What is at stake in the question of being is "to restore man's 
historical existence 
- 
and that always includes our own future existence in the 
totality of the history allotted to us 
- 
to the domain of being., '303 What is at stake 
in art is not merely a question of aesthetics, but the understanding of the part art 
plays in the comprehension of a people and the setting-forth of their historical 
fulfilment. Implied in his conclusion is a continuing struggle or polemos between 
302 Ibid., 78. 
303 1 feidegger, M., An Introduction to Metaphysics. (New I laven: Yale University Press, 1959), 
34. 
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art as a 'thrust' entering history, understood as "the transporting of a people into 
its appointed task as entrance into that people's historical endowment"304 
, 
and art 
as a supplementary phenomenon and product of metaphysical aesthetics. 
The setting into a work of truth, which 'is' the artwork, takes place in the 
struggle between earth and world for the 'un-concealing', aletheia, of truth. This 
is a constant conflict between the 'thingliness' of the earth, its self-subsisting, 
sheltering, hiding, its ungraspable, non-sense and the worlding of the world. Out 
of this struggle, with the thrusting and jutting of the earth up into the worlding 
world and back again, the 'rift' design, the figuring of this strife, is established, 
which is the setting of truth in the work and its movement of un-concealing, the 
taking-place of unconcealing/concealing, opening into a world/withdrawing, 
lighting/sheltering underneath, in the 'eventing' of truth. Techne the work of the 
work struggles with the thingliness of the earth to open up a world. In the great 
work of art (and as Heidegger says, it is great art we are talking about here), truth 
and history happen in the event of the work of art. 305 
For Heidegger the work of art has a place in demonstrating the way in which 
Being is an issue for human being, in both an historical and ultimately 
political/communal sense. The work of art can open up, make a space for and 
establish, install the difference between Being and being, the ontological and the 
ontic, which is 'covered up' in the history of the sending of Being. If history, for 
Heidegger, is the effect of the sending of Being and its liable 'fall', its 'decline' 
into ontic being, it is also always an inseparable relation, a relation of strife and 
polemos between that into which Dasein is thrown, that which is 'given' as 
'handed down' and its future possibilities. 
In earlier works Heidegger has understood the historicity of Being in terrns of 
the decision taken in relation to the handing down of tradition, in terms of future 
possibilities and the authentic being of the subject, recognised 'authentically' in 
terrns of being-towards-death in one's 'own-most'. Here the 'site' of tradition is 
understood in terms of Art. Art is the presenting of the space in that 'polcmos', 
304 304 Heidegger, M., 'The Origin of the Work of Art', op. cit., 77. 305 fleidegger, M., 'The Origin of the Work of ArC, op. cit., 15-88. 
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the struggle or conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of 
world and earth, figured in the 'rift design', takes place and can be authentically 
grasped. It is an originating 'event', a historical taking place, in which 'a people' 
can grasp its historical endowment, that which is bestowed upon it, and its future 
possibilities, such that an 'epochal' disclosure of Being occurs. Heidegger's title 
refers not to the beginning of art, but to art as 'origin'. Beauty and the pleasure 
derived from art are, for Heidegger, a function of its 'originating' power, rather 
than an aesthetic experience of a subject encountering an object. Heidegger is 
with Hegel, insofar as Hegel recognises that (great) art is at odds with, indeed 'at 
an end', or a thing of the past, with the rise of 'the science of art, or aesthetics. 
Heidegger uses the example of the Greek Temple, standing resolute on the earth 
whilst lighting its dark, obscurity in the course of 'worlding' a world. 
The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time 
sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as 
native ground 
... 
The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things 
their look and to men their outlook on themselves. 
306 
Such an example perhaps makes sense in the terrns in which he is speaking of 
art, as a communal 'site' emerging in the strife between the earth upon which it 
is grounded and the 'cosmos' to which it opens, but Heidegger has already 
prepared the ground in the earlier part of the essay on a smaller scale, and he 
goes on in the essay to discuss poetry in the same terms, naming it as the greatest 
art. 
The ground laid in the earlier part of the essay, distinguishes between things, 
being-products and works. He develops this precisely to get away from, to get 
underneath and go somewhere else other than the 'matter/form', or 'informed- 
matter' mode of thinking, which derives from equipment and being-products for 
use, which has also dominated the thinking of things as unformed matter, and 
works as useless products. This is the human-subject/object representational 
thinking from the 'late' Greek thinking of Plato and Aristotle onwards, and the 
beginning of the epoch whereby everything is 'set before' 'us' and the human 
306 See ibid, p. 42-43. 
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cogito for 'our' exploitation and use, which figures in his reading of 
technology. 307 
Heidegger uses Van Gogh's shoe picture to perform a double-take on equipment 
and works, to destabilise the dominance of the matter/form 'equipmental' 
thinking, and to demonstrate how artworks work to break us from that thinking, 
revealing a truth which is 'there' but obscured by the matter-form. paradigm or 
frame. He wants to show that the matter-form frame of reference is in fact 
derived from a more primordial 'truth' of Being which falls into the 'secondary' 
mode of ontic being which the matter-form distinction characterises. 
Following Hegel's dictum, however, Heidegger makes an unusual move with the 
shoe picture. From "A painting, e. g. the one by Van Gogh that represents a pair 
of shoes [and] travels from one exhibition to another", in accordance with 
Hegel's view that as art, as "we have known it is a thing of the past", it is indeed 
consigned to the "exhibition" value(s) of the museum, he then wants to make it a 
world, endowing it both with a 'worlding' of equipmentality and reliability in the 
world of the peasant woman that he assumes wears the shoes, and an 
authenticity, such that: 
The equipmental quality of equipment was discovered. But how? Not 
by a description and explanation of a pair of shoes actually present; not 
by a report about the process of making shoes; and also not by the 
observation of the actual use of shoes occurring here and there; but only 
by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh's painting. This painting spoke. 
In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we 
usually tend to be. 308 
Insofar as Heidegger wishes to depart from any matter/form reading of the 'shoe 
picture' or any empirical investigation of the shoes as equipment as such, he is 
already certain that these shoes are apair of shoes and that they belong to a 
peasant woman. 
307 See ibid, pp. 20-39. 308 Heidegger, M., 'The Origin of the Work of Art', op. cit, p. 35. 
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It is perhaps not incidental that Heidegger is sure that they are a pair of shoes 
belonging to a peasant woman and not only does the picture establish the truth of 
the equipmentality of the shoes and the 'truth', the source of which is more 
'distant' than that underneath the soles of these shoes, which is the relationship 
of reliability between the shoes and the 'world' or 'life' bestowed upon this 
peasant woman, but he also, by intimating that the 'woman' is 'with child' points 
to another thinking of origin. 
"And yet" says Heidegger, and breaks into a tone full of pathos to describe the 
'earth-world' strife of the peasant woman, pregnant in her shoes. 
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome 
tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the 
shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the 
far-spreading and ever-uniform farrows of the field swept by the raw 
wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the 
soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes 
vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and 
its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. 
This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the 
certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood 
want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the 
surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and 
it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this 
protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within- 
itself. 309 
In a little known text by Heidegger, 'unconcealed' in an article by Werner 
Hamacher, woman and child appear again. It is the Sistine Madonna, mentioned 
in a text by Heidegger in which he addresses, not only the Raphael painting, but 
also the history of the museum, as the history of Being, as the history of art. 
"The proper historical course of Occidental art since the Renaissance is 
concealed in the fact that the Sistine Madonna became a panel painting suited to 
309 ibid. p. 34 (my emphasis) 
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310 the museum. It is interesting to note that the Van Gogh painting was seen by 
Heidegger in a museum and was subject to a debate concerning a series of 
pictures he might have seen, as evidences in his correspondence with Meyer 
Schapiro, which I mention later. Given his commentary on the Temple in the 
'Origin' essay, we can expect Heidegger to be critical of the museum as the 
place where works of art lose their 'site', lose the pleasure and beauty which is 
their truth in their 'original' installing and setting. "Wherever a picture might be 
displayed in the future, there it has lost its site 
.,, 
31 1 At the same time for 
Heidegger, the museum marks the course of history of Being, precisely because 
history is the 'fall', the 'decline' or 'withdrawal' of Being into the being of its 
errancy and foreignness, obscuring its 'proper' course. As Werner Hamacher 
puts it, "Transformed in its essence as artwork, the picture errs, abroad in its 
foreignness. ',312 Heidegger can uncover this history and chart its course, because 
he reserves the privilege of thinking an originary sending of being, as alethia. it 
is the pairing of the Madonna and child, which is this origin and 'birth' of 
ontological difference. It is on this basis that Heidegger can consider the ex- 
position as the putting-out-of-position of the originary positioning of truth. 
Heidegger can think, with its implied loss, the errancy, the wandering-at-a-loss 
of the museum and the Madonna and child, at-a-loss within it, because of his, as 
Hamacher argues, assumed primary and prior existence of an 'untransposed' 
world, figured in the mother. 313 The figure of the figuration of truth is the mother. 
But a mother 'is' a mother on account of the child. It is the mother that is also 
herself 'born of' the (Christ) child. She 'is' insofar as she is 'born of', or brought 
forth, as mother by the child. They are a pair, at origin, but the mother gives and 
sends 'being' only insofar as she is 'covered over' by the being that she sends. 
They, mother and child, are held together in their necessary difference, like a 
pair of shoes. 
310 See Hamacher, W., 'Expositions of the Mother', pp. 81-134 in (eds) I landhardt, J. G., and 
Keenan, T., The End(s) ofthe MuseumlEls limits del museu, 1996, Barcelona: Fundacio Antoni 
Tapies, p. 89 31 'Ibid., 89 
312 Ibid., 89 
313 Ibid., go 
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If this holding together were not to take place, if the mother were not 
"ensheathed" by the child, "the pair would be in pieces". 314 There would be no 
ontological difference, no birth, no advent, and no 'coming to' presence. There 
would only be the errancy and foreignness. 
Derrida takes up Heidegger's certainty with regard to the pair of shoes. Although 
this may seem tangential to the main debate concerning this chapter, with regard 
to art and technology, it is actually part of an ongoing intervention on Derrida's 
part concerning the metaphysics of presence and the political consequences of 
this metaphysical alignment with presence. 
That there has been errancy on Heidegger's part is the contention of the art 
historian Meyer Schapiro, in his correspondence with Heidegger concerning his 
attribution of the shoes to. a peasant woman. It is this correspondence, which 
315 Derrida takes up and plays upon in 'Restitutions of the truth in pointing'. 
Derrida draws out the correspondence between these two professors, who had 
indeed written to one another concerning the 'belongingness' and the 'origin' of 
the shoes. Schapiro's argument took little note of the fact that Heidegger had 
'restored' the shoes to a peasant woman, but he was adamant that the shoes did 
not belong to a peasant, as implied in Heidegger's 'pathetic' reading (in), his 
sheer "projection on to" the Van Gogh picture. Schapiro was certain, and it was 
evident from Heidegger's reference to the museum in which he saw the painting, 
that the picture depicted shoes belonging to Van Gogh himself, who was 
moreover, "by then a city dweller". These are urban shoes that amount to a 'self- 
portrait' of the artist as an expression of his world. 
Derrida makes much play of the correspondence between these two professors in 
their fetishisation of the shoes, their having to look up and find a substitute for 
the threatened loss, the castration at origin, which they bear. The very forin. of 
the shoes begs such castration anxiety, suggests Derrida, gaping open, whilst at 
the same time phallic. Both professors have fallen into the trap, ensnared by the 
314 Ibid.. 92 
3 15 Derrida, J., 'Restitutions of the truth in pointing', in The Truth in Painting (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987), 25 7-3 82 
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laces of the shoes, sharing the need to fill these empty and abandoned shoes 
again. Thus both 'point' with their pens and prick the canvas to get at the 'real' 
shoes underneath. Truth is always punctual. Both have to make these shoes a 
pair. For different reasons, of course, there being more to the reasons than meets 
the eye (or eyelet) of the painting. Derrida suggests, or interweaves another lace, 
that these reasons 'point to' their different understandings of history, as well as a 
debate about correct interpretation between a historian and a philosopher. 
For Schapiro, history is something to which one owes the truth, as a debt repaid 
to the past. Empirically, as Derrida hints, this is a debt to his friend, Kurt 
Goldstein, an emigrant to America in 1933, who first told him of Heiddeger's 
essay. It is also, as Derrida extrapolates from these laces, a debt of return on 
behalf of all those abandoned shoes, left lying in piles after the mass deaths of 
the Holocaust, from which Goldstein had fled. History is a debt repaid to 
restitute the truth in the face of the ideological, such as Heidegger's ideological 
reading of the belongingness of the shoes to a peasant. This is not only the 
ideology of the country versus the town, but also that of the blood and soil of 
Nazism. If history is an advent for Heidegger, for Schapiro it is a debt of truth 
and respect and a facing down of those ideological ghosts. The face of the artist 
Schapiro sees in these shoes is a testament o historical truth. The truth of an 
artist who himself greatly respected the past and honoured his debt to the rural 
and urban oppressed, as is further supported by testimony. Derrida is teasing out 
the difference here between the painting and its referent. Does the painting 
'correspond' to its written testimony, which in turn corresponds to an event? Are 
we at this third remove again, as in Plato? If the museum is the loss of authentic 
site, the displacement of originary advent to foreignness and errancy for 
Heidegger, it is an archive of the truth of the past for Schapiro. Yet both need a 
pair. Both need shoes that fit their owners, one to underscore that which is the 
world of the peasant woman, the other to 'embody' the subjective view, indeed 
the 'epiphany' visualised by the artist. 316 But what is there to say these shoes are 
316 See Schapiro, M., 'The Still-life as Personal Object: A note on I leidegger and Van Gogh', 
139-140 and 'Further Notes on Heidegger and Van Gogh', 146-7 in Schapiro, M., Theory and 
Philosophy ofArt: Style, Artist and Society (Georges Braiziller, 1994). Schapiro, through 
recourse to diary notes from Paul Gaugin, connects the Shoe picture to Van Gogh's assistance to 
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a pair, Derrida constantly asks, and even if there was the slightest doubt cast 
upon their pairing, the path towards an originary truth these professors were 
stumbling along would fall away beneath their feet. 
The 'point' for Derrida in his playful intervention is that the very identification 
of the shoes as a referent (as a pair and to the world of the peasant woman) re- 
introduces a form of representation at this new site of the 'authentic'. In 
Heidegger's case it is the authentic 'worlding' of the world of the peasant 
woman that the work discloses in the work's setting-to-work of 'truth'. But, as 
Derrida is suggesting this 'originating' power of the work is already dependent 
upon a representational 'figure, a pair of shoes. 
On another point, however, this very figuring of truth more distant, "In the 
vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to 
be"317 and we might say, allied to the 'figure' of the Madonna, who 'hands over' 
the 'truth' in her very withdrawal, is as Howard Caygill suggests, to return art to 
the 'site' of ritual and 'cult' value. 
"This ability to distance its viewer marks the authenticity of the work of art, and 
,, 
318 is what Benjamin described critically as its 'cult value'. 
However, there are qualifications to this if one thinks of both the 'Origin of the 
Work of Art', in relation to Heidegger's stance on technology, and recognises 
the dynamic in play in relation to the 'rift' as the site of art. Thus, first it is 
important to understand Heidegger's meditation on the Greek word techne in the 
section 'Truth and Art' in the 'Origin' essay in relation to the later 'The Age of 
the World Picture 019 and 'The Question Concerning Technology'. 320 
an injured miner, whom Van Gogh envisioned as a 'Christ-like' figure, whose sacred status is 
's 
, 
r, ýbolised' by the yellow background to the shoes in the painting. 31 
, 
318 
Ileidegger, M., 'The Origin of the Work of Art', op. cit, p. 35. 
Caygill, H., 'Benjamin, Ileidegger and Tradition' in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: 
Destruction and Experience, eds. Benjamin, A. and Osborne, P., (London: Clinamen Press, 
Second Edition, 2000), 24 
3 '9 Heidegger, M., 'The Age of the World Picture' in The Question Concerning Technology and 
other essays, tran. Lovitt, W., (New York, I larper and Row, Ltd., 1977), 115-154 320 Heidegger, M., 'The Question Concerning Technology' in The Question Concerning 
Technology and other essays, tran. Lovitt, W., New York, I larper and Row Ltd., 1977), 3-35 
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In the section 'Truth and Art' of the 'Origin' essay, Heidegger returns to the 
coriginal' meaning of the Greek word techne, which defines neither craft nor art, 
as such, but a mode of "knowing or seeing", which both "brings forth" and "lets 
happen" and is distinct from and indeed "not at all the technical in our present 
day sense 
.,, 
32 1 Heidegger will go on describe how techne connects to a more 
'originary' unconcealing/withdrawal. or 'bringing forth of truth' via the work of 
the work of art: 
The works becoming work is a way in which truth becomes and 
happens 
... 
Truth is untruth insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir of 
the not-yet-uncovered, the yet uncovered in the sense of 
concealment 
... 
Truth occurs in the opposition of clearing and double 
concealing. Truth is the primal conflict which, always in some particular 
way the Open is won within which everything stands and from which 
everything withholds itself that shows itself and withdraws itself as 
being-Truth is present only as the conflict between lighting and 
concealing in the opposition of world and earth 
... 
In the strife the unity 
of world and earth is won 
... 
As the world opens itself the earth comes to 
rise up 
... 
World demands its decisiveness and its measure and lets beings 
attain to the Open of their paths. Earth, bearing and jutting strives to 
keep itself closed and to entrust everything to its law. The conflict is not 
a rift as a mere cleft that is ripped open; rather it is the intimacy with 
which opponents belong to each other 
... 
The rift does not let opponents 
break apart; it brings the opposition of measure and boundary into their 
common outline. 322 
Important here, and continually threading through the 'Origin' essay, is the 
dynamic of the 'work' as fore-grounded in this coming into presence of 'truth' 
and its articulation of the dynamic between 'creators' and 'preservers'. As 
Caygill says: 
The configuration of the rift design does not only gather together world 
and earth, but also configures tradition and politics. The origin of the 
"; Heidegger, M., The Origin of the Work ofArt, op. cit., 59 32 Heidegger, M., The Origin of the Work ofArt, op. cit., 60,62-63 
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work of art is 'the origin of both the creators and preservers', which is 
to say of a people's historical existence. 323 
In Heidegger's sense the 'originating' of a work art would always already be 
4prior to' any act of ritual. The commentary on the 'Origin' essay by William 
McNeill is indicative: 
The great work of art opens up the being of beings as a whole; it first 
opens up a world for human beings. The openness of beings as such is 
first brought to a stand, as this or that historical world and indeed needs 
to be brought to such a stand 'in order to be what its is, namely, this 
openness'... the work not only opens up a world but grants it a singular 
time and space, grants it a place, grants it a stay 
... 
324 
The instituting and originating of the work of art, essentially both an opening and 
a holding of the open in a strife between the unconcealing (worlding) and 
concealing (earth) is understood as founding and not pre-supposing a 'people' or 
community. However in its 'play' of 'opening' it could be construed as 'auratic' 
in Benjamin's sense 325 
, 
as McNeill has it: 
Yet the work of art, in accomplishing this disclosure of being manifests 
not only the 'that it is' of this work, but in so doing discloses also the 
nothing, the fact that such a work is rather than is not 
... 
in the presence 
of the work of art we are held in 'unrelenting' fashion by the power of 
this play of being and non being... an opening that announces the 
concealed approach of something yet to come 
... 
the constancy of the 
works resting in itself of its self-withdrawal in its approach 
... 
The 
improbable unforeseeable event of the work's corning into its own 
presencing precisely in withholding such presencing as always yet to 
323 Caygill, H., 'Benjamin, Heideggcr and Tradition' in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: 
Destruction and Experience Benjamin, A., and Osborne, P., eds. (London: Clinamen Press, 
Second Edition, 2000), 26 
324 McNeill, W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1999), 286 
325 In 'A Small History of Photography' Benjamin characteriscs aura as "A strange weave of 
space and time; the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close the object 
may be. " Put very schematically here, in one sense the significance of aura lies in the relationship 
established between the work or object and the viewer and the potentially hierarchical 
relationship the work creates vis-h-vis the viewer by means of its "unique distance". Benjamin, 
W., 'A Small History of Photography' in Benjamin, W., Otte Way Street and other writings trans. 
Jephcott, E. & Shorter, K., (London, New Left Books 1979) 250 
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come 
... 
first occurs as something that has already occurred. Its first 
happening is thus also something that has already happened 
... 
that is ec- 
static, an always already that 'is' (presences) as a 'not yet'... The event 
that the work casts before it and had always already cast around itself is 
the singular and enigmatic presencing of the work itself 
.. 
Ileidegger's 
analysis makes visible this 'aura' not as a property of an already 
existing thing, but as an event of being, an event of presencing that 
shrouds the work itself in its promise and its refusal. 326 
Heidegger would not connect this with ritual as such, as his 'originating' nature 
of art and its effective opening 'with' creating and preserving is prior to any 
articulation with ritualising 'presence'. 
The work of art does not (re) present anything; it is neither 
representation of something else nor presentation of something absent. 
It has in fact no relationship at all to presence, but, on the contrary, it 
has a relationship to the becoming and happening of truth, to the coming 
into presence of everything. 327 
Furthermore, the creating and preserving of the work of art is a matter of 'to 
things their look', rather the inverse, which Heidegger would associate with a 
ritualistic 'standing before' in terms symptomatic of the Platonic 'eidos' and 
adequation of art to the Idea, in the fundamentally representational sense against 
which Heidegger is arguing. 
If Ben amin is right to identify aura and ritual in tenns of his starting point for 
thinking the relationship between modes of technology and sense perception, 
Heidegger is not making an argument about art in this sense of sense, although 
his starting point is problematic in fundamental ways, as identified by Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida. I take Lacoue-Larbarthe first and approach 
Derrida later, having also dealt with Heidegger's 'questioning' of technology. 
326 Ibid., 291-293 
327 Dastur, F., 'lleidegger's Freiburg Version of the Origin of the Work of Art' in Ileidegger 
Towards the Turn: Essays on the work of the 1930s, cd. Risser, J., (New York: SUNY Press, 
1999), 138 
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Lacoue-Labarthe points to a difficulty for Heidegger in maintaining two possibly 
incompatible apprehensions of the origin of the artwork and how, in so doing, he 
falls unwittingly into a Platonic mimetology, which identifies techne with 
fiction. This reading may be selective, but it makes a significant point, which I 
follow up differently below: 
On the one hand it is initially in respect of the work of art that 
Heidegger seizes upon the word Gestell [Heidegger uses Ge-stell in 
connection with 'the challenging forth that gathers man', which is 
modem technology (see below)] to make it mean the gathering together 
of all the modes of stellen-chief among them in relation to art, being 
Herstellen (produce), Darstellen (present) and Festellen (institute, 
constitute [Dastur has Aufstellen (setting forth) and Herstellen as setting 
up 
- 
as two modes of 'placing' essential to the work of art328] 
_ 
through 
which he seeks to ground the work in its essence as truth's being fixed 
in place in the figure (Festgestelltsein der Wahrheit in die Gestalt). The 
semantic chain of Stellen does admittedly come into competition in this 
passage 
... 
with the chain 
- 
quite different in scope 
- 
of reissen (Riss, 
Auffiss, Grundriss, Durchriss, Uniriss etc) in which one sees the 
outlines of a thinking of techne and, as a consequence, of difference, on 
the basis of the incision, the trait or the 'inaugural' tracing of the 
breachingibroaching or the inscription, in short of something not 
unrelated to the archi-trace or archi-writing in Derrida's sense. The 
work is none the less Gestalt or in other words figura of the truth and 
this determination is consistent with the onto-typological theme of the 
Rectoral Address and distributes the roles of creators and guardians of 
the work, that is to say the division of roles constitutive of the 'mission' 
of art... it was not until ten years after the collapse of the Third Reich 
that Heidegger had the definitive revelation that National Socialism was 
the truth of the inversion of Platonism or of the restoration of what Plato 
had fought against 
- 
though not without yielding to the tyranny himself 
- 
in other words the thinking of the technical or the political as fiction: 
the last attempt at 'mythizing' the WeSt. 329 
328 Dastur, F., 'Heidegger's Freiburg Version of the Origin of the Work of Art' in Heidegger 
Towards the Turn: Essays on the work of the 1930s, ed. Risser, J., (New York: SLINY Press, 
1999), 127 
329 Lacoue-Labarthe, P., Heidegger, 4rt and Politics, trans. Turner, C., (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990), 85-86 
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Lacoue-Labarthe acknowledges his debt to Jean-Luc Nancy with regard to the 
reference to mythizing. Nancy is an attentive reader of Heidegger and would 
wish to avoid any sense of reductionism in interpretation but there is something 
of the mythic in Heidegger's approach and myth is not far from ritual. 
We know the scene: there is a gathering, and someone is telling a 
story 
.. 
It is a speech live from the origin, live because it is original and 
original because it is live. In its first declamation there arises the dawn, 
simultaneously of the world, of gods, of men. Myth is therefore much 
more than a kind of first culture. Because it is an original culture it is 
infinitely more than culture: it is transcendence 
... 
presented immediately, 
immediately immanent to the very thing it transcends and that 
illuminates or consigns to destiny. Myth is the opening of a mouth 
immediately adequate to the closure of the universe 
... 
Myth is very 
precisely the incantation that gives rise to a world and brings forth a 
language, that gives rise to a world in the advent of a language. It is 
therefore indissociable from a rite or a cult. Indeed its enunciation or 
recital is itself already a ritual. Mythic ritual is the communitarian 
articulation of mythic speech. 330 
For Nancy, 'mythicization' goes beyond what may still appear as an empirical 
description of myth; it connects with the striving for 'sense' as 'given' and 
'absolute' in a world of apparent loss of sense-i. e. nihilism. It is precisely the 
point of 'end' or limit that Heidegger will go on to characterise as the epoch of 
nihilistic technology. For Nancy, as I have discussed in other chapters, this 
demands a rethinking of the interdependency between what Nancy terms the 
absolute and relative of sense: between the absolute given of sense, as myth, as 
the 'origin' of meaning or sense, and the relative desire for sense, not yet 
attained, deferred meaning, nihilistic loss of sense, endless means. This latter of 
course appears as the absolute nihilism of the abyss and thus, in turn becomes 
myth, as the null and void of the relative erected as 'truth'. Here one can see how 
'nihilistic technology' indeed erects it own truth concealing any other 'truth' as 
Heidegger argues. But for Nancy, it is the oscillation between tile figuring of 
satisfaction or 'truth', in which desire (for truth) is resolved in the given, as 
DO Nancy J-L., 'Myth Interrupted' in The Inoperative Community, trans. Connor, P., 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 43-50 
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myth, or the possibility of satisfaction is negated in the endlessly self-undoing of 
desire as the truth of nihilistic dissolution that has to be addressed right on the 
edge of sense. 331 
It is a matter then of when Heidegger is caught in the oscillation that Nancy 
describes and how that may be the case and thereby how he is compelled to turn 
to his conception of art as a way to 'defuse' the nihilism of technology. It is here 
that Heidegger's very concepts or thinking of historicality and the 'sending' of 
being are at issue. Even as Heidegger has a concept of history and tradition as 
the 'having been' for its future possibilities and a recognition of the socio- 
political dimensions of the 'being-with', it remains in question whether he has a 
concept of 'an other' or, in Nancy's terms, certainly not 'the other' but the 
'sharing/dividing' or 'partage' or 'aleatory' of sense that 'anachronistically' 
crosses the time and space of 'community'. 332 Heidegger will want to separate 
truth and sense in terms of Being and being, even as that truth can only be by 
way of being as its ungrounded grounding, 'in action', 'coming toward' or 
'being toward' of being. In addition, Heidegger will persist in particularly 
'punctuating' the signification(s) of being in a 'gathering'. 
Heidegger declares that we need this impossible transitivity of 'being': 
being is Being. In this instance 'is' speaks transitively and means 
approximately 'gathered together' 'collected'. Being gathers being 
together insofar as it is being. Being is gathering together 
- 
Logos. But 
it is clear that the equivalence with 'gather' is no more tenable than any 
other equivalence; we still do not know what Logos means 
... 
the 
331 See Nancy J-L., 'Sense and Truth' and 'Gift, Desire, Agathon' in The Sense of the World, 
trans. Librett, J. S., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 12-15 and 50-53 
332 The fact that Nancy's thought is still an attentive and sophisticated response to Ileidegger is 
evident in both Nancy texts so far cited here. This will come up again. Here, in broad terms, 
Heidegger will want to separate truth and sense, with truth as the transcendent condition of the 
possibility of sense whereas Nancy will think truth and sense a co-'belonging' in the particular 
way that truth is always already crossed by (or even contaminated with sense) such that 'sense is 
the differance of truth itself'. Insofar as 'truth' punctuates and is 'without spatial or temporal' 
dimensions which Heidegger's 'epochal' sending still wants to sustain, at the same time argues 
Nancy, sense 'enchains'- "Enchaining opens up the dimens lonal, spaces out punctuations [as] an 
originary spatiality or spaciousness before any distinction between space and time 
... 
[ifl truth is 
semantic, sense is syntactic, that syntax enchains, enchains itself, involves itself and carries itself 
away across semantic punctuations... [there is] one sole sense presencing (itself), or pre-sensing 
itself), that is deferring in its very truth. Differing/deferring signifyingness. " Nancy J-L., 'Sense 
and Truth' in The Sense of the World, trans. Librett, J. S., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996), 14-15 
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transitive sense of being is determined only as vicious circle and/or 
absolute limit of signification in general. (Heidegger comes at times 
very close to such a formulation, but his poeticoetymologizing will to 
333 
appropriate significations makes him resistant). 
I delineate Heiddegger's thinking of technology to explore these issues but will 
take up Derrida's critique of Heidegger's thinking of 'representation', which will 
lead on to wider considerations of Heidegger's thinking of temporality and 
history. 
In the 'Technology' essay, Heidegger maintains that technology, too, is part of a 
mode of revealing of being, but: 
... 
The revealing that holds sway throughout modem technology does not 
unfold into a bringing forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that 
rules in modem technology is a challenging 
... 
a setting upon in the sense 
of a challenging forth 
... 
What kind of unconcealment is it then that is 
peculiar to that which comes to stand forth through the setting-upon that 
challenges? Everything everywhere is ordered to stand-by 
... 
What ever is 
ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing- 
334 
reserve Bestand. 
Heidegger characterises this challenging forth whereby the real everywhere, 
more or less distinctly, becomes a standing-reserve for the purposes of man's 
'ordering' the calculable, and perpetual production of the 'new' as 'Enframing', 
Gestell. 
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets 
upon man, i. e. challenges him for, to reveal the real in the mode of 
ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing 
which holds sway in the essence of modem technology and which is 
itself nothing technological 
... 
The assembly [of-technological parts for 
example] falls within the sphere of technological activity and this 
333 'The sense of the world' note 15 in The Sense of the World op. cit 174 334 Heidegger, M., 'The Question Concerning Technology' in The Question Concerning 
Technology and other essays, tran. Lovitt, W., (New York, I larper and Row Ltd., 1977), 14-17 
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activity always merely responds to the challenge of Enframing, but it 
never comprises Enframing itself. 335 
For Heidegger, 'Enframing' as a mode of being, as technological is the mode of 
the destining of Being in the modem epoch, and as such is nothing technological 
in the narrow or familiar sense of technological science, apparatus or means. As 
significantly neither is it a consequence of the 'activity' of 'man'. As with his 
view of art and the 'artwork', that is not to be narrowly defined by a 'creation' or 
'handiwork' of an artist, so technology is not to be thought essentially in terms 
of the anthropological. 
The word stellen to set upon in the name Ge-stell [Enframing] not only 
means challenging. At the same time it should preserve the suggestion 
of another stellen from which it stems, namely, that of producing and 
presenting which in the sense of poiesis lets what presences come forth 
into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth e. g. the erecting of 
statue in the temple precinct 
- 
and the challenging ordering now under 
consideration are indeed fundamentally different and yet remain related 
in their essence. Both are ways of revealing, of alethia. In Enfrarning 
that unconcealment comes to pass in conformity with which the work of 
modem technology reveals the real as standing reserve. This work is 
therefore neither only a human activity nor a mere means within such 
activity. The merely instrumental, merely anthropological definition of 
technology is therefore in principle untenable. And it cannot be rounded 
out by being referenced back to some metaphysical or religious 
explanation that under girds it. 336 
As suggested above there is a strange sense in which Hcidegger wants to think 
alethcia, the disclosing, as various forms of installing or establishing, (here 
erecting a statue) that seem to work against his thesis of 'pro-ducing', bringing 
forth in some dynamic tension/release vis-A-vis world and earth, as if he cannot 
let go of some form of pre-figured 'figure' through which to think being. This 
335 Ibid., 20-21 
336 Ibid., 21 
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has consequences for his political stance concerning the modes of 'gathering' or 
'configuring' a people, 337 which I take up later. 
Here however, because Heidegger understands technology as another mode of 
the destining of Being, or unconcealment/disclosure, and firmly not to be 
construed in instrumentalist, anthropological, or metaphysical representational 
terms, his is not a simple 'denigration' thesis. Whilst technology is the supreme 
'danger' of the modem age, its threat lies firstly in enframing, potentially 
pushing mankind to the brink of falling into the standing reserve (him) self and 
his self-exultation in resistance to this threat, pretending that everything exists 
only in terms of human self-production; and secondly that it is a mode of 
disclosure that has a tendency to "eliminate or eradicate every other mode of 
disclosure", i. e. its revealing obscures that related revealing as poiesis and its 
dynamic between past, present and future. 
Hcideggcr's response to this cannot be charactcrised as wholly pessimistic. The 
holding sway of enframing is "never a fate or destiny that compels; for Dascin 
becomes truly free only insofar as it belongs to the realm of sending and thus 
becomes a listener to that sending although not one who simply submits. The 
danger is that man fails to recognise that he 'ek-sists' in response to the sending 
and revealing of being and thus "can never encounter only himself. 038 As Fred 
Dallmayr states "In terms of the [Technology] essay, freedom does not merely 
reside in the exercise of will power or the initiation of causal chains, it means 
,, 
339 
attending to the happening of disclosure in its various forms. 
On the one hand, Heidegger appears to offer the thesis that it is through an 
understanding of technological enframing as a mode of being that we can be 
freed from its danger, 
337 As above, this is a theme running through Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's readings of 
Heidegger's works and Heidegger's 'forgetting' of the 'doubling' or 'movement' in his case for 
an origin that is counter to Plato's 'adequation' to the Idea. See in addition Lacoue-Labarthe, P., 
'Typography' in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, (Cambridge: I larvard University 
Press, 1989), 67-72 
338 Heidegger, M., 'The Question Concerning Technology', op. cit., 27 339 Dallmayr, F., The Other Heidegger (Comell: Cornell University Press, 1993), 67 
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Precisely the essence of technology must harbour in itself the growth of 
the rescuing or saving power 
... 
Precisely in this extreme danger there 
arises also the innermostý indestructible bond of Dasein and the grant (of 
being) 
- 
provided that we, for our part, begin to heed the essence of 
technology. 340 
On the other hand, in the end he feels compelled to invoke Art. 
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential 
reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation within it must 
happen in the realm that is, on the one hand akin to the essence of 
technology and on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a 
realm is art. But certainly, only if reflection on art, for its part does not 
shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are 
questioning. 341 
What can this turn to art and the "constellation of truth" signify? The reference 
to art may seem superfluous, given Heidegger's argument in the lecture 
accompanying the 'Technology' lecture, published as 'The Turning'. 342 It is in 
'The Turning' that he makes clear the necessity for recognising technology as a 
mode of sending being that will come from within the epoch of technology itself. 
In so far as technological nihilism reaches its extremis, if we can ever say it 
does, and presents what Heidegger thinks of as the 'refusal of the world' it is still 
a claim on 'us'. 
The refusal of the happening of the world is not nothing but rather is 
itself 'the highest mystery of being within the domination of 
Gestell'.... This claim of the event of un-concealment itself addresses us; 
it turns towards us in and through technology. 343 
340 Heidegger, M., 'The Question Concerning Technology', op. cit., 33 
341 Ibid., 35 
342 Heidegger, M., 'The Turning' in The Question Concerning Technology and other essays, 
op. cit., 3649 
343 McNeill, W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidgegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory, (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1999), 211 
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Receptiveness towards this 'turn', where "we find ourselves unexpectedly taken 
into a claim that frees us", requires thinking and questioning. Seeing the danger 
of technology as danger amounts to not just a "thoughtful attentiveness to what 
is refused in Ge-stell" as such, but "It would also be a transformation in the 
claim of being as presencing.,, 344 Thinking the un-thought in Ge-stell marks the 
t 345 
receptivity to what Dreyfus calls a "gestalt switch' 
. 
McNeill elaborates on the 
scope Heidegger wants to give to this turning. 
Such transformation would occur as a knowing relation to concealment 
as a thoughtful relating to the appropriative event (Ereignis) of 
presencing itself, as finite in each case 
... 
the turning in question 
transpires as a kind of recovery but which, in each case occurs in the 
event of the arrival of another destiny 
... 
such a turning occurs without 
mediation 
... 
What is destined in each case proceeds intrinsically toward a 
distinctive Augenblick (instant; glance) that sends it into another destiny 
whereby however it does not simply become submerged and lost 
... 
the 
Augenblick locates, ['sites'] the historical turnings of presencings as 
held open for the possibility of hearing and response for an event 
(Ereignis) of language 
... 
that site in which the emergence of a new 
openness to the world first occurs 
... 
in which historical human beings are 
called to respond in a new and unforeseeable way. 346 
The instant that 'lightens' opens onto the scope of 'another destiny' for 
Heidegger and we should not be surprised to find, and here the references to art 
in the 'Technology' lecture make their sense, that 'destiny' invokes the (re) turn 
towards the divine 
- 
and here I am taking this to be a signifier for a 
transcendence within the immanence of being as that by which humans come to 
be mortals; i. e. in their finitude. 
344 Ibid., 214 
345 Dreyfus, H. L., 'Heidegger on the connection between nihilisrn, art, technology, politics' in 
The Cambridge Companion to Hedieggger, ed. Guigon, C., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 308. Dreyfus uses the model of cultural paradigm shift to articulate I leidegger's 
modes of the sending of being. This, in Heidegger's terms, would be within the representational 
logic of science and technology that he is arguing against and would not convey the insistence of 
the clearing and unconcealment/concealment that the sending of being involves. 
346 McNeill, W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidgegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Them),, (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1999), 214 
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Only when human essence, as that which is looked upon in the insight 
of this event, renounces human self-will and projects itself away from 
itself toward that insight can the human being in his essence respond to 
the claim of this insight. In such responding the human being is 
gathered into his own (ge-eignet) in such a way that, within the 
safeguarded element of world, he may, as the mortal, look toward the 
divine. 347 
This chimes with Heidegger's reading of art as alethia, in respect of his working 
out of the worlding of the world and the concealment of the earth as our 
'standing' under; at the "dispensation of'the divine and specifically, as gathered 
thereby. In the earlier Freiburg version of the 'Work of Art' essay, the stakes are 
clear. Both that as Dastur suggests: 
"The world is immediately defined as the unity if relations into which the 
essential decisions of a people (victories, sacrifices, works) are articulated 
together 
... 
a world for specific people; a specific historical world. 99348 
And: 
We are submitted to the world in the sense that we are exposed to the 
dispensation of the favour or disfavour of the gods. The ekstatic 
character of human existence is now understood in relationship to the 
absence or presence of the gods, with reference to the dimension of 
holiness 
... 
world is both the locus of the historical dimension of a 
definite singular mankind and the reign of holiness or of the absence of 
holiness, as it is the case in the modem age, which is deprived of 
gods 
... 
We have therefore-to think together, as a whole, the body 
dimension of the world, the opening of the world as the setting forth of 
the earth and the world as the locus of the historicality of a collective 
singular being. We could then consider that this conception of the world 
in the middle of the thirties is midway between the human Unwelt 
347 Heidegger, M., 'The Turning' in The Question Concerning Technology and other essays, 
trans Lovitt, W., (City?: Harper and Row Ltd., 1977), 47, quoted, slightly modified in McNeill, 
W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidgegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory, (New York: SUNY 
Press, 1999), 217 
348 Dastur, F., 'Heidegger's Freiburg Version of the Origin of the Work of Art' in Ileidegger 
Towards the Turn: Essays on the work of the 1930s op. cit., 129-130 
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(habitual environment) from 1927 and the world as Geviert (the fourfold 
- 
earth, sky, divinities and mortals 
- 
in the fifties. 349 
If by the 'Technology' and 'Turning' lectures Heidegger had renounced an 
element of the specificity of 'a people' whose task it is, under the 'dispensation' 
of Being to heed 'its' call, one cannot help but think that Heidegger's turning 
invokes something of a (re) turn to an originary sending of Being, a Geschick 
more original and still 'retroactively' outside of and beyond the rupture and 
'obscuring' of the Being/being relation that technology puts into place. 
This takes us back to Derrida and what I might call the 'stelle' versus the 'riss' 
and the sense in which Being is (not) gathered. Derrida. tackles Heidegger twice 
on 'the sending' of Being. To start with, 'Envoi' (singular), translated as 
"Sending: On Representation". 350 Derrida's concern here is to critically analyse 
Heidegger's notion of the epoch of representation, presented in the 'Age of the 
World Picture' in 193 8 
. 
35 1 Heidegger examines the condition of modernity, 
whereby the essence of beings has undergone a radical change. All being is now 
as an object for representation arising not just from a change of form or approach 
in metaphysics, but as a result of a radical shift in the essence of metaphysics. 
The characteristics of modemity that Heidegger identifies accord with what he 
will later say in the technology lecture. Science and technology's autonomous 
instrumentalist essence transform and ultimately coincide with the essence of 
modem metaphysics itself. Following this, art, religion and action are all thought 
in relation to subjective experience. Art becomes the subject of aesthetics insofar 
as art is now understood in terms of lived experience, religion as religious 
experience accords with Christianity becoming a 'worldview' as an effect of the 
world-become-picture, and human action is understood as a subjective striving 
towards the realisation of 'human values' defining a culture. These 
characteristics derive from the essence of science and technology as that which 
349 Ibid., 130-131 
350 Derrida, J., 'Envoi', translated as 'Sending: On Representation', trans. Caws, P. & M., in 
Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy, eds. Ormiston, G. & Scluift, 
A., (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 107-13 8 
35 1 Heidegger, M., 'The Age of the World Picture' in The Question Concerning Technoloo, 
op. cit 115-154 
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renders beings calculable and objects of explanation. This is accomplished by a 
representing (Vor-stellen) that summons all beings before itself in such a way 
that calculating man can be certain of them. 
Hence science is only possible only from the moment that truth 
becomes the certainty of representation, the moment of the Cartesian 
cogito 
... 
it is with Descartes that science and objectivity come together 
for the first time. What is at issue in passing from the Greek world and 
the Middle Ages to modernity is not some sort. of progression but a 
radical change in the essence of beings. This change in the essence of 
beings, their becoming an object for representation is in separable from 
a change in the essence of man; man becomes subject. 352 
From the Greek hypokeimenon to the Latin subjectum, we now have the ground 
that gathers everything around itself This marks a genuine change in man's 
essence. Man becomes 'subject' at the very moment that beings become objects 
brought before 'him' (gegenstand) as representation. Importantly it is not a 
matter of deciding what picture of the world modernity presents, but that 
modernity is the world become picture, with man as thereby always already 'in' 
this picture. 
Derrida's interest in this, which involves a play upon're-presentation', is how 
Heidegger traces the epoch of modernity in relation to the 'sending' of Being. 
Heidegger is clear that the epoch of representation comes from the Greek world. 
But that world has no sense of representation being seen as the effect of a 
subject. Rather it is man who is gazed upon by presence (Anwesen). So how is it 
that from Anwesen the world as picture is already announced? Heidegger argues 
it is with Platonism and Plato's determination of being as eidos and appearance, 
aspect, view or figure as adequation to the Idea, 
That which is does not come into being at all through the fact that man 
first looks upon it, in the sense of representing that has the character of 
subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by 
that which is; he is the one who is-in the company with itself-gathered 
352 Marrati, P., Genesis and Trace: Derrida's Reading of Husserl and Ileidegger (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 89 
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towards presencing by that which opens itself 
.. 
Greek man is the one 
who apprehends that which is and this is why in the age of the Greeks 
the world cannot become picture [Bild]. Yet on the other hand that the 
beingness of what is, is defined for Plato as eidos [aspect, view), is the 
presupposition, destined far in advance and long ruling indirectly in 
concealment for the world's [Welt] having to become picture. 353 
Derrida will pick up on the presupposition that it somehow started with 
Platonism, which indeed presupposes an 'already-but not yet' structure, with 
Platonism as the announcement of that which cannot yet be said to be. Critically, 
if Platonism destines the epoch of representation, there has to be a unifying 
presumption that originally steers the history of the metaphysical suppositions of 
being. "There has to be something like a still representational pre-interpretation 
of representation. , 354 This brings the entire notion of epoch and the Geschick 
(sending, destining) of being into question, inasmuch as what remains un- 
thought in Heidegger's thought is the liability that his historicality amounts to an 
unfolding of successive concealments from a single originary moment of 
(ontological) difference. 
The historical or destinal interpretation of the epoch of representation 
(and this holds true for every epoch) orders and derives that epoch from 
an originary sending of being Answesenheit 
... 
Answesenheit translates 
itself into presence and thence into representation according to 
translations that are mutations within the same, within the being- 
together of the same sending-this being together of the originary 
sending in some way arrives or happens to itself 
.. 
the origin arrives to 
itself, in proximity to itself, at the origin. 
355 
Even as there is an originary dissension, this is itself secured and held together 
by the legein/logos (gathering). Insofar as Answesenheit is concealed in the 
epoch of representation, nevertheless it is presence as Answesenheit that has sent 
presence as representation. The 'logic' of Heidegger's thinking of the sending of 
being is that this being would necessarily divide itself, "it has to divide itself in 
353 Heidegger, M., 'The Age of the World Picture' in The Question Concerning Technology and 
other essays, op. cit., 13 1, quoted in Marrati, P., op. cit., 92 354 Marrati, P., op. cit.,. 93 
355 Ibid., 94 
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order for there to be history", 356 thereby challenging the legein, and the very idea 
of destination as unitary destination. Being is always already 'threatened' not 
just by difference, but by dissemination. But for Heidegger it is evident that 
gathering is decisive and constitutive. The history of the "sending of being", for 
Heidegger, is a one-time thing. It is "the history of Answesenheit's difference 
with itself, of the difference of presence, the history of difference as presence. 
Heidegger's notion of historicality would be a history of the same, thought, 
certainly, in its difference from the identical, but in such a way that the 
difference between the identical and the same serves only to reinforce the value 
of the latter. , 357 
This 'model' of gathering and sending, origin and concealment, prevents the 
thinking of 'sending' as constitutively entailing the 'address to' the spatio- 
temporality of an 'other', sending as 'destinerrance'. Derrida takes this up again 
in his second, doubled, and plural: envois. Early on in Derrida's 'Envois', which 
marks a substantial part of his The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and 
358 Beyond, Derrida thinks Heidegger's 'model' of historicity in accordance with 
the 'logic' of the 'post. Meditating on Heidegger's epochal historicity of being, 
Geben, Schicken, Geschick, whereby being is nothing that 'is, but is es gibt, 
'there is', sending in epochal withdrawal, Derrida argues that this 'model' of 
historicity is, contrary to Heidegger, not something that can stand outside of a 
thinking of the 'postal' but is necessarily inscribed within the conditions of 
postal 'sending'. 
[T]he very idea of the retreat (proper) to destination, the idea of the halt, 
a relay, a suspensive delay, the place of the mailman, the possibility of 
going astray and of forgetting (not of repression, which is a moment of 
keeping, but of forgetting). The epokhe and the Ansichhalten which 
essentially scan or set the beat of the 'destiny' of Being, or its 
'appropriation' (Ereignis), is the place of the postal, this is where it 
comes to be and that it takes place (I would say ereignet), that it gives 
place and also lets come to be 
... 
This is serious because it upsets perhaps 
356 Ibid., 95 
357 Ibid., 95 
358 Derrida, J., 'Envois' in The Postcard. 
- 
From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Bass, A., 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 3-256 
206 
Heidegger's still 'derivative' schema (perhaps) upsets by giving one to 
think that technology, the position, let us say even metaphysics do not 
overtake, do not come to determine and to dissimulate an 'envoi' of 
Being (which would not yet be postal) but would belong to the first 
'envoi'... if the post (technology, position, metaphysics) is announced as 
the first envoi, then there is no longer A metaphysics, etc 
... 
nor even an 
envoi but envois without destination... in a word as soon as there is, 
there is differance. 359 
What would be untenable for Heidegger 
- 
that the metaphysics of technology, 
which in his terms 'befalls' Being at a point in its history, should be there from 
the 'origin' or that all the 'sendings' cannot be gathered in "one central post- 
office" 
- 
is for Derrida the very condition of historicity. There would be no 
sending without the possibility of forgetting, the irreducible distance and 
interruption as the very inscribing of an address, the possibility of errancy and 
non-arrival. "If everything begins with sending, this sending has nonetheless 
always been divisible and plural; there is no single Sending but only sendings 
without assured destination, without destiny. , 360 
Derrida suggests that Heidegger's ontological difference does not open history; 
rather is enacts a closure on the basis of its presumptive origin. If there is history, 
it cannot be gathered in a presumptive unifying that is embedded in Heidegger's 
Geschichte. It comes back to 'the shoes', who is to say that they can be gathered 
in advance as 'a pair'? Differance is that which interferes with a thinking of 
history as an origin, a 'pure' origin that 'originates' in proximity with itself 
- 
that sends only it-self, as per Heidegger's unitary origin. "Differance denies 
sending the possibility of functioning as an origin. , 36 1 Differance is not another 
kind of origin. It is the denial of origin. There can be no origin to history because 
origin is not a historical term. At the same time, differance is not a mere 
empirical inscription within history. It is 'older' than the thinking of origin, 
anterior to this, "but not as an a-tcmporal and synchronic structure somehow 
commanding history. It is the dimension of historicity in general'9362 both 
359 Derrida, J., 'Envois' in The Postcard: From Socrates to Frelld and Beyond, op. cit., 65-66 
360 Marrati, P., op. cit., 105 
361 bid 
' 
107 
362 bid., 107 
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anterior' to any thought of origin and, at the same time, indeten-ninately future, 
'to come'. Hence, returning to where I began, there is the importance of thinking 
this in the context of the 'determinations' of technology. 
Nancy captures this somewhat differently and in a more tangential critique of 
Heideggerian difference. In terms of historicity: 
The ontico-ontological difference puts the transitivity of being into play 
in the form of being-the-existent. From the heart of this difference, 
difference envisions a dehiscence of esse away from esse itself, a 
diastole, or fold of the same act (or entelechy); its ek-isting. In a sense, 
this very entelechy that differs (from itself), senses itself in accordance 
with the logic of the entelechy of the sensible that we have recalled 
above. Being senses itself deferring and differing. It senses itself or 
knows itself to be differing and different. But differance, 'the whole 
differance' if one may say so, is precisely that here there is neither 
'sensing oneself' nor 'knowing oneself' in the sense of appropriation or 
revelation. 363 
And in terms of phenomenology: 
It is only by beginning with a certain reservation of the sort I am 
evoking here that it be possible to do justice to aletheia 
... 
This concerns 
the degree to which truth as aletheia continues to operate in terms of 
presentation, placing in view, exhibition, manifestation. If sense is still 
manifest insofar as it is on the surface of the world and nowhere else, 
the opening that it is or makes is not frontal. It is a passage through a 
narrow pass, praes-entia 
... 
that which precedes us 
... 
that which comes to 
meet us and which thus opens the path but which nonetheless does not 
interrupt the road by the illumination of a revelation... phenomenology 
does not open us up to that which 
... 
infinitely precedes consciousness 
and the signifying appropriation of sense; that is to that which precedes 
and surprises the phenomenon in the phenomenon itself, its coniing or 
its coming up 
... 
it still irresistibly convokes us to the pure presence of 
appearing, to seeing 
... 
there remains a proper, immanent/transcendent 
point of origin for sense, a point with which consequently all sense is 
363 Nancy J-L., 'Differance' in The Sense of the World, op. cit., 34-35 
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confounded 
... 
phenomenology or beyond-phenomenology do not open 
sufficiently to the coming of sense, to sense as a coming that is neither 
immanent nor transcendent. This coming is infinitely presupposed; one 
does not let oneself be taken in, carried away or put out of sorts by it. 364 
Hence, for Derrida and Nancy, the problem with Heidegger's historicity, 
premised upon the sending of being and its 'epoch', is that ultimately it falls prey 
to the same representational or 'immanentist' (which for Nancy is a mode of 
making the immanent as it were transcendent) logic in terms of reflecting back a 
'figure' of origin or subject-centred ideality (even as that subject might be 
thought as a 'community'), or again, Nancy might say something like a 
sovereign gathering, that in other ways it had sought to 'destruct'. 
So how might Walter Benjamin's thinking of technology come up against this 
'whole differance' we have come to? To begin with, it seems to me we can 
describe Heidegger's notion of art as 'auratic' in the particular sense of 
originating. Heidegger's aletheia, as the originating power of the work of art 
looks toward another sending of being that 'preceded' or 'diverted' from the 
metaphysics of technology, technology as metaphysics. To go back to the 
beginning, this is borne out by Heidegger's consideration that it is a matter of 
questioning, attuning (paying heed to) and 'preparing' as to whether 
... 
art is or is not an origin in our historical existence, whether and under 
what conditions it can and must be an origin 
... 
In such knowledge which 
can only grow slowly, the question is decided whether art can be an 
origin and then must be a head start, or whether it remains a mere 
appendix and then can only be carried along as a routine cultural 
phenomenon. Are we in our existence historically at the origin? Do we 
know, which means do we give heed to the nature of origin? Or in our 
relation to art, do we still merely make appeal to a cultivated 
acquaintance with the past? 365 
364 Nancy, J-L., 'Philosophical Style' in The Sense of the World, op. cit., 16-17 
365 Heidegger, M., 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in Poetry Language Thought, op. cit.,. 78 
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This is a political question in the context of a presumed 'gathering', arguably 
still modelled upon an 'authentic', 'collective' and 'gathered' self-reflexive 
subjectivity. 
If Heidegger is too 'transcendent' when it comes down to it, then if anything, 
Benjamin is going to be too 'purely' immanent, from the ultimate perspective 
that he can and does invoke the 'Messiah'. Messianism in Benjamin's terms is 
'outside' of temporality, such that there is no struggle between 'authentic' and 
'inauthentic' being. Being is inauthentic, tout court. That said, it begs the 
question as to whether Messianism might still operate as an atemporal 
transcendental signified, which I take up later with a return to Derrida and the 
messianic. 
As Howard Caygill says, Benjamin's point, contra Heidegger, is that history 
understood from the point of view of tradition, the 'handing down' for future 
possibilities is profoundly inauthentic. 
Heidegger keeps open the possibility that historical time may be a 
suitable vehicle for authenticity, an option Benjamin utterly refuses to 
entertain. For him, authentic, redeemed historical time is only possible 
at the end of history with the advent of the Messiah 
... 
It is the distinction 
between falfilment in historical time and the fulfilment of historical 
time which marks the difference between Heidegger and Benjamin. 
Benjamin identifies Heidegger's understanding of historical time as 
tragic, one in which past, present and future can be gathered in time, 
whereas for him fulfilled time is Messianic, a gathering of time, not in 
time 
... 
In the absence of the Messianic fulfilment of time there can be 
none in time: all events in time are not only inauthentic, but they can 
never attain authenticity. 
366 
This enables Benjamin to have an entirely different lever on the relationship 
between past, present and future. Whilst he may share with Heidegger the notion 
of 'origin' as Ursprung, a 'leap' which is nothing to do with genesis in terms of 
the objects to which it (the origin) gives rise, there is nothing of Heidegger's 
366 Caygill, If., op. cit., 1OBenjandn'sPlzilosophy: Destruction and Experience, op. cit., 10 
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explicitness in view of which or in heed of which an authentic stance and 
struggle towards the disclosing of being is possible. If, following Caygill again, 
Benjamin understands origin and the 'tradition', the handing over to which it 
gives rise, as the basis for inauthencity, and consequent destruction, "the price of 
becoming an object of tradition is inauthencity, its emergence is always already 
its disappearance"367 
. 
Thus in the interplay of 'restoration' that is at the same 
time perpetually incomplete, 'tradition' is a site of mourning, ruination and 
sadness, with its cultural accomplishment never amounting to more than 
allegorical incompleteness. However this insight can potentially enable the use 
of the 'ruin' of tradition (double genitive) against itself, inasmuch as the 
'ideology' of tradition obscures this destructiveness and lays claim to continuity 
or a melancholic nostalgia for the past. Thus when it comes to technology: 
While previously [Benjamin] saw tradition as destructive of whatever it 
handed over, now he suggests that it may itself be destroyed by 
technology. Tradition worked by distancing its objects as past in order 
to bring them into presence in the present; technology however, 
destroys this distance 
... 
the reproduction of the object as neither distant 
nor unique does not for Benjamin entail its devaluation. It was tradition 
that destroyed the integrity of its object in its handing over; it was 
tradition that distanced the object from itself and its recipient. But with 
its destruction by technology the object is freed from tradition. The 
object is re-activated when the qualities of distance and uniqueness are 
removed from it; it becomes something different, something which need 
no longer be experienced in terms of presence and absence. 368 
Technology cannot do this by itself and as we shall see, for Benjamin, it is a 
matter of 'reading' technology and connecting it with other modes of 'reading' 
that provides a 'flash' of hope against the barbarism of tradition, freeing up its 
objects such that it can be understood as a potential site for a reconfiguration of 
'tradition' on the basis of politics in political struggle against the adverse 
potential for technology to forcefully re-enact the destructive powers of 
'tradition'. For Benjamin, this is also the historical and political means of 
'rescuing the dead', put to death by the inhumanity of progressive history, within 
367 bid., 18 
368 Ibid., 24 
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the context of their afterlife in a transformed present. Although it should not be 
forgotten that it is only by the Messiah that history, as such, may be ultimately 
redeemed. It is in this sense that Benjamin understands the 'reading' of 
photography in his 'Small History of Photography', which enables him to say at 
the end, 
Such are the questions in which the interval of ninety years that separate 
us from the age of the daguerreotype discharges its historical tension. It 
is in the illumination of these sparks that the first photographs emerge, 
beautiful and unapproachable, from the darkness of our grandfather's 
day. 369 
It is possible to read technology politically in this way, because of the 
remarkable coming together of the means of technological reproduction and the 
(potential) social relations of 'the masses'. 
The abolition of distance and uniqueness through technology requires 
the perpetual redrawing of boundaries between human beings and the 
world. For this reason technology for Benjamin raises the necessity for 
politics: limits and boundaries have to be drawn on the basis of 
deliberation, not simply given through tradition 
... 
In the era of 
technology it is possible for the "mass" to configure not only the law 
but the site where it is received, the way in which it is given, and 
themselves. 370 
Before embarking upon a more detailed reading of Benjamin's reading of 
technology and the connections he makes with other modes of reading, it is 
useful to turn to another Caygill text and grasp the principles of Benjamin's 
Ospeculative critique'. 
Put very telegraphically, Benjarnin's interest in Kantian philosophy was to 
disturb Kant's notion of transcendental apperception by way of which Kant kept 
the distinction between the idea of reason (inaccessible in itselo and the 
369 Benjamin, W., 'A Small History of Photography' in One Way Street trans. Jeplicott, E. & 
Shorter, K., (London: New Left Books, 1979), 256-257 
370 Caygill, op. cit., 27 
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dimensions of experience. Benjamin understood Kant's schema to be both 
historical and thus subject to variation through time and restrictive. Benjamin, by 
incorporating or enfolding, the 'absolute' of speculative critique as the excess of 
Kant's schema into the very co-ordinates of that schema, conceived of the 
spatio-temporal dimensions of the Kantian 'frame' of experience differently. 
The 'absolute' of speculative critique as this excess disturbed and convoluted 
experience such that potential future possibilities of perceptual experience may 
be perceptible. 
Benjamin extended this speculative critique as a philosophical and historical 
principle, recognising that perception in its historical frames of reference would 
disclose some things and obscure others, but that distorted and obscured forms 
could potentially be freed, at the same time transfon-ned, in the after-life of 
different historical experience. Throughout his work, Benjamin, through his 
separation of technik from technology, was able to recognise 'forgotten' modes 
of experience and their transformed, or transforming, potentials heterogeneously 
folded into other modes. 
... 
(A] transcendental account of infinite readings (or perceptions) 
possible within a given surface of legibility-is supplemented by the 
speculative claim that these conditions are themselves but one of an 
infinite set of possible surfaces or conditions of experience. The 
speculative configuration is both folded into and exceeds the particular 
surface of legibility, allowing Benjamin to conceive of a double infinity: 
the transcendental infinity of possible marks on a given surface and the 
speculative infinity of possible bounded but infinite surfaces or 
frameworks of experience. The transcendental infinity of possible 
legible marks on a given surface is framed and supplemented by the 
speculative infinity of possible surfaces of legibility. The exploration of 
the complex relationship between the two infinities provided the 
occasion and motivation for much of Benjamin's subsequent work. 371 
It is in this sense that one can understand the ways in which Benjamin views 
experience as a constellation of discontinuous and heterogeneous elements of 
371 Caygill, H., 77ie Colour ofExperience (London: Routledge, 1998), 4 
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past and present, with resemblances existing as an 'invisible' or 4non- 
representational' memory, as a disruption or convolution of the continuities of 
time and space as they are thought in the concept of history as a continuous 
development and progression. The technologies of photography and cinema, 
together with the movement of the 'masses' are the features of contemporary 
experience that present "surfaces of legibility" in the complex and heterogeneous 
arrangement of historical and future possibilities of experience that can shatter 
the tradition of destructive and repressive continuity, thought as continuous 
development and progression. 
To grasp the strength and subtlety of Benjamin's motivations and thought in 
these respects, it is important to establish the connections between various 
writings, as articulations of ways of reading. Three themes are important here; 
Benjamin's thought of non-sensuous imilarity; the further elaboration upon his 
concept of tradition as a relation between 'sadness' and 'hope', and the 
distinction between the aesthetic and technology and their consequences for the 
thinking of history and politics; a distinction between 'art' and 'image'. 
In his 'Doctrine of the Similar'372 
, 
and its later version, 'On the Mimetic 
373 1) Faculty' 
, 
Benjamin signals the concept of non-sensuous similarity when he 
writes of the mimetic capacity, which worked in archaic times to bring into focus 
specific points of resonance in the cosmic order through forms of divination. 
These were acts of reading and direct perception of the mimetic character of 
objects of experience. In Benjamin's terms, there is a historical movement from 
this more direct perception to experience involving the deciphering and 
apprehension of "non-sensuous similarity"; the correspondences that emerge 
through different patterns of the conditions of experience. Benjamin's point is 
that any direct perception of similarity emerges from a particular context of 
constellation, through which other 'perceptible' elements remain invisible. 
However, once this perception is understood within a broader frame of reference 
372 Benjamin, W., 'Doctrine of the Simil4r'(1933) in Selected Writings Volunte2 1927-1934, 
trans. 
, 
R. Livingstone et al., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 694-698 373 Benjarrýn, W., 'On the Mimetic Faculty' (1933) in One Way Sireet, op. cit., 160-163 
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of heterogeneous conditions of experience, an element of the dynamic between 
past, present and futurity can come into play. As Graham MacPhee states, 
If what is visible in one structuring of consciousness may yet become 
visible in another, then visual experience cannot be restricted to 
subjective intention, but must be understood to include the 'after-event' 
of the becoming conscious of what is, as yet 'unconscious'. The 
configured patterns involved in perception are therefore not static and 
self-identical, but are informed and inhabited by different possible 
futures, and so are subject to reconfiguration, change and decay. 374 
Some key elements are significant here in terms of the overall corpus and 
trajectory'of Benjamin's thinking, one of which is his introduction of the notion 
of the 'unconscious' of perception. 
It can still be claimed of our contemporaries that the cases in which they 
consciously perceive similarities in everyday life make up a tiny 
proportion of those numberless cases unconsciously determined by 
similarity. The similarities perceived consciously 
- 
for instance in faces 
- 
are, compared to the countless similarities perceived unconsciously or 
not at all, like the enormous underwater mass of an iceberg in 
comparison to the small tip one sees rising out of the water. 375 
Benjamin will revisit this notion of 'unconscious' perception when considering 
the contemporary technologies of photography and film, but, importantly, in 
their transformed context of modem experience. 
Thus Benjamin's criticism is not redemptive in the sense of seeking to recover 
the past, as if unchanged. "The question is simply: are we dealing with a dying 
out of the mimetic faculty or rather perhaps with a transformation that has taken 
place within it? 9076 
374 MacPhee, G., The Architecture of the Visible, (London: Continuum, 2002), 187 375 Benjamin, W., 'Doctrine of the Similar', op. cit., 695 376 Ibid., 695 
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Benjamin will also make the connection between the archaic forins of non- 
sensuous perception of similarities with the technik of language and the later 
changed and 'charged' temporality of the technik of photography and film. On 
the basis of the means by which languages 'translate', such that "words meaning 
the same thing in different languages are arranged about that signified as their 
centre 
... 
while often possessing not the slightest similarity to one another"377 
, 
we 
retain some sense of non-sensuous imilarity. We can make the connection 
between thought, language and image through other layers of the 'Doctrine' and 
'Mimetic' essays, all within the context of Benjamin's critique of the Kantian 
from of perception and his critique of tradition, as referred to above. 
Within both essays, Benjamin also makes the transition from spoken to written 
language, significantly in terms of language's visual aspect. 
The most recent graphology has taught us to recognize, in handwriting, 
images 
- 
or more precisely, picture puzzles 
- 
that the unconscious of 
the writer conceals in his writing. It may be supposed that the mimetic 
process, which expresses itself in this way in the activity of the writer, 
was, in the very distant times in which script originated, of utmost 
importance for writing. Script has thus become, like language, an 
archive of non-sensuous similarities, of non-sensuous 
correspondences. 378 
That is not to say that Benjamin wants to suggest that either the visual element of 
language outweighs its discursive meaning, or that they are somehow equivalent. 
Instead, he is formulating a relationship between them, which is necessarily non- 
identical but convoluted. The 'sense' that Benjamin points to cannot be separated 
from, but is different to, 'meaning' precisely as an 'instant'. 
But this, if you will, magical aspect of language, as well as of script, 
does not develop in isolation from its other, semiotic, aspect. Rather, 
everything mimetic in language is an intention, which can appear at all 
only in connection with something alien at is basis: precisely the 
serniotic or communicative element. Thus, the literal text of the script is 
the sole basis on which the picture puzzle can form itself. Thus, the 
377 Ibid., 697 
378 Ibid., 697 
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nexus of meaning which resides in the sounds of the sentence is the 
basis from which something similar can become apparent out of a 
sound, flashing up in an instant. 379 
Benjamin gives further focus to the temporality of the 'flicker' or 'flash' of the 
instant in the shorter version of the 'Doctrine' essay, 'On the Mimetic Faculty', 
Rather, the mimetic element in language can, like a flame, manifest 
itself only through a kind of bearer. This bearer is the serniotic element. 
Thus the coherence of words or sentences is the bearer through which, 
like a flash, similarity appears. For its production by man 
- 
like its 
perception by him 
- 
is in many cases and particularly the most 
importantý limited to flashes. It flits past. It is not improbable that the 
rapidity of writing and reading heightens the fusion of the serniotic and 
the mimetic in the sphere of language. 380 
This temporal element is critical. 
So tempo that swiftness in reading or writing which can scarcely be 
separated from this process, would then become as it were, the effort, or 
gift, or mind to participate in that measure of time in which similarities 
flash up fleetingly out of the stream of things only in order to sink down 
once more. Thus even profane reading, if it is not to forsake 
understanding altogether shares this with magical reading; that it is 
subject to a necessary tempo, or rather a critical moment, which the 
reader must not forget at any cost lest he go away empty handed. 381 
It is through the temporality of the 'flicker' or 'flash' that Benjamin's 
'convoluted' experience shows itself. This is crucial for an understanding of 
Benjamin's approach to technology, tradition and history. We can sense the 
correspondence to both Benjamin's concept of ursprung (origin) and tradition in 
the intrinsic characteristics of the technologies of photography and film here, but 
it would be a mistake to identify Benjamin's thinking of technology with a 
4progressivism' or contra-wise a straightforward mere retrieval of a 'buried' past. 
379 Ibid., 697 
380 Benjamin, W., 'On the Mimetic Faculty' (1933), op. cit., 162 38 1 Benjamin, W., 'Doctrine of the Similar', op. cit., 698 
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It is here that we need to turn to further consideration of Benjamin's ideas of 
sadness and hope as worked through his considerations of language and 
literature. Benjamin's essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities has much to connect 
it to his discussion of the origin of German Tragic drama, the Trauerspiel, where 
the notion of work as 'ruin' and site of 'mouming' is particularly articulated. In 
'Elective Affinities', Benjamin develops the idea of the work's afterlife 
emerging from its site of ruination. He makes a distinction between the 
4material' content and the 'truth' content of a work, indicating the former as the 
linguistic constraints which give rise to the fonn and content and the latter as that 
'absolute' or 'potential' configuration of the work through the history of its 
reception. 382 Benjamin traces how the gap between the initial material 
configuration and the work's 'truth' widens over time, such that the original 
material content appears increasingly 'strange' to its readers. This connects with 
Benjamin's meditation on Baroque Allegory, where the initial meaningfulness of 
the text decays over time until its meaningfulness, as such, is in its ruin. This 
concurs precisely with Benjamin's concept of tradition as the handing over in 
order to disappear, leaving the 'objects' of tradition as estranged, 'empty' 
allegorical configurations that are intrinsically sites of sadness and mourning. 
More will be said about the allegorical element later, but here the point is to 
stress that this ruin, as such, 
"[i] s precisely what reveals something of the terms that configure its 
own meaningfulness, an insight which is dependent on the element of 
non-identity or disfigurement in its transmission. " 
383 
We might say that it is in this very concept of ruin and afterlife that Benjamin 
dispels the ideology of aesthetic completeness attached to the notion of the 
'symbol'. When "all ephemeral beauty is stripped off and the work stands as 
ruin"384 
, 
elements of a text's futurity and potential for other modes of 
meaningfulness in an afterlife are glimpsed. There is an accord between 
382 Benjamin, W., 'Goethe's Elective Affinities' in Selected Writings Volume 11913- 1926, eds. 
Bullock, M., & Jennings, M. W., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 297-298 
383 MacPhee, G., The Architecture of the Visible (London: Continuum, 2002), 190 
384 Benjamin, W., The Origin of German Tragic Drama, tran. Osbome, J., (London: Verso, 
1977), 182 
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Benjamin's view that "the history of works prepares for their critique', 385 in 
'Elective Affinities', and his notion of criticism as the "mortification of works" 
in the Trauerspiel study which is not, as it was for the Romantics, the 
"awakening of the consciousness of living works, but the settlement of 
knowledge in dead ones. , 386 MacPhee will align this with "paradoxically the 
condition for their rebirth"387 but again, we must be cautious about an idea of 
progressive optimism here. As Caygill points out in discussing 'Elective 
Affinities', the seeking of an 'immortal' or, we might say, eternally returning 
'rebom 'truth' in the mortification of works offers a strange kind of hope. 
'Truth' as the "inexpressible presence of death in life" is always and remains 
veiled, as "marked by beauty"388 such that, 
Instead of revealing the truth behind appearances, the task of critique is 
redefined as tracing the mark delineating truth and appearance, 'not to 
raise the veil, but rather, through the most precise knowledge of it as 
veil, to raise [critique] for the first time to a true intuition of the 
beautiftil... not as a symbol for a remote eternal truth, but as a mark of 
the mutual dependence of death in life and life in death. 389 
The 'hope' in which the absolute is located is for the hopeless, "only for the sake 
of the hopeless ones is hope given US,, 390 without dialectical overcoming. 
This is a hope for the other, since 'the last hope is never for the one who 
cherishes it, but for those alone for whom it is cherished', a hope for the 
dead, which in an attenuated way becomes a hope for those who are not 
yet dead but will soon be dead. 391 
385 Benjamin, W., 'Goethe's Elective Affinities' in Selected Writings Volume 11913-1926, 
op. cit., 298 386 Benjamin, W 7he Origin of German Tragic Drama, op. cit., 182 397 MacPhee, G., The Architecture ofthe Visible, op. cit., 191 388 Caygill, H The Colour ofExperience London Routledge 1998 p. 50 389 ibid p. 51 
390 Benjamin, W "Goethe's Elective Affinities" in Benjamin W Selected Writings Volume 1 
1913-1926 Bullock M and Jennings M. W eds Cambridge Massachusetts Belknap Harvard 
University Press 1996 p. 356 
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Such hope, always already in mourning, is signified by the contingency of the 
shooting star, "Hope shot across the sky above their heads like a falling 
star'9392 which, as Caygill points out is "an image remote from the necessity of the 
rising and setting sun", such that, 
The contingency of the work that nourishes critique is aligned with the 
speculative union of death in life, an experience which combines 
contingency with necessity 
... 
In this way Benjamin repeats the Hegelian 
critique of the finite character of Kantian critique 
- 
its narrow notion of 
experience that banished the absolute from thought 
- 
but without the 
collateral of a progressive philosophy of history. The absolute is folded 
into experience in complex and often inconspicuous ways, which it 
becomes the task of critique not at the outset to judge, but first to 
delineate and map. 393 
Benjamin had underscored this context of hope as a contingency always already 
in sadness and thereby under threat, in his thoughts on language in the essay 'On 
Language As Such and the Language of Man'. 394 Here he describes a 
prelapsarian state of nature and the coming of man by way of Adamic naming. 
On being named by Adam, nature 'laments'. Such lamentation articulates the 
difference between the 'speechlessness' of appearances and human language, 
which nevertheless holds out some non-sensuous reciprocity by way of 
'translation'. However, nature will undergo a double mouming after the Fall 
with the institution of language, in accordance with a temporally restricted and 
non-reciprocal economy, on 'over-naming'. Such over-naming on the basis of 
the sense-certainty of human subjects subordinates nature to a static conceptual 
frame, whereby language is instrumentalised and reduced to 'prattle'. 
In stepping outside the pure language of name, man makes language a 
means (that is, a knowledge inappropriate to him), and therefore also, in 
one part at any rate a mere sign, and this later results in the plurality of 
languages 
... 
This immediacy in the communication of abstraction 
392 Benjamin, W., 'Goethe's Elective Affinities', op. cit., 355 
393 Caygill, H., The Colour ofExperience, op-cit., 51-52 394 Benjamin, W., 'On Language As Such and the Language of Man' in One Way Street, op. cit., 
107-123 
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[through signs] came into being as judgement, when in the Fall, man 
abandoned immediacy in the communication of the concrete, name and 
fell into the abyss of the mediateness of communication, of the words as 
means, of the empty word, into the abyss of prattle 
... 
how much more 
melancholy to be named not from the one blessed, paradisiac language 
of names but from the hundred languages of man in which name has 
already withered... 'over-naming' as the deepest reason for all 
melancholy and (from the point of view of the thing) of all deliberate 
muteness. 395 
There is no doubt that Benjamin considered the era of modem technology as one 
of destitution and sadness, and the limitations of experience, with the dissolution 
of 'traditional' experience, Erfahrung into the 'lived' experience, Erlebnis. 
Whilst Benjamin recognised this as the consequence of the handing down and 
passing away of traditional experience as such, the attempt to 'fix' experience in 
the way of Kantian philosophy, as itself a product of the inauthentic of tradition, 
and its consequential aesthetic judgement had to be resisted. The point was to 
meet this destitution head on and re-negotiate or re-configure it in terms of the 
transforming potential inherent in the 'shattering of tradition'. This is why 
demonstration of traditional experience as 'emptied' and 'dead' in Baroque 
allegory was of such importance for Benjamin. 
Baroque allegory demonstrates the decay of Erfahrung into Erlebnis. It is a 
lament to the loss of divine meaningfulness in the modem world, and the decay 
of intrinsic connectivity between divine and human, such that the soul withdraws 
into the interiority characterised by Protestant religion. The consequence of 
divine withdrawal and interiority is a world reduced to the 'objects of' the 
subject's gaze. The key 'characters' in the scene of allegory are the emblem and 
the corpse, inasmuch as, 
The allegorical gaze is a projection of the subject, which reduces the 
appearance of things to its own co-ordinates; therefore what is turned 
and rebounded by 'exteriority' back to the subject is in fact only an 
image of itself. From this perspective, the pre-eminent emblematic 
395 Benjamin, W., 'On Language As Such and the Language of Man', op. cit., 121-122 
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property, or allegorical object is the corpse, since what is seen in the 
world of things is simply an image of the human 
... 
But as a consequence, 
the 'human' is itself dismembered and hollowed out, so that the 
conventional, conscious physis of the integral human body is scattered 
and allegory images the absolute abandonment of traditional, organic 
conceptions of meaningfulness. 396 
For Benjamin, it is at the point of utmost destitution figured by allegory, "in 
allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica of history as a 
petrified, primordial landscape"397 
, 
that the very transitory nature, fragility and 
destructive character of tradition is revealed. Unlike the symbol, where 
"destruction is idealised and the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed 
in the light of redemption", in allegory, "Everything about history that from the 
very beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful is expressed in the 
9398 face-or rather the death's head' 
In the confrontation with the "death's head" of allegory; "the German 
Trauerspiel is taken up entirely with the hopelessness of the earthly condition. 
Such redemption as it knows resides in the depth of this destiny rather than the 
fulfilment of a divine plan of salvation"399; not only is the transitory and 
destructive character of tradition revealed but, given this, also the possibility of 
historical transfon-nation of the conditions of experience, as opposed to their 
aesthetic compensation, as suggested by the symbol, or as we shall see by Kant's 
'reconciliatory aesthetic'. The very starkness of the landscape of allegory might 
by this reversal provide a way to a new form of 'near-sight'. as opposed to the 
'always at-distance' of subject-ruled perception and the aesthetic. 
It is on this basis that Benjamin will approach modem technology. The 
experience of commodities, whereby appearances are set free from or adrift from 
'tradition', and subjective interiority is increasingly under pressure from the 
weight and 'bombardment' of 'lived experience', which characterises modemitY, 
provides a new kind of, but historically transfon-ned, allegorical landscape. But 
396 MacPhee, G., The Architecture of the Visible, op. cit., 204 397 Benjamin, W., The Origin of German Tragic Drama, op. cit., 166 
398 Ibid 
' 
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there are two ways one might go here. Either one intensifies the transformation 
of allegorical experience by way of technology, along the lines of the 'shattering 
of tradition, or one compensates for it by looking to technology as the vehicle to 
reconstitute the relationship between image and meaning on the basis of the 
6auratic'. 
Benjamin's writings in the later twenties and thirties trace the problematic 
between these two routes, the latter based upon the reconciliatory effects of 
Kantian aesthetic judgement, in the opposition between an aesthetics of harmony 
(the beautiful), characterised by the return of the subjective gaze, and an 
aesthetics of the sublime, striving for such a return which nevertheless evokes 
the power of subjective imagination, both of which are premised on the 
appearance of distance. Benjamin resists this Kantian dyad, consequent on the 
attempts to fix 'lived experience'. Some of his exemplary figures in 
demonstrating the necessity for this resistance are Baudelaire, Proust and the 
Surrealist movement, whilst he embraces the future of technology in the essays 
f IM. 400 that directly address photography and 1 
Benjamin's concern for the relationship between the aesthetic, the historical and 
ultimately the political, goes far beyond the consideration of art works. However, 
the aesthetic is the site upon which one can trace both the 'transmissibility.. of 
tradition (Erfahrung) and its disappearance, and the 'shattering' of tradition as 
lived experience (Erlebnis) on the basis of the historical conditions of perception. 
The conditions of modernity are such that the transmissibility of tradition and its 
passing away, previously understood subject to 'periods' of time, now, in the era 
of technology, happens in an instant. In an age of 'instant archaism' 
characteristic of the industrialisation and production of commodities of the 
nineteenth century 'second nature', any attempt to retain or capture Erfahrung as 
the experience of tradition can only be by way of the glimpse, the 'fixing' of 
which can only constitute an individualised, compensatory nostalgia, 
400 Benjamin, W., 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire' in Illuminations, tran. Zohn, I I., ( London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1970): 157-202; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations: 203-217; 'Surrealism' in 
Benjamin, W., One Way Street op. cit 225-239; 'A Small History of Photography' op. cit; 'The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' in Illuminations: 219-253 
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exemplified in Proust's 'memoire involuntairc' or the complex desire for the 
'return of the gaze' in Baudelaire's 'correspondances', both of which seek to 
invest in objects the characteristics of inter-subjective exchange (commodity 
fetishism). Here we might say these authors each present a last redoubt against, 
but at the same time, they point towards the transformation of experience. 
Perhaps nothing captures this more than Baudelaire's 'battle' against 
photography, the crowd and the passing veiled woman, as Benjamin reads them 
in 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire'. 401 
In 'Motifs', Benjamin demonstrates photography's lack of return of the gaze and 
Baudelaire's battle to come to terms with this. Characteristically, it is a battle 
between the 'photographic' and 'art', as the imaginative, the intangible and the 
beautiful. 
In so far as art aims at the beautiful and, on however modest a scale 
'reproduces it' it conjures it up out of the womb of time. This no longer 
happens in the case of technical reproduction. (The beautiful has no 
place in it. ) 
... 
If the distinctive feature of the images that rise from the 
memoire involuntaire is seen in their aura, then photography is 
decisively implicated in the phenomenon of the 'decline-of aura'. What 
was inevitably felt to be inhuman, one might even say deadly, in 
daguerreotypy was the (prolonged) looking into the camera, since the 
camera records our likeness without returning our gaze. But looking at 
someone carries the implicit expectation that our look will be returned 
by the object of our gaze. Where this expectation is met (which in the 
case of thought processes, can apply equally to the look of the eye of the 
mind and to a glance pure and simple), there is an experience of the aura 
to the fullest extent 
... 
Experience of the aura thus rests on the 
transposition of a response common in human relationships to the 
relationship between the inanimate or natural object and man. The 
person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in 
return. This experience corresponds to the data of the memoire 
involuntaire 
... 
The greater Baudelaire's insight into this phenomenon, 
the more unmistakably did the disintegration of aura make itself felt in 
this poetry. 402 
401 Benjamin, W., 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire' in Illuminations, trans. Zohn, I I., ( London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1970) 
402 Ibid 
, 
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Benjamin saw Baudelaire as the "last lyric poet of the nineteenth century" and 
the exemplar of the transformation of allegory in the era of modernity. The last 
lines of the above quotation encapsulate this. Insofar as he strove to 'capture' the 
auratic, the conditions of modernity impinged upon this strife. This is epitomised 
in Benjamin's reading of Baudelaire's sonnet 'A une passante' which he reads as 
a 'photographic' allegory of desire in modernity. The key 'figures' here are the 
'un-representable', 'negative figure of the crowd, "the mass was the agitated 
veil; through it Baudelaire saw Paris 
... 
In the sonnet "A une passante" the crowd 
is nowhere named in either word or phrase. And yet the whole happening hinges 
on it, just as the progress of a sailboat depends on the wind", 403 and the figure of 
the passing woman emerging from it. The figure of desire, "the figure that 
fascinates'A04 in Baudelaire's poem is the 'passing away' figure in the movement 
of the crowd, like a photograph, caught in a flash of an instant of passing, as 
"love-not at first sight, but at last sight. , 405 At the same time, the woman is "a 
figure of shock, indeed of catastrophe. ', 406 As such the figure becomes the 
emblem for the massed 'movement' of modem experience and what happens to 
desire; how it becomes photographic, as opposed to auratic, within that 
experience. The investment of desire is in the 'image' or 'imprint' of the woman. 
She is already gone, passed by, and as she is mourning, she is doubtless veiled 
and thus already possessing both the 'negative' effect of death and 
66 407 eyes 
... 
that 
... 
have lost their ability to look' 
. 
Yet her presence as 'passante' 
adheres to the temporal paradox of quasi-arrested passing. The 'photographic' 
shock that Baudelaire receives from the passing woman provokes the fantasy 
that the woman returns the gaze, but he can only attempt the fantasy as a 
projected 'hallucination' onto the 'screen' of her non-seeing eye and, in a 
retrospective figure of (punctuated) speech, which mimics the mechanics of the 
camera, "A lightning flash 
... 
then night! , 408 Thus there comes another shock, 
after the shock of the event, the happening of which remains entirely 
irretrievable. The poem stages the shock, and shock defence in Baudelaire's 
parrying of the shock in the repetitious parody of the camera. The image of the 
403 Bcnjamin, W., 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', op. cit. 170 
404 Ibid., 171 
405 Ibid., 171 
406 Ibid., 171 
407 Ibid., 191 
408 Ibid., 171 
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woman is photograph and camera in this relay of shock effect and shock 
defence; the camera imparting a "posthumous shock. "409The happening of the 
event, despite Baudelaire's attempts to attribute a 'look' to this 'fleeting beauty' 
is not masked by a resolution of the desire in such projected fulfilment. It can 
only be staged in the 'negative' space of the repeated parody of photographic 
shock interrupting such projected resolution. As Benjamin's commentary 
affirms, Baudelaire experiences not erotic rapture, but "the kind of sexual shock 
that can beset a lonely Manvi. 410 
As MacPhee states, referencing Benjamin's essay 'Central park'41 1, but as 
relevant to 'Some Motifs' and 'A une passante', "Baudelaire's allegory break[s] 
into [the] world 
... 
to leave its harmonious structures in ruins. "4 12 Despite 
Baudelaire's efforts to organise the experience of the 'passante' in terms of 
'fleeting beauty', he produces the photographic imprint emerging from the 
'negative' of the crowd, which does not 'look back'. 413 That said, his poetry 
exemplifies the critical historical moment of reading inasmuch as the impact of 
modem experience may still lend itself to the attempt to articulate experience 
such as in Baudelaire's correspondences as "an experience which seeks to 
establish itself in crisis-proof form 
... 
it presents itself as the beautiful. In the 
beautiful the ritual value of ad appears. '414 
This demonstrates the crux of the issue with regard to modem technology and 
the modem conditions of perception. Whilst allegorical seeing may articulate the 
demise of the holding at a distance, typified by the Kantian schema of 
perception, the possibility remains to 'freeze' the dynamics of modem 
experience into the temporal co-ordinates of subject-led perceptions, as indeed in 
the terms of Heidegger's 'world picture'. 
409 Ibid., 177 
4 10 Ibid., 171 
41 1 Benjamin, W., 'Central Park', tran Spencer, L., (New German Critique, no. 34,1985) 412 MacPhee, G., The Architecture ofthe Visible, op. cit., 207 413 See also the insightful reading of Baudelaire's allegory of photography and the crowd which 
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The destruction of experience as holistic Erfahrung in the era of modernity, with 
its production of commodities plucked from 'context' and instantly archaic, 
disperses the conditions for the transmissibility of tradition, as aura, but at the 
same time provides transformed opportunities for auratic perception. "The 
disconnected moments of lived experience, now free from tradition, lie available 
for new and potentially restrictive modes of recombination. 'A15 
This is why photography and film are so important for Benjamin, but in the 
critical context of new possibilities for perception, as he suggests in the essay on 
Surrealism, where "an action puts forth its own image and exists, absorbing and 
consuming it, where nearness looks with its own eyes [and] the long-sought 
image sphere is opened... in which political materialism and physical nature 
share the inner man, the psyche, the individual 
... 
with dialectical justice, so that 
no limb remains unrent. 'A 16 
This is where the concept of 'innervation' becomes important. In sum, this is the 
transposition of those mimetic impulses between the human body and 'first 
nature' technology from more archaic times, the residue of which have now 
become individualised and fetishised, such as in memoire involuntaire and 
correspondances onto the plane of the collective experience of modemity, where 
bodies are 'automatonised' to the rhythms of modem urban life, precisely to 
enable a 'play' within those conditions, with 'movement' dispersing the 
&autornatic' responses demanded of modem conditions and the transforming 
possibilities of 'play' as the sphere of non-instrumentality within technology. 417 
415 MacPhee, G., 7he, 4rchitecture of the Visible, op. cit., 
. 
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416 Benjamin, W., 'Surrealism' in One Way Street, op. cit., 239 417 The mechanisation of experience, its shocks and shock defence, forms the context for the 
'Motifs' essay. Benjamin cites "Of the countless movements of switching, inserting, pressing and 
the like, the 'snapping' of the photographer has had the greatest consequence. A touch of the 
finger now sufficed to fix an event for an unlimited period of time. The camera gave the moment 
a posthumous shock, as it were. Haptic experiences of this kind were joined by optic ones, such 
as are supplied by the advertising pages of a newspaper or the traffic of a big city. " And "wrote 
Marx, that the worker does not make use of the working conditions. The working conditions 
make use of the worker 
... 
In working with machines, workers learn to co-ordinate their own 
movements with the uniformly constant movements of an automaton. " Benjamin, W., 'On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire', op. cit., 176-177 
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Miriam Hansen explains the significance of innervation for Benjamin first in 
terms of the context, in which bourgeois culture had come to treat modem 
technology as 'second nature', 
Benjamin does not assume an instrumentalist trajectory [for technology] 
from mythical cunning to capitalist-industrialist modemity. The telos 
[of the] 
... 
'dornination of nature' defines the second, modem 
technology only from 'the position of the first', which sought to master 
nature in existential seriousness, out of harsh necessity. By contrast 
Benjamin asserts [that the] the second technology rather aims at the 
interplay between nature and humanity. And it is the training, practicing 
of rehearsal of this interplay that Benjamin pinpoints as the decisive 
function of contemporary art, in particular film 
... 
Film has the potential 
to reverse, in the form of play, the catastrophic consequences of an 
already failed reception of technology- 418 
Technology was conceived, as 'second nature' from the point of view of the 
domination of nature as an end in itself and "bourgeois culture had been 
complicit with that process by disavowing the political implications of 
technology, treating it as 'second nature', while fetishizing an ostensibly pure 
and primary nature as the object of individual contemplation. "419 The point is to 
recognise the residual yield, the play and movement of photography and film as 
a means to reconnect with those mimetic impulses of non-sensuous imilarity, 
transposed to context of the modem experience of the always potentially 
dispersed, moving 'crowd'; to put the 'play' or, in other terms, the heterogeneity 
of historical layers of perception, back into modem experience. 
Because of the medium's technicity, as well as its collective mode of 
perception, film offers a chance 
... 
to bring the apparatus to social 
consciousness, to maker it public. 'To make the technical apparatus of
our time, which is second nature for the individual into a first nature for 
the collective, is the historic task of film. '... Innervation as a mode of 
regulating the interplay between humans and (second) technology can 
only succeed (that is escape the destructive vortex of defensive numbing 
adaptation) if it reconnects with the discarded powers of the first, with 
4 18 Hansen, M. B., 'Benjamin and Cinema', in Critical Inquiry, (Vol. 25, no. 2, Winter, 1999), 
320 
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mimetic practices that involve the body as the 'pre-eminent instrument' 
of sensory perception and (moral and political) differentiation 
... 
[that is 
to say] efforts of innervation on the part of a new, historically 
unprecedented collective which has its organs in second technology. 420 
We can see how, for Benjamin, this is another way of turning 'second nature' on 
its head. If, going along with Hansen's interpretation, there is a hint of Kant 
lurking in this notion of the body as 'pre-eminent instrument', it is entirely recast 
against, "the perceptual limitations constitutive of the human being qua 
individual body 
.. 
the anthropocentrism that maintains the hierarchic polarization 
of humans over the rest of creation; and the capitalist society's perpetuation of 
the self-identical individual against the realities of modem mass experience". 421 
It is the challenge that technology potentially offers to all this that drives 
Benjamin. It is the imposition of subject-centred perceptual co-ordinates and the 
consequent subordination of the phenomenal. world through technology that 
creates the conditions for the utmost violence. That is why Benjamin exerts the 
utmost effort to read technology against that grain and imbricate it in an entirely 
new way of conceiving history as technology, technology as history. Thus 
Benjamin will turn to photography and film as technik, which provides for an 
expanded spectrum of perception and a visual yield that contributes to the 
deepening of apperception beyond the restrictions of subject-centred co- 
ordinates. 
'A Small History of Photography' addresses this in more or less overt ways. "' 
It hints at the importance for Benjamin of 'reading' history through the technik 
of photography, from "the fog that surrounds the beginnings... " to the "interval 
of ninety years [that] discharges its historical tension'A23 
, 
we are not dealing with 
history as the "fill[ing ofl homogeneous empty tiMe,, 424 
, 
but instead those 
moments whereby the arrest of time that is photography at the same time 
420 Ibid., 321 
421 Ibid., 323 
422 Benjamin, W., 'A Small History of Photography', op. cit., 240-257 
423 Ibid., 240 and 256 
424 Benjamin, W., 'Theses on the Philosophy of History XVIF in 11huninations, op. cit., 264 
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9425 presents the "crystallization into a monad' 
, 
shot through with heterogeneous 
time. The matters that emerge as decisive from the 'Small History of 
Photography' have to be understood in terms of the technik of technology as 
'second nature', which requires an entire renegotiation of the relationship 
between technology and human experience. Technology as a second nature is no 
longer in the position of being subordinated to the human-centred 'interiority' of 
the 'first nature' technologies of magic or aesthetic technique. Thus Benjamin 
will say that photography in its capabilities to reveal "the physiognomic aspects 
of visuals worlds which dwell in the smallest things" will "make the difference 
between technology and magic visible as a thoroughly historical variable. "426 
Photography opens up the potential for a spatio-temporal heterogeneity as never 
before, beyond the confines of aesthetic technique and subjective intention. This 
is what Benjamin means by the 'optical unconscious'. 'Tor it is another nature 
that speaks to the camera than to the eye: other in the sense that a space informed 
, 
A27 by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious. 
What compels in photography is beyond subjective intention, by virtue of the 
fact that, as Benjamin first delineates in reference to Hill's image of the 
Newhavenfishwife, "there remains something that goes beyond testimony to the 
photographer's art, something that cannot be silenced, that fills you with an 
unruly desire to know what her name was, the woman who was alive there, who 
even now is still real and will never consent to be wholly absorbed in art. " He re- 
iterates this in terms of the 'Dauthendey' picture, whereby, 
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed 
his subject, the beholder feels are irresistible urge to search such a 
picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with 
which reality has so to speak seared the subject, to find the 
inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-forgotten 
moment the future subsists so eloquently that, we looking back may 
rediscover it. 428 
42-1 Ibid., 265 
426 Benjamin, W., 'A Small History of Photography', op. cit., 243-244 
427 Ibid., 243 
428 Ibid., 243 
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Importantly, whilst such moments may appear 'incoherent' in terms of a 
perception co-ordinated by way of aesthetic technique, they can be subsequently 
coherent in terms of a 'new regime of perception'. It is important to again stress 
how photographs reveal "the visible as a historical variable" 429 and in this sense 
can undermine any clinging on to the 'naturalised' conditions of aura. So, 
photographs have the capacity to "pump the aura out of reality like water from a 
sinking ship. 99430 That historically variable nature of visibility is also apparent in 
the desire "to bring things closer to us'431 
, 
which, as MacPhee suggests, connects 
with "the different apperceptive arrangement" 432 demanded by photography, 
such that it, indeed as Benjamin says, "sets the scene for a salutary estrangement 
between man and his surroundings". 433 This seems to me to be precisely the 
condition for the 'play' within technology as characterised by Hansen, above. 
That element comes to the fore forcibly in relation to the technology of film. The 
key to film lies in its constructed nature as a matrix of sequencing, inter-relating, 
editing and cutting of images. As such, as MacPhee explains, "that is the spatio- 
temporal co-ordinates of formal coherence and meaning are themselves produced 
through the sequencing and interrelation of images, rather than being a function 
99434 of a fixed transcendental framework 
. 
That is to say that the medium of film 
matches the transitivity of technology as 'second nature' but brings this into play 
with the distraction of its audiences, which, being both an openness to new 
possible configurations of perception other than fixed co-ordinates and, as Sam 
Weber suggests, as dispersion or strewn-ness, 435 it connects with the way of 
being of the masses, so that technology and bodily innervation may come 
together. Hence the importance of the analogy with the surgeon, not just because 
"he greatly diminishes the distance between himself and the patient by 
penetrating into the patient's body and increases it but little by the caution with 
which his hand moves among the organs" and, in a similar way, the cameraman 
429 Ibid., 244 
430 Ibid., 250 
431 Ibid., 250 
432 MacPhee, G., op. cit., 215 433 Benjamin, W., 'A Small History of Photography' : 25 1, quoted in Macphee, G., op. cit., 215 434 MacPhee, G., op. cit., 218 
435 see Weber, S., 'Art, Aura and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin' Afass Afediallras, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 102 
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66 penetrates deeply into [reality's] web 9436 
, 
but because the picture obtained by 
the cameraman "consists of multiple fragments which are assembled under a 
new law. A37 [Emphasis added]. It is precisely in this sense that Benjamin reads 
technology through concepts, which are "completely useless for the purposes of 
Fascism" whilst being "useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in 
the politics of art438. " Fascism is capable of harnessing 'second-nature' 
technology for auratic ends. It can do so by precisely that imposition of subject- 
centred perceptual co-ordinates and subordination of the phenomenal world, 
suggested above, so that by way of technology the 'dispersed' masses are given a 
face that looks back, thus 'fixing' their co-ordinates. Fascism can "attempt to 
organise the masses without affecting property relations", by "giving these 
masses not their right but their chance to express themselves 
., 
A39 That chance 
comes most emphatically by way of 'self-expression'; 
"Mass reproduction is aided especially by the reproduction of the masses, In big parades and 
monster rallies, in sports events and in war, all of which nowadays are captured by the camera 
and sound recording, the masses are broughtface tojace with themselves. 440 [Emphasis added] 
Fascism, by co-ordinating the means by which the 'mass' looks itself in the face, allows the 
Gmass' to find the gaze that ostensibly looks back. Of course, this can also happen through other 
-spectacular' means via a certain 'selection', "a selection before the equipment from which the 
star and the dictator emerge victorious. 'A41 
It is this urgency that drives Benjamin to his famous inversion, and it is worth re- 
iterating its context in terms of the importance for Benjamin of the relationship 
between 'second nature' and innervation, 
If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property 
system, the increase in technical devices, in speed and in the sources of 
energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. 
The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been 
mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology 
436 Benjamin, W., 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' in Illuminations, 
op. cit., 235 
437 Ibid., 236 
438 Ibid., 220 
439 Ibid., 243 
440 Ibid., 253, n. 21 
441 Ibid., 249, n. 12 
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has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of 
society 
.. 
[Mankind's] self-alienation has reached such a degree that it 
can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first 
order. This is the situation of politics, which Fascism is rendering 
aesthetic. Communism responds by politicising art. 442 
It is true that here Benjamin 'names' a politics. But it is unlikely that he would 
be 'guilty' of "over-naming" in terms of an 'instrumental' communism. Two 
things are significant here. Benjamin has been at pains to recognise the 
proletarian masses as necessarily 'dispersed' by the 'atomising' forces of 
modernity, whereby bodily organs are 'disaggregated' into various 'functions'. 
The point is not to disavow this by a 'false consciousness' of an aggregated 
body, but to turn this around through the recognition of a new topography of 
perception, which demands an open field of politics that may shoot a star of hope 
across history. 
Following from this, Benjamin's conception of politics and history is decidedly 
contra historical time understood as a continuum. For Benjamin the non- 
sensuous similarity inhering in perception conforms to concept of history 
wherein, "The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant 
when it can be recognized and is never seen again'9443 ; "to articulate the past 
historically 
.. 
means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes by in a moment of 
danger"44 such that any politics is going to have to be in terms of the Jetztziet, 
66an image is that in which the Then and the Now come together into a 
constellation like a flash of lightening. In other words; an image is dialectics at a 
standstill 
... 
the image that is read, that is, the image at the Now of recognizability, 
bears to the highest degree the stamp of that critical, dangerous impetus that lies 
,, 445 at the source of all reading. It seems to me that it is from within technology 
that Benjamin seeks the conditions for a revolutionary (in terms of an awakening 
442 Ibid., 244 
443 Benjamin, W., 'Theses on the Philosophy of History V' in Illuminations, op. cit., 257 444 Ibid., 257 
445 Benjamin, W., 'Re The Theory of Knowledge The Theory of Progress' Benjamin: 
Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. Smith, G., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 50- 
51 
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to the 'Now-time) politics, without succumbing to a technological or political 
deten-ninism. As Miriam Hansen has it: 
For the promise cinema held out [as a form of sensory, psychosomatic 
aesthetic experience] was that it might give the technologically altered 
sensoriurn access to a contemporary materially-based and collective 
form of reflexivity that would not have to surrender the mimetic and 
temporal dimensions of [historically individualised] experience. 446 
Benjamin's reading has been characterised as one of technology as 'pure means', 
which resonates with politics as 'pure means'. To debate Benjamin's meditation 
on politics, as in his 'Critique of Violence' is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
this characterisation of his reading of technology derives from an interpretation 
that suggests, "Benjamin hoped to separate the pure, unalloyed use of 
technological means [the mediality of the [film] medium], that is film as a 
revolutionary medium, from its exploitation in fascist propaganda., A47 This may 
be to interpret his reading, which clearly goes beyond or seeks another direction 
to its 'semiotic' element, as 'pure' mediality. However, it seems to me that 
Benjamin recognised not only in film but in other aspects of modernity, a mode 
of sensory affect (surely always historical for Benjamin), which potentially 
interplayed with and thereby potentially "wrested from conformism" a social 
sensorium that had already become, far from 'pure' but mediated by the 'means' 
of production and aspects of the commodification of everyday life. In this sense, 
it could be said that Benjamin would not separate a politics of technology from a 
politics, as such. The legacy of readings of Benjamin appears to suggest 
something of an impossibility of the political, inasmuch as, in terms of 
Benjamin's view of the in-authenticity of tradition, as soon as politics became 'a 
politics', it would be on a path towards its own disintegration or, if given a 
'face', would be dangerously auratic. 448 If politics derives from and articulates 
446 Hansen, M. B., 'Benjamin and Cinema', op. cit., 341 447 Hanssen, B., 'On the Politics of Pure Means' in Violence, Identity and Self-Determination, 
eds. de Vries, H., & Weber, S., ( Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 246 
448 For example, David S. Ferris argues "Benjamin's understanding of the historical is useless for 
political organization: such an understanding is the testimony of an event, that is, of a dialectical 
image, that must last long enough to be critical, but be cut off from what it criticizes, lest the 
dialectical complicity of its ground be revealed 
... 
In the moment of [this] discontinuity, Benjamin 
attempts to think a politics, albeit a politics defined by its own inability to save itself, which is to 
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the 'Now-time' as the interruptive 'crossing' of history seizing the past in-to the 
presence of the new, then it is perhaps much more a politics of nuance and 
reflexivity than some of the more contemporary interpretations of Benjamin's 
language might allow, especially if we still search for a politics of redemption or 
overcoming. The fact that for Benjamin redemption was only possible at the 
point of the "outside of time" of the Messiah, acted, I think, as a critique of the 
presumptions of a politics of overcoming in favour of the recognition of the 
effect (power'; politics) of the enfolding of speculative critique into the here and 
now, at the level of existence, to 'open up' a hope for future possibilities. In this 
sense I am not sure that his reading of politics and the aesthetic is as far removed 
from Nancy's as perhaps I first thought. Nor so that of Derrida, but there still 
lurks the matter of the Messiah as possible transcendental signified, which I 
think needs to be 'worked out' between Benjamin and Derrida. 
In Specters ofMarx, Derrida shows how he goes with yet departs from 
Benjamin. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Derrida takes up the notion 
of the messianic as a spectral and promissory temporal structure. It is this that he 
is thinking of, with his injunction in resistance to 'technology' and 'the media' 
that for which we must assume the inheritance of Marxism as "that which 
continues to put back on the drawing board the question of life, spirit, or the 
spectral, of life-death beyond the opposition of life and death', 449. It is the 'time- 
out-of-joint' as the time of the infinite memory of and unaccountable future of 
the 'the other' which for Derrida constitutes justice, and that Derrida wrestles 
from Marx's ontology by're-working' Marxism as a hauntology. Derrida is 
particularly interested in those aspects of Benjamin's thoughts on history that do 
say that politics can have no history other than an inability to resist its ungroundable relation to 
history. " See Ferris, D. S., 'Aura, Resistance and the Event of History' in Malter Benjamin 
Theoretical Questions, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 24-25. Peter Osbome writes 
of Benjamin's politics as a 'black-hole . ..... the political dimension of the concept of historical 
experience remained crucially under-determined. As the temporal structure of the new concept of 
experience a sociologically based but MessianicalIy expanded conception of the historical 
experience of cultural form achieves increasing clarity, its political meaning recedes from view. 
The political, one might say, is the black hole at the centre of Benjamin's work. The linchpin of 
his project to fuse materialism with theology, the idea from which everything else derives its 
meaning, it is present, ultimately only as a need. " See Osbome, P., 'Small-scale Victories, Large- 
scale Defeats' Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, eds. Benjamin, A., & 
Osborne, P., (London: Clinamen Press, 2000 edition), 93 449 Derrida, J., Specters ofAfarx, op. cit., 54. 
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not just imply the 'messianic' but mention it. 450 But at the same time Derrida 
resists any identification with the Messiah. We might wonder why he namcs his 
injunction messianic at all. We might also wonder whether Benjamin's bringing 
of the Messiah into play here with his concept of history might be some 
equivocation on his part? I might say 'yes' and 'no', but the 'no' supports the 
view that a 'Messianic' appeal by. Benjamin at the same time is devoid of any 
model of 'overcoming' or completion on his part. Furthennore, the alliance in 
Benjamin between a politics of memory, ultimately premised upon the Messianic 
and his concept of innervation, is not modelled on anything suggesting tile 
'overcoming' in Hegel's sense of the incarnate of the 'body' of state or 
community. Dispersal is, I think, critical for Benjamin. So we need to explore 
why the messianic for Derrida and why the messianic pitted against that other 
spectre of technology9 In Specters ofMarx, Derrida answers this question in 
terms of an inheritance of Marxism and an open future. To take the latter first, in 
its thematic recurrence throughout Specters, Derrida will deploy the messianic, 
despite its religious signification to mark the entirely open 'to come' of the other, 
This eschatological relation to the to-come of an event and of a 
singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated 
... 
just 
opening 
... 
messianic opening to what is coming 
... 
to the event as the 
foreigner itself, to her or him for whom one must leave an empty place, 
always in memory of the hope 
- 
and this is the very place of 
spectrality. 451 
450 In a footnote in Specters qfMarx, Derrida particularly identifies Benjamin's theses thus: 
having extrapolated on the 'puppet and the dwarf, Derrida continues "The following paragraph 
names messianisni, or more precisely, messianic without messianism, a 'weak messianic 
power'... Let us quote this passage for what is consonant there 
... 
with what we are trying to say 
here about a certain messianic destitution, in a spectral logic of inheritance and generations, but a 
logic turned to the future no less than the past, in a heterogeneous and disjointed time. What 
Benjamin calls Anspruch (claim, appeal, interpellation, address) is not far from what we are 
suggesting with the word injunction: "The past caff ies with it secret index by which it is referred 
to redemption 
... 
There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our 
coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed 
with a weak messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled 
cheaply. Historical materialists aware of that 
... 
We should quote and reread here all these pages 
- 
which are dense, enigmatic, burning- up to the final allusion to the 'chip' (shard, splinter) that the 
messianic inscribes in the body of the at-present and up to the 'strait gate' for the passage of the 
Messiah, namely every 'second'. For this does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future 
turned into homogeneous empty time. " Derrida, J., Spectres of Alarx, trans. Kamuf, P., (London: 
RoUtledge, 1994), 181, n. 2 451 Ibid., 65 
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Simon Critchley suggests that, for Dcrrida, the messianic points to flic 
irreducibility of the religious, or more exactly, 
The irreducibility of the spectral is linked to the irreducibility of the 
religious for Derrida, where Marx critique of religiosity would be part 
and parcel of his ontological approach. Hauntology is premised upon 
the irreducibility of forms of non-identity and alterity, where the 
religious is a privileged form of such alterity. 452 
We could say 'yes' and 'no' to this in the context of Derrida's critique of Marx's 
ontology as a means by which to chase down all examples of the 'ideological', 
including religion. Derrida wants to put back in play a certain structure, which 
pertains to a mode of the religious in order to refute the ontological present in 
favour of the promise, the 'to come'. This is the transformation required to 
mobilise the spirit of Marxism against what Derrida characterises as an 
insufficiency of the ontological vis-A-vis (to go right back to the beginning), "the 
new speed of the apparition (we understand this word in its ghostly sense) of tile 
simulacrum, the synthetic or prosthetic image, and the virtual event, cyberspace 
and surveillance, the control, appropriations and speculations that today deploy 
unheard-of powers". 453 It therefore seems to me that Derrida posits the 
messianic, not so much for its irreducibility in terms of the religious, but because 
it shares something of or deploys a structure of differance, vis-A-vis what we 
might understand as the apocalyptic structure of technology. This differentiation 
is important in order to conclude that for Derrida there is no 'exterior' politics in 
a 'pre-formed' or envisaged 'incarnate' sense that can be applied to technology 
or our technologically dominated age. Just as we cannot assume that which 
counts as the inheritance of Marxism, or the inheritance of the religious for that 
matter, on the basis of a content that may impede the 'absolute hospitality', the 
4 454 yes' to the arrivant(e), the 'come' to the future that cannot be anticipated 
Insofar as it is open and it is "waiting for the event as justice, this hospitality is 
absolute only if it keeps watch over its own universal ity, 455 
452 Critchley, S., 'Derrida's Specters of Marx' in Philosophy and Social Criticism (Vol. 2 1, no. 3, 
1995), 17 
453 Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx, op. cit., 52-54 
454 Ibid., 168 
455 ibid., 168 
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Here in Specters Derrida will write of a despairing messianism, which might 
appear to have some affinity with Benjamin's articulation of hope and sadness 
and "hope for the hopeless", but is distinct from this. Derrida links a "despairing 
messianism" with the uncanny and unheimlich, "strangely familiar, yet 
inhospitable at the same time" of Freud and Heidegger, to get across the 
necessity for embracing a lack of assurance, an 'impossibility', "this figure of 
absolute hospitality whose promise one would choose to entrust to an experience 
that is so impossible, so unsure of its indigence, to a quasi-"mcssianism", so 
anxious, so fragile and impoverished 
... 
for a despairing messianiSM., A56 This 
despair is necessary because "without this... despair and if one could count on 
what was coming, hope would be but the calculation of a program. One would 
have the prospect but one would no longer wait for anything or anyone. Law 
without justice. "457 Such despair is necessary as the mark of a certain essential 
hesitation and, we might say, interruptive vibration against whilst within tile 
onslaught of the virtualisation of the tele-technological. 'It' moves, trembles, it 
'spooks', 'es spukt; as part of the two-fold gesture, the differance of the 
technological. As above, in this chapter: 
"in the general dis-location to which our time is destined 
... 
the messianic trembles on the 
edge of this event itself. It is this hesitation, it has no other vibration, it does not live 
otherwise, but it would no longer be messianic if it stopped hesitating; how to give rise 
and to give place, still, to render it, this place, to render it habitable, but without killing the 
, 9458 future in the name of old frontiers... 
This position re-emerges with Derrida's other sustained engagement with the 
question of technology, which occurs in his debate with Bernard Stieglcr. The 
dialogue occurs in Echographies of Television. 459 In brief, Derrida and Sticglcr 
share concerns about the ways in which contemporary technology may or may 
not keep open the possibilities for reflexive memory and an opening to the 
future. Stiegler is concerned that the current modalities of technological image 
production and the modes of 'selection' that predominate economically and 
456 Ibid., 168-169 
457 Ibid., 169 
458 ibid., 169 
459 Derrida, J., and Stiegler, B., Echographies of Television, tran. Bajorek, J., (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 2002) 
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socially, in terms of the dissemination of technologies, are such that, ratlicr than 
opening up space and time as modes for reflexive memory and futurc horizons, 
instead are at one with an undifferentiated temporal flux of consciousncss, which 
is in danger of reducing reflexivity. Responding to Stiegler's predominantly 
Husserlian paradigm, Derrida reiterates his thesis concerning the spatio- 
temporality of arche-writing, as differance, the already inscribed anachronistic 
temporality of that 'other' spectre that preoccupies him in Specters ofAfarx. 
Derrida will basically keep faith with his articulation of inheritance, reading and 
the notion of image reading as far more spatio-temporally "intcmally" 'different' 
than Stiegler might allow. Stiegler, on the other hand, suggests that the selection, 
direction and steer given to modalities of the image that predominate as 
potentially 'flattening out' memory, requires an'extemal political will to engage 
in new paradigms of intelligibility concerning the image. It is in this Paxtental 
sense that Stiegler will call for a 'politics of memory. ' 
The stake today is to invent, therefore, at an international level, a 
politics of memory, in response to the 'economic' and 
'phenomenological' specificity of the contemporary technologies that 
allows the future to take place in a manner that is more than less 
interesting, itself more than less promoting of the future 
... 
Political 
mobilization, is consequently for Stiegler, one important condition of 
reflection and invention upon the movement of difference and spacing 
that constitute the tele-technologies in the first place, a movement of 
which these same technologies, in alliance with the econon-dc, are 
reducing rather than increasing consciousness. vv460 
Both Derrida and Stiegier share an injunction for an open future, premised upon 
a politics of memory, but as we have seen with Derrida, "an invention that would 
promote the incalculable (open future) is itself impossible to calculate. 461 
As Beardsworth summarises, 
460 See Beardsworth, R., 'Towards a Critical Culture of the Iniage' in TeAhnema, (Vol. 4., Spring, 
1998), 8-9 or: b!! 12: //tekb nema. free. fr/4 Bea rds wort h. ht 461 ibid., 9 
239 
Thus where Stiegler looks for political determination between 
difference and the technical, for the future to remain open, given that 
determination opens up the future as much as it may close it, with this 
same horizon in mind, Derrida both looks to political determination and 
takes distance from the political instance, leaving the future of the 
technical to be decided, given that for him, anticipation always runs the 
risk of filling the future in. 462 
Derrida has shown that the thinking of technology needs to think the 
anachronistic spatio-temporality of differance and the messianic hesitation, 
within the 'speed of the apparition' that contemporary technology appears to be, 
in the way that he has brought the intervention of differance to other forms of 
communication, such as writing, art, speech, and the conceptual frameworks 
through which they have been thought, as a politics without calculation, without 
pre-determined 'exterior' force. 
Nancy will similarly but differently suggest that 'politics' in relation to 
technology and art is co-extensive with each of these on the basis of what they 
share and are exposed do with regard to the circulation of sense. What is perhaps 
difficult and strange in Nancy's thought is his privileging of 'sense' as the way 
in which we can rethink existence and how this can be applied to political and 
communal relations, as opposed to essentialising and totalising models of 
thought. Insofar as the aesthetic has a primary relation to sense, Nancy 
nevertheless is not promulgating the aesthetic as the route to the political or as 
the mode by which to deconstruct he technological as each needs to be re- 
thought within its own terms. 
I suggest Nancy makes something of a bridge between Heidcgger and 
Benjamin's thought along the lines of the distinction between aesthetics and 
'aisthesis', art and sense. He extracts from Hcidcggcr the notion that art opens a 
world, 'creates' the sense of sense as world, world as sense, and extracts from 
Benjamin, obliquely and more 'hidden' perhaps, that art has to be thought in 
terms of the infinite relativisation of the fragment. That is to say, where in sonic 
462 bid., 10 
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respects Nancy will 'echo' Heidegger's notion of the 'riss' on the border 
between sense and world, for Nancy this is a 'fragmentary' opening to 'sense' 
coextensive with world and has not to do with any claims towards the gathering 
of a community, or similar broader "theological-political claims". Nancy also 
takes from Heidegger the 'original' relation between 'art' and technology in 
'techne', but he resists an opposition between the routes or 'ends' of each. 
Rather, he re-thinks 'techne' in its specific articulation of sense. Similarly, vis-A- 
vis Benjamin, Nancy will not critically separate art as 'technique', as a form of 
constrictive application to 'nature', but will rethink technique as the mode of 
infinite relativisation of the fragmentation of art that breaks with the 'artifice' of 
the unicity in the concept of art. He takes from Benjamin something of the 
historical urgency of rethinking 'sense' in the here and now, whereby 'our ýime' 
appears to us as the 'absence' or 'loss' of 'sense', but is thus, and necessarily, 
open to a future uncertainty of 'itself'. The absence of sense of our world is 
characterised both by the accumulation of senseless atrocities and our current 
state of the West's future being determined by the continuation of a subject- 
centred individualism cast within an ever expanding 'eco-technics' of capital. 
Faced with this, the West's response is, rather than rethink possibilities, to cling 
on to 
... 
exclusionary and appropriative politics, its yearning fascination with 
exteriority (God, Law, Value); its debilitating nostalgia for lost 
community, myths and rituals 
... 
the precariousness of its rational and 
libertarian efforts to establish the self-evidence of 'freedom'; its self- 
deceiving presumption of evil's essential negativity; the intrusion of 
eco-technical values into health and life; its determination of the 
'market value' of human being reflected in media opinion 
... 
etc. 463 
Underlying this is a 'substantialist' metaphysics, which relies on the presumption 
of a predetermined existence and essence of human being, which is in turn 
reflected back upon itself in what Nancy calls an 'immanentism'. Contra to this, 
Nancy proposes a re-articulation of the 'circulation' or coming and going of 
sense (as opposed to the 'vicious' circle of significations that I think Benjamin 
463 Hutchens, B. C., Jean-Luc Nancy: The Future ofPhilosophy, (Buckinghamshire: Acumen, 
2005), 2 
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would identify with technique) that is our world, in which we exist as singular 
finite beings, insofar as we are exposed to the plurality of, and thus the 
fragmentary nature of this 'circulation' of sense. To share in the 'surprise' of 
sense is our freedom, as an inaugural act, irreducible to those historical and 
extant 'models' of history, community, politics, technology, art premised upon 
substantialist conceptualisation. Nancy's thought thus proceeds by way of a 
critique of and 'labouring' of such conceptualisations in order to draw out the 
"untapped 'an-archic' conceptual possibilities of experience and the intense 
disruptions, interruptions and fragmentations of existence"464, insofar as 
existence has been thought in substantialist, immanent ways, which prohibit the 
thinking of freedom in the fragments of sense. 
If Benjamin is a background figure for Nancy, it is through Hegel and Heidegger 
that Nancy will primarily approach a rethinking of art and sense. In some ways 
Nancy shares Heidegger's view about the distinctive possibilities of art in 
relation to experience. But Nancy moves away from Heidegger's immanentism, 
which is premised on an 'authentic' gathering, with regard to the place of art in 
disclosing a world. I want first to delineate some of Nancy's key thoughts in 
relation to art and sense before considering the wider ramifications of Nancy's 
thought on technology, politics and community. 
Significant for Nancy is art as the creation of 'worlds' of sense and the 
delineation, the 'setting out' of the singular plural of the senses. The point for 
Nancy is to bring sense. back into the world in all its fragmentation as existence 
to counter the attempts to 'capture' sense under some subject versus object 'law' 
or 'eidos', which can be traced back in the history of aesthetics. In this he is with 
Heidegger and Benjamin who, we might say, shared a view as to the 
'constrictive' coordinates of aesthetics, although they differed dramatically in 
their accounts of how to respond to this. Sense is restless and strange as co- 
extensive with world inasmuch as it marks the continuing affirmation of 
singularity and the infinite finitude of sense. Nancy thinks the world without 
transcendence and, as such, the world is nothing but the singular instances of 
464 Ibid., 3 
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sense in their restless aleatory 'coming and going'. Insofar as there is a 'trans', it 
is not the exteriority of a transcendental condition, but what Nancy calls a 'trans- 
imminence' to characterise this co-extensivity between world and sense as the 
spacing of singular sense. For Nancy what art marks, traces or brings to presence 
is the incessant strangeness and 'estrangement' of 'man' to his sense of sense as 
existence, which means to say, our infinite exposure of ourselves to our 
existence as non-essence. If this is our infinite exposure to the 'otherness' of our 
being, Nancy does not evoke this in existential or transcendent terms of being 
'thrown into the world'. It is more a matter of what Nancy characterises as 
4 affectability' and 'passibility' as being in the world toward sense. 
Affectability constitutes the pres-ence of sensible presence, not as a 
pure virtuality, but as a being-in-itself-always-already touched, touched 
by the possibility of being touched. For this, it is necessary for being- 
passible in itself to have already offered some part of itself 
- 
but here, 
the part counts for the whole 
- 
to something outside of itself (or to some 
part of itself set apart from itself). Affect presupposes itself. in this it 
behaves like a subject, but as the passive or passible actuality of a 
being-subject-to. This originary act of passibility necessarily takes place 
as the cutting and opening of an access, the access through which it is 
possible for a sensing thing to sense something sensed, for a sensed 
thing to be sensed. Exteriority as intimacy of the aisthetic entelechy 
gives us the cut of the place: sensation is necessarily local. A sensation 
without difference and without locality 
-a sensation without world - 
would not be a sensation (and would not be 'a' would not be this 
singular being that a sensation as 'a' sensation always is). 465 
This is to broach a complex evocation of sensing oneself sensing and being 
sensed. But this discussion, seemingly at the level of the minutiae of sense, is 
critical for Nancy in extrapolating the significance of the creation of singular 
'worlds' or 'fragments' of sense, which are necessary for our comprehension of 
the world as it is today. In a way, this is to recast Benjamin's innervation as the 
'between' of beings as singularities articulated by a supplementary, 'hidden' we 
465 Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the World, op. cit., 128-9 
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might say, sense of touch, as the one supposedly 'reflexive' but always 
'exposed-to-the-other-at-a 
-distance' sense. 
466 
The sense of touch feels itself feeling itself and thus presents the proper 
moment of 'sensuous exteriority'. It is both the interval between 
touching and the heterogeneity of the ways this interval figures in 
467 
contact with the singularities of the world 
. 
Insofar as the modality of touch 'stands for' the 'gap' and 'spacing' as the 
condition of sense as sensing oneself-sensing at the same time broached by the 
'other', Nancy is as interested in the 'localisation' of sense as the plurality of 
worlds, 'demonstrable' by way of the irreducible heterogeneity of the aesthetic. 
But what art makes visible 
- 
that is, what it touches upon and what it at 
the same time puts to work through techne 
- 
is that it is precisely not a 
matter of differentiation happening to an organic unity, nor a differential 
as continuous variation. It is rather a matter of this: that the unity and 
uniqueness of a world are and are nothing but the singular difference of 
a touch and a zone of touch. There would be no world if there were no 
discreteness of zones (an extension more ancient than any origin) 
... 
468 
Given that the arts both touch upon one another and yet are discrete, and that 
they can be thought as exposed to each other's 'otherness' in their very 
'identity"', continually fragmenting both 'within' and in 'contiguity' with each 
other any 'unity' that is Art, they articulate something of a 'modality' for 
thinking the political and the communal as well. As such, thinking the singular 
plural of the fragment enables a deconstruction of technology as a means of 
undermining the 'sovereignty' of the technological, without dismissing 
technology. In an interesting departure from Benjamin perhaps, and in a very 
particular way inflected by aspects of Heidegger's thought, 'art' (but let us not 
466 Derrida 's essay on Jean-Luc Nancy is entitled 'Le Toucher', in which he makes considerable 
idiomatic play on the notion of touch and its reflexivity; to touch on; to 'meddle with'; to 
approach at a tangent in such a way as to make clear the heteronomy and distance installed in 
touch which always already interrupts any assumed reciprocity or fusion' or auto-affection 46' Hutchens. B. C., Jean-Luc Nancy: The Future qfPhilosophy, op. cit., 55 468 Nancy, J-L., 'Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just OneT, 19. 
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forget, art in all its fragmentation), certainly supports, or goes along with, a re- 
thinking of technology. 
Nancy recognises the intimate connectivity between war, sovereignty and the 
circulation of capital and its mediations and within the immanential thinking of 
technology, war and its supposed opposites, humanitarianism and peace become 
inter-related, such that the values and ends ofjustice, goodness and perpetual 
peace become empty and inaccessible, just as sovereignty is the empty 'concept' 
or "figure" of legitimacy for the "ecotechnical spacings of the circulation of 
capital. "46'9 However, at the same time Nancy recognises that within itself, 
"ecotechnics can offer an absence of sense that it cannot itself appropriate by 
immanential thinking 
... 
there is a form of inaccessible sovereignty in the 
community of sharing among singularities that precedes the instrumental 
utilisation of figures of sovereignty. A70 
Political and or technological 'determination' in this sense is the aleatory coming 
and going of 'touches' of communicative sense that both 'tie' and 'untie' in their 
relation. 
The inexpressible communicability of sharing composes a sovereignty that will never 
reach a limit, never achieve the immanential end of sovereignty for which ecotechnics 
purportedly strives 
.... 
buried beneath the ecotechnical circulation of capital and the 
sovereign logic of war is the technology that assists in the circulation of meaning as an 
end in itself 
.. 
the network of communication exposes us to the interleaved reticulations of 
existence 
... 
the global condition of the world is one in which there is spacing, not 
finishing; the intersection of singularities not the identification of figures; and the 
exhaustion of the ideal of sovereignty that, in reality is lacking in itself. "47 I 
In Nancy's own words: 
The global world is also the finite world, the world of finitude. Finitude is spacing. 
Spacing "executes" itself infinitely. Not that this means endlessly beginning again, but 
that meaning no longer occurs in a totalization and presentation (of a finite and 
accomplished infinite). Meaning is in not finishing with meaning.... Within this "nothing"; 
there is no repression or sublimation of the violent burst of sovereignty: never to be 
469 Hutchens, B. C., Jean-Luc Nancy: The Future ofPhilosophy 153 
470 Ibid., 154 
471 Ibid., 154 
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finished with, there is an explosion 
... 
from beyond war, the lightning of peace. In a sense 
this is technology itself. What is called technology or again what I have called ecotechnics 
(in itself which would liberated from capital), is the techne of finitude or spacing. This is 
no longer the technical means to an End, but techne itself as in-finite end, techne as 
existence of finite existence in all its brilliance... a technology that of itself raises the 
necessity of appropriating its meaning against the appropriative logic of capital and the 
sovereign logic of war. 472 
As such, political and technological 'determination' is constitutively open to, 
exposed and even vulnerable to the future. But this is 'preferable' to, in Nancy's 
terms, appropriating the meanings of art, technology, the political, and 
community and reflecting them back in an 'ideality' so as to predict their future 
outcomes. 
Instead of empowering ourselves by treating such notions as significations of a controllable 
future, it is imperative to deconstruct their terms and contexts in order to free them from 
corrosive presumptions that anticipate the form the future will take. 473 
We need to go back to T. J. Clark's meditation on art and technology at the 
beginning of this chapter and re-approach this relation between art and the 
'image' world and the potential politics this relation offers. "What is the 
difference between dead mimicry and live (uncanny) 'giving voice' ? 99474 
472 
473 
Nancy, J-L Being Singular Plural op. cit 139-140 
474 
Hutchens, B. C., Jean-Luc Nancy: The Future ofPhilosophy, 159-160. 
Clark, T. J., 'Modernism, Postmodernism and Steam' 160-162. 
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Chapter Four: Life after Theory 
The underlying theme and concern of the thesis has been to rethink the 
relationship between aesthetics and politics without subordinating one to the 
other and without recourse to totalising concepts, which assume a foundation and 
ground for each and return the 'other' and its future possibilities to the 'same'. 
There is an ethico-political project of my own here, in that I am seeking a way in 
which the reading of art and its history and the philosophical history of 
aesthetics, can make a difference as part of an ultimately emanicpatory project, 
without such a reading being subordinated to a political programme that reduces 
the effectiveness and affect of the art, but at the same time without recourse to 
aestheticism. That is precisely why I have been attracted to the thought of 
Derrida and Nancy. It is their acknowledged debt to and close reading of the 
'metaphysics' of modernity and a radicalised repositioning of ontology for 
contemporary contexts that I have pursued here as a means to think another 
approach and a different conceptual space. 
The influence of Derrida's thought on the discipline of art history, although of 
some significance, has not been great, as I see it. Jean-Luc Nancy's influence has 
been even less so, and it has only been in the past four years or so that Nancy's 
6position' on art has been commented upon and his overall body of thought 
explained. 475 
Specific commentary on Nancy and art appears in a volume that characterises its 
provenance in terms of 'post theory' or after 'high theory'. Theory is here 
understood under the broad sweep of critical theory and its dominance in the 
eighties and nineties. 
475 See Malpas, S., 'Touching Art. ' In The New Aestheticism. Joughin, J. J. and Malpas, S., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 83-95., Hutchens, B. C., Jean-Luc Nancy and 
the Future ofPhilosophy. (Buckinghamshire: Acumen Press, 2005) and James, I., The 
Fragmentary Demand: an introduction to the philosophy ofJean-Luc Nancy. (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2006). 
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Art's relations to dominant ideologies have been exposed from a 
number of perspectives, as well as its potential to challenge these 
ideologies. What has frequently been lost in this process, however, is 
the sense of art's specificity as an object of analysis- or more accurately, 
its specificity as an aesthetic phenomenon. In the rush to diagnose art's 
contamination by politics and culture, theoretical analysis has tended 
always to posit a prior order that grounds or determines the work's 
aesthetic impact, whether this is history, ideology, or theories of 
subjectivity. The aesthetic is thus implicated in other terms, with other 
criteria and its singularity effaced. 476 
That Nancy's work might emerge and be given a context in the wake. of the 
demise of critical theory is not to be taken lightly. It could be argued that the 
demise of critical theory is symptomatic of various other 'posts' as part of the 
claimed neo-liberal consensus of the West, such that we are in a post-historical, 
post-ideological, post-feminist, post-colonial and now post-critical [theoretical] 
world. I myself have wrestled with this problem of whether the 'habitus' of the 
thoughts of Derrida and Nancy, might be part of the problem that they 
nevertheless eem to me to acutely address. 
However what has been evident to me is that neither Derrida nor Nancy has 
advocated either explicitly or implicitly in their writing something like a post- 
critical, new aestheticism. What they have done is recognise a different way in 
which art, literature, and language are critical, ethical and potentially 
emancipatory in relation to a re-thought idea of the political. 
The matter of theory has been in discussion through a major publishing event for 
the discipline of art history since 2004, Art Since1900, the encyclopaedic 
publication produced by the group of art historians/critics who are behind the 
journal October. 477 In its publishing release at least, it was claimed to be "a 
landmark study in the history of modem art". I state this to mark out its 
provenance within the commercial circulation of art historical texts and not to 
comment on its claim. My interest here is in how its presents 'theory' as part of 
476 Joughin, J. J. and Malpas, S. The New Aestheticism op. cit., I- 
477 Hal Foster, et al. Art Since 1900: Modernism, Anti-Modernism. Postmodernism. (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 2004). 
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its study. It introduces itself by means of four 'key' theoretical paradigms for 
the study of art history, 1) psychoanalysis, 2) the social history of art, 3) 
formalism and structuralism and 4) post-structuralism and deconstruction. I think 
it fair to say that these introductions draw upon the more obvious analogies with 
visual art works (and the specificity of art works is significant), such as surrealist 
painting with psychoanalysis, realism with social history, cubism with 
structuralism, "de-institutionalising" and "appropriation" art with post- 
structuralism and deconstruction. This is understandable in terins of its textbook 
status, which ensures for the reader a visual reference for the theoretical premises 
introduced, and it could be that the writers thought it important to historicise via 
art history, the claims of each theoretical conceptual apparatus. My sense though 
is that it presents us with a memory of the politics of theory, now past. 
I have deliberated over such matters and the where and how we are to search for 
a politics and ethics, has led me to some thinkers rather than others. This has 
been in an effort to avoid an over-reductive, either/or mechanism for critical 
thought, or a return to paradigms that appear to me to end up not quite meeting 
the demands of a situation which seems to call for a different conception of the 
aesthetic and the political. 
Theory itself has been rendered by some as culpable in forging the 'consumerist 
syndrome' and spawning a 'culture without a subject' or direction, inasmuch as 
it has been thought by some commentators that, say, a scepticism in terms of the 
link between power and knowledge renders all knowledge and all truth (and thus 
ethical) claims relative and continually subject to re-evaluation to the point of 
insubstantiality, or that the questioning of assumptions about subjectivity renders 
the 'subject' bereft of agency, powerless against the onslaught of linguistic and 
pictorial intcrpellation. 
In terms of Art Since 1900,1 had an expectation that it might have something to 
say about the resources we can bring to bear upon an understanding of ethics and 
politics in relation to aesthetics and art objects and their location within 
4 representation' now. The publication is mindful to point out some of the 
difficulties faced in articulating the aesthetic and the political in current times. 
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The round-table discussion concluding the book, tellingly entitled "the 
predicament of contemporary art", marks this out in a number of ways. 478 
The argument captured in the discursive signing-off is that we face the overall 
absorption of contemporary art into the culture industry, epitomised by the 
spectacularisation of the museum and gallery as part of an abundant 
spectacularisation of design along with consumerist display via fashion and 
retail. This is, according to the argument, the falfilment of Guy Debord's 
& society of spectacle' analysis of 'integrated spectacle'; the working out to its 
fullest intensity of "the intensification of capital to the extent that it becomes an 
image" and "the intensification of the image to the effect that it becomes 
capital. tA79 
There is the relationship between art and globalisation in the wake of 
postcolonial critique, whereby, despite critical effort and the opening of spaces 
for 'postcolonial others' and their aesthetic articulation, the impact of 
globalisation nevertheless endangers and brings about further commodification 
of criticality. 
There is the awkward relationship of art to technology. This is presented as an 
antinomy between the artist as 'technophile' and the artist as deliberately 
'technophobe'. On the one hand, there is the embrace of the technological by 
artists augmenting technologies to the 'second power'. This is by virtue of the 
further aestheticisation of the already aestheticised commodity of visual 
technology, which marks the everyday experience of circulated images. The 
work thereby brings about an immersive experience of awe. On the other hand, 
there is the ploughing of the remnants of the technological by exploring the 
discarded and the outmoded as a medium. However this is then prey to a 
fashionable commodification. 
Finally there is the demise of theory. None of the paradigms; psychoanalytic, 
Marxist social historical, structuralist or post-structuralist appears to speak to 
478 Ibid., 671-679 
4'9 Ibid., 673. 
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these times of "flattened indifference", "consumerist-touristic sampling of art", 
and memory in the shape of technologised amnesia. 480 
Whilst the book stands as an historical work, one still perhaps wishes for a sense 
of the future in which we might institute a reconsideration of what we might 
mean by, and need to think, in terms of the political and the aesthetic, in order to 
give us a different kind of leverage on these questions other than a somewhat 
dystopian view, tinged with, as I suggested above, the memory of, and perhaps 
nostalgia for, a certain historical conjuncture for 'theory'. 
The notion that we need a different kind of leverage has been running throughout 
my thesis, and has been intervening and interrupting, and I now need to set out 
the terms more extensively. Borrowing from Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, 
arguably re-thinking the political and the aesthetic and how they may relate to 
one another, does require something of a retreat. 481 It requires a retreat precisely 
in order to engage in what it means to face the political and the aesthetic when 
they have reached their limit points such that they are hypostasised into 
totalising concepts. The sense is that the political is 'everywhere', such that we 
can no longer critically engage with the political reflectively and the aesthetic, 
too, is such that it is 'everywhere but' where we might seek to critically engage 
with it. 
To explain this I first return briefly to Derrida and the political. In a seminar 
given by Christopher Fynsk, presented in relation to the inauguration of the 
Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political set up by Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in 1980,482 he shows how Derrida has explained that 
philosophy (his way of 'doing' philosophy) is political, insofar as it is a certain 
retreat from the political. Inasmuch as the political is understood as one means of 
the production of representation or representing production, Derrida shows what 
a limiting condition this is. Ian James in his book on Nancy discusses it thus: 
480 ibid., 678-679. 
48 1 Lacoue-Labarthe, P. and Nancy, J-L., Retreating the Political. Ed. Sparks, S. (London: 
Routledge, 1997). 
482 The papers and discussions in relation to this inauguration form the substance of Lacoue- 
Labarthe, P. and Nancy, J-L., Retreating the Political. Op. Cit. 
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Philosophical practice, in Fynsk's words, becomes [in deconstruction] a 
"work of reading or writing which brings to light that point where every 
representing production 
- 
and that is to say every practice which implies 
language 
- 
fails. Every practice then, including its own. "... This moment 
of failure which philosophical activity affirms is an encounter with what 
he calls, after Granel, the "practical finitude" of all human production. 
By this he means the inability of human production to master the 
relation it maintains to its ground or foundation. 483 
The key point about this reference to 'practical finitude' however, is that the 
recognition of this is repressed, or suppressed, by the metaphysical grounding of 
human production in its figures; God, Man, Reason, (and I add) Politics, Art, 
Technology, Human Rights, Sovereignty, the Nation State, Hospitality, 
Cosmopolitanism "and thereby attempts to install itself as master over a specific 
, A84 domain of beings. It is to this that Nancy's conceptualisation of totalising or 
immanentism refers, rather than totalitarian forms of political states themselves. 
It is also that which Derrida's thought seeks to uncover and, against which, his 
philosophy 'politicises', by way encountering 'practical finitude', and the 
41 
affirmation offailure. 
... 
philosophies affirmation of failure, the affirmation of the 
impossibility of mastering a ground or foundation, is less a nihilistic 
staring into the abyss and more an encounter with an instance of 
freedom and decision (that is the recognition that our being is not 
predetermined by an essence or a ground), a decision in which the 
existence of others and shared relation to being is at 
stake 
... 
[deconstruction's] encounter with 'practical finitude' means that 
philosophy is not and cannot be a theoretical practice, that is to say, one 
which directs itself toward the world as a work to be produced on the 
basis of grounded conceptual representations. Rather, in thinking 
existence in terms of practical finitude, as a relation to an unniasterable 
ground, philosophy allows for the possibility of a certain kind of 
483 James, I., The Fragmentary Demand: an introduction to thephilosophy ofjean-Luc Nancy. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006), 156. 484 ibid. 
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decision with regard to existence or being in which something new 
might emerge. 485 
It is not that Derrida's thought denies representation and its effects in philosophy 
and in the law, in the conditional of hospitality, of friendship, of historical time 
The effects of representation are 
... 
always at work within philosophy, 
but at its limit and in its encounter with practical finitude philosophy, 
"affimns itself as being both more and less than such a representing 
production"... Philosophy here is political because, as an attempt to 
interrogate or expose the limits of cultural knowledge and practices, it 
"would seek the conditions of an effective alteration in these practices; 
it would seek to open itself to what, from a past inaccessible to those 
practices, gives a future. It would seek to produce political possibilities 
for communities yet to come"... it is rather about releasing future 
possibilities from the limit points of what we think we know about the 
past and the present. 486 
arn not sure that Derrida would readily accept without further question the 
reference to 'communities' here and, to be more exact, it is perhaps not that 
philosophy or theory is political. It is differance, the spectral, time out ofjoint, 
the messianic without messianism, 'democracy-a venir-to come', unconditional 
hospitality, that are political because they expose the antagonism between 
finitude and its suppression. Hence, I suggest that, for Derrida, there can be no 
politics of thepresent moment, in the strict sense, as that would be based upon a 
'grounding in/of the present' which is the very suppression of finitude that his 
politics exposes. 
This has led to some well known difficulties considering what some have 
thought as Derrida's inconsistency or equivocation, "one the one hand 
conditional 
... 
on the other hand unconditional as two indissociable terms" and his 
insistence onnegotiation between such heterogeneous elements, whilst at the 
same time advocating the "to come" and avoidance of political programme. 
Laclau and Critchley's critique in Chapter One of this thesis would suggest that a 
485 James, I., op. cit., 157. 486 James, I., op. cit., 157. 
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more practical politics can in fact arise out of such negotiation, insofar as the 
articulations arising from hegemony, for instance, do not presuppose a purported 
grounding or foundational essence. As I have tried to show, however, Derrida's 
thought would suggest that hegemony as such, and that which arises as the 
overarching term, being open to deconstruction, renders it one more attempt to 
'frame' future possibilities. 
Considering Derrida's thought in the way that Fynsk articulated it in 1980, the 
political has been there all along. It seems to me that, for Derrida, the political is 
the tracing of this gap between representation and the groundlessness it seeks to 
obscure, and this is worked through in relation to the various encounters with the 
representations that he writes and talks about. Our responsibility is towards the 
intimation of this differance and limit. It is a responsibility because, within this 
gap, the exclusionary nature of our representations are opened to the other and 
the 'time ofthe other', as captured in Derrida's important figure of the spectral 
and his resistance to ontology and, to an extent, materiality. Art and Literature 
are political in the sense that they are [not] representations but are capable of 
exceeding representation by 're-marking' the intimation of the relation between 
representation and its inassimilable 'other'. Throughout the thesis, I have pointed 
to a number of texts in which Derrida develops this. I am not proposing that 
'deconstruction' be applied as a 'theory' to art works, as a means by which it 
demonstrates or finds itself reflected back its own premises. Rather, I am 
suggesting a comportment towards the reading of art, such that what might be 
un-thought is open to future possibilities. 
In one of his later seminars, Derrida makes a finer point of difference between 
the 'other in me' and the 'wholly other', with reference to the poetry of Paul 
Celan. 
Still privileging, since it has been our concern throughout, a thinking of 
sovereignty, of its majesty in the figure of a present and self-present 
ipseity, sometimes self-present in the form of the ego, in the living 
present of the ego, of the T, this T, this power to say T, that from 
Descartes to Kant and to Heidegger, has always been literally, explicitly 
reserved for human being 
... 
what I would like to make apparent, if 
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possible is how Celan signals toward an alterity, that, in the inside of the 
T as the punctual living present, as the very point of the self-present 
living presentý an alterity of the wholly other, comes not to include and 
modalize another living present (as in the Husserlian analysis of 
temporalization, where in the protention and the retention of another 
living present in the now living present, the ego comprises in itself, in 
its present, another present), but 
- 
and this is a wholly other matter 
- 
let's appear something of the present of the other, this 'letting the most 
proper of the time of the other'... 
But perhaps we are beginning here to think this subtle, unheimlich 
difference between the two kinds of strange, a difference that is like the 
place for the narrow passage of poetry of which Celan soon will speak. 
It is the difference, in the punctuality of the now, in the very point of the 
present instan4 of my present, between, on the one hand, my other 
living present (retained or anticipated by an indispensable movement of 
retention and protention) and, on the other hand, the wholly other, the 
present of the other whose temporality cannot be reduced, included, 
assimilated, introjected, appropriated within mine, cannot even resemble 
it or be like it, the present or proper time of the other, which I must no 
doubt forgo, giving it up radically, but whose very possibility (the 
perhaps beyond all knowledge) is also at the same time the chance of 
the encounter and of this eventý of this coming, of this step called 
poetry 
... 
a poetry that robs and turns the breath, that is to say, also life 
and path, which can still be a path of art at the same time larger and 
narrower. 487 
What Derrida seems to call upon here is an ethical relation (and it is a matter of 
debate as to whether this may also be 'political'), that is a relation to the wholly 
other such as is found in Blanchot and Levinas. This, insofar as that ethical 
relation is drawn from the absence of 'in-common' and that which relates 'us' is 
the absence of common and the intimating and attunement to the 'wholly other'. 
Art and literature can show this by virtue of their singularity and the capacity to 
re-mark this. It is the necessary, what we might term, struggle between the 
names [we] give to and inherit as, the institutions that 'bind' us, including 
language as such, and the singularity of the [wholly] other, that marks Derrida's 
work. There is something of a 'double' other in Derrida's thought, insofar as he 
487 Derrida, J., Sovereignties in Question. Eds Dutoit, T. and Pasanen, 0., (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 131-133. 
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is acutely aware of the relation of inheritance, history and memory (which is not 
always benign), that we bear to language, for instance, such that it is not our own 
most, even as we strive to make it our 'own' and is always inscribed with an 
'other'. ýkt the same time, it is through this spectrally inscribed language that an 
ethical relation to the other is possible. 
This revenance does not befall words by accident, following a death that 
would come to spare all others. All words, from their first emergence, 
partake of revenance. They will always have. been phantoms, and this 
law governs the relationship in them between body and soul. One 
cannot say that we know this because we experience death and 
mourning. That experience comes to us from our relation to this 
revenance of the mark, then of language, then of the word, then of the 
name. What is called poetry or literature, art itself - in other words a 
certain experience of language, of the mark, of the trait as such - is 
perhaps only an intense familiarity with the ineluctable orginarity of the 
spectre 
... 
the common universal experience of language in general 
becomes here an experience as such and appears as such in poetry, 
literature and art. Here would be much to say about this 'as 
such'... Whoever has an intimate, bodily experience of this spectral 
errancy, whoever surrenders to this truth of language, is a poet, whether 
he writes poetry or not. 488 
In this sense he has a somewhat different perspective on how we might think the 
relationship to sense, being, being-in-common and the place of the aesthetic and 
the political compared to Nancy. Derrida's differentiation between the other and 
the 'wholly other', appears to underscore something of a transcendental ethics, 
as has been argued in respect of Levinas. However, it would seem to be more of 
a piece with his notion of the messianic, insofar as there is the other in me that is 
always already in me as the necessary relation of identity which can in this sense 
be 'thought' and 'understood', but then there is the other, wholly inassimable to 
'thought' and an 'order' of temporality or horizon of expectation, as suggested 
with the double 'other' within language above. 
488 Derrida J, Sovereignties in Question, op. cit., 105. 
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It is here that there may be a difference between Derrida and Nancy, in that 
Derrida is much more concerned with a relation that involves a structure of 
temporal and spatial disjunction which 'inscribes' a [spectral] alterity on the 
principle of responsibility, rather than the 'sharing of voices' or 
contact/separation that Nancy invokes. 
In their earlier deliberations in setting up the Centre for Philosophical Research 
on the Political, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe think the relation of the 
philosophical to the political with Derrida's case for philosophy as political in 
mind and in response to Heidegger's ideas of epochal 'sending' and the 
'completion' of metaphysics. They identify two aspects to the political. One is it 
completeness. The retreat of the political is the retreat of philosophy from the 
political, insofar as the political is no longer a question. "... it is not a question or 
in question, but is rather that which, in politics, goes unquestioned (e. g. the 
acceptance within much contemporary debate that politics is ultimately and its 
last moment a function ofpolitical economy and that all other considerations arc 
subordinate to this). "489 
In the manner of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics and his understanding of 
epochal sending, the political is no longer a question because of the co-belonging 
of the political with the philosophical understood as metaphysics. The 
metaphysical sending of being of the epoch is the actualisation of thought as the 
political through philosophically instantiated figures of the human. In this sense 
Nancy and Lacoue- Labarthe articulate the completion of the "onto-theological" 
project carried on through the Enlightenment. 
... 
the European Enlightenment that constructed the human in a number 
of specific ways (through the privileging of free will, of rational or 
cognitive faculties, or of the equality and rights of the individual within 
a universality of justice or law) is itself a secular continuation of an 
onto-theological tradition 
... 
Through these figures of the human 
... 
that 
tradition has imposed itself over the past three centuries in an attempt to 
actualize or 'complete' itself in different political forms 
... 
What this 
epochal thinking leads to 
... 
is the sense that, in the wake of specific 
489 James, I., op. cit., 158. 
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(totalitarian) projects 
... 
and specifically in the light of the failure of these 
projects, the political has completed itself, or that it is now subject to a 
certain kind of closure 
... 
In this context socialism is given a privileged 
and dominant position since it is taken to be the complete and 
completing figure of philosophy's imposition - up to and what, for us at 
leastý could have represented the hope of a critique and a revolutionary 
radicalization of established Marxism. 
490 
With the failure of socialism and the loss of any sense of a revolutionary project, 
the political is complete as it is no longer able to be thought and rcalised. Instead 
it becomes that which is obvious, unexamined, and in its very completion and 
obviousness, that to which philosophical reflection is unable to respond. The 
political must be thought anew. 
This is on a par with Nancy's later Nietzschean-inflected meditation on the 
absence of sense, and the exigency of our time, also referred to elsewhere in this 
thesis. The absence of sense, understood as the completion or closure of 
philosophy, is evident in a number of Nancy's texts. 
We know, indeed, that it is the end of the world and there is nothing 
illusory about this knowledge 
... 
But the same adversaries of the thought 
of the 'end' are incorrect in that they do not see that the words with 
which one designates that which is coming to an end (history, 
philosophy, politics, art, world 
... 
) are not the names of subsistent 
realities in themselves, but the names of concepts or ideas, entirely 
determined within a regime of sense that is coming full circle and 
completing itself before our (thereby blinded) eyes. 491 
This connects with the other aspect of Nancy and Lacouc-Labartlie's analysis of 
the retreat of the political, which is the question of immancntism. As much as tile 
world has lost the sense given to it by transcendental values, so there exists the 
attempt to overcome this loss by realising erstwhile transcendent principles in 
figures 'posited' within the totality of the social body or community in tile here 
and now, to the exclusion of all others. It is this totalising immanence that is tile 
490 bid 
, 
162. 
491 Nancy J-L., The Sense of the World, op. cit., 4. 
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mark of totalitarianism in its broadest sense, and not in terms of empirically 
existing regimens of organisations of power hitherto described as such. It is in 
the name of these figures of immanence that atrocities continue to occur. 
Insofar as the political within the totalitarian formation is no longer a 
transcendence or an alterity (the divine or a 'yet-to-come'), but rather is 
invoked as an 'already here', an immanence governing the social whole, 
it cannot be questioned as such and maintains itself in an omnipresent 
giveness and self-evidence 
... 
[this] does not mean that it is for us a 
matter of repeating the appeal to transcendence, whether it be God, Man 
or History; these are transcendences which have installed totalitarianism 
or those in which it has installed itself, converting them to the 
immanence of life-in-common 
... 
such nostalgia is precisely that which 
motivates the drive toward immanence and totality proper to 
totalitarianisrn. 492 
This is the key to Nancy's drive to re-treat and re-envision 'being-in-the world', 
not on the basis of immanent figures or significations which claim to have 
already given or ordered or substantiated our sense of the world, but on the basis 
of sense, as such, as existence, which for Nancy is always already singular- 
plural. 
In order for the human to be discovered and in order for the phrase 
'human meaning' to acquire some meaning everything that has ever laid 
claim to the truth about the nature, essence or end of 'man' must be 
undone 
... 
Can we think an earth and a human such that they would be 
only. what they are 
- 
nothing but earth and human 
- 
and such that they 
would be none of the various horizons often harboured under these 
names, none of the 'perspectives' or 'views' in view of which we have 
disfigured humans and driven them to despair? 
... 
What if this 
... 
multiplicity, which tears open and is tom open let us know that we 
have not even begun to discover what it is to be many 
... 
what if it lets us 
know that it is itself the first laying bare of a world that is only the 
world, but which is the world absolutely and unreservedly, with no 
meaning beyond this very Being of the world: singularly plural and 
pluraly singular. 493 
492 James, I., op cit., 164. 
493 Nancy J-L., Being Singular Plural, op. cit., pp. xi-xiv. 
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If this sounds like a return to a 'new found' humanism, this is not Nancy's 
project, given that the 'human' itself has become one of those immanent figures 
claiming substance or substantial truth beyond question. Rather, what Nancy is 
broaching is an understanding of the world as the multiple, fragmentary 
circulation of sense that it is with singularities always in circulation with a 
multiplicity of sense. 
Insofar as Nancy appears to privilege the multiplicity of ýense, his thought might 
be conceived as a new form of aestheticism or something beyond existential 
phenomenology. Whilst it is the case that Nancy's thought develops by way of 
labouring or inverting some of the conceptual apparatus associated with these, 
such conceptions of his thought may re-instate a conceptual immanentism and 
desire for substantiation that his thought continually seeks to resist. 
It may be said that Nancy invokes a particular kind of realism and materialism 
through his ontology; an understanding of being and existence and the very 
materiality of thought, which he mobilises through certain modalities. As these 
modalities proffer sense in relation to exteriority and continual interruption of 
any 'Pull' to substantiation in the sense of immanence, they are both responses to 
and invocations of a 'fragmentary demand'. 
Nancy's thought writes against the grain of what one might have come to expect 
in relation to ontology, ethics, community, politics or art. It might be said, for 
instance, that there is an ethical presumption in 'relation' and 'communication' 
as facets of 'to be'. 
To be is nothing that is in-common, but nothing as the dispersal where 
what is in-common is dis-posed and measured, the in-common as the 
with, the beside-itself of to be as such, to be transfixed by its own 
transitivity: to be being all beings, not as their individual and/or 
common 'self', but as the proximity that disperses them. 
Beings touch; they are in con-tact with one another; they arrange 
themselves and distinguish themselves in this way. Any being that one 
might like to imagine as not distinguished, not dis-poscd would really 
be indeterminate and unavailable: an absolute vacancy of Being. This is 
why the ontological moment or the very order of ontology is necessary. 
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'To be' is not the noun of consistency; it is the verb of dis-position. 
Nothing consists, neither 'matter' nor 'subject'. In fact 'matter' or 
'subject' are nothing but two names that are correlates of one another; in 
their mode of consistency they indicate the originary spacing of the 
general ontological disposition 
... 
There is no difference between the 
ethical and the ontological: the 'ethical' exposes what the 'ontological' 
disposes. Our understanding (of the meaning of Being) is an 
understanding that we share understanding between us and, at the same 
time, because we share understanding between us: between us all, 
simultaneously-all the dead and the living, all beings. 494 
The resistance to immanence, the notion of contact/separation and fragmentation 
or incompletion in relation to the circulation of sense, are key concerns. This 
includes the incompletion that is 'literature' as the modality of in-common 
4communication' that at the same time continually interrupts the predilection for 
mythic or immanent, as articulated by Nancy through his thinking of community 
and the subject. Such concerns are worked anew in further writings, with 
reference to politics and art, some of which I have referred to throughout the 
thesis. For the purposes of conclusion I shall draw upon certain 'themes'. 
Nancy's thinking of community in Yhe Inoperable Community establishes his 
principle of community in-common but no common-bcing. The subject of 
community is important for Nancy, as it enables a critique of immanence and an 
articulation of how we might understand the finitude of shared existence. 
Community as an organic or communitarian project is a nostalgic response to the 
contractual partitioning of politics and, as such, could never exist, as there can be 
no 'communication' without separation, distance, dispersal or exposure of one 
singular existence to another. The immanent figure of community persists 
however in the model of community as 'self-production' as foundation and 
essence, indeed as 'work'. This is 'explicitly' in communism, but in persistent 
nostalgic arguments for community, as the 'totalisation' of bcing-in-common as 
the overcoming of finitude. By a reworking of Hcideggcr's Afitsein, bcing-with, 
in relation to the existential analytic of being-towards-dcath, which puts 'tile 
subject' into a relation of 'incompleteness' and exteriority on account of an 
494 Ibid., 98-99. 
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ungraspable finitude, combined with a re-evaluation of the work of Bataille in 
respect of encountering finitude indirectly in the irrecoupable death of others, 
Nancy conceives of a 'co-existential' analytic on the basis of an un-worked (that 
is to say not able to be 'worked' on the principle of overcoming or dialectising 
finitude) community of being-with on the basis of singular existences exposed 
to ( and thereby sharing) each other's finitude. 
This notion of 'being-with' in shared finitude, without foundation or essence, 
right at the 'surface' of existence is supported by Nancy's notion of literary 
communication at its limits. It is in the sharing of literature that 'communication' 
'ex-scribes'. It is through literature that the circulation of sense, in excess of 
signification is shown, that is exposed, and is the means by which meaning is 
continually interrupted and thought anew. Thus, where for Derrida literature is 
the place where language re-marks itself in its differ-ance, intimating the spatio- 
tem orality of the 'other' in being, for Nancy the literary is the spacing for the p 
circulation of sense in excess of signification that being is. In that sense, insofar 
as the literary 'ex-scribes', it has a certain power of ontological disclosure and 
'creation' of being-with in the fragment of its world. This is an ontological 
disclosure thought very specifically by Nancy. 
... 
the ontological condition required here is not a status 
... 
but consists in 
a releasing of being 
... 
a releasing of being, abandoned to a singularity or 
trajectory of singularitics 
... 
Freedom exposes existence, or rather, 
freedom is the fact that existence is exposed 
... 
the disclosedness of 
beings as such 
... 
refers to the improbable, to the unexpected to the 
surprise of disclosure 
... 
what is disclosed-it is being-and that its 
disclosure exceeds and surprises instead of coming back to it.. 495 
It is in this circulation of sense, which is each time ex-scribed and inaugurated 
anew and incommensurably, that Nancy ascribes our freedom and interruption of 
the oscillation between a mythicisation of sense by way of immanent grounding 
or the nihilistic denial of sense, which becomes yet another form of 'myth', as 
referred to earlier in the thesis. 
495 Nancy, J-L., The Experience ofFreedom. Trans McDonald, B., (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 94. 
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If being is 
... 
our sharing, then 'to be 
... 
is to share. This is relation: not a 
tendential relation, need, or drive of portions of being that are oriented 
toward their own re-union ( this would not be relation, but a self- 
presence mediated by desire or will), but existence delivered to the 
incommensurability of being-in-common. What measures itself against 
the incommensurable is freedorn. We could even say that to be in 
relation is to measure oneself with being as sharing, that is with the birth 
or deliverance of existence as such (as what through essence de-livers 
itself), and it is here that we have already recognized freedom... 496 
On this basis Nancy will further develop his notion of politics as an arena of 
non-self-sufficiency, insofar as freedom is not to do with political autononly, 
which may be construed as relative by way of social contract and citizenship or 
absolute by way subject-hood subordinate to the state, as enshrined in the 
Enlightenment project of 'the political' referred to earlier. According to a logic 
of immanentism, the relative autonomy of the exteriority of citizenship will seek 
its completion in a desire for interiorised subject-hood, as its supplement and the 
absolute autonomy of interiorised subject-hood will seek to complete itself in 
exteriorisation. Again, such dialectical oscillation is interrupted by Nancy's 
construal of a politics of non-self-sufficiency, which amounts to an extreme 
relativisation of autonomy on the basis of the tying, untying, retying of the social 
bond at the limits of singular and plural identity as and at the "site of their 
coalescent disintegration". 497 This praxis of non-self-sufficiencyproduces the 
singular/plurality of the social bond, each time anew. 
The (k)not: that which involves neither interiority nor exteriority but 
which, in being tied, ceaselessly makes the inside pass outside, each into 
(or by way of) the other, the outside inside, turning endlessly back on 
itself without returning to itself 
.. 
Such a politics consists, first of all, in 
testifying that there is singularity only where a singularity ties itself up 
with other singularities, but that there is no tie except where the tie is 
496 Ibid., 73. 
497 Librett, J. S., 'Translator's Foreword' in Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the World, op. cit., xxi. 
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taken up again, recast, and retied without end, nowhere purely tied or 
untied. 498 
As previously discussed in this thesis, Nancy, in the same volume, gives an 
analysis of art that appears analogous to that of politics. Nancy understands the 
historical moment of art to by one of 'autonomous fragmentation', which might 
be deemed to have become exhausted in this time of 'absence of sense' and thus 
a discourse on the desire for a return to aesthetic wholeness emerges (the return 
to meaning, for example). Nancy counters this by arguing that, insofar as art has 
been thought as autonomous fragment, this has always been in relation to a 
concept of wholeness which has not been forgone and hence has both returned to 
itself as a 'micro' whole and is open to the attempt to re-incorporatc in a figure 
of holistic aesthetics. This leads to Nancy's articulation for a fragmentation of 
the aesthetic as such. This is another way in which Nancy articulates the 
relationship between art and the excess of signification and the 
interruption/circulation of sense, referring back to the notion ofpresentation in 
connection with Hegel's aesthetics. 
Instead of the ambiguous end of the fragment, it is a matter of the 
fraying of the edges of its trace 
... 
the frayed access to a 
presentation 
... 
the infimity of a coming into presence, or of an e-venire. 
The event is 
... 
the incommensurability of coming to all taking-place, the 
incommensurability of spacing and fraying to all space disposed in the 
presentation of a presentation 
... 
it is presentation itsel(.. as fractal ex- 
position: presentation as fragmentation. 499 
Jeffrey Librett, Nancy's translator, asks whether the closeness of this analogous 
thinking amounts to rendering the political aesthetic or the aesthetic political. 
Nancy provides an answer re-affirming the relationship between literature and 
community discussed above and re-traces a distinction betwecn 'the political' 
and Politics. 
We call writing that which does not respond to any model whatsoever of 
the appropriation of significations, that which opens at once relation, 
and, along with relation, significance itself... 'writing' is what precedes 
498 Nancy, J-L., The Sense of the World, op. cit., I 11 499 ibid., 126. 
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signification, what succeeds on it and exceeds it, not as another, 
heightened and always deferred signification, but as the outline, the 
breaking of the path [frayage] of significance through which it becomes 
possible not only for significations to be signified but for them to make 
sense in being passed on and shared among individuals. Writing is thus 
political 'in its essence' that is to the extent that it is the tracing out 
[frayage] of the essenceless of relation. It is not political as the effect of 
an 'engagement' in the service of a cause, and it is not political-qua 
'literature' 
- 
according to either the principle of the 'aestheticization of 
politics' or its inversion into the 'politicization of aesthetics'. It is 
indeed necessary to ask in what way literature and, consequently, 
aesthetics and fiction become involved here, but only after one has 
affirmed the political nature of writing: the in-finite resistance of sense 
in the configuration of the 'together'. 500 
One can see here a casting of writing as that which brings about the finite 
sharing that is existence as the singular/plural being-with, and in this sense is a 
modality of 'the political' as he is seeking to define it. On this basis Nancy may 
reject any attribution in terms of previously thought relations between aesthetics 
and politics. That said, writing is political, perhaps on two fronts; insofar as it 
resists 'politics', as its has been thought immanently and in terms of a hypostasis 
of community and as that which breaks out the 'path' by which the circulation of 
sense that is the basis for the political takes place. This does not preclude a 
political exigencyfor writing, which at the same time is not the subordination of 
writing to the political. 
Writing 
- 
and thus also necessarily its poetry, which is to say, above all, 
its praxis 
- 
is the task of sense, on condition that it has not already been 
tied up, but the response 
- 
without resolution 
- 
to the absolute 
injunction of having to establish ties. And this nonprescribable 
injunction is also irreducible to all 'poetizing' or 'literary' 
aestheticization. The languages are to be tied. Each language is to be 
indefinitely tied up in the (k)not of its proper infinity and into the 
(k)nots of the proper infini-ties of others. They are to be tied up into the 
unattached (k)not and the non-subjective ipseity of the in-common that 
does not communicate or commune 
... 
this does not mean above all 
500 Ibid., 118- 119. 
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'literature' as a model, but the poetries of styles, modes of existence, 
modulations of relation and retreat, languages, peoples, that is cultures 
and ethnic groups, as well as social classes and non-identified 
populations, the peoples' idioms and countries, their passages from land 
to land, landscapes, worlds that are the world, worlds that are a world. 
In this sense, the political exigency cannot not be an exigency of 
configuration, even though it ought to resist the figuration/presentation 
of a sovereign body 
... 
Identities must write themselves 
... 
as non- 
identifiable (k)nots of sense 
... 
501 
A later text shows how Nancy further considers this relationship and affirms a 
particular relation of the aesthetic and political which is not a subordination of 
one to the other, but an acknowledgement that each has its distinctive 'force'. 
Nancy characterises their distinctive force in response to the question, 'Is 
everything politicalT and in that sense a continuance of the concern to're-treat' 
the political, as referred to previously. 502 Nancy articulates their distinctive force 
vis-A-vis "an incommensurable justice". 503 Politics is understood as the spacing 
which keeps open the general incommensurability ofjustice and the spacing of 
the other spaces, "where the incommensurability is in some sensefornzed and 
presented. , 504 Insofar as this incommensurability may be presented in art, 
amongst other configurations ('religion', 'thought', 'science, 'ethics', 'love' 
twar' etc), these configurations are both presentation and at the same time, "give 
form to an "impresentation" or a withdrawal of presence"505 and are at tile same 
time incommensurable with each other, even as they may touch each other. 
Politics is the site for the keeping open of these types of incommensurability 
without unifying or even giving shape to them whilst holding a certain 'shaping 
power' of non-unity. 
Politics should now be understood as the specific site of the articulation 
of a non-unity 
- 
and of symbolization of a non-figure 
... 
the necessity of 
not accomplishing an essence or an end to the incommensurable, and 
nonetheless, and precisely, of maintaining the (im) possibility: a 
501 Ibid., 121-122. 
502 Nancy, J-L., 'Is Everything Political? ' The New Centiennial Review 2.3, Fall (2002): 16-22. 
50' Ibid., 20 
504 Ibid., 20 
505 Ibid., 20 
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necessity of shaping power 
- 
the force that must hold together the non- 
organic, non-unity-on the model of an incommensurable 
'justice'... Politics becomes precisely a site of detotalization. 506 
We might say therefore, somewhat paradoxically, that politics is the passage by 
which the open relation of singular/plurality and tying/untying is kept open. 
Art, as one of the 'incommensurables' is, for Nancy, one of the means by which 
we relate to sense in excess of signification and in this sense, art touches on 
existence or brings our sense of existence to presentation, as opposed to 
representation. As we see, this understanding of a sense in excess and thus 
resistant to totalisation or subordination to a unifying concept is allied to a 
thinking ofjustice and value at the level of existence. I now turn again to the 
very particular ways in which Nancy elaborates upon the relation of art to sense. 
As I have iterated more than once, Nancy wants to understand sense as both in 
and in excess of the bounds of signification and mimetic appropriation and, 
importantly, if Nancy is working out the ontology of sense, he is doing so in 
response to a demand of the present. 
Insofar as fundamental ontologies as unifying principles intent on restoring 
'word and world' to full presence, which is what is behind mimetic thinking, 
only serve to repress the multiple andfragmentary nature ofthe sense that the 
world is today, Nancy 'allows' sense to emerge as "the multiple, fragmented and 
fragmentary real of the world to which thought is ceaselessly exposed at its 
lirnit., ý507 ... Sense' [in Nancy] is untied from an exclusive belonging to a 
symbolic order or relation of signifier to signified; it exists both as an outer limit 
and as an excess of signification, per se, becoming the element it, ithin ivhich 
significations, interpretations and representations can occur. , 508 Sense for Nancy 
takes us to a limit, which provokes a rupturing of signification; a rupturing of 
presence and it is on the basis of this that we have to re-think an ontology and 
ethics of being in the world together. 
506 Ihid., 2 1. 
507 James, I., op. cit., 9. 508 Ibid., 9. 
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Nancy's ontology is distinctly materialist, in that he is trying to think a 
materiality 'prior' to and in excess of modalities of thought, which at the same 
time exposes thought to its fragmentation. His materialism is not that of 
'substance' in the ways in which we have been used to thinking it. One can begin 
to grasp this through his writing on 'the subject' and 'the body'. A key motif in 
his thinking of the subject is his somewhat unusual invocation of 'la bouche', the 
mouth. Ian James explains thus: 
Where for Lacan eyes and ears are sites of reflection which offer a 
perfect figure for his emphasis on the specular quality of the imaginary 
order and a dialectic of desire and recognition instituted by the 
symbolic, for Nancy, la bouche figures this instant of thought of 
presentation and withdrawal of an I which surgesforth in a spasm of 
'extreme withdrawal' prior to any economy of exchange or of 
recognition. "Imagine" Nancy tells us, "a mouth without a face 
... 
a 
mouth without a face then, making a ring from its contraction around 
the noise: T' The mouth here is not the mouth that we represent and 
place within an identifiable face. Rather it is that opening or beance 
around which the mouth that we know forms itself. 
509 
Nancy is presenting a materiality here, which is figured as an exteriority of 
spasmic spacing in which the singularity of the subject's existence takes place. 
As such, it is exposed to other singularities in this 'field' ofphiral spacing 'prior 
to' any substantive identification. Insofar as identity is 'inscribed' it is always 
already 'ex-scribed' in this exposure. 
In a complex thinking of bodies as creating or becoming or 'worlding' 
(disclosing a shared 'world') without prior 'foundation', Nancy understands tile 
way in which bodies relate to each other or are related 'internally' in respect of 
their 'component' parts in terms of 'Parts outside parts'; that is to say fragnicrits, 
but not fragments of a 'whole'. This is one of the ways in which Nancy 
articulates the key idea of relation as contact, which is at the sanic linic distance 
and separation. Being together but apart, contact and distance without 
509 Ibid., 6 1. 
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foundation is key to Nancy's re-thinking of art, technology, ethics, politics, and 
community. 
The structure of 'parts outside parts' describes the way in which 
material bodies exist in a relation of exteriority to each other, never 
occupying the same place, and is thus able to articulate themselves as 
bodies and come into relation or contact with other bodies. In this sense, 
for Nancy, matter or materiality is always an outside or an impenetrable 
element, since we know that objects are touched, seen, sensed and given 
sense only from the outside and from this relation of exteriority, of 
objects touching each other in a mutual distance or separation. 510 
This connects with another aspect of Nancy's materialism, figured through his 
thinking of the body via techne. Along with Heidegger, Derrida and Stiegler, 
Nancy wants to think originary technicity as the means by which material bodies 
are disclosed in the contact-separation of matter and sense. But his is a 
profoundly different thought and a departure from Heidegger. It is not a matter 
of objects ready-to-hand in a meaningful context that ultimately returns to a 
subject that confers upon them instrumentality orpurpose. For Nancy, in what I 
suggest is radicalisation of Benjamin, "it is the body of sense itself, the body as 
the spacing and sharing of sense, which emerges as the site, or locus of 
interconnection of tools or apparatus and it is this interconnection which is the 
,, 
511 happening of the body and the spacing, sharing of sense. It is important to 
retain a grasp of this on the basis of contact/separation as also developed through 
Nancy's thinking of ecotechnics. 
Similar to Benjamin, but for a new era, for Nancy is it decidedlynot tcchnicity in 
itseýCthat serves an ideology of technical ends or goals. Ecotechnics can be 
thought as a modality of 'being' without 'ends' and without foundation. 
For Nancy, by the very fact that it is 'nonsystematisable' and premised upon 
contact/separation rather than presumptions of unity and indeed global 
unification, technology can be understood as multiple, local, continually 
5 10 Ibid., 143. 
511 Ibid., 145. 
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'bifurcating', splitting off in differences and in excess of ideological 'ends'. 
Ecotechnics can invoke the event and passage of the world of sense in all its 
coming and going and passages of interconnectivity, contact/separation. 
It is from this basis that we need to understand the importance for Nancy of 
'touch'. Touch is the modality of sense that 'embodies' the thinking of contact 
and separation/distance. Touching is the movement from exteriority, from the 
outside that involves both contact and separation/distance at the same. time. In 
order for contact to take place there has to be exteriority and distance. It is 
modality that 'presents' the limit of embodiment where embodiment 'undoes', 
exposed to exteriority. Importantly for Nancy, touch is the 'gateway' to the sense 
of the senses, insofar as the senses are singular plural and touch one another in 
proximate distance. 
Touch is nothing other than the touch of sense altogether and of all the 
senses. It is their sensuality as such 
... 
touch presents the proper moment 
of sensible exteriority, it presents it as such and as sensible 
... 
Touch is 
the interval and the heterogeneity of touch. Touch is proximate distance. 
It makes one sense that makes one sense (what it is to sense): the 
proximity of the distant, the approximate of the intimate. 512 
How does this impact on thinking of and reading artworks? For Nancy, artworks 
take all we have said up to now about sense, the 'worlding... of sense, the body 
as singular/plural contact/separation, technics and the modality of touch to a 
presentation and patency, by delineating, by presenting (not representing) the 
sense of sense, the presentation of sense. Artworks present presentation and 
thereby present the 'there ness' of a fragment of world, world as fragment. This 
is not the same as Heidegger's notion of a poetics of world-disclosure. For 
Nancy, in their admixture of technicity and sense, artworks undo 'poetics' or 
phenomenological sense and instead present "an exposure to an irreducible 
exteriority or being of sense 'outside of itself '... the-contact-in-scparation, touch, 
and exscription of sense. Z13 
512 Nancy, J-L., The Muses. Op. cit., 17. 513 James, I., op. cit., 222. 
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Nancy has 'pressed' this account right at the 'ground' of the image. Related to 
but differing from Derrida's thinking of the trace and latterly theforce of image, 
Nancy accounts for the working of the work in contact/separation of the tracing 
of the 'line' (this applies to any medium; inasmuch as there is spacing there is 
tracing) which has the double function of 'figuring' but at the same time 
separating and differentiating and importantly 'holding at a distance, 'stopping' 
at the threshold. The 'force' of the line is exactly this contact/separation, "it is 
because the line of the image (its tracing, its form) is itself 
.. 
its intimate force; 
because the image does not 'represent' this intimate force, but it is that force, it 
activates it, it draws and withdraws it, it extracts just as it withholds it, and it is 
with that force that it touches US.,, 514 This intensification of touch via the 
technicity of the image suggests the image is ontologically distinct. What matters 
here is that the image is a force not a thing and, inasmuch as it opens up and 
creates a world in its fragment, it at the same time withdraws from/exceeds 
signification, so we might say, somewhat elliptically, it touches both the visible 
and the 'invisible', which is another way of indicating the singular/plurality of 
sense which the world is, without mystique. I am aware that this is evocative of 
Merleau-Ponty, but I think with Merleau-Ponty it is the contact and not the 
separation that wins over, whereas for Nancy the separation is key but cannot 
'be' without the contact. 
What Nancy presents is a move beyond and different to those ways of 
approaching the 'image-like' and fragmentary nature of our world as it is, which 
have predominated to date. Both Derrida and Nancy are aware of the dilemma in 
terms of 'grounding' this world, either by continuing to present this world in the 
Marxian sense of historical materialist grounding or by the paradoxical 
acceptance of fragmentation in the desire for grounding. It *seems to me that 
Derrida does move from a memory of politics to a very distinctive politics of 
memory in which the aesthetic plays a part in re-marking the spat i o-tcrnporal 
difference and 'hauntology' that shapes his thought of the political. Nancy takes 
the fragmentary there-ness of the 'world' and re-cognises that within it which 
works creatively to open us to a new sense of world and 'being-in-the-world', 
514 Nancy, J-L., The Ground of the Image. Trans Fort, J., (New York: Fordharn University Press, 
2005).. 5. 
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that opens us to the 'along' and 'between', the contact/ separation (at the limit, 
exposed) of abundant singularities and their co-existence. The aesthetic can do 
this in accordance with its specific relation to signification, technicity and sense. 
I do not think these thoughts from Derrida or Nancy amount to aestheticism, the 
privileging of the aesthetic over the political or the aestheticisation of politics, 
insofar as both the aesthetic and the political have been re-thought in relation. 
They do present for me the possibility that the moment of critical theory, 
criticism and the emancipatory project for art history is not necessarily 'a thing 
of the past'. 
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Conclusion 
The journey that this thesis has taken has followed a path of theoretical 
interventions in respect of the reading of art and particular turns in that reading. I 
have considered the impact of the Marxist social history of art on the discipline 
of art history, first in terrns of a certain historical conjuncture in relation to a 
reading of Manet's Olympia and then how my chosen advocate for such reading, 
the art historian T. J. Clark sustained and developed his overall position through 
later texts. Then, following a particular trajectory in terms of aesthetics, politics, 
memory and representation, I considered a cinematic 'text', Hiroshima Mon 
Amour. I explored this across its visual arrangement, considering the script and 
synopsis that shaped the cinematic presentation in accordance with the literary- 
philosophical position of its script-writer Marguerite Duras. I examined the film 
in relation to the 'philosophical turn' in interpretation, characteristic of 
influences in film studies and art history and theory in the nineties in respect of 
Gilles Deleuze. I allied Duras's writing to the thought of Maurice Blanchot and 
reflected upon Blanchot's influence on considerations of memory, the other and 
community. 
I then returned to an underlying problematic in terms of aesthetics and politics 
'figured' in the relationship between art and technology. Here I revisited an 
cantinomy' between art and the technological, as thought first by. Heidegger and 
then Benjamin. This difference between thepotential for technological 
reproducibility and the 'saving power' of art from technological reduction still 
plays itself out today in the institutions of 'art history' and 'visual culture'. 
I have referred to the institutions of art history and art criticism in respect of a 
certain 'anxiety' in the institutions with regard to the contemporary. This anxiety 
concerns the usefulness of the theoretical paradigms that have become 
established as the modem tradition for these disciplines, with regard to tile 
articulation of the relationship between the aesthetic and the political in tcrms of 
contemporary art. In a text which I have taken to be representative of the 
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disciplines, Art Since 1900515 contemporary art is understood in relation to the 
contemporary world which is characterised by the further integration of spectacle 
across all aspects of cultural life. This involves the proliferation of technology 
across the realms of information and entertainment, the fragmentation of 
previously thought identities via globalisation and the incorporation of the 
aesthetic into various forms of leisure bringing about a general lack of 
differentiation between modalities of the aesthetic. 
Such anxiety has emerged, as I suggest, through a 'memory of politics'. There is 
an acknowledgement, yet regret, that theoretical models, premised upon a 
different and former set of orders of meaning and boundaries to cultural 
formations, cannot sufficiently serve as critical resources to bring to bear upon 
this change in cultural circumstances. Thus the disciplinary anxiety prevails. I 
have further elaborated upon the thought of Derrida and Nancy as a means by 
which to respond to this anxiety for the future of theory within these disciplines. 
Each of the chapters in the thesis is marked by the intervention of these two 
primary interlocutors. The chapters are episodic inasmuch as they interrogate 
each question in hand and pursue it through the interventions of Derrida and 
Nancy. 
Underpinning the thesis is the concern to rethink the relationship between the 
aesthetic and the political as part of an ethico-political and ultimately 
emancipatory project. This is to enable both the aesthetic and the political to 
remain open to their future possibilities and the unanticipated 'other' without 
being foreclosed upon on the basis of totalising concepts and the return of tile 
'other' to the 'same'. 
I have employed a 'motif' throughout the thesis to capture the distinction 
between foreclosure and openness, suggesting that the difference lies between a 
5 15 Foster, Hal et al (eds). Art Since 1900: Modernism, Anti-Atodernism, Postino(lernisni. London: 
Thames and Hudson, 2004. 
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'memory of politics', premised upon a metaphysics of presence and ultimately a 
continuum of past, present, future and a 'politics of memory', as I borrow the 
term from Derrida. The 'politics of memory' is characterised by anachronism, 
the 'time-out-of-joint' and the promissory structure of the messianiC. 5 16 This 
rethinking of history and memory has been formulated by way of the thought of 
Derrida and somewhat differently by Nancy. Both have provided the means by 
which to question and re-treat the 'models' of the historical, the political and the 
political subject that have shaped the approaches to the reading of art with which 
the thesis has engaged. 
Derrida insists that the self/other relation or any presence, including that of the 
work of art, has inscribed within it the trace of absence. This is the absent other, 
from the immemorial past or the future of mourning to come, unpredictable and 
incalculable to which we must respond or give hospitality towards in our 
517 18 
thought. As is evident from Memoirs ofthe Blind or the Restitutions essay, 
for example, which I have refer-red to in this thesis, Derrida will approach art 
from the point of view of that absent other inscribed in the work and 'remarked' 
in its structure. The absent other cannot be restituted to a subject of or for the 
work, but neither can it be foreclosed upon in terms of its force. 
Derrida reads art in respectfor that 'absolute' anterior memory of the other, 
inscribed in the absence/presence of the trace, but whose loss cannot be 
redeemed. The memory of the absent other both calls for inscription in the trace, 
Yet exceeds any such 'witnessing', and is always to come. In this way the 
historical position and meaning of art and its trace of the other cannot be 
finalised as 'past', 'over' or at an end. This is part of an ethico-political 
516 For Derrida here 'the messianic' is in lower case and not a proper reference to the Messiah. 
As previously indicated in the thesis, Derrida's interest is in the structure of the messianic, 
discussed in terms of 'democracy-to-come', offering the promise of the future and the entirely 
unpredicatable, unanticipated coming of the other, without its religious content. I refer to this 
af. ain in this conclusion. See Derrida, J., Specters ofMarx op. cit 65 57 Derrida, Jacques. Memoirs of the Blind: the Self-Portrait and Other Ruins. Translated by 
Brault, P., & Naas, M., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
518 Derrida, J., 'Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]', in The Truth in Painting (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 257-382 
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commitment running throughout Derrida's work and the different topics to 
which he responds. 
Nancy offers a different asymmetry of 'spacing' whereby the historical, the 
political and the political subject are thought as articulations of singularities. 
These singularities, which Nancy also refers to as 'worlds of sense' are always in 
a position of exposure to other singularities in a singular/plural world of 'being' 
as existence, without 'end' or foundation or unity of sense. This is Nancy's 
response to the contemporary world as it exists and articulates his resistance to 
the return to essences, foundations or particular figures of transcendence to 
explain and give sense to this world. Thus, rather than being thought as a 
foundation, the political is understood in terms of the tying and untying of 
relations and the spacing of incommensurable 'fragments', one of which is art. 
Art is a fragment as it is not bound to substantialisations, idealities, 
representation or presumed orders of signification determining meaning. Nancy 
eschews any mythicising in relation to art, the subordination of art to ideals of 
tessence' or unified identity or the reading of art in terms ofpresumed other 
identities like 'religion', 'community', particular socio-cultural groupings such 
as nation, class, race or gender or other substantiating concepts seeking to 
complete art's presence in representation. Nancy considers all 'identities' and 
worlds of sense including that of art to be singular and thus incommensurable 
with each other, whilst plural in that they necessarily co-exist and touch each 
other. Art is not autonomous but neither are these other worlds of sense. They 
too are without essence. Art is as part of the world of different singularities 
which touch and are exposed to each other without any one dissolving into 
another. This is the world where what is in common is difference and 
'fragmentary' identities. 
Nancy approaches art as the presentation of existence and difference bringing 
forth singular 'worlds of sense' in this plurality of different 'worlds' exposed to 
each other. Such presentation interrupts the normaliscd thinking of rcalms of 
sense, conceptual organisations, and hierarchies of meaning or exclusive 
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identities., which might aim to subordinate art to another world of sense, as 
suggested above. 
Art is read in terms of the emancipation from and displacement of its sense from 
unities and essences and in that way it is understood as presenting the 
articulation of difference and the fragmentary mode of being-in common that is 
existence. At the level of the reading of images, this keeps in question and 
invites exploration of the border or threshold between an image's points of 
reference; in simplified terms, this is the threshold between content (idea) and 
form (technique), because neither of these can be assumed to be entirely closed 
in their point of reference, nor can one be considered as subordinate to the other. 
The thesis has dealt with readings of art which each in their own way broach the 
question of history, memory and the political and challenge the assumptions of 
the epistemologies that may pertain to these, in order that the question remain a 
question for the sake ofjustice to the past and that very opening to the future. 
T. J. Clark offers a Marxist position which recognises the dynamic of the 
historical situation and the demand placed upon the artist in terms of the socio- 
cultural resources at his or her disposal. Clark understands this changing 
dynamic in relation to the further incursions of capital into everyday life, 
characterised as spectacle and thus into the cultural forms that infonn the artist. 
From the Marxist political commitment of his position, this calls for an art 
history on the basis of a re-invigoration of the concepts of class and ideology and 
their relation to 'social practice' and indeed the importance for him of 
recognising a 'memory of politics', as I have characterised it. 
Invigorating a model of the relationship between the aesthetic and tile political 
that sustains class, ideology and 'subjects of history' as part of a social totality is 
critical for Clark. That this is ultimately under the aegis of a represcritational 
aesthetic and substantiated 'truth' of the political and the social is critical to his 
position vis-A-vis the debates within Screen over modernism, signification and 
identity, social practice and ideology. I have articulated the significancc of his 
theoretical stance and its trans formational influence upon the disciplinc of art 
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history, whilst problematising the presumed concepts and model of history 
which his thinking of the relationship between the aesthetic and the political 
subtends. 
The readings of the film Hiroshima MonAmour including that of Duras, through 
her synopsis and screenplay, recognise the challenge the film presents to more 
conventional understandings of and the epistemological basis for the relationship 
between history, memory, the aesthetic and the political in respect of the 
'documenting' of the atrocity of mass death in 'memorial' cinema. I have shown 
that these readings draw upon a range of resources for critical theory including 
Duras's affiliation with the writings of Blanchot, in order to articulate this 
cinematic challenge and complicate and displace memory in terms of any 
straightforward 'giveness' of memory. The readings problematise such giveness 
in respect of the relation of the self and other in terms of loss and memory, 
received notions of mourning as working through, assimilating the 'other' and 
overcoming; or conventional presentations of 'remembering' and the modes by 
which they inscribe the ethical imperative not to forget. 
However, I suggest that these readings of the film variously reach their limits in 
two ways; one way is by ultimately 'retreating' to a model premised upon an 
inter-subjective understanding of traumatic loss and its overcoming, even as this 
transcends self-hood for the sake of East and West; the other, by way of Duras, 
is by substantiating the 'impossibility of memory' as nevertheless thepossession 
of a subject, and thus dependent upon a subjectivity, even as this may be 'given 
over' as 'survival' to the 'other'. 
The thought of Heidegger and Benjamin has been presented here within the 
context of their positions regarding art and technology and through this, the 
impact of their thought on aesthetics and politics. The ramifications of their 
thought extend beyond any such circumscribed debate. Heidegger's thought of 
art as 'originating', provides a critique of representational aesthetics. Art as the 
site of the rift between world and earth challenges both representation and the 
'enframing' of technology. Heidegger thinks this on the basis ofa model of 
history and memory that recognises the linkage and 'strife' between inlicritancc 
278 
and the opening of future possibilities. However, this model remains 
underpinned by the significance of 'the authentic' in terms of the 'unveiling of 
truth' and the event of disclosure in art and how this is related to Heideggcr's 
thinking of the historical subject, ultimately gathered into the 'people' in terms 
of the political. Art's saving power renders it ultimately redemptive in the strife 
between past and future possibilities. Thus Heidegger presents a substantiated 
9 end' and 'teleology' for art and politics. 
Benjamin forges a concept of history and memory against the 'catastrophe' of 
history as continuous progress. History conceived as continuous progress denies 
the force of the inheritance of that which is lost to history and that which is to 
come. For Benjamin, insofar as experience is 'inauthentic' in accordance with 
his Messianism519, it is not open to the gathering of memory or redemption of the 
past in historical time. It requires a distinct understanding of experience as 
marked by the vicissitudes of historical and perceptual change. It is possible to 
break the chain of history thought as progress, recollection or redemption and 
dreinscribe' history's lost moments in accordance with the changing realm of 
technology. 
Benjamin thinks through the alteration of both the spacing of time and modes of 
subjective experience brought about by technological reproducibility in 
photography and cinema. On this basis he recasts the historical moment in 
'photographic' ten-ns as the constellation of past and present, which seizes on tile 
past at the moment of its disappearance. This seizure interrupts the dialectic of 
the historical continuum. Whilst for Benjamin this interruption opens up tile 
possibility of a justice for the past and a hope for the future, this is fleeting and 
dispersed and thereby requires vigilance. This is vigilance towards the 'now' as 
present 'otherwise' with the glimpse or flash of the other, when synchroniscd 
with the index of the past's injustices. 
519 The Messiah is the pronlised deliverer of the fulfilment of historical time and in that sense 
authentic time is only possible with the fulfilment of history (its end) with tile advent of tile 
Messiah. 
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The distinction between Benjamin's and Derrida's position is indicated by tlicir 
use of the Messianic (capitalised) or the messianic (without capitalisation). For 
Benjamin, the significance of the Messianic lies in its reference to the Messiah's 
advent from 'outside' of time and history. As previously stated, on the basis of 
Messianic time, the historical tradition and its passing are inauthentic and 
thereby are to be thought in terms of the seizure of time and the interrupted 
dialectic without redemption; history will only be redeemed at its end. Benjamin 
is an important source for Derrida's particular thinking of the political, insofar as 
the Messianic invokes a promissory structure and the crossing of time by the 
immemorial past and an open future that cannot be anticipated or redeemed, in 
the name ofjustice. However, Derrida conceives of the messianic (without 
capitalisation), apart from its particular religious content, as folded into historical 
time and thus invoking the structural injunction of the 'time out ofjoint' and the 
unanticipated 'coming of the other' in history yet without end, to which we have 
an ethico-political responsibility. 
I have sought to show how the readings addressed in this thesis meet their own 
limits when they ultimately subtend the metaphysics of presence. This may be 
realised in a substantive presence or ultimate end or even the negation of 
substantive presence in favour of its direct opposite as substantive absence or 
impossibility. 
Derrida and Nancy demonstrate these limits and offer conceptual bases for 
'reading otherwise'. On this account I have reflected upon the position of theory 
in relation to the aesthetics and politics informing art history and art criticism in 
the contemporary world and have sought to articulate a particular stance towards 
a politics of memory as an ethico-political project in respect of tlicse disciplincs. 
Der-rida and Nancy have offered similar but significantly different positions with 
regard to the themes and formation of this ethico-political project. As I havc 
suggested, Derrida is concerned with what I might terrn an extreme crossing of 
time and space, a spatio-temporal disjunction that inscribes and affirms an 
alterity 'spectrally' on the principle of responsibility for the 'inimcniorial' past 
and an open, undecidable and incalculable future and hospitality to thc 'otlicr' 
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always to come or return. Nancy's affirmation of responsibility invokes a 
different spatial and temporal relation which displaces the present and its 
substantiation, by way of the opening of and exposure to the singular plural of 
being-in-common and an ethico-political affirmation of the sharing of voices or 
4 worlds' of experience within a mode of contact/separation in this respect. 
In each case they offer for art history and art criticism ways in which to rethink 
their conceptual terms, tradition and their past as a 'response' for the future-to- 
come. 
Insofar as art history or art criticism may draw upon or seek a 'politics' grounded 
in presumed subjects of that politics or other essentialising or totalising concepts, 
I suggest this invokes a past-present, prior ground or presumed future ground 
and thus I refer to this as a 'memory of politics'. 
Throughout this thesis, 'reading art otherwise' suggests a displacement of such a 
ground and memory in favour of an ethical injunction to interrupt, cross time or 
affinn spacing and exposure to the other without this ground or (past or future) 
presence, as the force of a 'politics of memory'. 
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